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,/e whose origin is in liberal theology
could not have become or remained theologians
if we had not encountered in liberal theology
a serious and radical honesty; we felt the
work of orthodox theology at the Universities,
of whatever complexion, to be an attempt at
compromise, within which we could only have
sustained an existence which was inwardly
fragmented.... Here - so we felt - was the
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Abstract of the Thesis.
She thesis seeks to examine Karl Earth's theo¬
logical method against the backdrop of the historical
context in which it developed, that is, the political-
social-econonic context, and the philosophical-theolog¬
ical context.
After outlining this context, and tracing
Earth's theological development up to 1930 in Part I,
the thesis turns its attention to Earth's study of
Anselra'e theological method, the Fides -uaerens Intell¬
ectual of 1931. here, prior to the commencement of
his Church Dogmatics, both Earth himself, and his major
interpreters (after I960), concur that Earth "found
himself" methodologically. Thus Part II of the thesis
seeks to examine both (1) the accuracy of Earth's
interpretation of Arise 1m and (2) the nature of the
theological method Earth attributes to Anselra, The
thesis maintains that Earth "found himself" methodolog¬
ically only by seriously misinterpreting Ansel® at a
quite basic level.
Part III of the thesis seeks to examine several
basal aspects of the actual method of Earth's theology.
As 'the Credo', or the credal tradition and dogmas of
the Early Church, was of central importance to the
method Earth attributed to Ansel® (in contrast to
cripture), Part III asks questions as to the place,
importance and type of relation to Tradition, specific-
x
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ally the credal Tradition of the Early Church, in
Barth's theology# This aspect of Earth's laethod has
been all but ignored by the major interpreters of Barth,
Among our findings are that (1) credal beliefs form a
significant portion of the basis upon which this theo¬
logy is built; (2) the type of relation to credal
Tradition is characterized by unquestioning submission
to, and dogmatic assertion of these credal beliefs.
In addition, there is significant evidence that Barth
operates on the assumption that credal Tradition is
an infallible articulation of revelation, and an
infallible form of "the Word of God."
Part III goes on to examine issues of method
concerning the relationships between man, ti:oology and
revelation. Here the thesis finds that unquestioning
submission to Tradition is accompanied by unquestioning
submission to what is alleged to be revelation, that
is, to what is experienced as "the Word of God" in
an "EVent" in which human words (allegedly) become
"the Word of God" by the action of the deity (the
human words of Boripture, etc.).
Evidence is also found that Barth operates
upon the assumption that Dogmatics itself, like
Scripture, preaching (and creeds) is, at least at
points, a human form of "the Word of God," It is
from this vantage point that Barth's conception of
Apologetics is viewed. It is a conception in which
the deity allegedly 'validates' the theologians own
xi
words as "the Word of God" for "unbelievers".
After laying out and examining these several
.
basal aspects of Garth's method, the thesis seeks to
put t is ethod into historical perspective, viewing
it firstly with reference to the development of another
influential figure, the composer, Igor Stravinsky;
and secondly, by seeking possible reasons for the
develop e it of Garth*s method by turning to consider
t :o extremely troubled economic, social and political
■
context In W'.ic.i this ...ethod developed.
The thesis concludes by summarizing the results
of research, and by listing eight reasons for holding
that Earth's theological programme should not be
t a en seriously as a real option for theology. In a
- -
coacludii critique Earth's theology is found to nave
only minimal relevance for preaching, that is specif¬
ically for Earth's own preaching. Thus Earth theo¬
logy apparently has only minimal relevance for its
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IJTtiODUCTIOK,
Our quest in our thesis is for historical
perspective upon the nature and development of a
theological method which has had considerable impact
on twentieth century religious thought, both positively
and negatively. Here in the next few pages we shall
try to describe, in brief form, the task which we are
undertaking.
Our quest is for a deeper understanding of a.
method. Thus the content of the writer's thought
will concern us only insofar as it can help us under¬
stand the method. This does not mean we shall ignore
the content, or pass over it lightly. For this
thinker was of the opinion that "content" should
determine "method". hven if we shall not always
find this to be the case, nonetheless, we shall have
to deal with content, at many points, in dealing with
method.
It is concerning the issue of method that we
have found weaknesses in the major studies of Darth*s
Theology. Ior, at this point in the history of the
1
2
interpretation of Barth (1970-75)» there is a general
consensus among interpreters that Earth's study of
Anselmj tildes , uaerens Intel tectum , is of crucial
1
importance for understanding Earth's actual method.
Yet this work has lain in neglect (with only a few
exceptions) until about 1958-1960. Thus we find that,
almost without exception, each of the major studies
of Barth'3 Theology has almost completely ignored
this important study (being written in this period
c194.5-1950 when the work on Anselni was neglected).
It is this work, Earth's study of Anselm, which has
suggested many of the methodological issues we have
investigated in our thesis.
A second weakness we have found in the major
studies of Barth is the sparcity of attention paid to
certain aspects of Earth's working method. That is,
while these works may accurately report on Earth's
■otnodoloyy (that is on what Barth says about theolog¬
ical method), we have usually found these studies
inadequate in their attempts to describe Earth's
actual method in operation. Thus, for example, we
have found these studies of little or no help in
investigating the major theme of our thesis; the place
of Tradition in Earth's actual operational procedure.
One finds reports of Earth's views on Tradition, but
one does not find the Interpreter's view of the import-
2
ance of Tradition in Earth's actual procedure,
1. Bee below, pp.257ff.
2. Bee below, PP.279ff.
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It has been, In fact, Barth's methodological
study of Ahselin, the work ignored by these major inter¬
preters, wiich aas suggested the central importance of
tradition for Barth's operational procedure. To our
knowledge, no major study of Barth has taken up this
theme and investigated it. In our study we shall be
arguing that !radition, specifically the credai tradit¬
ion of the aarly Church, has a significant and import¬
ant place in Barth's operational procedure, a place
and i ortance close or equal to that of jcripture.
As we have already stated, we see our task as
both historical and critical. In our procedure we
shall not separate these two aspects of our task, for
example by placing the critical task at the end of our
thesis. Rather we shall offer critical comment
directly following our exposition of aspects of Barth's
work. Thus v/e shall distinguish but not separate
exposition and critique.1 Additionally, at the
conclusion of our thesis we shall offer a limited
critique of Barth's theological program; e as a whole.
as our quest is both historical and critical,
one might object, and say: "It is too early to eval¬
uate such an influential figure. we must leave this
to later generations." We would reply both "yes"
1. We are following Haaer's precedent in this respect,
one that we find useful. Of. Earner, p.vi.
and "no". In one respect this might "be quite true.
That is, it is most likely much too early to try and
evaluate north's "lace in the development of Twentieth
Century religious/theological thought, that is, to
evaluate both his stature, and his influence upon
contemporary and subsequent thought.
lot there is another respect in which, in our
view, historical and critical perspective is both
possible and much needed. If one leaves aside the
questions of Earth's stature and influence, that is,
his importance for Twentieth Century religious thought,
we would argue that it is both possible and necessary
to gain historical perspective on, and deeper under¬
standing of the nature of this theology, and in
particular the actual method it uses as it proceeds.
Tor if man is determined by his oast, he is also deter¬
mined by the recent past. That is, unless unexamined
assumptions and presuppositions made in the recent past
can be uncovered and critically examined, there is the
risk that they will simply be carried over into the
prose..t in their unexamined state, affecting activity
in the present for good or for ill. One would argue,
therefore, that there is a real need for historical
perspective and critical examination concerning the
thought of the recent past. One would also argue
tiiat this task is pressing and cannot wait for the end
of time. While one might be in a better position to
do such work several decades from now, as more document
5
emerge, yet there would seem to be both a plethora of
documents, and enough distance in time to enable us to
gain some perspective upon this body of thought and
upon its method.
6
she procedure of the Thesis.
In Part I we shall look briefly at the context
in which Barth's theology developed. we shall look
at both the ideational context and the political-
econoaic-social context. We shall also sketch Barth's
development up to 1930, the date of his methodological
study of anselm, our study of which makes up Part II.
In this sketch we shall also attempt to relate the
development of Barth's theology to the theology of the
previous century.
In Part II we shall turn to a small book which
Barth wrote in 1931. It concerns St. Anselra of
Canterbury, his theological method, and his jroslogion,
where his theological method, in Barth's view, was put
into practice. we have turned our attention to this
work in particular, for both Barth (in 1958)* and his
major interpreters (after I960) concur that in this
study, Barth found much of what was to inform his
actual theological method in the Church Dogmatics,
which commenced just after this book on Anselm was
written. Our questions in this part of our thesis
will be*. (1) Is this interpretation accurate? and (2),
Since Barth finds much of methodolofieal value here,
what is the nature of this method, which Barth
attributes to Anselm?
In Part III we shall turn to Barth's mature
theologizing, specifically to the period 1930-194-2,
(that is approximately the first half of Barth's
7
mature productivity). With the method of Berth's
Angela in mind we shall inquire into several aspects
of the actual procedure of this theology* That is
we shall inquire as to what his actual method is, in
several of its basic aspects. We shall not concent¬
rate on Berth's views of his method, as given in the
"Prolegomena" to his Church Dogmatics (C.D.I/1, 1/2),
for we find these views a poor guide to the understand¬
ing of his actual method* he shall however sketch
his views of his method, and also note what, in our
opinion, is missing, or inadequately dealt with.
We shall not attempt to give a complete account
of Barth's actual working method, as in our view this
is beyond the scope of a single thesis. Rather we
shall take up and examine several basic aspects of this
method, which in our view underpin Berth's whole dog¬
matic enterprise. We shall only mention other basic
aspects, and describe them in brief.
We shall examine the manner in which the
theologian relates to Tradition, and the manner in
which he uses Tradition, specifically ISarly Churca
Tradition, in this theology. The other aspects of
method we shall consider all centre around the manner
in which the theologian relates to what is alleged to
be "the Word of God" in this theology. Here we shall
treat (1) Barth's avoidance of contemporary anthropology
and philosophy, (2) his own view of Apologetics, and
(3) the nature of Dogmatics as a form of the "Wor.d of
8
God" *
We shall bring together our views of these
aspects of Barth's method at the conclusion and offer
a critique which will argue against taking this
theological program seriously as a real option for
theology* As this theology claims to serve "Church
Proclamation", the chief form of which is preaching,
we shall also ask whether and to what extent this
theology was relevant for preaching, and specifically
for Barth's own preaching#
I art One»
'xu-. .lisioaiQiVL JoiaiKT ajd p.b'v. iLOPn '.irr
.. .-^lL 3:u^;;'2 THEOLOGY. 1886 - 1950.
9
Plpm Afif
X J L. V,j, vAUJi
The Historical Context and Development
of Karl Barth's Theology. 1866 - 1920.
Introduction to Tart One,
In Part One we shall first sketch the political
social and economic setting in which Barth's Theology
developed. We shall begin here for we are of the
opinion that certain aspects' of Barth's method can
be more fully understood when seen in reference to
this context. .e shall then describe "the philosoph¬
ical landscape" of Germany in t \e years 1890-1930,
Here we shall find philosophical options which Barth
shall finally reject after 1930 in spite of the fact
that one of these options, the I - Thou personalism
of Martin Buber bears a strong resemblance to Barth's
own views as they develop after 1930. following
our survey of the philosophical setting we shall
trace Barth's theological development from his Uni¬
versity years up until 1930, the time of his compos¬
ition of his study on Anselm's theological method.
•We shall then turn to this study in Part Two.
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Chapter I,
I. , i'OLllTOiih— ,sa)I.JLj- .CwIaa.IC
o.m ii.irjii'o ii^hu,. ../j.
In t .e following pages we shall s ..etch three
events in the political-social-economic context of
Berth's theological development. In attempting to
understand the development of Berth's actual working
method, we shall at the end of our thesis, hold that
■
this method can be more fully understood by under¬
standing the context in which it developed. As
Earth's working method or "operational procedure"
received a rather definite formulation as early as
1951* and became for all intents and purposes
"operational" as early as 1952 (with the publication
of Barth's Church dogmatics. Volume 1/1) we shall
look at the political-social-econoraic context lead¬
ing up to these years. The period which will con¬
cern us is roughly from 1900 - 1932# This means
that we shall leave aside consideration of the
"triumph" of hazism. For both the popular surge
toward kazism and its "triumph" occiirred after north's
operational procedure received formulation, and became
more or less operational. /e shall therefore look
at events leading up to 1952 in attempting to under¬
stand this method more fully, hear the end of our
thesis, after we nave explored several basic aspects
of this theological method, we shall attempt to corr¬
elate these two, the method and the context in which
11
it developed. Here in Part One we shall sketch these
events in brief form. following this we shall
explore one of these events, the Inflation of 1919-1923,
in some detail, inquiring into its impact upon people
generally, and upon Barth in particular. e have
chosen to investigate this event in particular for (1)
it was the first of the three events which Barth
experienced directly and (2) we have access to Barth's
reaction to t is event, in the form of letters written
in tnis eriod.
The question may arise as to the relevance of
eve to in the political-social-economic sphere in the
task of understanding developments in the ideational
or "intellectual" sphere of activity. We shall seek
to answer this question, at several points, as we proceed.
The . or.
One need hardly argue in our own time that the
Great ar had a deep impact upon Burope, and upon
Germanic Airope in particular, Besides the obvious
.
physical destruction of this war, the magnitude of
the loss of life, the impact of this war was felt in
perhaps less obvious ways, For example, severe food
shortages within the heart of Germany during 1916-1918
caused an estimated 750,000 deaths alone.
One ay ask in this connection: was Barth
relatively unaffected by the Great War? One might
1. Holborn, a respected historian quotes this as a
reliable statistic. If, Ha^o kolborn, A history
of . odern Germany, 1840-194-5» iyre and. Gpottiswoode,
London, l96v, pyi-oO•
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note that even if his physical existence v/as not
threatened, (he resided In Switzerland during this
period) there is no evidence that this war was not
significant, even in his theological development.
In the 1950's Barth looks back upon the outbreak of
the war, and upon his reaction to finding the signat¬
ures of his most important theological teachers on a
document supporting the German Kaiser's declaration
of war.
One day in early August 191'+ stands out in
my personal memory as a black day. hinety
three German intellectuals Impressed public
opinion by their proclamation in support of
the war policy of d11helm II and his
counsellors. Among these intellectuals I
discovered to my horror almost all of ny
theological teachers whom I had greatly
venerated,1 In despair over what this
indicated about the signs of the time,
I suddenly realized that I could not any
longer follow either their ethics and
dogmatics or their understanding of the
Bible and of history, Lor rae at least,
nineteenth Century theology no longer
held any future.^
One might point out that (according to his
own account) Barth has reacted, and reacted sharply
to the political decisions of these figures, that is
to their decision about something, technically speak¬
ing, in the political sphere, that is, their decision
in reference to a declaration of war, let this
political decision had, for Barth, rather deep theolog-
1, The signatories Included Adolf iiarnack, keinhold
Seeberg, and iilhelm Herrmann among other
theologians,
2. The Humanity of God, p.l+-» Collins, London, 19G1.
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ical significance. ^hat one wishes to point out here
is the extent to which a political occurrence had an
impact upon Barth not only personally, but theologic¬
ally.
lias Barth overstated the impact of this
political occurrence upon his thought in the theolog¬
ical realm (he reports his reaction here nearly forty
years 'after the event'). In our view, he has not,
for two years after the above mentioned event, in 1916,
will
-ic/ehuM climb to the pulpit of the Town Church of
Aarav, Gwitzerland and in a theological address declare
that the 'god' of the Western world is finished:
He is not even righteous, lie can ot prevent
his worshipers, all the distinguished uropean
and a-erican apostles of civilisation,
welfare, and progress, all zealous citizens
and pious Christians, from fallin upon one
another with fire and sword to the amazement
and derision of the poor heathen in India
and Africa. This god is really an unrighteous
god, and it is high time for us to declare
ourselves thorough-going doubters, sceptics,
scoffers and atheists in regard to him. It
is high time for us to confess freely and
gladly: this god, to whom we have built the
tower of Babel, is not God. He is an idol.
He is dead.1
•
Here Barth. is most emphatic about the significance
of this political event for theological realm.
Apparently, then, the war had considerable impact not
(pu V
only upon Barth as a person,/upon his theological
1. "The Righteousness of God" in The Cord of God and
the Word of than, Harper and Row, 'Jew '£orl:, 1^^/,
p.22. Cited by Parker, pp.9f«
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thinking as well. We shall explore this further
below.^
berth's sensitivity to events lolitical, social and
jcononic.
If we find sensitivityj even acute sensitivity
to events political, social and economic in nature,
perhaps this is not too unusual. i'or Barth, a
Continental pastor at this time (1912-1921) has not
only associated himself with, but become an active
figure in a movement of Religious Socialism. Barth
was to remain active in Swiss Religious Socialism
well into the 1920"s/~ even if he ceased to be
active in this movement after c.1923 it is doubtful
that he ever lost his sensitivity to political,
economic and social issues, or that events in these
spheres ceased to have considerable impact upon him.
Je shall find evidence of continuing sensitivity to
such is ues as we proceed. One would note also,
in this con.;ection te-ut(in Earth*0 reaction to the
-"-f i, outbreak of the Great War, and the
German involvement in this) how events of a political
nature have an impact upon theology via ethics. (In
both passages we have .just cited "rightneso" and
"righteousness" are central). Thus perhaps >art •s
ethical sensitivity is a factor in helping ho under-
1. Gee below, pp.45ff.
2. Gee below, p.5lf,
15
stand the Impact of such events upon Barth not only
personally, hut (in the case of the Great War)
theologically. It is, in fact, to a work of vtaics
(the . kb-hik of Wilhefi^ Herrmann, 1915) that Barth
1
attributes his first deep interest in theology.
Two Economic Catastrophes; I'he Inflation of 1919-1923.
and tne Jepresslon of 1929-1933*
.Following upon the war, Germany experienced
two economic catastrophes in the period 1918-1933*
In 1919 an inflationary spiral began which was to
spin out of control until the end of 1923^when the
German economy was to find a new monetary basis.
(We shall study this occurrence in some detail follow¬
ing our sketch of the period 1900-1933)•
Following a period of economic recovery and
relative prosperity from approximately 1924-1928,
trouble again occurred in the German economy. ven
prior to the Wall Street crash, that is, early in
1929 unemployment had risen to crisis proportions;
both agriculture and industry in Germany were in deep
trouble again. When the Wall Street crash came,
and New York financial sup. ort, upon which German
industry to a large extent depended, was withdrawn,
Germany was plunged into a Jepression of its own,
one which was to bring its economy near to total
1. Gee Theology and Church, p.238*
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paralysis for over four years. It was in this
context that the "triumph" of Nazism occurred, with
the Nazi Party taking power in 1933•
Now that we have sketched in brief form three
events in the period 1912-1933 which shook Germanic
Jurope, and shook it deeply, we shall take up one of
these events, the Inflation of 1919-1923 and study
it in greater detail together with Berth's reaction
to it. We choose this event in particular for (1)
it was the first of these events which Barth exper¬
ienced at first hand: he had become a i rofessor of
ideology in Gettingen, G-er lany in this period; and
(2) we have access to Barth's reaction to this occur¬
rence, in the form of his letters to his friend and
comrade Gduard ihurneysen, and thus we can e&in some
idea of the nature of his reaction to one of these
events.
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The Inflation of 1919-1923
We turn now to the Inflation of 1919-1923. Here we
shall go into some depth. What concerns us in the
following is not simply bare figures spread out over
certain timespan, but the impact of this occurrence on
the great multitude of people, where it mattered. That
is, what happened to their savings, their even meagre
investments, but even more basically, to their ability to
provide themselves with the most basic food, clothing and
housing necessary to live. Tied up with all of this, the
feelings aroused by a volatile and rapidly changing
situation. In short it is the human aspect of this
broad economic situation which is our concern.
In such a situation one tends to become acutely aware
of how "tied into" the "economic fabric" of his immediate
setting he is, and how dependent he is upon the viability
and relative dependability of this economic fabric. For
he becomes aware that such very basic human needs as food
and housing, and of course the means of income, job or
otherwise, to get these things, depend on this fabric.
In less •trying* times one tends simply to assume these
things.1
1. Perhaps one tends to be more aware of these things
in our own time because of economic stress throughout
the Western countries.
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Our Procedure in the Study which Foliovs
We will first try to describe the rapidly changing
situation. Then we will try to sense the consequences,
for people in general, of this occurrence. Finally we
shall ♦listen* to Earth's reaction to these things as he
writes from the midst of them to fellow thinkers in
Switzerland.
The Period of Inflation 1919-1923
Inflation had begun in Germany during the war.1 The
cause is generally accepted to be the manner in which the
German government financed the war. While the Mark was
stable before the war at a rate of 4.2 Marks to 01 it
emerged from the war with a drop in value to about 20
Marks to 0 1.
In describing what happened to the Mark between 1919
and 1923 we shall refer to its exchange rate with the
Dollar. Yet in doing so we are also describing what
happened to the Mark within Germany, that is its purchasing
power within the Germany economy. In the case of Germany
in this period, these two coincide (that is, both the loss
of value on the international exchange markets, and within
1. For the following v/e are using: R.A.C. Parker, Europe
1919-45. Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 1969; Ha,jo
Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: 1640-1945. Eyre
and Spottiswoode, London 1969 j_A major and respected
work]; A.J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler.
Macmillan, London, 1958. Other works as cited. In
footnotes we shall refer to the foregoing by author.
2. See R.A.C. Parker, Qp.cit., pp. 63,64.
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the domestic economy). Today, typically, they do not.
There was a general assumption that after the war the
Mark would stabilize at this low value, and nothing need
be done. How wrong this assumption was we shall shortly
see.
In the year after the treaty of Versailles was signed
the Mark declined steadily and rather sharply to February
of 1920, when it took 100 Marks to equal #1. Thus from
1914 to 1920 the Mark had lost ground so to have only 1/25
of its value in 1914.
The political context from September 1918 to 1920,
that is from when the German High Command called for an
end to the war, and parliamentary government, to the
establishment of the Weimar Republic in late 1919. the
political arena within Germany, had been highly troubled.
As we shall see in the next decade both the extreme 1right*
of the political spectrum and the extreme *left* were
highly active, volatile, and, even if small in numbers at
this point, forceful in an unstable situation. For
example, Bavaria was proclaimed a Soviet Republic in
April 1919, to remain so for a full month before being
suppressed by the German Army. There were numerous
political murders.
From the beginning of 1920 to the middle of 1921 the
Mark had a period of relative stability, that is, after
losing over 90% of its value in the previous six years.
It recovered slightly, and fluctuated at between 40 and
70 Marks to £L. Yet beginning in mid 1921, the Mark began
an unrequited decline. While a worker needed 60 Marks to
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buy goods worth #1 in June of 1921, in August he needed
84 Harks to buy the same goods. In September he needed
100 Marks. In October 150 Harks. In November 260.
Something was happening, which must have seemed inexorable.
The worker could not find reasons. There were numerous
strikes as workers tried to win back what they were losing.
In 1922 the decline became an increasingly rapid drop.
While the same worker needed 210 Marks in February to
purchase the same goods worth about #1, by June he needed
315 Marks. Then the decline increased dramatically.
One needed 500 Marks in July. But then suddenly, in August
he needed 1,000. In October he needed 3,000 Marks.
By the end of the year he needed 7,379 Marks to buy the
same #1 worth of goods.
What had happened? Explanations were offered from
various quarters. The most popular explanation, supported
firmly by the government, and an explanation which was
basically wrong, was that the overwhelming burden of
Reparation Payments demanded by the Allies following the war
was wrecking havoc in Germany*s economy.1 This explanation
was widely accepted, and bore with it the bitterness of the
German people toward the Allies.
Finally the German government declared in default on
1. There is a general consensus among historians (Parker,
Holborn, Nichols and others) that while there was some
limited truth in the governmental explanation, other
factors far outweighed the causes the government chose
to cite. They point out that the inflationary spiral
began and became an established phenomenon well before
any Reparation payments were actually made.
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Reparation Payments, Just at this point, in January of
1923. The response of France and Belgium, to the
abhorrence of Britain and America, was to invade the
industrial Ruhr Valley by force, occupy it and attempt
to exact Reparation Payments from the occupied territory.
They were met with passive resistance.
One wonders what the German government was doing at
this point to counteract her economic situation. A group
of foreign economists were summoned in late 1922, including
John Haynard Keynes of Britain, and Gustav Cassel of
Sweden. They urged stabilization of the Mark using
Germany's Gold Reserves, limiting the notes in circulation,
and balancing the governments budget. The Mark in Germany
was not backed by gold, and could be stabilized by so backing
iI in the opinion of the assembled economists. Germany
had sufficient gold to do so.
The German government ignored this advice, perhaps as
too radical, and instead took one half of their very con¬
siderable gold reserves to purchase Marks on the inter¬
national money market, in the hope that this would halve
the headlong decline of the exchange rate. Holborn
comments: "It was quixotic to expect that these inter¬
ventions could result in anything but the mere loss of
gold."1
It was at this point, the beginning of 1923 when the
Mark had plummeted to 7,300 equalling $1 that the real
QP»ci.t.. p. 596.
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plunge began. With Germany running short of factories
capable of printing more notes, the Mark plunged toward
nothingness for a full ten months. Postage stamp^ of
5,000 Marks were quickly overprinted with a 'value' of
2 million Marks (specimen below).1 Notes were likewise
overprinted, perhaps to save the value of the paper they
were printed on!
Earth wrote to his friends that his University salary
has been set at 6 million Marks in May of 1923, remarking
wryly that together with his house he was now a multi-
2
millionaire. But in just four months his whole salary
will be worth approximately 4 $ and would be just enough
to purchase a cup of coffee. So while the specimen note
(shown below)"* would equal a University salary in May, it
would barely buy a cup of coffee in September.
From September of 1923 to November of 1923 the Mark
dropped from an astonishing 120,000,000 Marks equal to #1,
to a hard to believe 4,200,000,000,000 (4.2 Million Million,
or 4.2 Trillion). What one finds remarkable here is not
simply the quantities involved, but more important, the
rapidity and the magnitude of the change.
The effects of the Inflation
A few large fortunes were amassed, mostly among
industrialists, for one could borrow large sums, and pay
them back very cheaply in inflated marks. "Inflation
1. Please see next page.
2. Letter of May 18th, 1923, R.T.M.. p.140.
3. Please see next page.
Five Million Mark Note issued 1st August 1923.
Five Thousand Mark Stamp overprinted as a
Two Million Mark Stamp.
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profiteering" was a game played by many German Industrial¬
ists.1 Some large industrial conglomerates resulted.
All debtors and mortgage holders could easily pay off
their debts. Conversely creditors suffered.
Yet for the vast masses of people there was hardship
and suffering. The Middle classes and the Working classes
were both very hard hit. In the Middle classes, all
savings lost their value, together with insurance policies,
bonds, and war bonds in particular which were widespread.
(The German government had financed much of the war on
war bonds.) Perhaps more important for day to day life,
there was no longer any income from these sources on which
to live.
Ironically, one of the few institutions in which funds
retained their value, the German Stock Market, was so dis¬
trusted by the Middle classes in this period that few had
invested in it.
If the wages and the salaries of both the Working
classes and the Middle classes had kept up with the pace
of inflation, perhaps the whole picture would have been
2 3
far different. Both Holbom and Simon point out that
this was not the case. There was only one exception to
this, on the whole, and that was greater and lesser state
officials.
1. W.M. Simon, Germany, A Brief History. Batsford, London,
1967, p. 294.
2. Op»cit.. p. 599.
3. Op.clt., p. 295.
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Holborn states:
...The great mass of people suffered severe hardships...
Most workers' families were unable to afford the pur¬
chase of adequate food and clothing. Mortality and
sickness increased at an alarming rate, particularly
among children of the poor.l
Arthur Rosenberg, present in Germany during this period
2
confirms this view in his History of the German Republic.
At the height of inflation a well trained and skilled
worker would have to work a whole v/eek for wages to buy a
hundredweight of potatoes, several days for a pound of
butter; six weeks for an ordinary pair of boots; a suit
of clothes: twenty weeks. His figures on health bear
out Holborn's statement.
So we have seen material loss and suffering. But in
and with this we must see many broken dreams, strangled
aspirations and deep frustrations. The process has cut
across the whole social structure called Germany as a
knife across flesh.
Gustav Stresemann, the Chancellor who finally led
Germany out of this debacle, made the following statement
four years later, on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize
(1927):
The historian still to a great extent regards the
catastrophe of the War for Germany as being mainly
the loss of territory....He often overlooks the most
serious loss in which Germany has been involved.
And this, as I see it, is that the intellectual and
productive middle class, which was traditionally the
backbone of this country, has been paid for the
utter sacrifice of itself to the State during the
1. Holborn, op.cit., p. 599.
2. Methven, London, 1936, pp. 184, 185
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War by being deprived of all its property and by
being proletarianized. How far reasons of State
could justify the demand of such a sacrifice of a
whole generation - a sacrifice that consisted in
the total devaluation of money issued by the State,
which was not replaced - is a question upon which
the minds, and perhaps also the practice of the -
Legislature have hitherto been vainly exercised,
Stresemann*s statement, however inaccurate about
causality, does seem to us to highlight the seriousness
of what had happened.
The historian Holborn makes perhaps the most pertinent
comment and one suggestive for consideration of that
other economic earthquake of this period the Depression
of 1929 in Germany:
The inflation of the German currency was a nightmarish
experience to most Germans, and the panic caused by it
was likely to recur whenever the economy entered
critical days.2
Barth and the Inflation of 1919-1923
Let us turn bow to Earth* s reaction, as observer and
participant, in this situation.
Barth entered Germany in October of 1921 when he
accepted an Honorary Professorship in GOttingen in the
Northern Lowlands of Germany, leaving behind the relative
peace and stability of the small Swiss village of Safenwil.
Was he insensitive to this developing situation?
Could he remain aloof emotionally as well as practically?
Practically, he could not. We have no evidence that he
had any substantial *means' outside the German economy now.
1. Quoted in Rosenberg, Qp.cit.. pp. 183, 184.
2. Qp.cit.. p. 600.
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A possible exception was income from his Romans, but
after the initial printing of the first edition in
Switzerland, In 1919, the book was taken over by Christian
Kaiser of Munich in 1920, who subsequently published the
completely revised Second edition in 1922. They also
published most of his other writings of this period.
We can get a glimpse of his reaction at several points
in his 'circular letters' to comrades in the Zwischen den
Zeiten group. It is interesting how he goes about
describing the landscape on a trip in the North and how
the economic situation gets woven into his description.
The time is October of 1922. The Mark is now losing
ground with increasing rapidity.
So to Bochum. Countless factory chimneys and fantastic
machines, the air full of coal dust, the kingdom of
Stinnes and Thyssen. Naumann would have composed some
appropriate "devotions": 'Jesus at the Blast Oven' and
others like it. That kind of thing, however, is now
perhaps finally past. The [fall in the value of the
Mark] in these recent days gave to everything-, the
remarkable appearance of a world in decline.
It is interesting to note Earth's own awareness of how
2
the economic situation is affecting his outlook here.
1. Letter of October 26th 1922, In R.T.M.. p.115.
2. The Mark which had been declining steadily since the
orevious uturan had in these last three months taken
three drastic falls. In the previous September it
took 105 Marks to equal #1. This increased steadily
to 269 Marks the previous May but then the amount of
increase changed dramatically, to 315 Marks =» #1 in
June, 500 in July, then suddenly 1,000 in August,
1,400 in September and finally 3,000 in October. Yet,
serious as this was the year ahead would be far worse.
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If we move ahead six months, from October of 1922 to
May of 1923, the situation has intensified in such a way
that cannot easily be grasped by the onlooker. (Here
in the quote we repeat some of what we remarked about
in the foregoing, but we repeat it to grasp Earth's
reaction)
...A hundred Marks has become a small coin which the
up to date beggars (actually!) refuse as being worth
nothing!••.My income at present amounts to six
millions and if things continue like this I can as
house owner bring this up automatically to the level
of a multi-millionaire....Oh what a fraud! Every¬
thing else moves ahead, the printing of banknotes,
the sliding scale of wages, and in correspondence
with this, life itself...at least for those who some¬
how manage to have a remunerative post....But it is
quite impossible for anything else to happen than
that countless-jpeople should silently be ground under
the wheels...•
As Barth accurately senses here, in the extremity of
the situation, he is suffering less than the vast majority
of people. For as Holborn points out, wages and
salaries simply did not keep pace with the inflation of
prices. Those who did better in this respect were people
who held higher positions in State-paid employment. As
a Professor in a German University, Barth would have been
one of these. Yet still the loss of real income compared
with pre-war levels was not small. In general such
'fortunate' people might have received one-third of the
p
real income he would have received in 1914.
Barth, in this same passage, reflects the feeling of
mysteriousness, of suspicion and frustration in seeking
1. Letter to Thurneysen, May 18th 1923, R.T.M. pp. 140, 141.
2. Hajo Holborn, Op.cit., p. 599.
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explanations for what was happening.
...And if only one knew more exactly...where in the
nistory France really stands in regard to the right
and wrong of it....But where is really the root of
the evil, where the intrigue...what needed to be
different? ^Ke talk of F.W. Foerster and his
people seems to me altogether too superficial and
too incendiary to be convincing.
Barth concludes:
In short one feels his way entirely in the dark.1
That Barth is not unaffected by all this is clear by
the way he continues:
...In the meantime everything moves on in its course.
That is the remarkable thing. One stands amazed
and shocked, one feels that he is completely in the
dark and ye-z lives on nevertheless in his corner,
itself relatively transparent,' and humanly speaking
he draws his life out of this corner.2
The inflation spiral is to rage on for another seven
months at an ever increasing rate of change. Four months
later, Barth remarks (as we have noted before) that a cup
of coffee is by now four million marks "tomorrow likely
six", that is, the same as his whole university salary
"5
four months before.
Three months later, things became so severe that Barth
must reassure those of his comrades in Switzerland that
1. R.T.M.. p. 141.
2. Ibid. [First emphasis added, second emphasis original.]
3. Letter to Thurneysen, September 24th 1923, R.T.M.. p. 149.
He also confirms that the value of these Marks 'in gold
(that is, for foreign exchange, including the dollar) is
the same as for goods. Thus the Mark's loss against the
dollar is an accurate indication of the Marks loss of
purchasing power in Germany.
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alongside these "apocalyptic events" there is "certainly
always much that is harmless, much *happiness in a
corner*." We are quite sure that he uses *apocalyptic*
figuratively. Yet his last word,re-echoing his
reflections in his May letter eight months earlier, is
wonderment about *human survival', even his own * survival'.
"One notices above all in oneself how indestructibly
?
one goes on living [in the midst of all this]"
This last remark, taken in its context seems highly
personal. That is, it is not a general reflection, but
something about himself: "One notices above all in oneself
...[how one goes on living]". This is the wonder. The
context in which Barth makes this remark is also of
interest. He seeks to reassure those of his friends in
Switzerland that life is more liveable than "the Swiss
newspaper reader thinks as he takes in all the alarming
reports". There are smaller things in ones daily life
which compensate for these things which are "really sad
and gruesome".^
The common presupposition between Barth and his
5
comrades is that these events are indeed *apocalyptic*,
1. We are quite sure Barth does not use 'apocalyptic* in a
theological sense, but rather, in a descriptive-poetic
sense, which is quite in keeping with his practice in
his letters.




5. Again, we are quite sure he speaks figuratively.
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that is, so serious that Barth will reassure them that he
can bear up under the stress ("how indestructibly one
goes on living") and find compensations.
We find Earth's reaction to his situation far
different from, say, one who takes the attitude internally,
to himself, as well as outwardly, to others, that "this is
nothing to do with me. I just get on with my work and
ignore these things": We do not find Barth isolating
himself from his situation. What we find is a sensitivity
to the situation and an emotional involvement, perhaps
deeper than would first appear. For both times he goes
into this subject in some depth in his letters in 1923.
that is, both in May and (eight months later) in December,
there stands the same theme: "one stands amazed and
shocked,•..yet lives on nevertheless..." (May)• And
(in December) "[yet] one goes on living in the midst of all
these apocalyptic events". These events, then, are not
experienced as minor and insignificant, but as major events,
even on an 'apocalyptic' scale.
We can only conclude then that Barth did feel the effect
1
of these events, and felt them quite deeply.
1. One might ask then: Why didn't Barth say more in his
letters in this period? He does go into some depth
in at least two of his eight letters May to December
1923. He says some in a third, and there are passing
references in the others. But one must note (1) these
are not personal letters, communicating about 'how things
are' in general. They are 'circular letters' meant to
further communication on theological matters among a
group of like-minded men. Thus the majority of space
is devoted to these concerns. And (2) he is writing
primarily to comrades in Switzerland who as Barth
remarks seem more fully and accurately informed of his
own political-economic situation through the respected
Swiss press than he is.
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Chapter II.
TiiE PHILOSOPHICAL LANDSCAPE OF GERMANIC EUROPE: 1890-1950
In surveying the scene of philosophical Germany in the
early part of the 20th century our purpose will be two fold:
(1) Firstly to sense the ideational setting of Barth's
theological development; the ethos of his times;
(2) Secondly, to set out the options which were open to
him as a theologian, which he, and perhaps to a greater
extent, other theologians would take up in the period 1915-
1930 and beyond. (3) A third purpose could be listed also:
To know more fully the full range of options in philosophy
which Barth was to leave behind when he chose to 'opt out*
of this context in 1930-31. In a section following this
we will seek out figures who were influential for Barth.
Here, in this section, we have another task, that is, to
survey the general philosophical scene of Germanic Europe,
in order to sense the whole context, and the whole range
of options Barth was to reject after 1930.
In this brief sketch we can only sense the general
currents and cross-currents of thought. We can only skim
the surface.1
We might best begin with Husserl, and the setting
in which he found himself in the 1890's. The Germanic
setting at this point consisted mainly of two broad areas,
1. In the following we are using: I.M. Bochenski,
Contemporary European Philosophy, trs. Donald Nicholl
and Karl Aschenbrenner, California, Berkely, 1956;
Walter Laqueur, Weimar. A Cultural History. 1918-33,
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1974; Peter Gay,
Weimar Culture, Seeker and Warburg, London, 1968.
Others as cited.
32
one}of Idealism}the other; of various forms of "Materialism".
Both had their zenith earlier in the century, Idealism in
the grand systematizations of Hegel and others, and
Materialism, in various forms, in the work of Marx,
Feuerbach, and at a slight distance from these, in the
evolutionists following Darwin. What both of these areas
of development had in common was the construction of
extensive, comprehensive systems, in a manner in which the
phenomena of existence would be 'reduced1 (using this word
loosely) either toward the realm of the Ideal on the one
hand, or the material on the other. Both intended to
interpret the whole of the phenomena of existence compre¬
hensively.
As subsidiary currents, running against these one
could mention Kierkegaard, and his attack upon Hegelian
Idealism, which we shall consider below in more detail,
and Nietzsche and others in whom instinct and vital inner
forces were given prominence over against the purely
rational in Hegel.
We mention Husserl first, for in his development of
Phenomenology, a new approach to perception and experience,
one finds the first significant signs of a break with the
Nineteenth Century systems and methods. One also finds
here the most germane thinker for the development of the
German Existentialism which found expression in Martin
Heidegger and Karl Jaspers.
One may note at the outset here with Walter Laqueur
that "in philosophy, as in most other fields, the main issues
1
that agitated minds during the 1920's antedated the war".
1. Weimar. A Cultural History. 1918-33. Weidenfield and
Nicholson, London, 1974.
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Husserl's Lectures on "Die Idee der Ph&nomenologie"
(The Concept of Phenomenology) were given in 1907 in
GOttingen. His "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft"
was published in 1911. While Husserl conceived his
discipline as a strict and exact science, it is this
element that those he influenced so heavily left behind.
Those who followed, in what might loosely be grouped as
*German Existentialism1, Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers
as the primary examples, were to repudiate quite strongly
any notion of philosophy as a 'science*.
In Heidegger we find 'the human condition' the real
and main concern of philosophy, that is, man in his life —
world, or Lebenswelt. As Laqueur observes, here the
barriers between poetry, philosophy and theology were
broken down. Here there is a central concern common to
all three. It is not surprising then to find 'the poetic'
as a vehicle for expression in Heidegger.
Heidegger's writing, especially his Freiburg Lectures,
published in 1927 as Sein und Zelt had an immediate appeal
to a broad range of Germans in the years immediately
following. Peter Gay in his study Weimar Culture describes
this phenomenon. We shall quote him at length, for here
one can sense not only the philosopher, but his unusual
impact on Ms readers.
"...One of Heidegger's most perceptive critics, Paul
Htihnerfeld, has said: 'These books, whose meaning was
barely decipherable when they appealed, were devoured.
And the young German soldiers in the Second World War
who died somewhere in Russia and Africa with the
writings of Hblderlin and Heidegger in their knapsacks
can never be counted'•
Gay continues the theme:
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The key terms of Heidegger's philosophy were, after
all, anything but remote: more than one critic has
noted that words like "Angst", "care", "nothingness",
"existence", "decision", and (perhaps most weighty)
"death" were terms that the Expressionist poets and
playwright had made thoroughly familiar. "What
Heidegger did was to give philosophical seriousness...
to (the concerns) that dominated so many Germans in
this hard time. Thus Heidegger aroused in his
readers obscure feelings of assent, of rightness;
the technical meaning Heidegger gave his terms,
and the abstract questions he was asking, disappeared
before the resonances they awakened." 1
We are of the opinion that some of the same dynamics
were at work when Barth was read, that is, in the words of
one commentator 'carried as loaves of bread' across the
border from Switzerland into Nazi Germany. Here too one
finds terms and concepts with a depth of emotional import
not irrelevant to the situation into which they were spoken.
(Cf. below, Part III,
Heidegger's relevance to Germanic Theology is most
obvious in Bultmann. His influence in theology widened
after the Second World War.
Karl Jaspers stands out as another major figure in
German Existentialism. A psychiatrist who became a
philosopher in the late 1920's he stands out in contrast
to Heidegger with his emphasis on interpersonal reality,
and his consideration of theological questions.
Beyond these two major figures there are a host of
others in the diversity of thought usually associated with
2
the term 'Existentialism' in Germany.
1. 9 PP • 31, 32.
2. The term was coined in 1929 well after its beginnings
by one Fritz Heinemann, an outsider to the group.
Cf. Laqueur, p. 205.
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Barth was aware of Heidegger's work, even in his
early theological period. Both Heidegger and Bultniann,
the latter in close cooperation with Barth in this period,
were at the University of Marburg. Thurneysen, Barth's
closest friend, for example, relates to Barth in detail
the reaction to his lengthy presentation of their
theological 'program' at a special seminar in Marburg in
1924, in which Heidegger's response, basically positive,
was noted with interest.1
Neo-Kantlani sni
In contrast to the 'Existentialists', and in another
'area' of the philosophical landscape of Gerraany, we find
the Neo-Kantians. Springing from a revival of interest
in Kant in the last 30 years of the 19th century, the
movement was active well into the 1930's.
The major figures of this movement are Hermann Cohen,
Paul Natorp and Franz Rosenzweig. While their main
emphasis was 'Critical Idealism' their contribution to this
period transcended this. What was the character of this
Neo-Kantianism, and that of the Marburg School in particular?
It was a re-thinking of Kant in which emphasis was placed
on logical analysis of knowing and willing. Knowledge of
the world of objects was synthetic, that is a construction
of the mind operating upon sense data. In the construction
which resulted, one had no knowledge of, or access to the
essence of something, only knowledge of phenomena, that is,
1. Letter of 21st February, 1924, in R.T.M., pp. 169-170.
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things as they appeared to the beholder. The creative
nature of knowledge was emphasized; that is, synthesis,
the creating of a whole in one's mind out of several parts.
Also emphasized is the inaccessibility of real concrete
reality, or better, the essence or content of real things.
The 'data' of sense perception, standing, as it were, in
the middle ground between knower and a would-be known, were
a -problem for the mind, not 'givens' to be simply accepted
as they were and then built upon. Thus intuition, for
example, was an impossibility (i.e. direct unmediated
insight.)
Thus the re-processing and re-affirradng of Kant in
all of this gave a strong critical cast to their thought.
James Collins points out that their thought should not be
seen as simply imitating Kant, but "as a distinctive plane
of modern philosophical argumentation".1
But there was also a constructive impetus. Let us
turn to the Marburg School. It was perhaps the most
influential of the schools,founded by Hermann Cohen (1842-
1918), and included Paul Natorp who wrote an influential
work on Plato: Platons Ideenlehre (1903). Here we find
'panlogism*, or 'Logical Idealism'. One commentator sees
2
this as "an extremely radical type of idealism". What he
means is that in constructing a view of reality, members of
the Marburg school would first construct a web or network
of logical laws, thought to be immanent in pure reason.
This web would then act as a filter, which would filter out
1. James Collins, Interpreting Modern Philosophy, Princeton,
Princeton, 1972, p. 171.
2. Bochenski, op.clt.. p. 93»
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any irrational elements in experience. These would be
rejected as unreal. Only those data which could be
logically Integrated with other sense data would be
accepted in the search for truth. In the end, reality
was reduced to a set of logical relations. Thus the
term 'panlogism', or Logical Idealism. What is worthy of
note here is how the irrational is rejected, almost scorned.1
This rejection of the irrational was not typical of
all Neo-Kantianism. The other main school, the Baden-Baden
School had more respect for the irrational.
We would infer from this that it was the critical
impetus of the Marburg School which Barth took up, not
their constructive efforts.
Barth knew of both Cohen and Natorp in his University
years, and even attended Cohen's lectures during his period
of study in Marburg. That they both made a deep
impression on him can be gathered from a comment he makes
in 1925, while yet in his early years, theologically:
"There has been and there will perhaps be again a philoso¬
phical fervour which is almost priestly, as was impressed
on us at Marburg in Hermann's time by the figures of a
2
Cohen and a Natorp".
1. One wonders why such Neo-Kantians, with their emphasis on
reality being 'created' in the mind,cut off the intellect
from the rest of the human personality, and did not study
how 'reality' in practice might continually be 'created'
by non-logical processes, (accurately or inaccurately).
The non-logical connections actually made by people in
real life are given no consideration here. It is hard to
see how such a process of thought so limited in scope
could become so strong and live on.
2. "The Principles of Dogmatics according to Wilhelm
Hermann" (1925) in Theology and Church, p. 256.
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Heo-Hegelianlsm
A revival of interest in Hegel culminating in a Neo-
Hegelian reaction to Existentialism came to a peak about
1930 with the establishment of a World Hegel Association
and International Congresses in 1931 and 1933.1 This
movement, however, did not carry as much weight within
Germany as the Neo-Kantian movement.
The Vienna Circle
Against each of these developments was heard a voice
from Vienna, in 19291 which in essence said: "You are all
wrong. You need your language examined". In this year
the 'Vienna Circle', a loosely knit group of thinkers
issued their 'First Manifesto'. Its central point was
that the problems of their German colleagues were a product
2
of semantic confusion. Although 'positivistic' in
thrust, the many-faceted Wittgenstein emerged from this
same framework. From the Circle came Rudolf CamOp,
Morltz Schlick and Hans Reichenbach.
There is no evidence that Earth took any real notice
of this 'school'. It had, in fact, more influence inter-
nationally than within Germanic Europe.
1. Laqueur, pp. 206, 207.
2. I.M. BocheiSski, Contemporary European Philosophy, tr.
from the German by Ronald Iiicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner,
California, Berkely, 1956, 52ff.
3. Ibid.
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Fialofflcal Anthropology
The last group of thinkers considered, here are
usually given only passing notice in accounts of
philosophy of this period,yet their names arise at
significant places in the pages of theological thinkers
in this period. This group could be fairly listed under
♦Existential Thought* if the term is used broadly enough,
but their theme is so distinctive that we have considered
them separately. We will devote somewhat more space to
consideration of this group, since we find an interesting
parallel with an aspect of Barth*s later thought here, while
at the same time Barth would completely dissociate himself
from their *movement*.
When Martin Buber was finishing the rough draft of
Ich und du in 1922, after a period of 'spiritual
ascesis' in which he put aside the reading of any
contemporary philosophy, he found to his surprise that
three other of his contemporaries were exploring and
writing about the same concerns.
These concerns centred around the manner and the
modes in which one can encounter and interact with that
which is 'other', 'other' not in the sense of different,
but as separate from oneself. Thus, and we can only state
it in crude form here, one may encounter that which is
other as 'it' in which case it will be to him as simply an
object. Yet there is another way in which we can encounter
that which is 'other', and that is as a 'you' ('Thou' is
the usual translation). Here one is in a quite different
kind of relation with this 'other'. It is the specific
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way of being with this 'other* and the way this 'being
with' is reciprocated by this other which characterize
this other made of encountering. Here the 'other' which
may have formerly been a mere object, an 'it' for one,
becomes present to him as 'subject', that is as a 'you'.
The one who encounters this 'other' as 'you' experiences
things from the standpoint of this 'you' as he takes his
stand in relation.
It is perhaps significant that Buber tries to express
his thinking in a poetic form of expression, for poetry,
like the relation Buber wants to speak about, involves
the whole of one's personhood. One can then sense in
Buber*s poetic writing the mode of encounter about which
he speaks. We have tried briefly to describe Buber*s most
characteristic concern: the difference between an I-It
relation and an I-Thou relation.
What Buber found in 19221 when he emerged from a
period of no reading was that three other figures had
concerned themselves with this same distinction, and had
published their writing: Hermann Cohen, a Neo-Kantian
2
Jewish thinker, at this point retired in Berlin, Franz
Rosenzweig, a Neo-Kantian thinker and disciple of Cohen,
x
also a Jewish thinker, and Ferdinand Ebner, a Catholic
4
Schoolteacher in Austria. Buber was soon to find others
1. For the following, cf. Buber*s "History of the Dialogical
Principle" in Between Han and Man, pp. 209-224.
2. Religion der Vernuft aus den Quellen des Judentums. 1919.
3. Per Stern der Erlbsung. 1921.
4. Das Wort und die gelstlgen Realltaten. 1921.
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on the track of the same concern including Eberhard
Grisebach.1 Later, Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers,
What we find of interest is how reference to the
writings of these figures turn up among those in the
movement of dialectical theology, especially in Gogarten's
writings. Thus for example Gogarten expresses appreciation
for Ebner's las Wort,,, (1921) in 1923,2 Grisebach's
Die Grenzen,,, (1924)^ and Grisebach's Problems der
wirklichen Bildung (1923) in 1928,^ It is not surprising
then to find the concern of Buber and his fellow thinkers
reflected in one of the central themes of Gogarten1s
Theology:
The problem of reality begins for man at the point
where he faces other men as his counterparts; all
decisions concerning his relationship with reality
are made ih the sphere of his relationship to his
fellowman.5
This would seem to re-echo Buber1s statement that all real
life is meeting.
This is the context, the immediate context and the
wider context,we find Barth 1 opting out of1 after 1930
(below, Part 2, passim). He will have nothing to do with
anthropology, or philosophy which stands independently
of (his concept of) 'the Word of God*. He denigrates
the procedure of using "independent" anthropology: the
product can only be "lemonade" (that is, weak and watered
£
down substance),
1. Die Grenzen des Brzichers und Seine Verantworten. 1924.
2. Cf. Beginnings of Dialectical Theology, p. 342, n. 3.
3. Cf. Bethge, Bonhoeffer. p. 59, n. 63.
4. Cf, Beginnings of Dialectical Theology, p. 379, n. 15.
5. Zahrnt, p. 58 (Zahmt's paraphrase).
6. Zahrnt, p. 58.
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Yet we find it somewhat ironic that nearly twenty
years later when Earth publishes his Doctrine of Creation
both he, in that place, and Buber agree that the anthropo¬
logy in Earth concerning relational reality, is almost
identical with Buber1s anthropology.1
1. Cf. Buber, on.cit.. pp. 222-224.
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Ohantor III,
KARL BARTH'S BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT UP TO 1950
Karl Barth was born in Basle, in 1886, into an old
established Basle family.1 His father, Fritz Barth, a
minister was appointed Lecturer in Theology in Bern three
years later, and remained there until his death in 1912,
becoming Professor of New Testament and Early Church
History. Here the young Barth grew up, and here, in such
a family "deep and lasting foundations were laid at home,
in church and at school, where his faith was nourished
2
in positive evangelical theology". His father, a
moderately conservative theologian, was not an inconse¬
quential figure in his setting. One of his books, Die
Hauptorobierne des Lebens Jesu was well received and went
through three editions between 1899 and 1907.
Considering the younger Barth's later development,
especially his relation to Church History and Tradition
after 1924, we do not think his family background to be of
minor significance. We would venture that his father,
and the character of his thought, was quite probably a key
factor in his later development, particularly when Barth
1. For the following we are using: Peter H. Monsma, Karl
Barth's Idea of Revelation. Somerset, Somerville (New
Jersey), 1937 |_we find Honsma's treatment of Barth's
background and development unusually fulsome and sensitive
to pertinent issues despite its early date. We find such
a treatment sorely needed and typically missing or quickly
passed over in the major works on Barth such as Balthasar,
and Berkower]; Also used: T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth:
An Introduction to His Early Theology. 1910-1931. S.C.M.,
London, 1962; T.H.L. Parker, Karl Barth,' Eerdmans, Grand
Rapids, 1970; Godsey's Introduction in Karl Barth, How I
Changed My Mind. Introduction and Epilogue by John D.
Godsey, John Knox, Richmond, 1966; Others as cited.
2. Torrance, op.cit.. p. 15.
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turned to Dogmatics after 1923.1
As a youth, Barth showed literary inventiveness,
for example in writing a play (performed several decades
later for his students* entertainment). His interest in
entering the ministry was early, well before his
University years.
He began his University training in 1904 under his
father in Berne. Then, while on the one hand, Barth
wished very much to study under the younger Ritschlian,
Wilhelm Herrmann in Marburg, his father, on the other
hand, perhaps wary of Herrmann's Kantian 'liberalism',
did not wish this. "Compromise": Barth went to Berlin,
for one semester (hearing Harnack), then to Tubingen (one
semester) and finally to Marburg where he sat under
Herrmann for three semesters. Here he also attended the
lectures of the Neo-Kantians Hermann Cohen and Paul
Natorp (cf. below p.49). Here he also met a fellow
Swiss who was to become his closest and most important
friend, Eduard Thurneysen of Basle.
But it was the influence of Herrmann which was most
central here. (cf. below, pp.SOff). Emerging from
University in 1909, Barth saw himself as one of the younger
2
Ritschlians.
After taking a clerical Job with a church publisher,
Barth finally entered the ministry in Geneva. A few years
laterj in 1911, he went to the parish church of bafenwii, a
1. We shall consider this possible factor below,pp#62ff •
2. Torrance, op.clt.. p. 16.
45
small rural Swiss village in the agricultural setting of
North Central Switzerland. It was here that his most
significant theological development was to begin.
We shall turn now to look at how outward events
were to force Barth to rethink his ^Liberalism', in particular
the Great War which broke out three years after his arrival
in Safenwil. What did the outbreak of the war mean for
Barth, and in particular the fact that his mentors, his
theological teachers, lined up behind the cause of German
nationalism and supported Germany's entry into the war*
Was not something brought out into sharp relief which
was sensed as immanent in the religious situation previously?
Namely that Christianity, and Protestant Liberalism in
particular, had in the last one hundred years become too
tied up with German nationalism. And was this not, for
Barth, part of a larger problem, namely that Christianity
had become too tied up with European civilization, and
civilization in general; so tied up that, for Barth,
there was the danger that Christianity would lose, or had
lost, any distinctiveness over against 'culture*.
If Thurneysen's reportage is correct, Barth and
himself had slowly begun to see this before the war,
that is in the period 1911-1914, and had begun to move
away from 'bourgeois' Protestantism quite firmly in this
brief pre-war period.^
Did not the war, and in particular the fulsome support
the established theologians gave to the cause of German
1. Cited in Monsma, op.cit., p. 49.
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nationalism bring this problem out into the open with
perhaps devastating impact? His well known account of
his own reaction to these things would support this.1
Barth proclaims from the pulpit of the Town Church of
Aarau in 1916, (that is, before his study on Romans was
to begin) with eloquence and fiery determination that the
god of the Western world is finished:
"He is not even righteous. He cannot prevent his
worshippers, all distinguished European and
American apostles of civilization, welfare and
progress, all zealous citizens and pious Christians,
from falling upon one another with "fire and sword
to the amazement and derision of the poor heathen
in India and Africa. This god is really an un¬
righteous god, and it is high time for us to become
thorough going doubters, sceptics, scoffers, and yes,
even atheists in regard to him. It is high time
for us to confess openly and gladly that this god..•
is not God. He is an idol. He is dead."2
Not only has Christianity become too tied up with
Germanic nationalism but the deity has become too tied up
with Germanic "civilization*.
Perhaps it is not just by chance that a Swiss "student*
of this situation is able to see this and articulate this
so clearly. As a Swiss he has lived on the fringe of
Germanic civilization, and experienced its nationalistic
thrust. As a Swiss he lias no inhibitions to overcome in
criticizing what would be, for Germans, the Fatherland.
Yet this phenomenon he views, large and significant
as it is, that is, Christianity tied to German nationalism
1. "...For me...[as of that day] nineteenth century theology
no longer held any future". In The Humanity of God,
cited by Parker, oo.cit., p. 16, ——————
2» In The Word of God and the Word of Man, p. 22, pointed
out in Parker, Karl Barth, Eerdmans. Grand Rapids,
1970, pp. 9,10.
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and German 'civilization*, is part of an even larger
problem, that is, the problem of how Protestant Christianity
has become so intertwined with Western culture in general,
Y/hile naturally, one need not agree with the radical nature
of Barth's solution, nor the radical means he employed in
pursuing his goal, and even if at times he overstates the
problem, in categories that are perhaps too black and white,
yet one senses a genuine insight here, one that was to
impel a formerly middle class youth into becoming a
revolutionary on the theological scene. That this issue
runs deep in Barth's impetus and outlook can be gauged by
the manner, and the radicalitv with which the same issue
arises a decade and a half later, even if the frame of
reference has shifted somewhat, that is from a more or
less political-cultural situation, to an ideational-
cultural situation. It is right in the heart of Barth's
methodological concerns, which we shall be pursuing in
the thesis, that he offers these words (1932):
... to the best of my ability I have cut out.•.
everything that...might give the slightest
appearance of giving theology a basis, support,
or even a mere justification in the way of
existential philosophy....Because in the former
undertaking I can only see a readoptlon of the
line Bchleiermacher-Ritschl-Herraann, and because
in any thinkable continuation of this line 1 can
only see the plain destruction of Protestant
theology and the Protestant Church.
Beneath this we see the same issue, the same concern in
slightly changed terms. In place of German nationalism
and Germanic culture, here is substituted Y/estern culture,
and more specifically philosophy. (That it is not
1. C.D. 1/1, pp. ix, x. (emphasis added).
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existentialism in particular that Earth fears here, can be
seen by his reference to Echleiermacher-Ritschl-Herrmann,
in whom existentialism is not present). What one senses
here also is the radical nature of the threat Earth sees:
"the plain destruction of...the Protestant Church". And
here, as well as in the period we are studying, Earth
seeks to take a radical solution: d^fetasis, a clear cut
breaking off of relations with that which'endangers*.
We have said that Earth seeks a radical solution in the
war period to the state of affairs where Christianity and
its God have become tied up with and intertwined with
'civilization', with Germanic culture, philosophical as
well as political. What will the means of this
revolutionary be?
He will seek out others who have questioned and 'cut
at' this situation.
We venture that Kierkegaard was for Earth in this
period somewhat of a sword which slashed into the web of
interconnections between the two parties. That is a
sword which, inserted into the situation cut them apart
creating not only distance between them but ci^stasis and
a vacuum. Between which two? Between Christianity and
'civilization*, but also, and primarily, between God and
'the world'. Kierkegaard's imagery will not only fuel
the fire, but sharpen the bite of the flames which will
sear this alliance. So we hear proclaimed an "infinite
qualitative difference" between Time and Eternity.
This and other imagery will be wielded as swords in
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cutting apart what had become knotted together during the
previous century.
There were certainly others Barth called upon
(1) to help him sharpen the vision in his own mind,
(2) to help him wage an attack upon the mainstream of
Protestant Thought during the previous hundred years.
Kant. Cohen and Natorp
There were many, and we cannot, in such limited space,
adequately try to describe what part they played. Kant
was there, the 'critical' Kant, in the work of Herrmann,
Cohen and Paul Natorp (whom we have looked at above in
surveying the Philosophical Landscape). Here again we
see the creation of a vacuum,created this time in the
area of knowledge. For the insistence of the Neo-Kantians
that one cannot know real being, that one cannot know the
essence or contents of objects, only appearance, means in
the hands of a theologian that there is a noetic vacuum
between man and the deity, a gulf} which man cannot cross
using reason. Thus Kant's affirmation of the limits of
'reason alone' becomes in the theologian's hands an
affirmation of the hiddenness and inaccessibility of the
deity. Thus a vacuum is created between man and God, a
vacuum which will, in Berth's view, be filled not from
man's side, but from God's, in his speaking his Word.
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Overbeck. Feuerbach. Iostoevsky
Other figures important to Earth in this period
included the secular Historian, Franz Overbeck, the
secular philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, the novelist
Feydor Postoevsky, and in the background, the liberal
theologian Wilhelm Herrmann, and Earth's father Professor
Fritz Earth.
Feuerbach's views on religion presented Earth with
a problem similar to the one presented by Kant. That is,
the problem of knowledge. For Feuerbach religion and
religion's God were man's creation. Man took the
"highest" in himself, that is, those attributes he
considered most worthy, then after isolating these out,
man absolutized them, making them into perfections (for
example, 'love' became 'perfect love') and assembled these
attributes into a conception: the deity. Thus the deity
was a projection of the highest of man's attributes. As
in Kant, it is man's creativity which is foremost here,
a creative synthesizing.
Yet, for Barth, Feuerbach has stated the problem to
be overcome. For Earth, man and his religion are here
enclosed within man's subjectivity. Between this circle
of subjectivity and God himself there remains a gulf which
in Barth's view has not been bridged. For Barth
nineteenth century 'liberalism' is a living example of the
process Feusrbach describes. And Earth uses Feuerbach
to 'hit out' at and dismiss 'liberalism'.
In the secular Historian, Franz Overbeck Barth finds
several things, perhaps chief among them is this non-church
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thinker's warning to German Protestantism that it is in
danger of being no more than a mere duplication of
German 'Culture'. Here Barth finds also a concept,
'Urgeschichte', roughly 'primal history', events
allegedly concrete and real, yet by definition outwith the
grasp of the historian as historian. Barth will find
this concept useful in describing 'events' which are
revealed, and are part of revelation, yet stand beyond
the historian's grasp.
In the writer Bostoevsky, Barth and his comrade
Eduard Thurneysen find themes and emphases which are
suggestive for their own work: the deity as a being who
is distinct from man and the world, Dostoevsky's conception
of divine forgiveness, his conception of the resurrection
of the dead, and his criticism of socialism, religion
and the church for being 'a law unto themselves* apart from
1
the deity.
The influence of Fritz Barth and Wilhelm Herrmann
were more marked for the period in which Barth turns to
dogma (below).
Ragaz. Kutter and the Blumhardts: Berth's Involvement in
Religious Socialism
At the same time Barth was dissociating himself from
the prevailing theology of his time, Protestant Liberalism,
he was also dissociating himself from the prevailing political
movements, thus creating a distance from both sides of the
1. Cf. Monsma, op.cit.. p. 205, n. 25.
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♦alliance' he was attacking. Thus his active involvement
in the movement of Religious Socialism was both politically
and theologically relevant for him. For in the Swiss
leaders of this movement,Hermann Kutter and Leonhard
Ragaz, he found a cutting criticism of both established
political forces and established ecclesiastical forces.
These two figures, together with the younger Blumhardt,
not only emphasized the need for political reform, but
saw this need in terms of the kingdom of God, This
Kingdom, in contrast to the 'Kingdom' of Protestant
'liberalism' was not of man's creating. This was God's
doing. Here there was a sharp distinction between man's
creating (machen) and God's doing (tun).
Barth was an active figure in this movement, not just
a passive member. For example, during Ms Safenwil
pastorate, he actively aided the women workers of the
nearby knitting mill in their struggle to assert themselves.
One may note also that these figures, Ragaz and Kutter
were Swiss, Barth found companionship here with these
socialists when other socialist groups were disappointing
to Barth in the way that they, like other political forces,
followed their several nationalistic leanings in the war.
Ragaz, Kutter and their followers had avoided this.
The Commentary on Romans
As Barth pursued Ms pastoral duties in the small
Swiss village of Safenwil, he became involved in a study
of Paul's Letter to the Romans wMch was to become a book
to shake the theological firmament of GermaMc Europe and
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change the course of Germanic Theology in the coming
decades. Over the three years 1916 to 1918 Earth
•plowed and reolowed the furrows1 of this text many times
(his own imagery), remarking at one point how to his
surprise, he found Paul so much richer than either Luther
or Calvin. Yet as he plowed and replowed, all the
influences we have described above came alive in and with
the text of Paul.
The basic and central theme of Earth's RSmerbrlef
is that God is Totally Otherj totally other than man or
the world. He is not the highest aspiration of civili¬
zation, nor in partnership with it. It is his 'infinite
qualitative difference' (Kierkegaard) from man and his
world which is stressed. Man cannot reach him either
through his reason or his religion (as such) (Kant and
Feuerbach). Across this gulf, a gulf separating Time
and Eternity, from the other side God speaks his Word.
It is essentially, in the Romans, a word of judgement,
upon man's efforts, his civilization and his religion.
Thus it would seem that using these influences to¬
gether with Paul, or Barth's interpretation of him, Barth
succeeded with varying degrees of success in driving a
wedge between Christianity and 'civilization', God and man
in his world, at least for significant numbers of his
contemporaries in Germany and Switzerland. Barth had
attacked 'established' theological positions, and by the
end of the next 4-5 years had won considerable ground.
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The dialectical* character of the theology of the Romans
In the Romans one finds a recurring characteristic,
one which must have struck his contemporaries as perhaps
strange and new. We refer to its dialectical character.
That is, one statement is made, or rather proclaimed.
And then another statement is made, or proclaimed, hut is
in apparent contradiction to the first. This is somewhat
similar to Hegel's dialectic of thesis and antithesis,
except that here in Barth, there is simply no synthesis.
The two statements find no resolution. Rather they remain
standing, and clash with one another. But where is truth
to be found, one asks? It is to be found in the clash.
Perhaps one could find a parallel with this in music.
If two chords are struck, between which there is, not
harmony, but dissonance, and if each chord is left sounding,
without 'resolution', then we have a parallel with the two
differing statements of Barth. But continuing with the
parallel, neither of the two chords is the really important
thing. Rather, the dissonance produced between them which
results when both chords are struck together, is the important
thing. So in Barth's mind, when both statements of his
writing are thought together at the same time, the resulting
clash or dissonance was where the truth was to be found, or
better, was to best egress the truth. One must note,
however, that in such a scheme, the truth is left unstated,
that is, it remains, for lack of a better term, 'implicit'
in the clash between the two statements, which while they
might be 'equally true', are also 'equally contradictory'.
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In such a scheme one ends up with many paradoxes. It is
not surprising then that paradox is perhaps the most
prominent feature of this theology. Here he is very
close to Kierkegaard.
The relatively minor role of dogma, and tradition in this
•period (1917-1922)
Of special interest to our thesis, is to note how
little attention is given in this period to dogma, creeds
or Tradition in general, that is, the theology of the
Christian tradition from the second century onwards. In
the sixth and final edition (revision) of Romans. one
finds almost no reference to the figures of Church History.
The minor exceptions are Luther and Calvin, as one might
expect. Apart from these two there are only a very few
figures that even come up for consideration, even in their
exegesis of Paul. Apart from one mention of Augustine,
and one of the relatively minor figure of Tersteegen, one
is hard put to find others. By contrast, the philosophers
Plato (twice), Socrates (twice), Nietzsche (7 times), Kant
(4 times) Feuerbach (twice) cross his pages with far
greater frequency.
Even those he found especially important in general
in this period far outweigh Luther and Calvin. For
example Lostoevsky comes up for consideration 19 times,
Calvin 5 times; Kierkegaard 12 times and Overbeck 8 times,
while Luther comes up only 9 times, even though one might
have thought Luther's Romans might have been especially
relevant. The same, essentially, holds true in Barth's
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other writings of this period (1917-1922). The art¬
icles of this period reflect Earth's main preoccupat¬
ion with exegesis of scripture and ethics. we can
find no major study of a theme of dogmatics proper,
nor past dogmaticians."'*
We point this out, for after 1923, the situat¬
ion will change dramatically in this respect.
She founding of "Gwischen den ^eiten", and Gogarten,
Tillich, Bultnann and runner.
Earth was not alone in his attack upon liberal
Protestantism. Soon after the publication of the
first edition of his i&raerbrief in 1918, Earth found
that there were otherstheological thinkers ready to
join the attack upon nineteenth Century Liberalism.
Thus one finds Brail Brunner, Priedrich Gogarten and
Rudolf Bultmann reacting with qualified praise for
Earth's idmorbriof in this early period (1919-1922)
1. T.1I.L, Parker; a biographer quite favorable to
Earth, confirms our view here, stating that in his
initial years of University teaching,1921-1923,
Barth was only slowly re-discovering older exposit¬
ions of Church dogma. The Reformation Bra ca e
first. Yet "...even at this stage (1922) his read¬
ing outside the Reformation v/as chiefly for under¬
standing the Reformation... .Nothing from the ,~>arly
Church. Anselia does not yet appear." (Parker,p.52)
Parker is even of the view that "Barth was learning
theology" in this period (1921-1923), following his
production of "The Letter to the Romans" (1917-21).
(See Parker,p.55). In Parker's view, Barth is
undergoing a transformation (in this period,1921-24),
from a leader of a movement of religious thought to
a theologian. Of. T.Ii.L. Parker, Karl Barth, Berdnans,
Grand Rapids, 1970, pp.49ff.
2. Of. The beginnings of dialectic Theology, ed. J.i .
Robinson, John' Knox Pres.:, Richmond, 196s, pp.63ff,
pp.82ff; and pp.lOOff.
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Que finds a fifth thinker, Paul Tillich joining the
internal debates between these three and Barth, as
early as 1923. --lot all was peaceful between these
figures, even in this early period of their associat¬
ion, yet there was sufficient common ground for the
founding of a periodical: "Bwischen den Beiten" in
1922. Yet from this point onwards, the differences
between t iese figures grew ever more significant•
•Tillich and Bultmann left the group first (1924-1926);
Gogsrten left in 1929. Finally Barth and Brunner
parted company after a fiery exchange of articles in
1953.^ We shall consider this fragmentation, with
the methodological divergences implicit in it, near
2
the end of Part II of our thesis.
The Turn to dogmatics; 1923-1930.
Berth's work in his initial period of product¬
ivity had been mainly concerned with theological
exegesis, that is exegesis of scri ture with pointed
theological invective. Theological exegesis had in
the main a critical and destructive function in this
initial period: the attempt to smash the liberal
Protestantism of the late Nineteenth Century. Yet
after 1923 we seo major changes in the direction of
1. g•: ..arl Barth and Bail Brunner, natural Theology,
comprising "Nature and Grace" by .n;ii '"Brunner and
a reply, "No" By Karl Barth, Centenary j.ress, London
1946.
2. Bee below, pp.210ff.
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Berth's work. essentially we shall see a turn from
the critical-destructive task of theological exegesis
to the essentially constructive task of a new dogmatics.
Perhaps the most significant sign of this
change is another change which occurred at about the
same time: A revival of interest in pre-JSighteenth
Century dogmatics. Chile iiarth had studied the older
forms of "orthodoxy" as a student, that is, as a
student with liberal leanings, and had most probably
studied in depth, yet, as we have already noted, pre-
ineteenth Century theology: Protestant orthodoxy,
scholasticism, the fathers, Creeds etc., undergo an
almost total eclipse in the period 1914-1922. Thus
in the iffmerbrlef's sixth edition (essentially the
2nd edition with minor revisions), we find only one
reference to Augustine, one reference to Tersteegen
and one to hinzendorf, Thus anart from the Reformers
(Calvin: 5 references, Luther: 9 references, Bwingli:
1 reference) one finds only three references to the
whole history and development of Christian dogma.
One finds the situation roughly the same in Berth's
shorter writings 1918-1922. It is only after 1922
t at one finds significant attention paid to the
history of Christian Thought•
Let us look now at how the situation changes.
In 1924 Barth rives his first lectures in Dogmatics.
If we turn to the letters of this period, we find
comments which sug est both intensive and wide ranging
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reading of older dogmatics. he also find comments
willed suggest a rediscovery of these older works, and
perhaps more significantly, a rediscovery of their
1 worthiness••
So we find Barth writing to his close associate
.jduard ihurneysen about his in-depth reading of ancient
'
formulations of the Trinity, (he writes in . .ay of
1924, several months after beginning his first Lectures
in Dogmatics)*
...I an just now in the midst of the mysteries
of the Trinity. I had to think over it long
and sadly, brooding ever and again over the
runic characters which the ancients have left
us: esse ;tia» persona, riotiones personalos . *.
not to forget filloqu'e.
Barth then apparently exhorts his associates:
•1.Don't think, however, that this is old
rubbish; all, all of it, seen in the light,
seems to have its own good sense.
Barth concludes by saying:
-
It was already high time for us finally
to give our attention to these things and
so to begin at least the attempt to establishcontilat with the ancient' church.1~
Earth's final comment is perhaps the most
significant: It is high time to begin to try to estab¬
lish contact with the ancient church. Jo find this
together with the exhortation not to think that these
"ancient dogmas" are simply 'old rubbish'. There are
Letter of 26th May 1924, pp.184-185.
(emphasis added).
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other passages in these Letters of Barth which indic¬
ate renewed reading of the ancients, reading of con¬
siderable intensity and breadth. Barth often reports
his discoveries, or rediscoveries, concerning ancient
dogma to his comrades.
Thus together with evidence already cited (and
trie lack of explicit attention paid to 1 ancient
thinkers' previous to 1924), Barth's comments here
point to a revival of interest in, and renewed concen¬
tration upon, ancient church dogma. This appears
as a new development c.1924# Thus the turn to
dogmatics is accompanied by a turning to old dogma.
..'e may note that the nature of this turn, to Tradition,
shall be a central concern in Part III of our thesis.
Til ..el..: a err -nun and fritz Barth.
In considering figures influential in Barth's
theological development, we have left two figures
for consideration in this period, his turn to the
tas : of Dogmatics. we shall now try to give brief
-•USy . .
assessments of the influence of Wilhelm Hermann and
Brits Barth, the fataer of Karl Barth.
Karl Barth had studied under wilhelm Herrmann
in harburg in his University years. When he turned
to write an article on Herrmann In 1925, that is,
Just after his first Lectures in Dogmatics, Barth
states:
61
Herrmann was the theological teacher of ray
student years. The day, twenty years ago
...when I first read his Hthik, I remember
as if it were today. If 1 had t..e temper¬
ament of Klaus Earns, ...I could say as'
Stilling did of herder,'Iron this book I
received the push into perpetual notion/
With more restraint, but with no less grat¬
itude, I can say that on that day I believe
my own interest in theology began.
Who was Wilhelm Herrmann, and how was he important,
in Earth's mind, now, at this distance, in 1925?
Herrmann's theology was both neo-Hantian and moder¬
ately liberal. Herrmann'beganswith human religious
experience and proceeded toward the affirmation of
revelation. That is, he began within the purely
au; in context and proceeded Inn/orl V..c rivico.
How is it then that he had importance for a thinker
such as liarth, who had turned upon liberalism, some¬
times with a vengence, and who insisted on beginning
with the assertion of revelation and then proceeding
to comment upon man (in his REfrerbriof)? One can
perhaps find only partial answers to such questions.
Yet one factor of perhaps first order significance
in this context, (Earth's turn to the task of Dogmat¬
ics) v/as Herrmann's seriousness and earnestness con¬
cerning the task of Dogmatics. ThiB discipline, in
the view of Earth and others, had fallen into relative
neglect of the latter part of the nineteenth Century.
Herrmann was one figure who attempted to elevate the
task of Dogmatics "to its rightful place," Here
Barth had found a figure of considerable influence
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who had asserted the importance of the question of
truth concerning older dogmas, as a question of even
greater importance than the (for Herrmann, methodolog¬
ically prior) question of man's own religious exper¬
iences. Perhaps this factor, together with errmann's
emphasis upon the importance of Jthics, helps us to
understand why he was so important for earth.
waeiijU.—1
The other figure which we have left for consider¬
ation until now is Professor Pritz Barth. This
should not imply that he had little or no Influence
on garth's development up until this point (1925-1950),
but rather that his influence was probably greatest
in the present period (1925-1950). Among the inter¬
preters of Barth, only Peter Konsma, an early inter¬
preter, devotes any real attention to this figure.1
Professor Britz Barth, the father of Karl
Barth, while not a major figure in Continental Theol¬
ogy at the end of tne nineteenth Century, v/as non-the-
less a productive and original thinker. His book,
hie iiauptproblene des hebens Jesu, went through three
editions (republications) between 1899 and 190?* A
collection of his shorter writings was published just
after his death in 1912.~
1. Karl Berth's Idea of Revelation, Somerset ress,
,j0 .ervilie, .J., 1957* (Jesplte its early date,
a scholarly and often acutely sensitive work).
2, Jhristus/u- sere Hoffnung, Bern, 1915 •
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Fritz Bartli, a pastor in Basle, first became
a lecturer in a ideological College In Basle• e
was then called to the University of -erne, where
ae was appointed a Professor of New Testament and
,arl,y Church History in 1889* He remained at this
post until the end of his life, in 1912#
Although we cannot, in a brief introduction
to a thesis go into much depth.concerning the amount
of influence fritz Barth had upon Marl Barth's devel¬
opment, v/e may note several things, and then cite
reter . onsma's summary of the signs of this influence
The first thing we may note is that Fritz
Barth was a conservative theologian of a moderate
cast. As a moderate conservative, he argued, for
example, upon historical grounds, that the Gynoptic
Gospels did not support the 'liberal' view of Jesus.
Yet in opposing liberalism he was hot so conservative
in so..a respects as his son i.arl was to become. For
example, ,ritz Barth could not accept the Virgin
Birth, and publical/y rejected it.1
Thus the younger Barth was brought up in a
home setting in which there was high respect for
moderate-conservative views of Gcripture, and where
iarly Church creeds and dogma were held to be of
• vigh importance. le not only emerged fro., such a
1. honsava, p.9. Compare this with Barth's treatment
of the Virgin Birth, below, PP#?lpff.
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hone setting, but went on to Ber-ne University to study
under his father. Only then did he go on to Berlin
and finally to Marburg, to study under Herrmann.
Yet in Konsma's view, "from this father Karl Barth,
while at Berne learned more than from any other
professor of theology.Perhaps Konsraa overstates
his case, yet the evidence Monsma cites in support
of his statement is significant. Monsma summarizes
his evidence thus:
...Certain characteristics of his father's
teaching later reappear in his own. Among
these are, on the one hand, his father's
acceptance of tae Bible as the v.ord of Cod,
his belief in the peculiar sonship and in
the resurrection of Jesus, ...his limiting
of the sphere of philosophy, his tendency
to oppose revelation to it, ...his idea of
God speaking on the basis of his revelation
in the Bible through our lives unto us...
and on the other hand, his denial of the
equality of tee Bible's dignity with God
himself, his acknowledgement, though
qualified, of the right and need of Biblical
criticism, and his rejection of all current
theories of inspiration,d
It is clear that Barth did not totally reject
his father's influence even in his post University
years when his affinities lay essentially with the
liberal Protestantism of Wilhelm nermann and others.
Chen Karl Barth became pastor at Cafenwil in 1912,
it was his father who preached the sermon at his
installation. (Barth thought well enough of the
1. nonsma, op.cit., p.10.
2. Ibid. Bee also nonsma's exploration of the thought
of frita Barth, pp.9-10.
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sermon to send his coiorade, Eduard Thurneysen, a copy
of it). ,'hen Barth comes to write the preface to
the first edition of his R&nerbrief in 1918 he says
this:
The understanding of history is an uninter¬
rupted conversation between the wisdom of
yesterday and the wisdom of tomorrow. And
it is a conversation always conducted
honestly and with discernment• In this
connection I cannot fail to think with
gratitude and respect of my father, Professor
Pritz Barth. For such discernment he
signally displayed throughout his whole
active life.1
It is just this respect for history which we
see coming alive in Barth five years later when he
begins his in-depth reading of the History of
Christian Dogma. And it is the influence of his
father which >erhaps shows up most clearly in Earth's
rather heavy handed emphasis upon harly Church creeds
and dogma, the latter being an aspect of Barth's
theology we shall study in some depth in Part III of
2
our thesis.
While we have given brief accounts here of two
more figures influential in Earth's theological devel¬
opment, we have only added to an already large list.
Thus the influence of, and/or intellectual kinship
with figures such as Kierkegaard, Gverbeck, Dostoevsky,
1. (Preface to the llrst edition), The -ppistle to
the Romans (.CPU. of the sixth edition), Oxford,
London, 1933» p.l.
2. Lee below, pp.279-382.
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the 31umhardts, the heo-Kantians, Cohen and Hatorp
continue in this period (1925-1950). In 1952 this
situation will changes Bartn will try to delete from
his theology (1) any significant 'non-Church'
influence, and (2) any significant participation in
philosophy. fiie document which signifies this
change, earth's study of Anselms fides Quaerer,s
Intellectum, will be the subject of part II of our
thesis. How however it remains for us to complete
our sketch of earth's development up to the point
when this work on Anselm was written, that is up
until approximately 1950.
The first Attempt at "prolegomena" to Dogmatics:
jie Chrlstliche Dogmatik of 1927#
Borth's first attempt at writing "Prolegomena"
to Dogmatics, (that is a methodological account of the
nature and purpose of Dogmatics together with its key
concepts) appeared in 1927 •"*" What shall concern
us at this point is the question as to why Barth chose
to set this book aside and later begin again upon
the sa e task. This second attempt appeared, five
years after the first, in 1952} that is just after
his study of Anselm had been completed (1951). We
shall ask this question (as to why Earth set aside
his first attempt), for methodological issues were
I. full Title: Dogiaatik I. fie Lelire vom .orto Cottes.
Prolegomena zur Christlichen Dogmatik, jar, haiser
Verlag, "Mtfnchen, 1927 •
67
central to this decision. Thus if we can isolate
and lay out the major differences between these two
attempts, we shall be in a better position to under¬
stand the importance of Barth's methodological study
of Anselm, undertaken between the publication of these
two attempts.
In 1932, with the publication of his second
attempt, Barth states in "Author's Forward":
...to the best of my ability I have cut out
in this second issue of the book everything
that in the first might give the slightest
appearance of giving theology a basis,
support or even mere justification in the
way of existential philosophy.... Because
in the former undertaking I can only see a
readoption of the line Schleiermacher-Ritschl-
Herrmann, and because in amy thinkable
continuation of this line I can only see the
plain destruction of Protestant theology and ,
the Protestant Church...! can only so Wo here.
In his first attempt at Prolegomena in 1927,
Barth had described one of his key concepts "The
Word of God" with the use of existential terminology,
.ore significantly Barth had sought to consider "the
Word of God" from man's standpoint, i.e. from the
standpoint of man's own concrete setting. Thus Barth
had attempted, not to describe "the Word of God" in
abstraction frora man's hearing of it, but rather, he
had attempted to describe his conception of "the Word
of God" as heard by man* Thus it was from man's
1. C.ii.I/1, p.ix, x.
68
standpoint (nan's perceptual standpoint) that lie
wished to describe his conception of the Word of God
inihis first attempt, Thus man and nan's perceiving
'
were included here. Consequently, as man and man's
perceiving were involved, this meant that anthropolog¬
ical considerations had to come into play. This is
roughly how things stood in Barth's first attempt at
Prolegomena in 192?,
The importance of these anthropological consid¬
erations was pointed out to Barth in a review of his
first Prolegomena written by Friedrich Gogarten,
formerly a close associate of Barth's,1 Go nrten's
'
central criticism was that Barth had not followed
through with his existential insights and developed
an adequate anthropology.
how one sees at least two possibilities open
to a thinker in Barth's position at this point:
(1) either he shall develop an adequate anthropology,
or (2) he shall find a way of proceeding which
(allegedly) does not involve an anthropology. (Of
course there may be other possibilities; at this point
i
only these need concern us).
It is fairly obvious froxa the passage we have
quoted from Barth's second attempt at Prolegomena-that
he chose this second option. That is, rather than
attempt to describe "the Word of God" from man's
1. Bee Friedrich Gogarten, "Karl Barths Dogmatik",
Theologische Pondschau, G.P.l, 1929,
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standpoint, from the standpoint of man's concrete
situation, he shall attempt to describe "the Word
of God" from outside any standpoint man can take up,
ae will try to describe "the Word of God" from an
(allegedly) "objective" standpoint, that is without
takin : into consideration man's perception and/or
iaispcrception of "the Word of God", Only then,
only after this initial step shall he take up man's
standpoint and consider this same Word of God from
man's own standpoint,1
This change of methodological procedure is
reflected throughout Garth's second attempt, (Church
dogmatics Volume 1/1, and 1/2). It is reflected in
-is4-
Garth's deletion of existential/terminology, his
deletion of references and allusions to existentialu-l-
philosophers, in particular, Kierkegaard, and even
in the change of chapter headings, treating roughly
the sane subject.
As the vehemence with which Barth expresses
himself concerning this change suggests this is not
a minor methodological issue but a methodological
issue of the highest importance ("...in the contin¬
uation of this line I can only see the plain destruct¬
ion of Protestant theology and the Protestant Church,..
p
I can only say 'No' here.")
1. Whether or not it is actually possible to do this
need not concern us at this point. v'e shall how¬
ever study Barth's "Bo" to Anthropology, in Part III,
below, in greater detail.
2. C.B.I/1, p,x.
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Barth shall not only try to excise his Dogmatics
of existential anthropology, and any other type of
anthropology, but he shall attempt to eliminate from
his Dogmatics any elements of thought borrowed from
philosophy, in fact any elements of thought having a
non-ecclesiastical origin (an origin outside of
church dogma and scripture). Bon-ecclesiastical
(e.g. philosophical) concepts will be used only in
an incidental way, only in illustrating or elucidating
what has already been worked out indeperider.ttly of
their use."'" In place of philosophical presuppositions,
assumptions, etc., Barth shall attempt to draw upon
"the »ord of G-od" itself. Thus, even methodological
presuppositions are to have their source in revelation,
not in secular or religious philosophy.
We have now arrived at the point where it is
important to turn to Barth's study of Anselm, For
in Anselm, Barth thought that he had finally discovered
a theologian who, like himself, wished to build his
thought solely upon the Church's articulation of
revelation, that is upon the Church's 'Credo'. Con¬
versely none of his thoug;ht shall be built upon any
source other than this.
Barth turned to the study of Anselra's theolog¬
ical method in 1930, that is, three years after the
1. This was Barth's aim, 'We have left aside the
question as to whether he succeeded. Such a
question is beyond the scope of our thesis.
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publication of his first attempt at Dogmatic Proleg¬
omena and., perhaps significantly, only one year after
Gogarten's review of his Prolegomena, in which the
methodological issues we have been describing i^ere
thrown into sharp relief#
It is our own contention that barth has mis¬
interpreted Anselia, and misinterpreted him at a very
basic, methodological level. Thus our task, in
Part II which follows will be (1) to examine the
nature of the theological method which Sarth finds
in Anselm's thought, and (2) to examine the accuracy
of Berth's interpretation of Arise Ira • Prom this
point we shall go on, in Part III of our thesis, to
examine several basic aspects of Earth's theological
method, that is, his actual operational procedure as
he carries on his theological enterprise. It is
Barth's study of Ansolm, and in particular, his rather
unusual interpretation of Anselm, which has been
highly suggestive for the study of Barth's actual




.hhln ^UTA'E EJuPl UP AA.AjLH'S ThEQLQGIOAL :...EUPD.
Introduction,
Section A,
. Y _-an ,.A.AnY UP BAHTd'S BOOK On ABB ALB?
Before entering upon our study of Barth's "book
on Anselm we should raise the question as to why we are
turning to this book in particular, and devoting a size¬
able portion of our thesis to its study. As wo shall
note in the brief survey of the interpretation of this
book which follows, the answer to such a question would
not have been at all apparent to interpreters of Barth,
even major interpreters of Barth, before the year I960.
Until about this year, Earth's Anselm was almost
entirely neglected by interpreters of Barth. After
this year, as we shall see in the following, the
picture changes dramatically.
Our question remains: why do we consider this
book in particular in interpreting Earth? .;e shall be
exploring its relevance, of course, throughout both
Part II and Part III of our thesis, and therefore this
question would be answered most adequately near the
conclusion of our study. let here at the outset we
can give a preliminary answer: namely that (1) in our
view, Barth "found himself" methodologically, in his
study of Anselm; and that (2) he found "himself in
his study.
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Perhaps we could take the first statement firstly;
iie "found himself" in regard to method. Barth's own
account, almost thirty years after its publication, would
support this supposition. In 1958, he writes, in the
preface to the second edition of his Anselm1
Only a comparatively few commentators...[have]
realized how much [my study of St. Anselm] has
influenced me or been absorbed into my line of
thinking. Most of them have completely failed
to see that in this book on Anselm I am working with
a vital key, if not the key, to an understanding of1
that whole process of "thought that has impressed me
more and more In my^dhurch Dogmatics as the only one
proper to theology.""
One may note that Barth speaks of "a key" to " a process
of thought". V/hat is central here then, is theological
procedure, that is, method, in contrast to "content"
considered by itself.
That Barth experienced a "methodological vacuum"
after his first and abortive attempt at Dogmatics in 1927,
Die Chrlstliche Dogmatlk, primarily because he could no
longer accept or tolerate in his theology an anthropological
element, that is, an element of philosophical anthropology
which stood in independence from scripture and 'revelation',
and, as a consequence, was to search for a process of
thought which would obviate such anthropological pre¬
suppositions (or so he hoped), lies behind his reflection
1. Although the original title of his work is Fides Quaerens
Intellecturn, it has been given the title: Anselm: Fides
Quaerens Intellectum in translation, and we' shall refer
to it as "his Anselm" to avoid confusion with the




in 1939 when he speaks of
"...[having had] to rid myself of the last remnants
of a philosophical, i.e., anthropological.•.
foundation and exposition of Christian Doctrine.
The real document of this farewell is, in truth,
not the much read brochure 1MeinI *, directed against
[Hiall] Brunner in 1934, but ratiier the book about the
evidence for God of Anselm of Canterbury which
appeared in 1931• Among all my books I regard this
as*the one written with the greatest satisfaction.1
In short, taking these two passages together, Barth
has, in his own thinking, found in his study of Anselm
the key to a"process of thought" which will enable him to
bid farewell to philosophy and philosophical anthropology
along with their presuppositions in his doing of theology.
(In our sketch of how the book on Anselm has fared with
Earth's interpreters which follows, we shall see to what
extent interpreters, especially after I960, find themselves
in agreement with this estimate.)
Our second supposition was that in his study of Anselm,
Barth found "himself". That is, he found a process of
thought that was uniquely his own, and can only be ascribed
to Anselm by misinterpreting him at several crucial
junctures. Of course, this is our own view, and our task,
in part, in what follows will be to examine several of these
crucial junctures, in order to explicate and support our
view. Further, the way in which (in our view) Barth mis¬
interprets Anselm, or pushes the evidence farther than the
text warrents, should be highly suggestive for understanding
"that whole process of thought" embodied in Earth's Church
1. Autobiographical sketch "How My Mind Has Changed" (1939)
reprinted in Karl Barth: How I Changed My Mind, ed.
John D. Godsey, John Knox, Richmond (Virginia), 1966,
pp.42,43.
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Dogmatics. Of course those points where we find no
real reason to question Barth's interpretation of Anselm
may also be suggestive.
A Brief Sketch of the History of the Interpretation of
Barth's book on Anselm
Now we might look briefly at the use made of this
book in interpretation of Barth over the past several
decades, and in particular how its importance has been
assessed by major interpreters of Barth. We shall be
limiting our sketch here, essentially, to major inter¬
preters of Barth, leaving aside those whose main task
was to interpret anselm. What we find, surprisingly, is
that the book has been almost completely ignored until
about I960. Then, as we have remarked, the picture
changes, first slowly, then dramatically. There are
only a few exceptions to this general overview.
In Hans Urs von Balthasar's major work on Barth,
1
completed in 1951, Earth's Anselm is given only three brief
mentions. Here it is seen only as the place where Earth's
emancipation from philosophy "found expression".
Balthasar uses the book only to draw out what Barth means
by analogy. The question of the book's importance for
interpretation of Barth in general is not even raised. So
it would appear that the book is not considered any more
1. Karl Barth; Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie,
English Trans. The Theology of Karl Barth, Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1971•
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important than Earth's essays of the same period.
If we go to the second major work on Barth, in this
same period, G.C. Berkouwer's The Triumph of Grace in the
Theology of Karl Barth.1 we find even less consideration
given. There is only one reference, in a footnote. Even
though Berkouwer states that "Barth regards his book on
2
Anselm as the decisive turning point in his development",
we find no consideration of the sense in which this could
be so.
In Gustav Wingren's = lethodenfragen, (Translated as
Theology in Conflict...)"* an influential study also written
in the 1950's, we can find no mention at all of the book on
Anselm.
So also in Jerome Hamer's suggestive study published
in 1949; only in the preface to the English Edition,
published in 1962 is the book mentioned.'1'
Before I960, we find only three significant exceptions
to the general picture of the book remaining in obscurity.
The first is Peter Monsma's sensitive and suggestive study
of the early Barth, Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation.
published in 1937. In this little known work, Monsma
devotes a full page and a half to study of Hie book and
regards it important in understanding Barth's way of
relating philosophy and theology (or rather, dissociating
these two fields).^
1. E.T. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1956.
w. ^J^n^ci^c., p. 42, n.pO.
3. E.T.: Theology in Conflict; Nygren-Barth-Bultiaann,
Muhlenberg, Philadelp'hia, 1958.
4. Karl Barth, L'Occaisonalisme...theologique de Karl Barth.
Paris. l'jB l£.f.. Karl £artK panels.'Tdndon. 15fc£).
5. Somerset Press, Somerville (New Jersey), 1937.
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The second exception, following cmvitolhgieaily, occurs
in a work concerning interpretation of Anselm, yet in
assessing Barth's interpretation of Anselm at some length,
the author also pauses to assess the importance of Earth's
book on Anselm for the understanding of Earth. In
Bt. Anselm and his Critics, published in 1954, John Mclntyre
states that
...[Earth's] Fides Guaerens Intellectum...an analysis
of and a commentary upon St. Anselm's proof of God's
existence...is a work of paramount importance for any
examination of Karl Earth's own works and of his own
methodology.1
The third exception, and the only major study of Earth's
work before I960, to take Barth's book on Anselm seriously,
2
is Henri Bouillard's Connaissance de Dieu a compilation of
material selected from a larger two volume work on Barth
published in 1957.
After I960
After about I960 we find that the picture changes, slowly
at first, then dramatically. This may be due to the fact
that the book was reprinted in 1958* and finally translated
into English in I960. Bo we find the book figuring
prominently, for example, in the study of T.F. Torrance
in 1962,^ in the theological biographies of Parker^ and
1. ,Op,git., p.25.
2. E.T.: The Knowledge of God. Herder and Herder, New York,
1968.
3. Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology,
1910-1931, -CO, London, 1962.
Karl Barth. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1970.
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Bowden1 of the same period, and in James Smart's work,
The Iivided Mind of Modern Theology (1967), where a sub¬
section is devoted to "The Contribution of Anselm of
2
Canterbury" which highlights the importance of the book
for understanding Barth.
Finally even the popularizers of Systematic Theology
reflect what lias become a more or less generally accepted
view:
Barth's Anselm is an indispensible key to the under-
standing ox his mature position [on issues of method]
...and as such is one of the most important documents
of modern theology.5
We find then that Earth's own view of the importance
of this work for his theological development finally under¬
lined and confirmed by studies after I960,
We may note that as a consequence of the relative
lateness of the 'discovery* of this book, that there is no
ma.ior study devoted to the full breadth of Earth's mature
work which has taken into account this important study on
Anselra.^
Karl Barth. S.C.M., London, 1971.
2. p.l94ff.
3. William Nicholls. Pelikan Guide to Modern Theology. Vol. I.
Pelikan, 1969, pIIBSt*
4. Possible exception to this: Bouillard's study (1957).
Section 33.
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THE NATURE OF THE HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP OF EARTH'S
ANSELM
In the preface to the first edition of his book on
Anselm, Barth argues a point of historical method. This
can be summarized briefly, i.e., that the Proslogion, the
text with which Barth concerns himself, is to be seen in
the context of the Anselmian corpus and not in isolation
from the rest of his works. One may grant that much
historical or polemical inquiry into the Proslogion up to
this point (the 1930's) had steadfastly ignored the context
of the Proslogion. or how the Proslogion fits into the
«
remainder of Anselm1s works. This isolationism has been
a tradition in some philosophical circles, with its
advantages and, we think, major disadvantages. It has
of course been a tradition in some theological circles,
where doing history is sometimes to too great an extent
confused with doing theology. History done with no
polemical interest, or no personal involvement would be
dull, but where it is done only to serve polemical interest
or with unacknowledged bias, it is no longer worthy history.
So much for our polemic.
We return to Earth's point about seeing the
Proslogion in the context of the Anselmian corpus. Barth
asks: if others cannot agree with the result, of the
study, can they not at least agree with the (general outline)
1
of the path taken in pursuing it?
A.F.Q.I.. Preface to the first edition, E.T., pp. 8,9.
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To this we would agree. It is obvious that if one
seeks to understand the Prosloglon. one must become
acquainted with the writer. His other writings should be
a major help.
Yet there is one "but" that crops up immediately.
What about the context in which Anselm did his work. If
Earth insists on seeing the wider context into which the
Proslogion fits, and this context, for some reason he calls
it a "theological scheme", is his major interest, one notes
some interesting things about his study.
We could perhaps best draw out what we have to say
by asking the following question: If the reader did not
know the period, that is^the^date, as well as something
of the nature of the times in which the Proslogion was
written, what would he find out or know from reading
Earth's book?
We would note the following, and divide our notes
into the following sections, that is:
(1) what was said of (la) Anselm's immediate
intellectual context, i.e., his contemporaries and
(lb) his intellectual mil/ieu, e.g. the growing
openness to non-ecclesiastical antiquity: Stoic
and Neo-platonic thought;
(2) what was said of Anselm's wider cultural context
of an ideational nature, (2a) contemporary vernacular
and Latin verse ("secular" as well as ecclesiastical);
(2b) Popular religious notions which may have
entered the assumptions and thought processes of
great writers; (2c) the cultural context beyond the
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mainly ideational, i.e., fine arts and architecture;
(3) the political and ecclesiastical course of events;
(4) Last but not least, Ariselm' s predecessors in
the history of Christian thought.
It will be relatively simple to deal with these
questions. We take (4) first since it is perhaps most
relevant. There is no more than passing reference to
Anselm's predecessors. The most conspicuous example is
Augustine. There is passing reference, but by that we
mean one sentence, not a developed paragraph or series of
paragraphs, (In contrast, other commentators have often
devoted space to studying Augustine; for example,
Charlesworth gives at least two paragraphs of careful
analysis.) This is probably the most fruitful figure
to study among Anselm's predecessors if only for the fact
that he found value in the same philosophical tradition as
Anselm.1
As for other figures, no comparisons or contrasts
are made. They simply do not exist."*
We take, next (la), Anselm's immediate intellectual
context, that is, his contemporaries or near contemporaries.
Here again it is a rather simple question to answer.
There are simply no references. (One could have referred
for example, to the Abelard-Clairvaux ferment later in the
same period, or to the realist-nominalist controversy, etc.)
1. Neo-platonism. Augustine also had an argument for the
existence of God that was in some respects similar to
Anselm's.
2. On re-reading Berth's Anselm for this aspect we need to
qualify this, but only slightly. There are several refer¬
ences to Augustine, yet still only passing references. As
for other predecessors, or contemporaries, we find almost
no references. References are made to take interpreters of
Anselm's argument however, St. Thomas, etc.
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Of his intellectual mil^ieu, by which we mean the
ideas in the air, ((lb)), whether or not propounded by
contemporaries, there is one philosophical stream
mentioned, Neo-platonism. But it is only mentioned,
and again, only in passing, mainly in a way to indicate
that Barth thinks it of little or no significance in
understanding the text. He mentions only "the Neo-
platonic technique of the exposition" in the case of the
Honologion, and avoids asking the question whether Anselm
made use of anything more than Neo-platonic technique,
that is, for example, whether any basic Neo-platonic
assumptions were involved.1 Again we find no real investi¬
gation or even minor genuine historical questioning.
As to point (2) above, that is, what was said about
Anselm's wider contemporary context of an ideational nature,
yet not strictly theological or philosophical thought, we
would not e3q>ect much of a historian of Berth's period.
The possible fruitfulness of such questioning was not v/ell
2
seen in his time and within his sphere of activity.
As to (2a), no troubador or trouvere crosses Berth's
pages; none of the thinking or artful nobility who ventured
to enrich the meaning of the words of Latin as well as the
vernacular tongues with their feelings and their art. Had
1 • AjjEjLCl.^. , p. $8•
2. An exception of course is New Testament study -where ((2b))
popular religious notions have been investigated, however
unpleasant the questions these searches raise. It seems
somewhat ironic that New Testament scholarship lias in
some ways been more adventurous in its historical
questioning than, for example, the History of Philosophy
or for that matter, the History of Christian Thought!
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Pante read Earth's book a century and a half after the time
of Anselm he would have felt ill at home indeed. By
reading the text it is doubtful whether he could have
discovered either the period, or the place where Anselm
had written (unless he had discovered one footnote midway
through Earth's book). And most of all there was no
mention of the poets of the twelfth century whom Pante
loved and admired, and tried to emulate. But perhaps more
importantly, Pante,or such a man would not have been able
to sense the world, or the context in which the Proslogion
and its accompanying works were written.1
We find this neglect of search for possibly fruitful
insights from Anselm's context surprising, for in Earth's
other attempts at doing intellectual history he ranges
quite widely and arouses interest in doing so. We see
this in his Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century.
He does not stay within the highly intellectual realm
(cross references backwards and forwards to other thinkers),
but seeks images and analogies for concepts beyond the
intellectual sphere). He also has small but delightful
references to the humanity of a writer. (Kant's daily
walk at precisely the same time every day and in the same
place.) How it enlivens one's understanding of an otherwise
2
perhaps dry writer. In his introductory section in
1. On (2c) and (3) Barth does make use of the image of the
'cathedra', the architecture, where it suits his argument
most; and there is a footnote, but only a footnote, in
which the crusades are mentioned, in the context with
the writing of the Proslogion. Again, it would seem,
to support Barth*s "militancy" or militant posture, which
he finds in Anselm's text.
2. Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl (American
Sedition) 196$, p. 152.
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the same book, on the Enlightenment, the attempt to
contextualize is very present and greatly appreciated.
We will try to speculate briefly later, in the
conclusion of Part II, as to why Earth's Anselm is so
"narrow" in this regard, because we think it has something
to do with the nature and function of the book in Barth's
theological development. He was, we venture, at work on
something more and basically other than purely historical
inquiry.
Perhaps now we could look at the text of Earth's
Anselm from another aspect, and explore a proposition:
There is a similarity between the way in which Barth
approaches and deals with scriptures, and the way Barth
approaches and deals with the text of the Proslo/rfon.
After laying out what Barth calls Anselm's
"theological scheme", a reconstruction of what Barth sees
as the frame of reference in which Anselm does his
theology, he finally turns to the Prosloglon itself. This
forms the second half of his book on Anselm.
In noting the character of his work on the Prosloglon
itself there is an overall impression that Barth is dealing
with a scripture: a text which has, in his mind, a
primordial significance. What contributes to this
impression?
The most visible element of this is his way of
dealing with the Proslogion in a series of comments on
two or three sentences of the text, that is, in a "verse by
verso" treatment. This continues up to the last page of
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the book. There is no drawing together of all that has
come before. The last page is devoted to an exposition
of a further "verse" from the Proslogion and the book
ends with a short concluding paragraph.1
Barthian exegesis of scripture is notable for
ignoring the life-setting in which the scripture is
written; for its unwillingness to consider the life-
setting from the perception or point of view of the
author of a scripture, (e.g. the several editions of the
Romerbrlef); also, its unwillingness to consider the words
of the author in terms of his setting (Intellectual,
religious or otherwise) as perceived by the author. Barth
was either ambivalent about this issue or a bit coy in
kis R3merbrief period when he declared: "the critical
2
historian needs to be more critical". As others have
noted, this declaration runs right against the grain of
his whole approach in the Romerbrief.
But as we have noted above, Barth gives no consider¬
ation to Anselm's intellectual setting or intellectual
resources, for example, Augustine, Greek and Roman
philosophy etc., nor to his wider religious, Ideational
or cultural setting (the only exceptions being a few
scattered references, one to cathedrals, another to
crusades). Ve find therefore a similarity here between
Barth's approach to scriptures and to Anselm, but a
1. We may note that Barth's commentary on the last 'verse'
of Anselm's text does form a conclusion of sorts for
the whole book. Cf. below: "Anselm's Prayer of Gratitude
and Barth's Interpretation", pp,150ff.
2. Preface to the second edition, E.T., p. 8.
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definite contrast with liis studies of the figures included
in his Protestant Thought; From Rousseau to Ritschl.'1'
One notes a "word by word" study of key words and
phrases throughout the study especially in Part 2 dealing
with the Prosloglon. Again this is very close to Barth's
approach to scripture study. The words are studied in
some detail, although we leave open at this point the
question as to whether Barth has selected evidence which
only supports his theories and ignored evidence which runs
across the grain.
But one must note first that, as with many Germanic
scholars, there is an overwhelming dependence on a "root
theory" about the meaning of words: the assumption that
one almost infallibly gets the author's meaning by tracing
the rootage of the word back to one basic meaMng. Although
at times there is a bit of consideration given to how the
word is used and the phrase or context in wMch it is used,
tMs is minimal. TMs issue is of crucial importance, for
example, in considering Anselm's phrase about proving "sola
ratione" or "by necessary reasons alone". Barth gives very
little space to considering other interpretations than Ms
own, that is, to considering the options in interpretation
and then justifying Ms own view or option. He runs
2
through tMs problem as if "there is no real problem here".
In fact he begins Ms e:xposition of the phrase "sola ratione"
■3
by naming it as a "much disputed methodological formula".
1. .
2. A-F.Q.I.. pp. 43ff»
3* A.F.Q.I.. E.T., p. 43#
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But in the ten or more pages which follow there is not a
single reference to another interpretation, nor even
another interpreter, nor even as to what the dispute is
about. Only eleven pages later does one get a hint that
there is a deep difference between Barth and the main
stream of all interpretation of the Prosloglon coming before
1
him, over the interpretation of this phrase. Even here
one finds no exposition, or serious consideration given
to other interpretations.
The second thing one notes is a lack of historical
sensitivity in his word studies. What is meant here is
that there is an implicit assumption that a word or a
phrase (e.g. sola rations) meant the same thing to Anselm
over a period of thirty to forty years. In Luther studies,
for example, it has become evident in the last few decades
that such assumptions can lead to unfruitful and misleading
results.
What is implied in this assumption, among other things
is that Anselm did not develop or mature over this period
of time, or ever change his mind. If Barth holds the
opinion that the Monologion is not a mature work, (and it
is convenient to his general theory about Anselm* s method
to do so, as signs of Neo-platonlc influence are quite
strong there), must he not at least raise the question of
maturation and change throughout the Anselmian corpus?
One may note that Barth is not alone in not raising the
question of change and maturation. This question becomes
1. Ibid., p. 54. Although one finally gets the $ist of
what the "dispute" is about, Barth gives no serious
consideration, or extended exposition of those who he
disagrees with.
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more important when trying to reconstruct uselm's working
method over the period of his productive lifetime.
The literary style of Earth's study of the Proslogion
(i.e., the second half of his book) suggests that the
Proslogion. or parts of the Proslogion became, in Barth's
frame of reference, "Word". That is, that parts of the
Proslogion 'came alive' for Barth to such an extent and in
such a way that at points the words underwent that trans¬
formation which in Barth's frame of reference would mean:
became revelatory.
Of the three forms of 'the Word' that Barth was to
set out in the first volume of the Church Dogmatics it
would seem to be 'the Word preached* here.
We will have to pursue what is suggested here in
another part of Part II (below), but we may note that if
this is so, if the Proslogion or parts of it were in Barth's
mind 'Word' one would want to put alongside this the rather
sharp distinction that Barth frequently makes the same
period between preaching, or 'the Word preached' on the one
hand, and theological reflection on the other hand.
Was Barth* s Anselm a work of history or a work of theology?
The question could also be raised as to whether it
was primarily Barth the historian or Barth the dogmatician
at work here. This question is suggested by Jaroslav
Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, where
Pelikan sees a definite difference between the two, a clue




of "good guys and bad guys" in theology does not arise.1
One clue in answering the above question is that Anselm
comes out, as interpreted by Barth as such an undeniably
and unambiguously "good guy" in theology in Berth's eyes
where if, for example, Barth had accepted the general
lines of interpretation of others before him, it seems
fairly certain that, given his extreme position against
natural theology, Anselm would have had to be in Earth's
2
mind an undeniably and unambiguously "bad guy".
In pursuing this question of whether it was primarily
Barth the dogmatician, or Barth the historian at work here,
one question which could be raised is: are there marked
differences in character and approach between his study on
Anselm, and the essays a few years later which make up
Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl. We have
pointed to one such difference above: the lack of
attention to Anselm's ideational religious-cultural
context; and another, above: there is no ambiguity in the
value Judgements Barth passes on Anselm's work. One
senses, in contrast, a healthy ambiguity, for example, in
Berth's Judgements about Schleiermacher in Protestant Thought...
Barth points out 'favourable' elements wherever it comes
most readily. For example, Schleiermacher never neglected
the importance and centrality of preaching, either in his
1. Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl (American
Edition; Harper, New York, 1959, p. 8,
2. That is, in his Proslogion.
3» Op.cit.
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personal activities or in his theology. In contrast
Barth the dogmatician, e.g., in the Church Dogmatics,
has very little favorable to say of Schleiermacher.
Perhaos we could summarize here by saying that even
though Barth1s work on Anselm is quite valuative in nature,
he rarely or never reaches a negative valuation about
any aspect of (1) Anselm*s method in general, his
"theological scheme" or (2) the Prosloglon in particular.
In his preface to his work he finds the Proslogion and the
"theological scheme" in which he sees it residing, as "a
model piece of good, penetrating and neat theology, which
at every step I have found instructive and edifying".1
This statement, because of its unqualified nature, suggests
to us a lack of critical detachment from Anselm's text,
and, more generally, Anselm's theological method. Together
with the evidence already cited, there would seem to us to
be fairly sound evidence that it was basically 'Earth, the
dogmatician' at work here, not 1Barth, the historian', and
more than that, that 'Barth the dogniatician' had quite a
bit at stake personally in his work on Anselm. We shall
be exploring this point more extensively below.
We have tried in these pages to look at the nature of
the historical scholarship in Earth's Anselm from several
vantage points. We have done so with the hope that what
we have found may prove suggestive in various ways for the
remainder of the study which follows.
1. A.F.Q.I.. p. 9«
Chapter 1,
■




FAITH'S 1-iAIiN? THESIS ABOUT AN3SL.» AHD ITS COROLLARY.
Before embarking on a detailed study of Earth's
interpretation, wo wish in this chapter, to set out what
we find to be Earth'3 main thesis along with what we see
as its corollary.
Earth's main thesis about Ansela's actual working
method we might state as follows: In pursuing his theo¬
logical program, all the 'building blocks', that is all
the presuppositions, and basic elements of thought were
drawn from 'the Credo', that is from 'the texts of revel¬
ation1. fhis term 'the Credo' needs some clarification.
It is to be distinguished from Scripture.^" What then
forms the content of 'the Credo'? Barth names "Articles
p
of Faith", and specifically, the creeds of the Early
Churchj^ 'The Credo' apparently consists of the creeds
and dogmas of the Early Church as developed and given
official sanction by the Medieval Church of the West.
Gubthesis to Earth's Main Thesis.
There is a subthesis to this main thesis:
namely that Anselm began, and finished his work, in
faith, that is, in the fullness of faith, faith with
no significant admixture of doubt. And further, that
1. A.F. y.I., p.4-0.
2, See for example, A.F.Q.I., p.55»
5* A.F.Q.I., p.24. Here, very early in Earth's study he
also includes Scripture in 'the Credo'. Yet not
after this point.
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• existential7'/doubt was not in any way a motivating factor
for Anselm's work.
In addition, the process of thought Anselm was
engaged in was not designed to strengthen or reinforce
faith. It could have no effect on faith.
The relevance of this subthesis to the main thesis can
be seen in what is perhaps the best way of paraphrasing
Earth1s view of Anselm's approach to theology: "Anselm
believed and the Credo was assumed". The elements of this
statement remain in their unqualified nature. That is,
Anselm's 'believing' is never qualified by any remarks
about doubt. And his 'assuming', or assent to the Credo
likewise remains unqualified; it remains as unproblematlc
assent, without qualms. The only "questions" which remained
concerned the 'content' of 'the Credo*.
Further faith in its fullness, and unproblematic belief
in the whole of 'the Credo' are the methodological point
of departure for Anselm's theology, not the goal toward
which he shall aim. They are the terminus a quo not the
terminus ad quern of his theological work.
The Main Thesis and, the Subthesis Seen Together
Thus, taking the main thesis and the subthesis to¬
gether we see that in Earth's view Anselm took over a host
of assumptions from this 'Credo', and in effect took them
over uncriticlally. Neither initially nor in the process
of his work does Anselm in any way question or test the
viability and validity of any of these elements he takes
from the Credo. No problem of their viability ever arises.
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It would appear then that in Earth*s view of Anselm*s
theological work Anselm has a host of unexamined assumptions.
They remain in this primal, unexamined state.
Corollary to Barth*s Main Thesis
There is a major corollary to Earth*s main thesis: namely
that in taking over all his basic 'building blocks', presuppo¬
sitions and elements of thought, from *the Credo', he avoided
taking over any significant presuppositions and basic elements
from any stream of philosophical thought. In fact Anselm, in
Barth's view avoided any significant participation in philoso¬
phical streams of thought. If there appear to be borrowings,
or participation in philosophical streams of thought, these
are in practice of little or no significance. For example,
what appears to be substantial Neo-Platonism is really only
'technique of exposition' and nothing more.
Earth does not in any one place gather together his main
theses about Anselm in the course of his study. This is one
of the factors which make study of his work difficult. But
they are there none-the-less, appearing at various points
throughout the study.
Thus we find the main thesis and its corollary in a
description of Anselm's process of thought. In the
following, rationes necessariae. or necessary reasons are
roughly equivalent to: the 'building blocks', or elements
of thought Anselm uses in pursuing his goal. They are
the "A B C B's" used in establishing his "X". Thus Earth writes:
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Throughout all Anselm's investigations the origin of
the rationes necessariae is to t»e found somewhere other
than where it ought to be found in a philosopher...
namely...within the Credo itself. Within ^the Credo],
now this Article and now that Article figure as the
unknown X which is solved...by means of the Articles1
of faith a, b, c, d...which are assumed to be known.
Thus the elements, the •building blocks, of Anselm's thought
are seen as coming, not from a philosophical source, where
one might expect to find 'necessary reasons', but "[.from]
within the Credo itself". The elements of Anselm'4 thought,
the "A B C D's" used to establish Ms X are ail described
as coming from 'the Credo'.
So also in Barth's discussion of the Prosloglon, all
the presuppositions and elements wMch go to 'prove'
2
Anselm's 'X* are described as coming from 'the Credo'.
Not once is Anselm ever described as using any
borrowings from PMlosophy. Further at those points where
the subject of Anselm's borrowings from Philosophy cannot
be avoided, any signs of this are so played down as to
reduce them to insignificance. So, in discussing Anselm's
Monologlon, where Neo-PlatoMc elements are perhaps
strongest, Barth will dismiss the sigMficance of this
factor by referring to it as (mere) "Neo-Platonic technique
*
in the exposition".
Barth's view that there are essentially no borrowings
from pMlosophy comes to the fore when the question of





common ground between these two on which discussion could
take place. It is "quite clear that the parties in the
discussion are operating on two very different planes".1
Thus the main thesis, that all the elements of
Anselm*s thought come from 'the Credo1, and its corollary,
that there are essentially no borrowings from philosophy,
nor participation in philosophical streams of thought,
would seem to be quite clear.
As to the subthesis to the main thesis, that Anselm
did his work out of the fullness of faith, faith untroubled
by doubt, this is to be found at several places. For
example in his discussion of the relation between faith
(fides) and the result of Anselm's theological process,
understanding (intellectum), it is faith that has already
reached "the goal" toward which "understanding" can only
approach as upon a path. There is thus "a gap" between
the extent to which faith and theological understanding
2
can approach their common object. That faith has reached
the goal which understanding can only approach would mean
that Barth sees the fullness of faith operating here.
Our summary, "Anselm believed and the Credo was
assumed", is also reflected in several places. bo Barth
speaks of "that acceptance of the Credo of the Church,
which faith itself has already implied".^
That *the Credo* as the Faith of the Church is simply





evident when Barth states: "A science of faith, which
denied or even questioned the Faith (the Credo of the
Church) would ipso facte cease to be either 'faithful* or
'scientific'."'1" How is it that the whole of'the Credo*
and all of its elements are simply and unproblematically
assumed. Barth has a simple answer: "through faith in
the impartial good sense of the decisions of ecclesiastical
2
authority"•
We find no statements that would portray Anselra's
faith as anything less than the fullness of faith, or his
belief in 'the Credo' as anything but unprobleraatic belief.
We might turn now to Barth* s view of the nature of
Anselm's theological process. Here we will only give a
brief summary.
The aim of Anselm's theology is to explore and exhibit
•3
the "inner consistency" of 'the Credo' that is, the
rational interconnections existing between elements or parts
of 'the Credo'. Anselm will carry out this program, as
was remarked in the foregoing, by selecting one element
of 'the Credo', a doctrine or belief, place it 'in brackets',
that is, set it aside, and then, choosing other elements
out of 'the Credo' show the logical or 'rational' inter¬
connections between the selected elements of the Credo and
this one set aside, or placed 'in brackets'. Barth speaks
of this process using mathematical symbols, that is, the
bracketed belief is the 'X', and the other elements taken




from 'the Credo', in terms of which this 'X* will be
examined are the 'A B C D'S'. If the theologian has
•discovered1 and exhibited 'ratio' or rational inter¬
connections which exists between A B C B's and the X, that
is 'found* how the X interlocks with the A B C D's and
thus how they 'cohere* then he has 'established* the X.
The 'proof' has taken place. He has reached his goal.1
This goal then is 'understanding' which Anselm seeks
in faith. When Anselm speaks of "faith seeking under¬
standing", fides quarens inteliectum. this is the process
he speaks of.
It is a process which involves no presuppositions
borrowed from philosophy or current world-views, and
involves no significant participation in philosophical
streams of thought, nor are there any significant
borrowings from non-ecclesiastical thought in general.
Thus there is no common ground between Anselm and. one
who does not believe. There is no basis on which Anselm
could 'argue his case' before one who did not believe.
Consequently there is no apologetic, in the usual senses
of this word, in Anselm.
Vie shall now go on to examine the text of Anselm's
Proslogion. the text which Barth studies in his work, and
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There is another preliminary consideration
which we might take up before going to the text of
Anaelni's j roslo.'-;ion and studying Barth's interpretat¬
ion of it. In Barth's exposition of Anselm's
theological programme, Earth makes use of two unusual
l
terms: "ontological ratio" and "noetic ratio".
Since we can find no evidence that these are Angela* s
terms, nor any evidence that Anselsi ever used such
terms, w© shall treat them as specifically Barth's
terms. We shall do so for an additional reason:
Barth uses these terms approvingly, apparently with
high esteem for them, and later in his study makes use
of them in a normative way when he leaves Anselm's
text behind and makes theological formulations appar¬
ently meant to be relevant to Twentieth Century
2
theology.
In this chapter, we shall first question the
usage of such terms. Is there semantic confusion
here (or at least a semantic muddle)? Then we shall
go on to ask what these terms meant for Barth. Lastly
we shall examine what we see as certain "dissonances"
between what we see as Anselm's method of thinking and
Barth's method of thinking over this issue, specifically
1. Bee A.if. .1., pp.hSff.
2. Bee below, pp.i03ff.
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at the point where this issue touches on methods of
analogy.
The problem of the -LL§®_ of Language,
At one point in describing Anselm's theological
process of thought, Barth begins talking of "noetic
ratio". What he refers to is that which is in the
human mind, the mind of the theologian. It is used
in contrast to "ontological ratio." What this latter
term refers to is much sore difficult to pin down,
let this first term, "noetic ratio", may strike the
reader as somewhat odd. What other kind of ratio
can there be, if not "noetic"ratio? After all, does
not ratio have to do with what goes on in the mind,
with 'having reasons' for thinking such and such,
with 'reasoning toward a solution*, with 'using ones
reason', perhaps using it to construct a body of
logically interrelated thought, or a body of 'rational¬
ity'?
These things would all seem to have to do in
one way or another with the mind and what goes on
within it, with the realm of 'nous' or thinking.
Thus the term 'noetic': roughly, having to do with
thought. But why then talk of "noetic ratio"? This
seems repetitive. We shall return to this question
as v/e proceed. Let us turn to the other term now.
Barth goes on to talk of another kind of ratio. He
will call it "ontological ratio". This is something
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to bo distinguished sharply from "noetic" ratio*
ihis term may also strike the reader as somewhat
strange* Mot "ontological" is a term that usually
:us to do with "being". Yet both "noetic" and "ratio"
are terms which usually have to do with "thought",
iind since the time of Hume, and even nor© so, Kant,
the distinction between these two groupings of words
has become sharpened in to the categories of "thought"
on the one hand, and "being" on the other.
How let us suppose for a moment that Barth
intends to use this rather strange term "ontological
ratio"* to describe something outwith the circle of
human subjectivity that is, a 'ratio' existing
independently of any human mind.
Let us suppose further that what he wants to
describe has to do with the deity, for example, with
what is 'in the mind of God', and, if we go one step
further, with what God 'speaks' in his addressing man
'in his Word',
How it would seem to us that if one is talking
of a persoxial God, which we assume to be the case
here, one is talking of a personal Subject. how
if one wishes to use the word 'ratio'about what is
'in the mind' of this personal Bubject, one is hard
pressed to know why this should not be considered
"noetic" ratio, that is, why one wishes to make this
switch from "noetic ratio" to some sort of "ontological
ratio". Yet Barth does want to make this switch.
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But we must note (1) that he has had to invent a
term here at this point;1 and (2) he has created a
hybrid term, one part of which having to do with
thought, the other part having to do with being; (3)
In doing so he has mixed the categories of "thought"
and "being" in an area where philosophers and theolog¬
ians have been particularly sensitive about distinctions,
about 'which falls to each'• We shall note below
that ho makes this move not ^ust to interpret Anselm,
but also in a normative sense, for twentieth century
theology.
Nevertheless he does go ahead and sake this
move. Thus we find two kinds of ratio, "ontological"
and "noetic". If the one usage, "noetic" ratio1,'
would se . to us repetitive and 'redundant\ saying
one thing twice, this other usage "ontological ratio"
would seem to us an even more unusual usage of words.
We would venture then that the term "onto¬
logical ratio" must be considered as somewhat of an
anomoly. That is, if we compare this tern to a term
from a more mundane realm, the terminology of golf,
perhaps we night find a rough parallel,
golfer speaks of a "wooden iron", he speaks loosely^
and for the sake of convenience simply uses the term
without stopping to examine it. Yet if one wishes
to speak with precision about the substances involved
1 • .,e o -1.... •
l . j. » pp •'' f f •
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here, the noun could be misleading. Iron it isn't.
Wood it is. "A wooden iron?" an unknowing philosopher
might ask in surprise. "what kind of entity is thatll?"
However, golfers can speak loosely and the language
seems to serve the purpose. If, however, a philosopher
or theologian speaks loosely, without care, at important
points in his process of thought, his enterprise may
very well suffer. Or possibly the reverse might occur:
his thought process may do very well, to all appearances,
based on a technical mis-use of language, lie "gets
somewhere (illegitimately) with words".
Vie think it probable that the term "ontological
ratio" is much like this golfer's term "wooden iron".
While Barth may well wish to describe something that
is ontological, ratio it isn't; or: we do not follow
how it could be "ratio" if it is ontological* For,
if, for example he wishes to mean by ratio: "logical
relationships existing between ontological entities",
he will have to irork quite hard to convince many people
that logical relationships are "out there" rather than
being, for example the way objects are perceived (here
already it is in the 'noetic' realm, for 'in the way
that they are perceived' means in effect, 'In the
perception' and already we are within 'the eye of the
beholder'.) This would not necessarily mean, as it
can in modern thought, that this 'subjective' realisat¬
ion has no 'objective' basis, but rather, that 'logical'
and 'rational' are things to do with human perception
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and judgement.
If Barth means by ontological ratio, something
which is "out there" as far as humans are concerned,
yet "out there, in a mind", that is "in the mind of
God", then we cannot see how "ontological" applies,
for if it is thought of as existing in a mind, then
"noetic" would seem a more fitting term than "onto-
logical".
One of the problems of understanding Barth at
this point is that the term is used so loosely that
one cannot know specifically which of these he means#
In our view, the term remains an anomoly, like the
term "wooden iron". We can only go on now to see
how he views the relation between "ontological ratio"
and "noetic ratio".
ilow hoes Barth Use tnese Aerins?
We have referx^ed to these categories of "noetic
ratio" and "ontological ratio" in the foregoing as
Earth's categories, even though they appear in his
book on Anselm. Wo have done so.as we have said at
the outset of this chapter} because we cannot find any
evidence that Anselm used such categories. We have
not found, (and Barth does not give citations of)
Anselm using these terms. We have referred to these
categories as Barth's categories for the additional
reason that at points he uses the terms independently
of his interpretation of Anselm's text, and in a way
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that is. in our view, meant to be normative for twentieth
century thought. So, for example, when Barth ventures
suppositions about how such an argument as Anselm's
could have real force (in his interpretation) for an
unbeliever, he ventures that it is this "ontological
ratio" which "enlightens man from above", which makes
tae argument effective. here he uses the berm "object¬
ive ratio". yet in other places he uses "objective
ratio" and "ontologies! ratio" interchangeably• Thus
the argument could he effective for the unbeliever
because of "the objective ratio of the object of faith
that enlightens...(and is) able to teach truths that
are beyond the power of one human being to teach
another."^" Barth then lays beside this conception
of "objective ratio" which he attributes to Anselm,
his own view of how this conception of "objective ratio"
actually applies in the situation of preaching. That
is, "...where the first mid last presupposition of the
preacher must be trust in the objective ratio that...
enlightens from above ... and where we must wove on...
2
b° our task with a sense of humour..." ho vie can
only conclude that this is a normative view of Barth.
how we may ask, what does Barth. the interpreter
mean when he uses these terms of his. It would appear
that there are two realms of ratio. There is the
i* A.F. ,•»!.. p.?l.
Ihid. (emphasis added).
iQ5
"noetic ratio" of the theologian. But there Id also
i o "o tolo. ical ratio" of ••the beyond", of t .elty
existing l,> complete independence Iron the human. mind.
Biis latter is not only tie proper object of the
theologian's study, but is that on which the "noetic
ratio" is completely dependent, not only for its
content, but for its existence. Xhe "noetic ratio"
is 'bnlightened from above" by this "ontologies! ratio".
Without this relationship, one/almost pure dependence
of t :© "noetic ratio" upon the "ontologioal ratio",
theology would be impossible. The job of t. .0 "noetic
ratio" is to reproduce the "ontologies! ratio" with
accuracy and "faithfulness".
,e will see now how Earth's idea of analogy
derives from his view of these two realms of ratio.
In this idea of analogy the primary 'partner* of the
analogy is in the realm of the "ontological ratio"1.
Earthly reality is then to be interpreted as being
analogous with the reality of this other realm. For
examples one does not gain a notion of what the
Heavenly father Is like from earthly fathers, or
human parents, but rather, just the reverse. One
now what a human father should proper! ) be
by first knowing specifically what the Heavenly a-other
is like."'' Thus in this form of analogy one gets his
notion or idea from tho realm of "the beyond".
1. J.J.II/1, pp.229ff.
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Barth abhors types of analogy which travel in the
opposite direction, specifically the Catholic analo; ia
entla. which in Berth's view has the reverse procedure.
•That is, one travels roughly from earthly reality to
the realm of "the beyond".
It is somewhat interesting then to compare this
idea of analogy with the manner in which one gets an
idea of the meaning of the 'key phrase' according to
Anselm. In Anselm's response to Gaunilo he ad resses
this issue: How does one get an idea or notion of"that
than which nothing-greater-can-be-thought"? Gaunilo
Insists he cannot "form an idea of it from other
1
tilings similar to it." Anselm responds: Goviously
this is not so", and proceeds to show how he thinks
a notion can be formed^ "mounting from the less good
to the more good...it is evident to every rational
mind that...we can...conjecture a great deal about
2
th ;t—than—which-a greater-cannot-be-thought." ihat
he has earthl.y reality in mind as his starting point,
"mounting from the less good to the more good"is
underlined when he remarks that should any "orthodox
Christian" deny this, let his remember that 'the
invisible things of God from the Creation of the world
are clearly seen through the things that have been
1. Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo, Charlesworth, p.187,
line 5.
2. Ibid., lines 6-11.
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made, even his eternal power and God head Fitomans I,
HO]'."1
With his citation of Romans, then,Anselm would
appear to be underlining and supporting the 'rightnes
of his "mounting from the less good to the more good"
that is his use of 'the things that have been made'.
In short, we find Anselm forming notions from earthly
reality. And this is quite in contrast to Barth's
method of forming notions from other wordly reality
which will be applied to earthly reality.
We would see considerable "dissonance" then
between what we find to be Anselm's method hare, and
both Barth's interpretation of Anselm's method, and
Barth's own method of analogy which comes into operat
ion in the Ghurch Dogmatics«
We shall deal with these concepts at various
points as we go on now to consider the text of Anselm
Proslogion and Earth's interpretation of it.
1. Ibid., lines 30-35
gftfipIftff II,i
CONSIDERATION OF TUN TEXT OF THE i--ROSLOGION
A.»D EARTH'S INTERPRETATI E A OF IT.
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Section A.
auBCIDBfATIQh Pi? 1V:B IPX? OF TAB PR0SL0GI0N A iO BARSIi' S
I.A AxhuATIiA urn IS: i..., xAUCBiHJAB tfm SHALL FOLLOW♦
We shall now turn to considex^ in some detail
the text of the Froslogion, and Barth's interpretation
of it. In the chapters which follow we shall take up
, Sec j-io'nt
one element or aspect in each/sHaptar§ examine the text,
examine Barth's interpretation and offer a critique in
the sane place.
following this part of our study we will consider
more genei'al issues concerning Barth's interpretation.
At the conclusion of Part II of our thesis we shall draw
together and summarize our findings.
Be shall begin with a brief summary of Anselm's
argument in the roslogion. Chapter II (our own account).
A Summary of Anselm's Argument in the Froslogion,
Chanter II.
Ansola first sets out a definition of the deity.
If wc define him as: that-than-which-no—greater-can-be-
conceived, then we can reason as follows:
If one can hear and understand this phrase one
can then have it in his mind, as a conception. But
which is greater: this idea as it exists in the mind
alone, or also in reality? But surely if it exists in
1, The Insipiens or Fool who does not believe is brought
in here, as one who can hear and understand this
phrase, and follow as the argument proceeds. There
is no evidence that he is 'left behind' at any point
as the argument proceeds.
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reality it is greater. But then it must be the case
that it exists in reality, because if it existed in
the mind alone, one could think of a greatex- than that-
than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought. But such a
state of affairs would be absurd. Therefore that-than
which-a~greater~cannot—be-thought must exist in reality
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Section B«
THE MOO! OF THE OPENING OF ANLELM'S PROSLOGIONt
THE OPENING PRAYER AN! EARTH'S 8 CONCLUSIONS1
Barth makes much of the fact that Anselm begins his
Proslogion in prayer. Barth in fact derives much support
for his interpretation of Anselm from this fact. We will
first consider this prayer, then take up Earth's inter¬
pretation of it.
Let us turn to the opening of Anselm's Proslogion prayer
and let us try to sense the underlying mood, the character of
Anselm's prayer. It is a complex piece, one fraught with
difficulties for the interpreter; there are nuances and
allusions which perhaps only a contemporary, or Anselm himself
could sense. Yet its main concerns are clear enough.
In the prayer, which has the title "A Housing of the
Mind to the Contemplation of God", Anselm does not show
forth sure and certain faith, with which perhaps to bring
the same to the fore in his reader. In contrast, there is
a depth out of which Anselm asks for help, a depth of
'lostness* and a depth of longing to know "the countenance",
"the face" (of the deity). There is an underlying sense
of emptiness and unfulfilment.
"The countenance" that he wants to know, is a
recurring concern in his prayer. Is the countenance benign,
friendly or one of concern, or is it, rather, one of anger.
Is it,/perhaps, worsej, one of indifference?
He wants to know, and he does not. "How long, Lord,
Ill
will you be unmindful of us? 'How long will you turn your
countenance from us'?1 When will you look upon us and
2
hear us? When will you enlighten our eyes and show
•Your countenance' to us?^ When will you give yourself
again to us?..."^ Anselra continues in a way that suggests
a deep identification with the psalmist who vocalizes his
concern. He now uses his own words "...I beseech you,
Lord, let me not go sighing hopelessly, but make me breathe
hopefully again. My heart is made bitter by its
desolation..•I set out hungry to look for you...Do not let
me depart from you fasting...Do not let me return scorned
5
and emptyhanded.
Thus there is a real question here as to whether this
contenance will be benign, that is, will this countenance
be one that is benign, and 'giving', or will it be one
which returns this one, searching for Him, scorned and
/r
emptyhanded.
The one who searches for this countenance and wants to
know it, speaks as one who is 'out of relation' with that
which he seeks. That is, he speaks into the void. He
speaks into the darkness. Thus there is another question
implicit in his speaking: Is there a face? Is there a
countenance? In short, Does the one exist, whom he is
addressing.
1. Ps. xii, I.
2. Ps. xii, 4.
3. Ps. lxxix, 4.
4. Charlesworth, p.113, (last three lines), p.115, lines 1-3.
5. Ibid.f p.115, lines 8-16.
6. Ibid., p.115, line 15.
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We in no way see that simply because Anselm addresses
a Thou, that it necessarily follows tnat the one who
addresses has faith that there is a Thou, and more than
that, has sure and certain faith that there is a Thou.
Additionally, it would seem that the one who speaks here
is out of relation with the One he would address.
While on the one hand we are not saying this implies
total doubt, yet on the other hand, any faith that is sure
and certain, of itself or its Object would seem to be
absent. At best, we can only find faith that is troubled,
faith that is uncertain, perhaps deeply troubled and deeply
uncertain.
Thus the mood is one of darkness, one of apart¬
ness, one of longing, and of a felt helplessness that would
seem to border on hopelessness.
That the one who would address this Thou is 'out of
relation' with whom he wishes to address is underlined by
the manner in which the Fall is spoken of, that is, in a
way in which one senses that this Fall is experienced, and
experienced as somewhat overwhelming.
How wretched man's lot is when he has lost that for
which he was made! Oh how hard and cruel was that
FallJ...He [Adam] groaned with fullness; we sigh
with hunger. He was prosperous; we go begging....
Why, since it was easy for him, did he not keep for
us that which we lack to much? Why did he deprive
us of light and surround us with darkness? Why did
he take life away from us and inflict death upon us?
Poor wretches that we are, whence have we been
expelled and whither are we driven? Whence have we
been cast down1and whither buried? From our homeland
into exile....
1. Ibid.. p.113, lines 1-22.
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Anselm is deeply expressive here. That 'loss of relation'
is central here, and loss of 'the countenance' which he
seeks in the opening of the prayer seem clear by the way
he continues:
[Whence have we been expelled, and whither are we
driven?From the vision of God into our present
blindness; from the joy of immortality into the
bitterness and horror of death....What a grievous
loss, a grievous sorrow, utterly grievous!1
In what follows Anselm refers again to this loss of
relation. "Alas, unfortunate that I am, one of the
• 2
miserable children of Eve separated from God...."
Now one may object to this interpretation, saying that
Anselm has taken up the pose of one who doubts, in order
perhaps to vocalize and articulate the doubts of his reader,
that is, as a competent actor in drama might convincingly
do, acting the part of one who doubts. Yet even if this
were so, we would note (1) that Anselm speaks so convincingly
and with such expressiveness that he must well have known
and experienced that which he talked of; (2) that even if
this were so, the argument begins against the same backdrop,
that is, of what has actually been articulated in the prayer.
Anselm has still begun his Proslogion with the articulation
of this dark mood of doubt, or, at best, troubled faith
mixed with doubt.
Even though faith is seen to be important for what
follows in his Proslogion, near the end of the prayer, it
1. Ibid.. lines 19-26.
2. Ibid., lines 27-28.
3. "For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe;
but I believe so that I may understand [sed cred® ut
intelligaraJ... (Ibid., p.115). In this context one
should be careful not to interpret "believe" automatically
(Contd.
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would seem quite unnatural for there to be a transition
suddenly from the mood we have described, to sure and
certain faith, for the beginning of his arguments. As
we can find no evidence of such a dramatic transition,
we can only conclude that this mood of doubt, or troubled
and uncertain faith is meant to form not only the backdrop
but the point of departure for the arguments which follow.
Thus when at the beginning of the chapter which follows we
find the words "...now we believe that you are something
than which nothing greater can be thought", and in the line
before, "...grant me that I may understand...that you
exist as we believe you to exist...", the meaning, and thus
the force of "believe" here must be seen as modified by
the whole of the prayer which has just finished. Thus we
must see, at most, a tsntativeness here, congruent with
the mood of the prayer. Simply because the word is credo
does not mean that it is the credo which thunders forth
with the affirmation of certainty from the Mass or the
creed "Credo ia.unum deum...". We have seen no thundering
forth in this manner in the opening prayer. Such a sudden
transition of mood, again, would seem quite unnatural, and
we can find no evidence even to suggest it.
The mood of this opening prayer stands out in sharp
relief when compared with the manner in which Anselm closes
his Froslogion1. In Chapter 26, one no longer hears sighs
Contd.) as "believe with certitude", or as believing
untroubled by doubts. That it occurs within this
context suggests, in our view, quite strongly, that for
Anselm faith and doubt were not like oil and water,
i.e.,'unraixable'•
1. Pointed out by J. Mclntyre in St. Anselm and His Critics.
Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, p. 1954, p.^f'f.
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of hopelessness, agony over Adam's Fall, nor petition for
help in distress. Rather, one hears an almost unbounded
expression of exuberance. Anselm speaks of a Joy which
touches the roots of his being.
Since it was the Fall of Adam which was so acutely
experienced in the opening and, here at the conclusion,
the experience of this Fall is no longer present in a
relevant way, and since the Fall of Adam had to do, even
in Anselm's words, with 'separation', 'exile', 'loss of
relation' it would seem then that the change of mood has
to do, to some extent at least with a change vis a vis
Anselm's faith and restored relationship.
If it were only the case here, as Barth insists,
that a theologian has only better understood the inter¬
relations between previously accepted articles of faith,
and that his work, by definition, could be of no aid to his
faith, we would find not only the extended reference to the
experience of the Fall of Adam, at the beginning of the
Proslogion. and the consequent expression of exuberant
happiness, here at the conclusion, in terms alluding to
entering "into the Joy of the Lord"1 which so touches the
whole of his being that "when the heart is filled with that
Joy, the mind is filled with it, the soul is filled with it,
[and] the whole man is filled with it...",2 we would find
such a change of mood somewhat puzzling, if only an
intellectual process, even a very satisfying intellectual
3
process, such as Barth describes, had taken place.
1. Charlesworth, p.153, lines 11,12.
2. Ibid., lines 5-7.
3. We would add to this the view of J. Mclntyre, whose remarks
suggested this idea, that "This change of mood from
(Contd.
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Earth's Interpretation of the Opening Prayer
How then does Barth interpret the Opening Prayer.
He simply does not interpret it. He begins his 'verse
by verse' treatment of the text of the Proslogion with
Chapter 2, that is, that which immediately follows the
prayer. V,Te can find no consideration of the text, or the
content of the prayer anywhere in Barth's study.^ If our
interpretation of the prayer is somewhat near the mark, it
consider ii
is not in Barth's interests to/rlfi bc. For, in Barth's
interpretation, Anselm begins his 'argument' with untroubled
faith. That is, the methodological point of departure of
Anselm*s argument is sure and certain faith, faith with
essentially no admixture of doubt; and with unproblematic
belief in the totality of 'the Credo'.
By interpreting Anselm as beginning in this manner, it
would be our opinion that here, right at the beginning,
Barth has "gotten off on the wrong foot", or at least a
misleading one, and that this has shaped his whole inter¬
pretation of the Proslogion. Unfortunately, we find
that he has completely ignored the prayer, its nature and
character, which immediately precedes the arguments, wrongly
concluding from the fact that Anselm prays, that the argument
takes sure and certain faith, and an actualized relationship
to God as its methodological point of departure.
Contd.) c.l to c.26 is so marked that it appears
permissible to conclude that the address to God which
occupies cc.2-25 is the process in and through which St.
Anselm has been taken from uncertainty concerning God to
joy in his presence". Op.cit., p.9; Cf. p.10.
1. Even where Barth goes on about the prayer at some length,
it is solely about the significance of the fact that
Anselm prays (or Earth's interpretation of this
significance). Cf. A.F.G.I.. pp.101,102.
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Section C.
THE CHANGE OF CHARACTER IN ANSELH'S 'KEY PHRASE1:
BARTH'S INTERPRETATION^
At the beginning of the Proslogion's arguments,
Anselm uses a phrase to describe the deity. God is "some-
2
thing than which nothing greater can be thought". This
phrase, with only minor variations, forms a thread through
the whole of Chapters 2 and 3> the arguments for the
existence of God, and indeed throughout the remaining
chapters of the Proslogion. This phrase is so central
in Anselm's arguments that it has commonly been called
"the key phrase". In the following we shall call it by
this name.
The main interest in the following pages is to show
how this phrase Is regarded, and how it changes in
character and meaning halfway through the argument in
Barth's interpretation; and further, how the whole
character of Anselm's thought is affected as a result.
In Barth's interpretation of Proslogion 2, there is
a basic shift in the meaning of the key phrase. Briefly,
the phrase, "that than which no greater can be conceived"
has one word which shifts meaning, thus radically altering
1. Ideas germa/ne to the following were first suggested
by McGill, in Hick and McGill, p.lOOff.
2. Proslogion. Chapter 2, Charlesworth, p.117.
3. McGill is also of this opinion, op.cit.. p.100.
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the character of the argument midstream. The word is
"can" (posse).
As the "argument" begins, "can" has behind it the
basic meaning "is able". Man is not able to conceive a
greater, or "this is that than which man is not able to
conceive a greater".1 As far as we can tell this word
retains a meaning within the range of "is able" throughout
the argument. And for this reason Anselm's argument remains
an argument.
Yet in Barth*s interpretation, there is a basic
alteration of meaning of this model auxiliary "can". It
occurs midstream in the argument in Prosloglon 2. Suddenly
lusipiens (we cannot call him a "fool" if he can follow
such an intricate argument as this!) is left behind.3 The
sense of the key phrase will have to become a forbidding
•no* to certain modes of thought. The sense of "cannot"
is altered from "is not able" to a quite different "is not
permitted". And the "key phrase", changes character in
Barthfs interpretation from having "a purely noetic" content
2
to embodying in Barth*s words a "prohibition" for thought.
Perhaps now one could briefly examine the text of
Chapter II of the Proslogion in light of this aspect of
1. Our own paraphrase of Anselm's phrase.
2. Barth speaks quite explicitly of the phrase as: "this
prohibition: he can conceive of nothing greater".
A.F.Q.I.,p.77.Cf. p.73ff. for Berth's characterization
of this phrase. Is there not much of the early Barth
here, for example, the loud snapping "neins" to man's
'initiative'? Does not again a human voice get confused
with a deity's voice (or so it does in our view), and
does not Barth here do the confusing, that is confusing
what he wishes to slap or snap at with a supposition as
to how the deity would react? Here we find much of the
early Barth.
3.Anselm has been explaining how this insipiens, that is,
the fool who says in his heart there is no God (Psalm 13:1)
can follow his argument.
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Earth*s interpretation. We shall explicate Earth's inter¬
pretation further in the process.
Firstly, is there literary evidence for a basic shift
in the nature of the argument, specifically where (in
Earth's interpretation) the insipiens is supposedly left
behind, and is no longer kept in mind? That is, is there
evidence that Anselra has left him behind? This supposed
change occurs at a specific point in Anselra's text.1 One
could ask two questions: (1) Is there literary evidence for
a radical change, and (2) Is there in fact literary evidence
which weighs against the existence of any such change.
The last sentence before this change is: "Even the
Fool, then, is forced to agree that something than which
nothing greater can be thought exists in the mind since he
understands this when he hears it and whatever Is understood
is in the mind". The text at the point of the supposed
change continues, and in the Latin we find these words:
"St certe...." i.e. "And surely that than which a greater
oannot be thought cannot (nequ.lt) exist in the mind alone".
2
"Li enlra vel..." "For if it exists solely in the mind...".
Not only can one see no evidence of a change here, but:
(1) St certe suggests a continuation of the same train of
thought;-^ and (2) this impression is strengthened by the
beginning of the next sentence "Si enira vel...", "For if...".
1. In the Latin text, line 15 in Charlesworth, p.116; In
translation, line 22, p.117, ibid. Earth pinpoints
this sentence as the point of change. In exegeting the
passage following this, he begins: "We have now entered
upon the Proof proper..." A.F.Q.I..p.123. In the context
of Earth's discussion this indicates the point of change.
Cf. Ibid.. p,123f.
2. Charlesworth, p.117, lines 19-24 for this whole passage.
3. Suggested by McGill, in Hick and McGill, pp.100,101.
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Both of these literary connectives in the Latin text
suggest an even flow of thought, with no real shift,
either of intention or intended audience.
Secondly, is there evidence for a basic shift in the
meaning of the "key phrase" and specifically of that modal
auxiliary, "can" (posse)?
We may note at the outset that posse in Latin usage is
ambivalent, and can have at least two basic fields of
meanings. The one, of course, is "is able". The other
centers around "is permitted"; and one would suppose that
the context in which it would be most relevant is a legal
one, or one having to do with actions, for example, in the
social-political sphere, or with mores, customs, traditions.1
Again we could go first to the text with the question.
As the key phrase moves throughout the short chapter, are
there signs that this modal auxiliary within it undergoes
a basic change of meaning? It is quite clear that in the
beginning of the argument its meaning is within the field
of "is able".
1. In A Latin Dictionary, ed. C.T. Lewis and Charles Short,
Oxford, London, 1940, we find: "possum"
I. In gen., to be able, have power; I (thou, he, etc.)
can...; it may be, is possible...as much as (or) as
far as possible;
II.In partic., to be able, to have Influence or
efficacy, to avail; ... Posse as subst. (poet.) the
power of speech!.".".;
In apodosis of conditional sentences, analogous to
the auxiliaries of the Eng. potential mood.
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(1) We note that Anselm uses the term posse
throughout the argument. There is no change of word
which might indicate a shift of meaning.
There is one exception to this. In the sentence which
follows the supposed change in the nature of the argument,
the word Anselm uses in place of posse in the key phrase
is neqult.1 This is of definite interest, for nequire
does not share the same ambivalence of meaning as posse.
2
Its basic meaning is "to be unable".
So in the study of the literary aspect of the text
we can find no evidence of a change. We can in fact find
evidence to the contrary.
Thus, in the midst of the section of the argument where
Barth sees the key phrase suddenly taking on the character
of a prohibition, and thus in a place where one would thus
expect the modal auxiliary in the key phrase to shift from
"is not able" (that than which one is not able to think of
a greater) to "is not permitted" (that than which one is not
permitted to think of a greater) one finds nequit (nequire)
substituted for the more common posse. Further: nequire
does not have this secondary "prohibitive" sense which p&sse
can.^ We can only conclude that Anselm had no intention of
1. Line 16 of the Latin text, Ibid.
2. We shall establish this in what follows.
3. In Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary (op.cit.) we find:
"nequeo: to be unable, not to be able, I cannot." All
of these, we may note have to do with "is able". We
find only one other listing: "impers: it is impossible."
This last, "it is impossible" is used in an impersonal
sense. Thus it carries no sense of "beiy prohibited".
The example given 6y Lewis and Short would bear this out.
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implying a prohibition with his key phrase.
One could argue that thinkers in the medieval period
were basically insensitive to the question of meaning,
and thus basic shifts of meaning. That is, that Western
man grew only much later to sense the complexity of these
issues, and that if there was such a shift of meaning, that
Anselm simply could not be aware of the "mistake", and thus
be excused.
But there is evidence to the contrary, not only that
medieval thinkers were sensitive to this problem but also
that there was an awareness that some thinkers could and
would use fluidity of meaning to their advantage in a way
which one could only call subterfuge.
To the first point firstly: as to whether Anselm
in particular was sensitive to the complexity of meaning,
and in particular the meaning of modal auxiliaries.
That Anselm was sensitive to complexities of meaning,
and meanings of modal auxiliaries is evident in his
de Grammatica. We may note that the probable date of
composition of the latter is relatively close to the
probaMe date of the Proslogion (1080-85 and 1078 respect¬
ively). Here we find that posse can carry the sense of
having power, having competence in doing something; and
also whether something is within the range of possibility.^"
What we find then is a consideration of the complexity of
the meanings of modals and posBe in particular.
To the second point as to whether there was sensitivity
1. D.P. Henry, The Logic of St. Anselm. London, 1967,
p,140ff.
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to the misuse of words, of "getting places (illegitimately)
with words", one of Anselm's pupils was sensitive and to
the extent that he commented on Anselm himself in this
respect:
(Anselm taught) not as others do, but in a vastly
different way, explaining each point by referring
to common and well-known examples, and basing it on
solid arguments, without any ornaments or tricks of
speech. ^
The proximity of the two phrases, "solid arguments" and,
in contrast, "tricks of speech" suggest a sensitivity to
language, particularly in the field of argumentation and
suggests an awareness that words can "play tricks on you",
and perhaps also that the one who argues can use language
in a deceptive manner.
Another Approach to the Problem
We can look at this supposed change from another
angle. Barth sees the phrase as having a "purely noetic
O
content" at the outset. But (as we have pointed out)
there comes a point in the text when the insipiens is left
behind, and after this point the phrase is seen as a
prohibition. Just what Barth means by "purely noetic
content" is not made clear. But what would seem clear is
that the phrase is, in a Barthian framework of thinking,
inert, inactive, without the character of being "Word" or
at least considered as such. In contrast, suddenly after
1. Eadmer, Vita Anselmi. ed. E.W. Southern, London, 1962,
p. 56. Cited in Charlesworth, p.11.
2. A.F.Q.I., p.83; also pp.lOOff.
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line 15 of Chapter Two the phrase is a prohibition, a
•revealed rule for thought'; in short it is suddenly Word.
Barth remarks that interpreters have ignored "the revelatory-
theological character of [the key phrase]"."'
Perhaps now we could turn to another central aspect
of Earth's interpretation of Proslogion. Chapter II, and
this key phrase in particular. It is as if a deus ex
machina must enter halfway through the argument, interrupt
the reader and say: "Look here: you can't think like that.
I Li
I wont have it, this thinking of a greater. This is the
consequence we see when this phrase is interpreted as
(1) having the nature of a prohibition, and (2) having a
"theological-revelatory character", that is, being a Word
of prohibition.
The success of Anselm's argument, in Earth's inter¬
pretation, is dependent on this change midstream in the
1. Charlesworth, p.116.
2. A.F.Q.I., .p.77.
3« A.F.Q.I., p.78, n.2.
4. If this is Barth's deity, one could think of a greater,
namely one who would refrain from interrupting or
erupting this way in the midst of man's reflective
process. It would be "big" of the deity to allow man
to have peace, detachment and a mind of his own, as in
reality seems the case, even if man may be somewhat
wrongheaded at times. If this freedom is there, then
one could only conclude that the deity has been "big"
enough to take this risk. There are too many all too
human thinkers who would want to take away this freedom
and thus remove all such risks.
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Proslogion. Chapter 2. As far as one can see, this change
means a considerable change of meaning of the "key phrase"
and concurrently a considerable change in the whole ethos
and tone of the argument. A quiet meditative reflection
suddenly bodies forth some command which has struck down
into man's reflective process from above. And this has
happened with no change of literary style, no obvious
change of tone of the argument, no change of words in the
key phrase. In short, we can see no solid hint of this
in the argument.
We can only conclude then, if Barth is correct, that:
(1) Anselm is careless, or quite uncritical in his
use of words, shifting meanings at critical junctures
with no notice given, or doing this clandestinely, by
using a word (posse) which can embody at least two
widely disparate meanings.
(2) Not only is Anselm uncritical or careless in the
use of words but he is unaware of a basic shift of the
nature of his argument. Either he is not aware, or,
worse, not willing to be open and explicit with his
reader about what is occurring in his argument, and
about that on which his argument depends for its
validity.
In short he is either a quite uncritical thinker, or
quite an opportunistic thinker. Opportunistic, one would
have to add, in the name of a higher good, i.e. in order to
be convincing in a good cause.
It is interesting that points (1) and (2) above could
easily fill out the meaning of the term which Barth uses
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here and later in the C.D:"implicit apologetics". What
Barth sees Anselm doing, and on another level wants to
see happening in Anselm's argument, what one could call
a deus ex nachina intervening in midstream, these very-
things can help us understand what Barth meant by implicit
apologetics.
Are we right then in understanding Barth about this,
namely that certain portions of the Proslogion are to be
understood and "heard" as "Word", and that apart from this
happening, the whole thing falls through? By "this", we
mean of course the deus ex machina which we have Just
referred to which intervenes in the midst of the argument.
We may note the rather important implications of this,
if we are correct. For Barth there are three forms of
"the Word": "The Word Revealed" (Incarnation...), The Word
Written (Scripture), and the Word Preached (Preaching).
Theology or Dogmatics is to be distinguished carefully
from each of these, as reflection upon "the Word", and
not "Word" itself. It is to be distinguished from preaching
in particular.1
But here in the Proslogion we have what Barth explicitly
considers "a model piece of good, penetrating and neat
theology, which at every step [he has] found instructive and
2
edifying". And we find that here a human word, AnBelm*s
word, is to be a considered "Word". And at that, not in any
X* C.D. 1/1, pp.93-140.
2. A.F.Q.I.. p.9.
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inert way, but in an active, "inbreaking" way, so
characteristic of earlier Barthian thought. In short
it is 'Event*.
In the closing paragraph of Barth's book on Anselm
he states:
God. gave himself as the object of his [Anselm's]
knowledge and God illumined him [Anselm] that he
might know him as object. Anart from this event
there is no proof of the existence, that is of the
reality of God.••.In the oower of this event.•.nl
Obviously, then, for Barth theology is not only
reflection upon "Word", but "Word" itself.
The consequence of this is that it would be impossible
for Barth to maintain any clear distinction at this noint
between theology and preaching. Both intend to address
hearers, and both intend to address hearers, at points, as
"Word".
This should be instructive in understanding the
overall nature of the Church Dogmatics which Barth
commenced with at the same time as he wrote the above
words, quite favorably, about Anselm's theology.
An Argument from Authority
As we have already described, in Barth's interpre¬
tation there is, in the thinking and reflecting moment, a
sudden disruption, an intrusion into this important moment
in man's personal life. We refer to the "theological-
revelatory character" of the key phrase as it takes the form
1. A.F.Q.I.. p.171, underlining added.
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of a Word of prohibition. One says disruptive and
intrusive, for what Barth intends or wants to see is a
disruption by an authority; a command, and a negative
command at that.
This is not a side issue or a minor element in Berth's
interpretation of Anselm's Proslogion for without this
supposed intrusion, the argument, for Barth, would end in
futility.1 It would seem that Anselm's words carry weight
and have validity only with this supposed intrusion. It
becomes, as McGill suggests, just what Anselm intends it to
avoid becoming, (and Barth explicitly acknowledges with
ostensible approval, this intention): an argument from
2
authority.
One would note also that in Barth's interpretation of
Anselm's Proslogion. theology takes on and has to take on,
the character of preaching, for it to succeed in the manner
that Barth wishes it to. It is this supposed intrusion
into the moment of reflection which would give it this
character.
One could note also that the supposed intrusion that
Km in W<
Barthyperhaps is not supportive of free inquiry. It takes
the form of a prohibition. One could say that this supposed
intrusion is one that would be hostile to thought. It
takes the form of "Thou shall not think such and such...".
1. p. 171.
2. HcGill would also understand Barth's interpretation in
this manner. Q-p.cit.. p.lOlf.
Barth points out that an essential element in Anselm* s
methodology is a manner of argumentation which avoids
argument "from authority". This is in connection with
the intention to prove "sola ratione", or by means of
"necessary reasons". Whatever the latter phrase means,
it indicates the intention to avoid "argument from
authority".
But then, in Berth's interpretation, Anselm's argument
in the Proslogion Chapters 2 and 3 involves what appears as
a deus ex machina. an intervention of a deity who "speaks"
a word of "prohibition". As we have seen, the success of
Anselm's argument in Barth's interpretation is dependent
on the intervention of this authority, and dependent, on
no less than an authoritarian intervention: Not all
authorities intervene, and not all intervene in a manner
which is prohibitive, here, prohibitive of thought.
Barth then has failed to point out a basic and
essential contradiction between what he sees as Anselm's
methodology, on the one hand, (i.e. what Anselm has said he
is doing), and his method on the other hand (i.e. the actual
path he has supposedly taken in his argument). Thus, in
Barth*s interpretation Anselm has failed in an essential way
to live up to his explicit intention. And Barth the inter¬
pretive critic has failed to note the contradiction in his
interpretation of Anselm.1
Since Barth, so far as we know, is the only interpreter
1. This problem was cited first by McGill, in Hick and
McGill, p.lOlf.
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to interpret Anselm in this manner, and since there are so
many obvious difficulties with this interpretation, we
may ask: Why does Barth so interpret Anselm? That is, why
does he go so far out of his way to bring this authoritarian
element into the midst of Anselm's reflective moment?
Is this not a Barthian krisls which supposedly erupts]
Not a crisis in the most common sense of the English word,
but a supposed in-breaking of Judgement? This is our view,
since because we can find no Justification for Earth's inter*-
preting Anselm in the manner he does, we can only conclude
that Barth has Inadvertently mis-interpreted Anselm in such
a manner which would support his own views in theological
matters,
Tiie krlsis which supposedly erupts the inbreaking of
judgement which takes the form of a strict and harsh
prohibition, namely, not to think such and such, does in
fact re-echo a common and central theme of Earth's own
theologizing in the decade and a half immediately preceding
the composition of this book on Anselra.1 We would then see
this basic element of Barth's interpretation of Anselm as
an element carried over from this earlier period of his
thought.
1, Cf, Zahrnt, p.23ff«» especially p.25ff. In the Commentary
on Romans, second edition of 1920, the expression krisis
occurs on nearly every other page. It is a central and
key theme of Earth's early theology.
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Section D.
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Barth states quite categorically (1) that the
'key phrase', "that than which nothing greater can be
conceived", is taken from the Credo";"1" (2) it thus has
2 y v
the status of an article of faith, and (3) that Anselm
"declares quite explicitly the source from which ho con¬
siders it to have corae to him".^ He also states (4)
that the key phrase is in fact a 'Name of God* and (5)
that "it is in fact as far as Anselm is concerned a
revealed Hams of God."
As (1), (2) and (p) form a group, let us consider
these first. As to (1), the central and most important
statement here, we can find absolutely no substantiation
in Barth's text for this statement, That is, no source,
no concrete text is ever cited where this phrase or any¬
thing near it occurs, whether scripture, Creeds, or 'the
Fathers'. 2he objection that LcGill raises to this assert¬
ion of Barth is only partially to the point. McGill
remarks that it is simply not the type of phrase that
one finds in a Creed. It has no resemblance to a
5
Credal declaration. Yet while Barth means to cover a
wider territory than ^ust creeds with his term 'the
Credo', that is, more or less the whole of the
•authoritative documents' of the Church, excluding
/*
Ccripture, i.e., Creeds and 'Official roctrine',we may
1* . • «1 #« p.78.
2. Implicit in the same assage, Ibid.. p.78,
3. Ibid.. p.77
4. Ibid,, emphasis added .
5. Of. Hick and McGill, p.93ff.
6. gee above, p.91#
note that, given even this wider ground we still find no
substantiation of Barth's claim, no citation from any
source in Barth*s work. If Anselm does in fact "declare
quite explicitly the source [from which it came]" we find
this lack of citation somewhat odd.
There is only one Substantiating footnote* to this
passage in Barth*s study concerning Anselm*s 'explicit
declaration' of the source. Here we find what we take
to be an attempt at substantiating this claim indirectly
from something that Anselm has said. The footnote consists
simply of a short passage from the Proslogion, and a more
or less superfluous comment:
Si enim aliqua mens posset cogitare aliquld melius te,
ascenderet creatura super Creat'orem et.iudicaret de
Creators: quod Wide est absurdum I'... For if some
intelligence could think of something better than you,
the creature would be above its creator --.and that is
completely absurd], (Prosl. 3il,103»4ff)
Barth adds only a comment on the fittingness of Anselm's
use of melius rather than maius in the passage.
How this passage from Anselm has anything to do with
indicating the source of the phrase is not indicated. The
passage would seem to concern 'conceiving* (cogitare). and
the absurdity of conceiving of something better than the
deity.
As we have already remarked, in (4) and (5)» Barth
states categorically that this phrase, "that than which
nothing greater can be conceived" Is "a Name of God". He
A.F.Q.I.. p.77, footnote 4. We have added Charlesworth's
translation of the passage, and left it standing since
there seem to be no real textual difficulties here.
Charlesworth, p.119.
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also states that this is not his interpretation, but that
this is Anselm's view of the phrase.
Neither in the footnote to this statement, nor in what
follows this passage, do we find any reference to anything
which Anselm has said which might substantiate this.
But then if it is Barth's view, that this phrase is
"a Name of God": (l) What does he mean, and (2) How does
he substantiate his quite categorical statement that it
n
is "a Name of God".
From the footnote to this passage1 it would seem that
Earth means something similar to a usage of nomen in
Medieval Scholasticism. There occurs among the scholastics
the term "nomen Dei". Yet, as Barth has to admit, all
three writers whom .he cites, Bonaventura, Thomas and
Agidius of Rome, use this term in the sense of the
nomen essentiale Dei, that is, "the Nature of God". Barth
contrasts this meaning to his own meaning of nomen. For
Barth, the 'key phrase' is a "nomen personae". What he
means by this, in contrast to the Medieval usages he cites
is not clear. What is clear is that he means something
quite different from any source, Medieval or otherwise, that
he can draw on. Thus we find no substantiation from a text of
Anselra supporting Earth's contention. And we find that
when Barth has considered other usages of the terra nomen
in such a context as this, he cannot find a precedent for
his specific use of the term, and thus no precedent for his
specific way of regarding the phrase.
A.F.Q.I.. p.77, n.5»
A Supposition as to the Source
Our task, namely of examining the viability of Earth*s
interpretation of Anselm, and specifically the question of
the source of the 'key phrase* could well end here. We
have found Earth's view of the source of the key phrase to
be unsupportable and even lacking in any textual evidence.
Yet we could go on and raise the question: Where might
Anselm have found such a phrase, or a phrase close enough
to it to have been suggestive?
To the Library of Bee
If we go to the small library of the monastery of Bee
in the early 1100's, that is, about twenty-five years after
Anselm was to piece together his argument in a nearby room,
and we can go there, at least in our imagination, thanks to
a * catalogue' of the books in the library drawn up at this
time,1 we would find the books of no less than three authors,
whose work might have proved suggestive for Anselra in the
production of his Proslogion, and which used phrases which
may have proved suggestive for Anselm's 'key phrase'.
Thus in both the works of Boethius and Augustine, two
authors Anselm 'knew* well, he might have found definitions
of the deity which were highly suggestive. In fact, in
Augustine's De Libero Arbitrio. Anselm would have found an
argument for the existence of God which has marked
similarities with, as well as equally significant differences
1. Charlesworth cites sources, op.cit., p.15. See also foot¬
note 2 in the same place.
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from, his own argument.1 Augustine's argument would
seem to function in independence from 'authority1,
Scriptures or dogma, perhaps even in a *purely rational*
way.^
Yet to find those definitions of the deity which might
well have proved suggestive for Anselm we could go to





Aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest.
Something than which nothing greater can he thought.
Now we might go to the Confessions. VII. where we
find:
Neque enim ulla anima umquam potuit poteritj^j""'
cogitare aliquid. quod sit te melius, qui summum
et optimum bonum est.?
We may note that elements of Anselm's formula appear, yet
not the 'connective tissue*. The elements are not related
in the same way.
We might go also to Augustine's De Moribus Manichaeorum
where God is defined as a being
Quo esse aut cogitari melius nihil posslt^
Here again we find surprising similarities. We may note
that both of these instances exist separately from
1. Cf. Charlesworth, p.55f. See also footnote 1, p. 55,
where a comparison and contrast between Anselm's and
Augustine's works are drawn.
2. Cf. ibid.
3. Cf. ibid.. p.56, n.4.
4. There are minor variations of the phrase: "id quo maius
cogitari nequit"; "aliquid quo maius cogitare non
valet"; etc.
5. Cited in Charlesworth, p.56, n.4.
6. Ibid.
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Augustine's argument for the existence of God in De Libero
Arbitrio.
If we continue down the shelf in the library of Bee,
in the early 1100's, we find among quite a few other books
from ancient 'pagan* Rome, two copies of Maturales quaestiones
written by the Btoic, Seneca. Here in the preface to this
work we find a definition of God which is word for word
almost identical with Anselm's phrase. Firstly, Anselm's
phrase again:
"Aliquid quo nihil raaius cogitari potest".
Seneca's definition:
"...Qua nihil maius cogitarl potest".1
The context of this passage can be seen if we quote the
whole:
What is God? The mind of the universe; everything
that you see and everything that you do not see. His
greatness, than which nothing greater can be conceived,
is only attributed to him if he alone is everything,
if he holds his work from the inside and from the
outside.
Here then in Seneca's Naturales quaestiones we find a
phrase which word for word and in all essentials is
virtually identical with Anselm's phrase. We might also
note that it forms part of a definition of God. Could it
be that Anselm found his phrase here, in the work of a
'pagan* Roman Philosopher?^ This is where with others we
would venture a supposition, but one we think quite likely
for two reasons.
1. Cited in Charlesworth, p.56, n.4.
2. Translation given in Jonathan Barnes, The Qntological
Argument, Macmillan, London, 1972, p.7. We have made
only one minor change, translating cogitari as
'conceived', as is usually done, rather than 'imagined'
which is Barnes' translation. Emphasis is ours.
3. Barnes, op.cit.. p.7»t among others is of this opinion.
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Firstly, we know for sure that two copies of this work
n
of Seneca were in the library of Bee in the early 1100's,
that is, about twenty-five years after Anselm composed his
Prosloglon. It would then seem quite possible, even
quite likely, that at least one of these copies was present
in 1076-77 when Anselm wrote his Proslogion.
Yet, one might ask, even if a copy were present, what
were the chances that Anselm would have known of it? May
it not have been 'in a dark corner* lost in a host of
manuscripts, or neglected since it was a 'pagan*, not a
Christian, work?
To the first question, might it have been *lost in a
Uie y 4lei-
hOSt of manuscripts', and therefore easily passed byy/this
would seem highly unlikely. For in the eleventh and
twelfth centuries libraries existed only on a small scale.
The library of Bee in the early twelfth century contained
only one hundred and sixty-four volumes. Books in this
period then were scarce, and, perhaps as a consequence,
highly valued. They normally had a high circulation within
a monastery.
We may note also that Anselm would only have had to
read the preface to have run across this definition.
One might note also that there is evidence that 'pagan'
Roman writers were regarded with respect not only at Bee,
but across Medieval Europe in this period of the beginning
1. Ibid
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of 'the Twelfth Century Renaissance'. Alongside the study
of theology at Bee, one would have found the Roman poets,
Ovid, Virgil, Horace, the historical and philosophical
writings of Cicero, Pliny the Elder, Caesar, as well as
Seneca. *"
Even if neither of the two copies of Seneca's work
were present in Anselm's time, it is possible that it might
have been among the works that circulated among the
monasteries of France. There was a primitive system of
'library loans' in existence.
The second reason we think this supposition highly
likely is the closeness of the two phrases. There is no
major dissimilarity. Could it have been that Anselm's
phrase flowed off of his pen with naturalness after having
found the exact formulation of Seneca suggestive for his
own highly original line of reasoning? (We are not saying
of course that the phrase had the same meaning for both
authors).
If it might actually have been the case that Anselm's
phrase was suggested by his reading of Seneca, this would
shed a very different kind of light on Anselm's work, and
in particular the key phrase, from that in which the phrase
appears in Earth's interpretation. Rather than being
1. Evidence in Charlesworth, p.14. Cf. also Friedrich Heer,
The Medieval World: Europe from 1100 to 1350. Cardinal,
London, 1974.
2. Charlesworth, p.14.
3. Cf. Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St.
Anselm, Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1972, p.30f. '
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taken from 'the Credo* and assumed in faith, one would,
if the supposition here be correct, see Anselm finding his
highly prized phrase in the apparently pantheistic setting
of a work by a 'pagan' Roman philosopher.
One might note that even if Anselm might have used a
phrase almost word for word from another author, without
giving the source, this is hardly unusual for the Medieval
period. hor does it significantly decrease the originality
of Anselm's handiwork. After all, who among us 'lesser
mortal^ could have taken such an 'innocent looking' phrase
and forged an argument that was to set some of the greatest
minds in philosophy deep in thought and reflection until
they could reach some viewpoint concerning it. And so it
does yet in our own age.
What we would conclude from all of the foregoing, is
that Barth's assumption that the phrase is simply picked
out of 'the Credo* is not viable. In contrast there would
seem to be a high probability that the source of the 'key
phrase' is to be found in non-ecclesiastical philosophy.
We may note that if Augustine's works are the source of the
phrase, even here there is no evidence to suggest that the
phrase would have come from 'the Credo'.
Here then we have an example of a basic element of
Anselm's thought, whose probable source is to be found, not
in 'the Credo', but in philosophy, whether it be in 'the
philosophical Augustine' or Seneca, the Stoic.
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The Consequences of our Findings
We should point out that it is essential that this
phrase come from 'the Credo' if Berth's account of Anselm's
theological scheme is to be successful. For in his account,
this phrase is the chief and supreme element allegedly taken
from 'the Credo' and used to 'prove' or establish the
existence of the deity. That is it is chief among the
■
/
A B C D's taken from'the Credo'which go to 'prove' Anselm's X.
Compared with this one, the other 'presuppositions' taken
allegedly from"the Credo"are of such little consequence as
to merit attention only in a footnote in Earth's study.1 So
here^in the 'key phrase\ we have a crucial element for Earth's
v/hole interpretation. If this element does not come from
'the Credo', Barth's whole interpretation would seem to fall.
The key element of this alleged procedure was the lifting
out of one element from the Credo (as an X), not doubted, but
to be 'established' or 'proved' by means of other elements
(as ABC E's) each of which came from 'the Credo'. This is
the heart of the procedure Earth describes. These A B C D's
in Barth's own words are "found somewhere other than [they]
ought to be found in a philosopher who deduces the Credo a
orlori - namely on the same level on which the question to
be answered is raised, [that is,] within the Credo itself.
Within it, now this Article and now that Article figure as
the unknown X 'which is solved in the investigation by means
of the Articles of faith a, b, c, d... which are assumed to
2
be known.
1. Bee A.F.Q.I.. p.78, especially footnote 3*
2. A.F.Q.I.. p.55.
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Here, then, in our study, we have seen that there is
absolutely no evidence, that is substantiation, either by
citation of a text, or otherwise, (indirectly), that this
'key phrase', this chief and decisive element among the
A B C D's going to 'establish' Anselm's X comes from 'the
Credo'.1
In contrast to Barth's thesis, it seems quite likely that
the real source of this phrase is philosophical, and the
most probable concrete textual source would seem to be the
'pagan' stoic philosopher Seneca.
Of the several places that Barth's interpretation would
seem to us to fail, this is a central one.
1. McGill, among other interpreters, sees this as the
chief failing, among other failings of Barth's inter¬
pretation. Cf. Hick and McGill, p.93ff.
Section o.
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• ANSEL?T1 ic "GREATER THAN" PRECUPPOCITIOI)
Charlesworth, among other interpreters, points out an
assumption in Anselm's argument which we will try to isolate
out below. Our purpose in isolating this element out is
to ask about its nature, its importance in Anselm's argument
and about its most likely source. Unless we are wrong, it
forms a presupposition of a methodological sort which
contributes in a central and basic way to Anselm's arriving
at his conclusions.
The presupposition could be stated in a general form,
namely that one thing or being is "greater than" another if
it possesses certain attributes. "Greater than" lias the
sense of "better" or "more perfect".1 Thus, as Charlesworth
suggests, Anselm argues that" a man is "greater tnan" a horse,
by reason of his attributes. Likewise a horse is greater
2
than a tree by reason of the nature of its attributes.
"Greater" is not used in a quantitative sense, or various
other possible comparative or relative senses, but in an
absolute sense. For example, where we can compare in
particular respects, a man and a horse, and say that a horse
is greater, or more perfect in muscular ability, one such as
Anselm is saying that man is greater than or more perfect
than a horse in an absolute sense.
What lies behind this assumption is even more
interesting: using this idea of 'greater than', one finds




that the whole universe has been categorized into levels of
being, from inanimate matter at the lowest rung up to man
and beyond.
Involved with this mode of conception is the idea that
a being or object on a higher rung "has more being" than
the being or object on the rung just beneath. This raises
an interesting question, for on the surface, the question is
one of truth, that is, is a man "greater than" a horse, or
a horse "greater than" a tree, in em absolute sense?
One senses beneath this question of being a question
of value, for one decides this question only after taking
into account certain "attributes" these particulars possess.
And there would seem to be a weighting according to the
attributes considered. For example a tree lacks in muscular
ability compared with a horse. Y/hat one senses is the
involvement of values and value judgements in what at first
sight seems to be questions of truth, in truth judgements.
For example, for the poet, in contrast to the meta¬
physician, the superiority of a horse over a tree may not
at all be evident. A poet may in fact place a higher
value on the attributes of trees than on the attributes of
horses, and might, if he cared to, argue for their superiority!
Where the question may become more interesting is
where man is involved, over against a horse. It would se®m
that man is considered "greater" or better or "more perfect"
usually for the reason of his ability for ratiocination.
While not taking issue with this, one would venture
that a large value judgement is involved here also,
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specifically, the value of ratiocination. Why has
ratiocination been selected? One would note that the
person who usually makes this value Judgement, the philosopher,
perhaps above all others, is one who uses his process of
ratiocination in his daily work.
Why could not man be considered superior e.g. in the
reason of his capacity for relationship, for companionship,
that is, something which involves his whole personality?
Of course horses too, perhaps, are capable, in a limited
sense, of relationship, but not on the same level as man.
One raises the question to become better acquainted
with the values of the metaphysician, in this case, the
metaphysician of medieval times. Anselm is probably not
far off from Aristotle and Plato in their value scheme in
this respect. It would be understandable for a metaphysician
to consider ratiocination of higher value than the capability
e.g. for relationship. To poets and others these values
are not so obvious.
To return to our main theraeJ when one takes into account
this sense of 'greater than', allied with these levels of
being, i.e., that a being or object on a higher rung "has
more being" or existence than one on a lower rung, one can
sense better what Anselm means when in addressing the deity
he says that compared with the deity man hardly exists at all.
As Charlesworth points out, this idea of levels of
being and this sense of "greater than" strikes 20th century
readers as somewhat strange. We are not used to thinking
in these categories or with this sense of "greater than".
This raises the interesting question of its source or rootage.
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Firstly though, we shall consider what place this idea has
in Anseim's argument. Is it peripheral, of little
importance, or is it much more than tnat?
At several key points in Anselm's argument ne has to
ask whether A is "greater than" B. And if the answer is
positive, certain important consequences follow. This is
not only true in Chapters 2 and 3, the arguments for the
existence of God, but throughout the remaining 23 chapters.
In almost each case, it is a question of A being'greater
than B by possessing such and such as attribute. The
presupposition runs as a thread through the whole of the
Prosloglon. The all important consequence which typically
follows, is that if A is greater than B, it is A which
exists; or a state of affairs exists involving the presence
of A rather than the absence of A.
Certainly the most prominent example of Anselm's
employment of this idea is in Chapter Two where he poses the
question; which is "greater", the idea or description of
the deity which he proposes^as it exists in the mind alone,
or as it exists, in addition, in reality. He reasons as
follows; "...Lurely that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-
thought cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists
solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in
1 2
reality also, which is greater." '
The fact, for Anselra, that to exist in reality is
"greater" is of much significance. That the nature of the
significance may vary to some extent according to whose
interpretation of the Proslogion one follows is of little
1. Proslogion)Chapter 2. tr. Charlesworth, p. 117.
2. We leave aside the issue, often debated, of whether
"existence is an attribute". This is a separate issue.
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consequence here. In general, regardless of which inter¬
pretation is followed, this move forms a step, a building
block to get somewhere.
This question of "greater than" and the step it
involves, runs as a thread, not only through the well known
argument(s) in Chapters 2 and 3» but as we have mentioned
above, throughout the remaining 23 chapters as well. It
is one of Anselra's operational presuppositions which are
used to get to his conclusion. That is, we have here an
operational presupposition, and one of central importance.
Thus one cannot dismiss the significance of this move
and the presupposition involved as e.g. mere "technique
of exposition", or a peripheral matter of small consequence.
Our purpose in examining this element of Anselm's
work is not to ask of its viability, the philosophical
question, but to ask of its source and rootage: the
historical questions. More particularly, since it would
seem to be, not a peripheral assumption, but an important
operational presupposition, we wish to ask: Does it come,
or could it have come from "the Credo", in earth's usage
of this Term, or did it most likely come, by whatever route,
from 'pagan', non-Christian philosophy, that is, from a
source outside the confines of ecclesiastical culture. The
question is raised because Barth is holding the position that
there is no important or significant dependence on philoso¬
phical thought, and non-ecclesiastical thought in general, in
Anselm. In place of such dependence, Anselra puts his
dependence in "the Credo".
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It would seem very hard to see how Barth could hold
that this presupposition came from "the Credo". Its
content hardly concerns an issue in dogma. It would seem
to he more a manner of viewing the world, or in Barth*s
categories, a constituent part of World-View whose source
is neither in scripture nor dogma (tradition). That Anselm
may or may not have become acquainted with this mode of
thinking in Augustine or Boethius first does not modify
what we have said.""1
The most likely source for this idea, or rather nexus
of ideas is Beo-Platonism, however modified it may have
become in transmission and reinterpretation down through the
centuries, since the time of Plotinus, down through Porphyry
2
and Augustine.
Charlesworth comments that "for Anselm this whole neo-
Platonic notion of metaphysical 'perfections' Lattributes]
was so familiar and so seemingly self evident that it needed
no justification".
It would seem that Barth would want to hold not only
that Anselm wished to be essentially "clear" of and separate
from his philosophical world, but also that he in fact was.
1. Barth, while considering over and over again the sense
of "greater than" never raises the question of its
rootage or source.
2. Most commentators find the source in Neo-Platonism.
Cf. e.g. Charlesworth, p. 60.
3. Charlesworth, p. 60.
4. Where Barth can hardly avoid the issue of actual
participation in philosophical streams of thought he
plays it down or sidesteps the issue so as to deny it.
Cf. especially A.F.Q.I., pp. 58, 59.
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With this example, and others that we will examine, we
find this is simply not so. This operational-methodolo¬
gical presupposition is of central importance to Anselm's
process of thought. It is essential to his argument.
And it is Neo-Platonic in source and character.
Post conclusion
We cannot find evidence that Anselm had any hesitation,
unlike Barth, about participating in the philosophical
currents of his own times for the reason that they were per se
philosophical currents and had their rootage and source in
non-Christian 'pagan1 philosophy. While Anselm may have
objected to particular philosophical tenets, for example,
the universals controversy, one cannot sense any attempt to
"remain pure from the world", from philosophy in general,
nor from philosophical presuppositions in particular.
One may note that Barth is unable to cite any explicit
evidence to this effect. It remains as an unexamined
assumption in Barth's interpretation that Anselm does in
fact 'keep clear' of non-ecclesiastical philosophical pre¬
suppositions. For example the Neo-Platonic element of
Anselm's Monologion is explained away as merely "Neo-
Platonic technique of exposition".1 We see this as
indicative of Barth's position, for generally interpreters
1. This element is called a "procedural technique", A.F.Q.I..
p. 59. With reference to the Honologion it is called'
"Neo-Platonic technique of exposition" A.F.Q.I.. p. 58.
Nowhere is the former's philosophical rootage acknowledged,
nor that it is more than a mere 'technique*.
149
have pointed out Neo-Platonic elements in the Monologion
which are far more far reaching in importance than mere
"technique of exposition". I.e. they are on the level of
basic assumptions. One cannot term what we have been
concerned with}above; "mere technique of exposition".
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Section 1',
ANSELM'S PRAYER OF GRATITUDE AND
BARTH'S INTERPRETATION
We will now turn to consider another element of
AnselnHs Prosloglon. and Barth's interpretation of it:
the prayer of gratitude at the end of Chapter IV. Here we
find much that is faulty in Barthfs interpretation of Anselni.
When Anselm offers a prayer at the conclusion of his
arguments concerning the existence of the deity, we would
venture that one must take into account in interpreting
this passage the nature of the passage, that is,its mode of
expression. Yrtiile, as we shall consider below, Barth
makes much of this passage, he might have considered the
nature of the passage before embarking on his interpretation
of it.
What we find is a prayer, expressing a burst of
gratitude. We find this in sharp contrast with what comes
before it, that is, a rather technical discussion of the
question as to how it can be that the insipiens does not
believe. The passage before the prayer concludes:
....Whoever really understands this understands
clearly that this same being so exists that not
even in thought can it not exist. Thus whoever
understands that God exists in such a way cannot
think of him as not existing.
Thanks be to Thee, good Lord, thanks be to Thee,
since what I believed before through Thy free gift
I now so understand through Thy illumination, that
if I did not want to believe that Thou existed, I
should nevertheless be unable not to understand it.
1. Proslogion. Chapter IV lines 8-17, in Charlesworth, p. 121,
except that we have retained a more archaic form of
English (Thee) which seems more appropriate to the almost
liturgical opening of the prayer.
151
One is transported in an instant from a highly-
logical intricate argument of fairly academic theology -
...res cum vox earn significans cogitatur....licet haec
verba dicat in corde... etc. - into prayer expressing
feelings of gratitude, which opens in an almost liturgical
way: Gratias tibi, bone domine, gratias tibi, quia quod
prius.... That one has been transported from one mode of
expression to another could be highlighted by the poetic,
almost musical character of this opening, when one senses
the accents and groupings of words:
Grdtias tfbi, bone d6rnin<?,
What one wishes to point out is that there is a sharp break
in the mode of expression with the onset of the prayer.
The significance of this change cannot be ignored if one
wants to interpret this passage accurately.
One is not saying however that the presence of a
liturgical element and a poetic element means the absence of
noetic content or 'intellectual substance'. Anselm's
characteristic ways of speaking of his method recur here.
We shall however lay aside consideration of the latter in
order to address the point Earth wishes to make about this
passage.
Because it is a prayer, and, what we would venture
is an expression of Anselm's own religious life, we would
expect to find the language of prayer, that is, a mode of





\vhile there may be many contrasts between the two,
perhaps the most relevant one here is that prayer and
liturgical usage in general is not noted for its
"qualifications". That is, when one prays the Anglican
liturgy and says "there is no health in us", one would not
expect the phrase to continue "although we would qualify
this by saying.,,". An Anglican theologian, we venture,
would most likely very much want to qualify such a phrase.
We mention this contrast in particular, for in
Earth's interpretation the prayer appears as an unqualified
"acknowledgement" that all credit for his work must,
technically, be ascribed to the deity.
What one wonders is whether one would expect Anselm
to qualify his acknowledgement of divine help or aid in his
prayer? We shall consider this again below after
considering Earth's interpretation. ut if one does not
normally expect "qualification" in prayer, this would seem
to hold true even more so here. For example, even in
expressing gratitude to a friend for his help, e.g. in some
joint task, it would by custom be ill fitting and rather
out of place to mention one's own efforts in the same breath.
How much more so when Anselm chooses to express his
gratitude to the deity.
Thus the absence of any mention of Anselm's contribution
to this effort would seem entirely congruent with, and not in
conflict with Anselm being of the opinion that however much
"aid" he received, the work was still uniquely his own, in
which his own creativity and logical acumen played a significant
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and substantial part.
Barth, as we shall see, draws conclusions from this
passage quite hostile to this view.
Now let us turn to Barth's interpretation of the
prayer. Even though Barth gives consideration to the
material surrounding the arguments in Chapters 2 and 3 of
the Proslogion and considers this important for trying to
support his view of the nature of Anselm's theologizing,
he shows little awareness of the mode of expression of
these passages. That is, while he makes much of the fact
that Anselm addresses a Thou at points in his work, he does
not, as interpreter of Anselm, take into account the mode
of expression in this surrounding material, nor the
possibility that here Anselm wishes to express something to
the deity much more than communicate something, unambiguously
and with precision to mere mortals. This holds true for
Earth's consideration of this passage of Anselm as well.1
That is, in our opinion it would be a mistake to
conclude that Anselm's own view of his work as a whole can
simply be "read off" from this passage of gratitude. Barth
concludes too simply that the passage is a comprehensive
and reliable indication of how Anselm regards his work.
He goes much further than this, to conclude that this
passage indicates "not satisfaction over a work that he has
completed...but gratitude for a work that has been done
2
and of which ne is in no sense the master".
1. A.F.Q.I., pp. 170, 171.
2. Ibid.. emphasis added.
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\ie would say that no such thing can be concluded.
We would note however that Earth's formulation reflects both
the denial of human "initiative" and "enterprise" in
theology and the passivity and determinism which were to
become the hallmarks of Barthian views of theology.
V.re may note that there is none of this "all or
nothing" view even in Anselm's hymn of praise, i.e., there
is no negating of his own contribution (as can happen in
liturgical expression) in his expressing gratitude for the
deity's contribution. There is no simple either/or even
implicit in Anselm's praise.
It is perhaps significant that Berth's book on Anselm
ends with a commentary on this very passage from Anselm's
Proslogion. There is no other conclusion added (other than
another short paragraph which continues the same theme).
So it would appear that this is Berth's "summing up" about
the character of Anselm's theology. But it is also intended
to be a 'critical' commentary on this same passage from
Anselm's Proslogion. ^ust as the preceding pages are
♦critical' commentary on the passages of Anselm which precede
this. It is to serve both purposes, a 'critical*
commentary, and a "summing up" of his conclusions about
Anselm's work as a whole.
These are not minor points then, which Barth wishes to
make. Unfortunately, we find:
1. he has not taken account of the nature of this passage:
its mode of expression, its main purpose;
2. he has drawn out of it what we cannot find: that
Anselm denies any substantial or important
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contribution that he, as man, brings to theology
in his expression of gratitude to the deity for
His contribution. We refer to our consideration*
above, where we would find any consideration of
Arise la's role in the theological process rather
out of place in a prayer of gratitude, and thus
not to be expecte&j
5. he has, in place of accurately interpreting the
passage, taken it to imply (a) the noetic deter¬
minism (b) the noetic passivity (c) the deprec¬
iation of man in his contribution to theology*
which were to become the peculiar hallmarks of
the Barthlan view of theology.^
Jonclujsion of the Study of the Text of tae_^y?oslg£ion
and Earth's Interpretation of It.
;e have now come to the end of our study of the
text of the iroslogion in connection with Earth's
major theses concerning the method involved here,
he shall not at this point draw together our findings,
but rather do this at the conclusion of hart II, where
we snail explore our findings in the context of other
considerations concerning Anselm's theology, which we
shall take up in the chapters which now follow.
1. "hot satisfaction over a work that he has completed...
but gratitude for a work that has bo :• : done and _pf
which ho is in~~no sense the master11" A.h.
5pTi?O7 T7I.
We find (a; (above) in "for a work that has been
done and of which he is in no sense the ...aster";
(b) in "for a work that has been done"; and (c) In
the first segment taken together with the second
segment.
Gha.pter III,
m Bgg IB-a Ai;sg^ fflgg—*,
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IgiLi) QUESTION Or AL-GLOGifTIC INTENT
III AliSELK'S WRITINGS:
A, Introduction,
In raising the question as to whether Anselm
had 'apologetic intent' in writing,we shall in the
first of the two sections which follow, raise the
question as to whether there actually were people in
Anselm's own setting to whom it could have been rele¬
vant to present an argument. That is, were there
actually people tih' gg similar to the insipiens or
"fool" who "says in his heart there is no God?" If
so, were any of these people contemporary with Anselm?
Were they in his proximity? If there were not such
people, contemporaneous with Anselm, and also within
his proximity, then, in our view, apologetic intent
on Anselm's part becomes somewhat dubious. After
dealing with this question, we shall go on in the
section unich follows the first, to lay out several
types of evidence for apologetic intent in Anselm's
writing.
1. The type of apologetic intent we are concerned with
is to be differentiated from what we shall describe
below in describing Barth's view of "implicit
apologetics". Here, in this section of Part II,
we are concerned with apologetics of an explicit
sort: (1) an apologetic which intends to present
an argument which is meant to have some degree of
validity when presented to the thinking processes
and critical faculties of the "unbeliever", and^
(2) in addition does not presuppose the 'authority
We raise the question of apologetic intent
in Angela's writings, for if we can give to this
question a positive answer, this will count quite
heavily against Berth's view of Anseln's 'theological
programme', and thus against his view of Anselm's
theological method. How this is so should be appar¬
ent as we proceed.
of scripture' nor the authority of ecclesiastical
thought. In contrast, when dealing with Earth's
views of "implicit apologetics", we shall be
dealing with an apologetic in a very specialised
sense of the word, which is quite different from
the "explicit apologetics" we inquire about in
this section of iart II.
Eeetton B,
IN SEARCH OF THE INSIPIENE
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Anselm talks of an insiplens In his Proslogion, one
who denies there is a deity. In trying to understand the
nature of his argument one could ask: Did he have any kind
of person in mind, or any concrete persons in his own time
who were in some sense a kind of insipiens ? That is, is
it possible that he wrote, even if secondarily, with such
a kind of person in mind. And if Gaunilo writes a reply
"on behalf of the insipiens" could this Gaunilo have been
articulating the questions and/or objections of such a kind
of person? Such a question is not an easy one to answer.
One could try several paths. We will try one. But first
we must ask: How could this question be of importance in
dealing with the issues of this part of the thesis, in
dealing with the nature of Anselm's process of thought in
the Prosloglon and Earth's interpretation of it?
One reason we raise this question is that if there
were no external stimuli for apologia, or for an apologetic
element in Anselm's writing, that is, if there were no one
to argue with, or present an argument to, about certain
articles of belief, then the supposition of any apologetic
motivation on Anseim's part becomes doubtful. And if one
ignored evidence in the text to the contrary, Earth's thesis
of no real discussion with unbelievers would seem more likely.
It is this discussional or dialogical element which is of
central concern here. In Earth's theory about Anselm,
Anselm does not carry on a discussion with the insipiens or
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unbeliever. He merely confronts the hypothetical unbeliever
with the consequences of his belief. That is, with belief
systematizing itself. There can be no discussion about
the validity of these things, is the basic attitude Barth
sees. One notes that it is an attitude that is also a
hallmark of Barthianism. However, in all this, it would
seem relevant to ask the question: were there any with whom
Anselm could have discussed, who clearly could not fully
participate in what we see as the theological or religious
mainstreams of the High Middle Ages, i.e. who were somewhat
or perhaps totally estranged from the ♦cathedra', from high
theological culture and more generally from the ecclesias¬
tical culture, the general religious mood of those most
tightly within'the ecclesia1 in "Western Europe.
If there were not, if there were no diversity of
outlook, and no problems of belief in the declared doctrines
of'the ecclesia1, and no real dissonances within a thousand
miles of where Anselm did his work then (1) either any
apologetic intent in Anselm is a result of our own misreading,
and Berth's main thesis gains weight, or (2) if there was
apologetic intent the stimulus must have come solely from
(a) within the believing soul in order to meet its own needs
and the needs of others of like mind, or (b) the felt need
to defend certain ^hings in the face of Eastern Orthodoxy
or the Moslem world.
In the following we will in no way discount (2)(a)
and (b), for evidence for both has been cited, but rather
try a slightly different tack. The (1) above can be shown
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as doubtful from internal evidence in the text of e.g. the
Proslogion (c.f. above).
Perhaps our reason for raising the question can
better be put in its positive form: If there were those
in Anselm*s setting who doubted some or most of the major
tenets of ecclesiastical decree, and/or could not fully
participate in the contemporary theological-religious
setting for reasons of doubt or antagonism, i.e. if there
were basic differences in attitude to contemporary religious
authority, then Anselm and others would have had a concrete
and proximate stimulus for certain kinds of apologia in
defense of certain tenets.
Coming at this question from another angle, one could
ask: Was the concern in the Proslogion's Chapter II and III,
that is the question of the existence of the deity purely
academic? Were there in fact no persons having even the
slightest resemblance to the 1insipiens', who comes to the
fore in Chapter II? The question is not easily answerable
and perhaps not answerable at all, but we feel it to be
worthy of a try. Andr£ Hayen for example argues for
Anselm's solidarity with the ' insipiens1, yet Anselm' s^SVull
aUr participation in the theological community.1 Yet he
and most others working on the Proslogion have not raised
the question as to whether there were such as the insipiens
whom Anselm could have had concretely in mind. If, as we
question below, Medieval Europe was of one mind in its
attitude toward creeds and the dogma of the past then Hayen
1. In Hick and McGill, p. l62ff
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would have to search outside Western Europe for the likes
of the inslpiens, whom Anselm has in mind, perhaps as far
as North Africa or Arabia. One notes however that the
existence of the deity was hardly in question even in the
mainstreams of Islamic and Eastern Orthodox thought.
There is one issue which needs consideration before
we embark on any search. If Medieval Europe was socially,
culturally and more important, religiously homogeneous and
monolithic, and, perhaps most centrally, if it were
homogeneous in its attitude to creeds and the doctrines
expressed by past thinkers, the raising of this question
becomes trivial and without point. It is a priori
eliminated as a real consideration.
There has been strong debate about this assumption,
that is, of a "homogeneous" and "monolithic" Medieval setting,
historiography with roots in 19th century history maintaining
the assumption, and more recent writers vigorously questioning
it. Christopher Brookes points to the central difficulty
es
with this older historical work, "..Geist/geschichte, a form
of study to which we owe much genuine understanding, but
which has the tendency to urge us to believe that the out¬
look of our forefathers was far more uniform and monolithic
than the evidence suggests".'* The assumption of a
religiously and culturally homogeneous and monolithic
Medieval Europe no longer stands. It Is regarded now as




Again we may restate the problem, slightly differently:
if all in this period, or perhaps now more narrowly, all
capable of intellectual exercise, really were of one mind
about a certain body of dogmas, or ecclesiastical decrees
of a theological nature, and of one attitude toward them,
then our search would be of little use.
One may note in passing that even the larger figures
of this era were certainly not of one mind on what we call
philosophical issues. E.g. the debate about universals
became quite bitter and deep - and runs its course through
the Middle Ages from the tenth or eleventh centuries to
the sixteenth. And as to differences, theologically there
were an Abelard, a Bernard of Clarvaux, a John of Salisbury.
But our question goes even beyond these confines. It
concerns differences at an even more basic level. And
differences of attitude toward the enterprise of theology
and philosophy Itself.
Charlesworth recognizes the relevance of the
question, the search for the inslpiens which Anselm had in
mind, but finds the supposition of C.C.J. Webb, of a
medieval philosophical debating society which would meet
periodically to discuss certain questions a bit too romantic
an exercise of his imagination.2 Surprisingly Charlesworth
is one of the few to even raise the question. Could it
not shed light, in however limited a way on our understanding
1. Cf. Ibid. Also, Friedrich Heer, Professor of the History
of ideas, Vienna has written extensively to the contrary.
Cf. his work Die Mlttelalter. E.T., The Medieval World:
Europe from lluO to 1350. Cardinal. London,' T9W "(passim).
2. Charlesworth, p. 44, n. 5.
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of Anselra in his work, to have some ideas of his possible
Intended audience, even if he would have written for such
an audience secondarily, and as most commentators insist,
primarily for himself and his fellow Benedictines?
In all this we will have a try at one way, among
possibly others, of answering this question. One does
not seek a firm conclusion since knowledge of different
social or religious groups in such period of history is
limited, and gaps necessarily exist.
We would first propose certain criteria about the
persons or social group we are looking for and then later
look back at the extent to which these have been fulfilled.
We propose the following criteria:
1. People who were literate, could read and follow a
discussion of a problem in thought.
2. People who knew Latin (2a) and were probably
acquainted, even if only somewhat, with the
conceptualities of theological Latin.
3. People contemporary with Anselm whom he could have
come in contact with, could have known and sensed
their point of view.
4. People who could not fully participate in the main¬
stream of religious thought, and attitudes of the
period toward "received doctrine" (tradition),
that is who were partially or quite fulsomely
estranged from the mainstreams of religious thought
in the West.
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The Trouvere of Northern France
We could turn first to the Trouvere, poets of
northern France in the High Middle Ages.1 They flourished
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, yet probably had
their start in the eleventh. They were of noble birth
usually and had enough wealth to have their poetry and
music copied in collections, and performed by "professional"
singers (Grout). More than four thousand of their poems
are preserved, which is somewhat surprising considering the
content of some of the poetry. Their poetry of love was a
bit more earthly and earthy than that of the troubadors,
their counterparts in the south of France whose love was
more platonic in nature.
What is especially interesting here is that the
trouvere debated fine points in their songs, on political
and ethical topics. Many of the songs are dialogical in
character, exploring two or more points of view. Admittedly
many of the topics may seem quite trivial to 20th century
ears, e.g., the finer points of courtly love, yet there
was a means of vocalizing and expressing dissent, and more
importantly, in a form (dialogical) which engaged thought
as well as feeling.
Alas, however, we have fulfilled only 2, perhaps 3
of our criteria. While they were literate, and could
discuss a problem in dialectical give and take, i.e., had
1. For the trouvere our sources are Gustave Reese, Music in
the Middle Ages, p. 200ff., and Donald Jay Grout, A History
of Western Musfc, Norton, New York, I960, p. 59ff•, and
Karl Vossler, Medieval Culture. An Introduction to Dante
and ills Ilaes. 8 vols., linear. New tork. g of
Lie Gottliche Komodie; vol. I, pp. 32-67.
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some intellectual capabilities, and while they were
probably not only contemporary with Anselm but were
productive in the north of France,- their language was the
lanscue d'oll. the dialect of medieval French which became
modern French. There is no evidence they were fluent in
Latin. They did however provide * color' in this medieval
setting, as their outlook on life was quite spontaneous,
evidently without piety, yet rich with humanity. Their
most obvious connection with ecclesiastical culture was
in the music to which their verse was sung - almost
identical in form with plainsong chant.
But because there is no evidence of Latin, there is
also no evidence of ecclesiastical education nor the ability
to cope with the complexity of the conceptualities of
medieval Latin religious thought.
The "Followers of Golias": Qoliardic Verse
Fortunately this does not exhaust the possibilities
among those who put their thoughts and feelings 'in print'.
There is another group we might consider, loosely
scattered like the trouvere yet maintaining an identity
through similar concerns and perhaps an underlying common
outlook and perhaps most of all, symbolically united as
followers of a perhaps mythical Golias. The group was not
limited to one locale in Western Europe but ranged through
Europe and Britain. They rose in the tenth century, reached
their height in the eleventh century, and died out in the
1
early thirteenth. One commentator sees their ancestry in
1. Gustave Reese, Music in the Middle Ages, p. 200ff.
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1
the Latin poetry of the Carolinian court.
They are generally considered to be youth, perhaps
engaged in study, or perhaps students who left 'academia'.
What interests us is the ethos of their circle, their out¬
look, and their attitude to ecclesiastical culture.
Perhaps we could take one short poem and briefly
explore it. It is anonymous and concerns an abbot. It is
among their preserved texts.
Ego sum abbas Cucaniensis
et consilium meum est cum bibulis,
et in secta Decii voluntas mea est,
et qui mane me quesierit in taberna,
post vesperam nudus egredietur,
et sic denudatus veste clamabit:
Wafna, wafha,
quid fecisti sors turpissima
Nostra vita gaudia
ab stulisti omnia.
I am the Abbot of Cucany,
and I meet with my fellow drinkers
and belong to the sect of Decius.
Whosoever meets me in the tavern over dice
looses his garments by the end of the day,
and thus denuded, he cries:
Wafna, wafnai
What hast thou done, o infamous fate?
Thou hast taken away 2
all the pleasures of this life.
Without having much competence in interpreting
Medieval verse, one can still try to catch the flavor and
mood of the piece. Goliardic verse is most often satirical
1. Ibid.
2. Cited in anthology of Golardic verse used by Carl Orff
for his choral composition "Carmina Burana". Complete
collection of Goliardic verse in process: Carmina Burana
eds. A. Itilke and 0. Schumann, Heidelberg, Vol. I (1930),
Vol. II (1941).
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so we can almost assume that these words are "put to the
mouth" of an Abbot^, i.e. attributed satirically. That
is, it is quite surely not a poem by the ♦subject1. What
is of interest first is reference to "the sect of Eecius"
to which this abbot "belongs". An allusion most probably
to a pre-Christian, Roman legend of the gens or clan of
Eecius, the most notable member of which, P. Eecius Mus
was "supposed to have •devoted himself to death' in battle
in the Latin war (340 B.C.) and his son P. Eecius Mus,
supposed to have done the same at Lentinum (295 B.C.)" from
which the Romans derived an adjective, "decianic" (Eecianus-
a-urn.).1 In the context of the poem it would seem to be an
allusion to how the abbot in question pursued his game, or
perhaps his opponent!
One could venture out on a limb and venture the
supposition that Cucany is an allusion to Cluny perhaps
the most notable monastery in eleventh century France. If
so; could the general import of the piece be that the abbot
of Cluny^ the monastery of reform, was the most devoted of
throwers of dice at his •local', in fact 'devoted unto
death' in the defeat of his opponent (the tone of determin¬
ation in lines 4,5 together with the allusion to the clan of
Eecius)I
If so, one senses a maybe not so gentle mocking of
one in authority and perhaps also a bit of admiration for
his effectiveness with dice.
1. Cassell's Mew Latin Eictionary, p. 169» col, 1.
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The words of his 'opponent' are touching and
expressed with feeling: Wafna! wafnaJ what hast thou
done, 0 infamous fate?
If what we have found is somewhere close to the
sense of the text, it is not far off from what most
historians find in Goliardic verse: anti-clerical satire,
parody, poking fun "at their religion and themselves".1
Their verse was "distinguished by its clever manipulation
of rimes (sic) amusing parodies of even sacred phrases,
p
and its infectious spirit of fun". Neither of the
commentators, nor Reese (cited above) see them as totally
outside Medieval society, but as perhaps partially
estranged, and, of course, critical.
There is one other important aspect: their ability
to shape Latin phrases in sometimes deeply expressive ways.
One can sense this better in other pieces for which there
is no room here.
But where did they gain their rootage in Latin and
what fostered their facility? The most likely answer
would be the cathedral schools. Universities were not yet
founded and those who entered monasteries were likely to
remain tightly within the ecclesia. In any case, it is likely
they learned their Latin in an ecclesiastical setting,
probably along with instruction in religious thought
(edf. below).
1. Hoyt, op.cit.. p. Al3f.
2. David Herlihv. Medieval Culture and Society. Walker.
New York, 1968, p. 2<5S.
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One could suppose, as one commentator suggests, that
students of the Cathedral schools became *fed up* or over¬
fed with the constant feeding of the trlvium and quadrlvium
and could find no vent for their feelings in academic
Latin nor for their not so pious feelings in the liturgical
Latin, In fact if the usage of Latin had one deficiency,
it was so limited in its range of emotional color, in what
a person could express about his world and how he encountered
it. Although this view may follow a caricature of Latin,
could it not be far from the truth? It had been the
language of law, of history and the language of intricate
intellectual technicalities, but as a language of feeling -
had it not a stunted development in this area? The
exception being in liturgical usage and the expression of
pious and none-too-earthly feeling.
But the followers of this mythical Golias did not
desert the common ground of Latin when they tried to put
their feelings into words. The language which must have
burst upon them in its fullness as something strange and
new when they entered a course of study - certainly not the
language of their childhood or upbringing, did not die under
the weight of repetitive instruction, nor was it rejected
in toto or repudiated in favor of the available forms of
e.g. medieval French which proved quite rich in expression
for the Trouvere, contemporary poets of northern France.
But what did they do, then, with their Latin? Turn
it upon their masters? Anarchy? Repudiation? Bitter
disgust? Perhaps to some extent, but as one commentator
points out, any group which can mock itself also in its
170
poetry cannot be totally alienated from that which it
primarily mocks." Irreverence perhaps, then, but not
total repudiation. If he and other commentators are
right, then, this suggests a degree of openness toward
the *ecclesia' as well as a common language and a common
heritage of discourse.
What one notes also is the possibility of a common
affinity for Roman antiquity. Both the Goliards and a
few of the creative intellects of the 11th and 12th
century enriched their language and thought from Roman and
directly or more probably indirectly, Greek sources (e.g.
Abelard's affinity for Stoicism, Anselm's reappropriation
of parts of heo-platonism and Roman law). .,1 though on
a different level and perhaps for different reasons the
followers of Golias draw on Roman imagery directly to express
their feelings. A poem of spring:
Veris leta facies The bright face of spring
mundo propinatur, shows itself to the world,
hieaalis acies driving away
victa iam fUgatur, the cold of winter,
in vestitu vario. Flora reigns
Flora principatur, in her colorful robes,
nemorum dulcisono praised in the canticle
que canto celebratur of sweet-sounding words.
Flora fusus gremio Phoebus laughs
Phebus novo more in Flora*s lap again,
risum dat, hoc vario Surrounded by flowers,
iam stipatur flore. Zephyrus breathes
Zephyrus nectareo The fragrance
spirans in odor© of their nectar.
Certatim pro bravio Let us compete ~
curramus in amore. for the prize of love.
1. Robert S. Hovt. Europe in the Middle Ages, New York.
1957, p. 4l3ff.
2. Carmlna Burana. Section 3, Prlmo Vere. in the short
anthology Carl Orff chose for setting to music in a.
composition of the same name. E.T. from same source.
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Even without having much competence in interpreting
Medieval poetry, one can sense that the ethos of these
lines is quite different from poetry for the 'ecclesia^ of
the same era. here Phoebus, Flora and Zephyrus join to¬
gether to help the poet 'express spring. Yet they remain
vehicles for expression, poetic personifications. I.e. One
senses an affinity for Roman culture perhaps, rather than
Roman religions. The lines flow in playfulness and breathe
with the renewing life of nature. The writer, in spite of
his perhaps patchy knowledge of Roman sources seems
comfortable with what he knows.
Though the realm of Roman antiquity drawn on here
is different from the realms drawn on by e.g. Abelard and
to some extent Anselm and others, yet there is an affinity
for the same culture, and so in some sense they have something
in common: i.e. classical Roman sources.
Perhaps now we could return to Bee and Anselm and his
concern for the insipiens in the Proslogion. In another
place he gives us an account of one of his motivations in
writing. It was "to answer for our faith against those who,
not wishing to believe what they do not understand, mock the
believers."1 It is curious that in the very phrase in which
Anselm gives what has usually been taken to be his apologetic
intention he mentions "those who, not wishing to believe what
they do not understand, mocK the believers". This last
It Epislole. de Incarnatione Verby ed. Sclimitt, Bonn, 1971,
p. ib.
1?2
phrase, at least to some extent, is suggestive of the
situation we have been describing in describing the
Goliards. Of course we cannot be absolutely sure who is
mocking the "believers". But we do know now who were
among those who did in fact poke fUn, and "mock". As
David Herlihy has pointed out, the Goliards'productions
were distinguished by "(their) clever manipulation of
rimes (sic)...j,and]...amusing parodies of even sacred
phrases...•1
Here perhaps the words of Anselm's biographer, Eadmer,,
would suggest more about this wish itself in Anselm's
statement, as it could have been embodied in teaching either
in 'classroom' or in a piece of writing: "not as others do,
but in a vastly different way, explaining each point by
referring to common and well-known examples, and basing it
2
on solid arguments....
What is suggested is an appeal to the thinking part
of man rather than e.g. indoctrination; but more centrally^
a genuine concern to communicate, to reach out, and to reach
out to learners, to beginners or would-be beginners in
theological exercises.
If we presuppose an inner consistency in Anselm's views
IrHFa about education, i*e* over his productive
we could take these two passages together, granted that
Eademer's estimate is authentic, and conclude that given
Gp«cit.. p. 208.
2. Cited in Charlesworth, p. 11.
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people who would mock, Anselmfs response would he "to
answer for our faith", "explaining each point by reference
to common.•.examples". I.e. not by verbal tricks, nor in
a condescending or indoctrinating manner.
Cathedral Schools and the ^ chool at Chartres
To round out our venture into Medieval culture we
will turn briefly to the Cathedral schools of the Eleventh
and Twelfth Centuries, and to one in particular^ as both
illustrative, and possibly supportive of our other evidences.
The Cathedral schools of this era formed a counterpart to
monastic education. They flourished in the era of Anselm
and even more so in the era of Abelard and Bernard of
Clairvaux, and culminated in the establishment of the
Medieval universities. Yet while the quality of scholarship
varied, some, perhaps much, was on a high}or at least quite
sound level. The intellectual figures emerging from their
confines are impressive. E.g. John of Salisbury emerged
from the Cathedral school at Chartres, the school we will
examine a bit more closely.
Our question is twofold. The one concerns, roughly,
the level of scholarship, on the part of students and
teachers. The other concerns the possibility or probability,
or great likelihood that those such as the Goliards were
present and active in the vicinity of Bee, i.e. in northern
and central France.
In answering these questions we shall study briefly
the school at Chartres. Charlesworth thinks it possible
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that Anselm studied here before coming to Bee.1 We may-
note also that Chartres was only about fifty miles due
south of Bee and Rouen. Founded c.990 A.D. the school
flourished throughout the period of Anselm's lifetime.
James Bowen states in volume 2 of his book A History of
Western Education:
From the late tenth century beginnings under
Fulbert, Chartres had maintained the quality of
its school which was sustained by a succession of
scholars committed to the ideas of Plato....2
What was the nature of their education? Fulbert, according
to Bowen, taught grammar, arithmetic, astronomy and some
medicine along with a fulsome emphasis on theology, examined
with the use of a Boethian type of dialectic. So there
were liberal arts and theology. Plato was present in his
Tiir^fus, and Aristotle was used for the first four subjects
we have listed. Neoplatonism was seen in light of Plato*s
Timaeus.
John of Salisbury, who emerged as a student from
Chartres, gives a glimpse of dally 'goings on* in his
Metalogion. He studied under Bernard of Chartres then the
head figure at Chartres, and no mean thinker himself. The
period of Bernard's leadership is very close to Anselm's
lifespan, c.1114-1130. Bowen selects some of John's
comments on his experience at Chartres:
1. ' P# *
2. Op.clt.. Methuen, London, 1975, p. 55.
3. Bowen, op.cit.. p. 46.
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...Studies centered on grammar and the reading of
classical authors (Bowen).••'each student was
required on the following day to elaborate on some
of the matters he heard the day before*.
[John of Salisbury, Metalogion]
John's other remark is even more germajfn^to our
concerns here: "The boys composed daily written exercises
in prose and poetry and checked each other by comparing
2
their work". We would conclude from this remark by a
contemporary that not only was the response of the student
important, but was one that exercised the student's ability
in poetry as well as prose.
Ve conclude from this:
1. that there was study, perhaps extensive, of
classical authors^
2. there was intensive training in Latin grammar, with
daily exercises on the part of students, not only
in oral font but written,
3. These exercises were both in prose and in poetry.
So the poetic element was not at all excluded or
frowned upon. (In contrast, in our day, the gap
betweenj and possible condescension from)philosophy
to poetry is, at times at least, far greater!
Who is to say that the work of the poet is any less
significant than that of the philosopher?)
It would appear then that there was a tradition of
education at Chartres that could be compared on not too
unfavorable terms with monastic education which e.g. one
1. Bowen, op.cit.. pp. 55» 56.
2. Cited in Ibid.. p. 56 (emphasis added).
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might find at Bee. That is, it would be hard to
establish that the intellectual equipment of such students
v/as that much inferior to comparable monastic education.
The figures these cathedral schools produced would seem
to confirm this statement.
We examine this question as it has a bearing on
PU3
criteria (1) and (2),(2a), above,/!.e. whether these were
those who had the facility to follow a theological or
philosophical argument.
As to the second question, were there among these^
e.g. in the cathedral schools^who were either Goliards or
of their like, there is evidence to support this.
In speaking of the 1awakening* of the HOO's,
Friedrich Heer remarks of those schools which were open to
previously unknown literature:
"where a youthful and enquiring intelligentsia was
arming itself mentally and emotionally for the
encounter with the hallowed philosophical and poetic
giants of the past. Young men of this calibre were
to be found in the cathedral schools, particularly
those of France (Chartres, Rheims, Laon, Orleans and
Paris)....There were also "wandering scholars"...in
which there was so much literary and intellectual
movement. These...who were unbeneficed clerks [sic],
were acute observers of their times, specialists in
satire-^and irony, and, a few of them, highly gifted
poets.
Heer sees a pattern recurring: born a poet, died a
bishop. Basically, many of these youthful "dissidents"
went on to contribute their lifework to the Church. As an
example he points to one: Hildebert of Lavardin, who was
roughly contemporary with Anselm: 1056-1133. A schoolmaster,
1. Friedrich Heer, Professor of the History of Ideas, Vienna,
The Medieval Ivorld: Europe from 1100 to 1350. Cardinal,jl| HWIIHI111 Mlf—H IIWIII « I—M——i— lllli I iM II infill •' 9
London, 1974, p. 97#
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he died Archbishop of Tours, but "was perhaps the purest
exponent of classical Latin poetry of his time....He was
the author of satires, very worldly in tone....His verses
were on everyone's lips.""1' bo here we have, not an inept
young poet, but an articulate schoolmaster, a contemporary
with Anselm who lived and wrote in France and later,
perhaps after youthful revolt, became Archbishop of Tours,
a cathedral only about ninety miles from Bee. Heer cites
him as one among many, not as an isolated phenomenon.
Could it not be that when Gaunilo spoke, he spoke
"on behalf of" persons such as this in his Reply "On
Behalf of the Fool". Youthful these poets were, yet
capable. Later, after a period of youthful revolt which
was tolerated, many of them came to serve that church which
they satirized and perhaps angered with their pointed verse.
Does the poetic element in a person obliterate intellectual
capabilities? Can the two not exist side by side? We
would argue that they can. ^ e would also argue for the
probability that Hildebert was among the kind of person that
Anselm had in mind, in writing such a piece as the Prosloglon,
that is, writing for "those who mock the believers," for the
reason that while they could understand, they did not; no-
one had approached them as thinking beings capable of reaching
their own conclusions on hearing an argument, that is, an
argument that invited them to reach their own conclusion,
rather than merely assent to or "swallow" what is "given".
1. Ibid.. p. 119.
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And could it be that Anselm found the passage about
the "insipiens" from the Psalms fitting or useful because
while insipiens implies fool, or what some of what we in
English mean by fool, but in and with these meanings fool
can mean "jester" as in Court jester. But further: one
who makes jest, pokes fun, has wit. I.e. one such as the
goliards. One such as this may pose as "thick" i.e. stupid,
but there is often a cleverness to jest, a cleverness to
the "pose" of fool. Does this cleverness necessarily
exclude intellectual cleverness, i.e. ability? We feel
this does not follow. Hildebert, after all rose to a
fairly high post, and while it does not necessarily imply
creative or lofty intellectual capability, yet it does imply
a measure of intellectual capability. And this must have
been present in potentiality or actu in his earlier years.
Conclusion
From our study we reach the following limited conclusions:
(1) That there were in fact articulate, partially estranged
youth with Latin learning, (lb) who had the ability to follow
the dialectic of theological argument, yet (1c) with a
perhaps mocking and doubtful attitude toward ecclesiastical
authority, theological and otherwise.
(2) That these youth were present in the time of Anselm and
also in northern and central France, (2a) It would be hard
for Anselm not to have known of them, even if he had no
/f,Al
contact with them. So they fulfil our four criteria above.
(3) That Anselm's words about writing, for those who "not
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wishing to believe what they do not understand mock the
believers", dovetails with one of the characteristic marks
of the likes of the Goliards. His interest in teaching
in a way which could not be called indoctrination is of
relevance too. For it suggests a non-indoctrinating,
i.e. apologetic approach to unbelief.
These evidences we feel strengthen a supposition that
Anselm had, among others, the •followers of Golias',
dissenting^ anticlerical students, in mind when writing,
and that there is a high probability that one can in fact
find Anselm•s insipiens in such a group. If so. Anselm
would have had proximate and concrete stimulus for
apologetic intent.
As a postscript to this we will state that even if
we might not have fully succeeded in finding the like of
the insipiens. even if such as these we have cited could not
have given Anselm apologetic impulse, even though we are
maintaining the contrary, we can still maintain the presence
of apologetic intent from internal evidence, in Anselm's own
writing, both reflecting about his work, e.g. the passages
cited above, and the work itself. These both give




iSVIPGflCttS OF ArOLOGSTlO I II; AKSBLK*
Certainly the question of apologetic intent has
been raised in several quarters concerning Anoelm* s
work* In contrast to our approach in which we turned
our attention to the side of unbelief, to look for the
existence of the like of the insipiens* commentators
have usually turned their attention to the more access¬
ible sides that of belief, that is, to Anselm, and his
contemporaries* One might point out at the outset
that the question of the existence of apologetic intent
in Anselm is different from the question as to whether
Anselm was a "thorough-going rationalist*" Hot all
apologists are "thorough-going rationalists*"
We shell seek to lay out some of these evidences
in brief form. Since we cannot be comprehensive, and
since this is not a central question for our work we
shall note in a footnote here some of the places this
1
question receives consideration*
If one asked the question! were there others
engaged in apologetics, in an unambiguous manner, who
were (1) contemporary with Anselm and (2) in the prox¬
imity of Anselm, one might turn to Charlesworth*s
1* gee Charlesworth*s "Introduction", p*5-46} especially
p*30ff♦ See also John Hclntyre, St* Angela and His
Jritics, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1^5'^* p. 1-55;
Arthur C* McGill, "Recent Discussion of St. Anselcr* s
Argument", in Hick and McG-ill, p*33-110* McGill
gives references to other sources*
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citation of two significant examples. 2hey are Gilbert
Crispin and Rodulfus, both pupils of Anselm, that is,
two writers who studied under Anselm and over whom
Anselia had considerable influence. In his .Disputatio
Christiani cum Gentile do fide Christ!. Gilbert Crispin
describes a debate which takes place in a London inn,
among members of what to us would resemble a philosoph¬
ical debating society. Here a Christian engages in a
discussion with an unbeliever over the credibility and
rationality of the Christian faith and they both agree
to leave aside all appeal to the authority of Scriptures.*
That Gilbert Crispin's concern is with a "rational
apologetic" for the Christian faith, is confirmed, in
Charlesworth's view, by the course of the dialogue.
(One may note that Cherlesworth leaves aside the question
of whether the dialogue is meant to represent an actual
occurrence, or typical occurrence, and centres on
2
Crispin's intont).
The other disciple of Anselm whom Charlesworth
considers is Rodulfus. The latter declares at one
point that "those who live according to reason rightly
advance upon the right road, and if they make their way
always with reason, they will finally come into the
x
company of the saints."^ Charlasworth goes on to point
1, Gharlesworth, p,44f.
2, See Gharlesworth, p.A4f.
3, Quoted in Charlesworth, p.4-5.
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out that "In his dialogue between •Scions' and 'Keseiens*,
Rodulfus elaborates a causal proof of the existence, of
First Cause of life. The proof is constructed independ¬
ently of faith in order to persuade *Nesciens* who doubts
whether God exists#
One nay note, firstly, the dialogicai foria made
use of by both wrltes03« in which believer talks
directly with unbeliever# Here they follow a pattern
of their master, but take it one step farther# lie
have in mind Anselm's dialogue in the Our Beus Hftmo
in which Boso, a believer articulates the doubts and
objections of unbelief (and perhaps belief as well) to
the Incarnation, Herein the dialogical writings of
An.seIn's pupils, the unbeliever is brought into the
argument itself, where lie nay "speak" directly#
One may note, secondly, that given the (literary)
presence of the unbeliever, the writers proceed in a
strongly •rationalistic* manner, that is, in a manner
P
which sets aside faith, and 'authority*# Thus the
apologetic intent is quite unambiguous in two writers,
not only contemporary with Ansela, and in his proxim¬
ity, but more significantly, in two writers who reoeived
their training under AriseIn himself#
bvideace from Anselm's writings.
As we have noted, one of the passages in which
1# ibid,
2# In using the term 'rationalistic', a term which may
have a variety of meanings, we are using it in just
this senses a process of thought which sets aside
faith and authority (scripture and ecclesiastical
decree)#
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Anselm speaks of his motivation in writing, dovetails
neatly with the tyoe of insipiens we have found: namely
medieval scholars, that is, students and post-students
who stood somewhat outside the ^cclosia*, and satirised
. 1
both 'eccleGia' and its thought in their poetry#
Thus it may be much more the n coincidence that Anselm
states that he writes "•♦# to answer for our faith
against those who, not wishing to believe what they do
2
not understand, mock the believers#" We have found
articulate youth trained in ecclesiastical centres of
learning who do in fact "mock the believers#"
Yet Anselm goes on to say, in the sane place,
that his intention is to proceed "through necessary
reasons and without making appeal to the authority of
scripture to prove those truths we hold through faith
3
concerning the divine nature and its persons•" Here
in the Hoistola do Incarnatione 'Jerbi written about
fifteen years after the Proslogion, at le Bee, probably
just before becoming Archbishop of Canterbury, one
finds a rather strong emphasis on apologetic of roughly
*rationalistic• nature# One says this because of the
second passages " to prove through necessary reasons
and without making appeal to the authority of Scripture•"
1# See above. pp.l65ff
2# kgistola de Incarnatiqne Verbi. ed. Schiaitt, Bonn,lyjlj cited in uenri Bouillard, The Knowled; ;e of God,
Herder and Herder, London, 1968,"p#S2#
3# ibid.« cited in Bouillard, p#76«
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The phrase "through necessary reasons" and its allied
phrase "by reason alone", sola ratione, have proved to
be ♦problematic* phrases in the interpretation of
Anaelm's method. Yet we have found Earth's under¬
standing of this phrase to bo untenable. for Earth #
would have us believe that with this phrase ("through
necessary reasons"), Anselm Intended to indicate
articles of belief, taken from "the Credo". and this
alone."*- Yet wo have found that Arteelm has no hesit¬
ation in drawing on other sources, outside "the Credo",
for the presuppositions and elements of thought he uses
in his theological process. Even if he uses some
elements from "the Credo" at points, it does not follow
that he uses the Credo exclusively, or even predomin¬
antly. As to the phrase "ratloaes neceasariae", there
is no solid evidences for thinking that Anselm had
"the Credo" or articles at belief in mind. At minimum,
then, this leaves the question open as to whether
Anselm meant to indicate by this phrase: a manner of
proceeding which would have validity for believer and
unbeliever alike. The phrase is typically interpreted
in this manner. Ansela speaks at several points of
proceeding "by reason alone", sola ratlone. Arthur
McGill summarises these in his study "Recent Discussion
2
of Anselm*s Argument."
1. In A.F.Q.I., p.55 he states quite explicitly "the
origin of the rationes nocesrariae is to be found...
within the Crodo itself."
2, Cee Hick and McCill, x>.51ff»
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Textual evidence of Apologetic Intent*
As to the textual evidence from the Proslo&lon
itself, one might ask the questions How does Anselm
reply to Gaunilo's criticisms? That is, does he reply
in a manner which suggests that he intends his argument
to have some force with the unbeliever, that is, with
the insipions whom he names us the argument opens#
Or does he reply to Gaunilo solely as one believer
talking with another believer upon the basis of their
*7 *
faith, as Berth argues#
That argument may hove additional force for a
believer over and above the force it may have for an
unbeliever is a separate question. Thus, if Anselm
talks with Gaunilo at points as one believer with another,
appealing to the latter*s belief as an additional reason
for the strength of his argument, this need not concern
us#
What is of concern is whether there is evidence
that Anselm intends his argument to have validity in
the eyes of the unbeliever as unbeliever#
One of Gaunilo's central objections is that one
cannot really have a notion of "that than which nothing
greater can be thought•w As a consequence, he cannot
have it In the understanding, or in his mind#"*" If
this is so, then the argument cannot proceed to pose
the question! which is greater, this as it exists in
the mind alone, ox* in reality also# And thus to its
1# Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo, Charlesworth, p#169#
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conclusion that "that than which nothing greater can bo
thought" exists in reality#
Anselm*e reply to Gaunilo is twofold# Although
he does appeal to Gaunilo*s faith, arguing that Gaunilo
can have a notion of this, sinco he is a Christian^ he
also goes on to argue at length that the unbeliever,
the insiniens can understand this phrase "that than
1 * A »
which nothing greater can be thought#" Anselro is seek¬
ing to defend himself against the objection that the
unbeliever cannot form an idea of "that than which
nothing greater can be thought" on the grounds that he
"neither knows the thing itself, nor can... form an
2
idea of it from other things similar to it." Anselm
replies that "it is evident to every rational mind that,
mounting from the less good to the more good we can
from those things than which something greater can
be thought, conjecture a great deal about that than
which a greater cannot bo thoughtHe then gives
several examples, and concludes by saying*
In this way, therefore, the fool who does
not accept the sacred authority of
Revelation can easily be refuted if he
denies that he can form an idea from other
things of that-than-which-a-greator-eannot-
be-thought# ^
The manner In which Anselm continues is signif¬
icant.
1# ibid.
2# Charlesworth, p.l87t lines 4-6.
5* ibid, lines 8-11#
4# ibid# lines 27-50*
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But if any orthodox Christian should deny
this, lot him remember that 'the invisible
things of God from the cx*oation of the
world ore clearly seen through the things
that have been made, even his eternal
power and Godhead. C,Rom.i.2Q3 • *
Scripture is invoked here,not to confirm a
* datura of revelation', but to confirm a orocess of
thought by which an unbeliever may look at the natural
world and gain an idea of "that than which nothing
greater can be thought." 'That is he can gain an idea
of the latter, not only in its general outlines, but
of the specific content Ansel® will ascribe to the
deity throughout the 25 chapters which follow his
arguments for the existence of the deity in Chapters 2
and 5, For, as Anselin points out in this passage
concerning the unbeliever, the latter can understand,
for example, the eternality and changelessness of the
2
deity from the natural world.
What is perhaps more significant in this
context is that Ansel® refers Gaunilo to a passage of
scripture, which perhaps more than any other passage,
has been used to support "natural theology." And he
does so in order to point out to another Christian the
validity of the process by which the iasipiens can form
an idea of the deity.
1. ibid, lines 50-54.
2. Charlesworth, p.187 lines 11-27.
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What is of central importance here is the manner
in which Anseln meets Gannilo's objection, Anselm
replies in such manner as to take up the objection
from the standpoint of the iasipiens or unbeliever and
attempt to overcome it from the unbelievers standpoint#
In our view this type of move on Anselm*s part#
that is overcoming the objections of the unbeliever
from the standpoint of the unbeliever counts against
Earth*s view of Anselm, in which Anselm never for a
moment "leaves the ecclesia", or the standpoint of the
Church and its *Credo*#
In this connection we might note Gharlosworth*d
argument that Anselm Bay his piece of reasoning as a
* rational argument* for the existence of the deity
having force for both believer and unbeliever (and thus
having apologetic .intent)# Charlesworth reasons
roughly as follows: Gaunilo replies to Anselm as if
Anselm has presented a rational argument. Yet Earth
objects, saying that Gaunilo*s criticisms rest on a
"sheer misunderstanding" of the point and purpose of
Anselia'a work, Gaunilo's objections in Earth's view
are not simply invalid or inconclusive, but completely
irrelevant and pointless, Charlesworth concludes that:
1, We are using the term *rational argument* to indicate:
an argument having some force apart from faith, and
apart from Scripture and Tradition#
2# See ,1, p#131, where Jiarth claims that Gaunilo
has completely failed to see the basic nature of
Anselm's thought as Earth sees it#
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••• if Barth sees Gaunilo's attack as being
a complete misunderstanding of St. Ansel©*s
position, this is certainly not the way in
which St. -Ansel® himself sees it. In his
reply to Gaunilo he does not, in fact,
anywhere complain that Gaunilo's criticisms
are irrelevant or beside the point, but he
confronts Gaunilo's objections.•• and
attempts to show that they are invalid.
In short, what is obvious in St. Ansel®'s
counter-reply is tlist he agrees completely
with Gaunilo's reading of the Proslonion
argument as a rational proof of ''the existence
of God. 1
This we see as both a strong argument against
Earth's interpretation and an argument which favours
'apologetic intent' in Ansel®'s I-Toslo ;ion« There
are other writings of Ansel® in which one can be quite
sure apologetic intent is present. vie have not gone
into these since they lie outside the scope of a thesis
which is concerned only indirectly with Ansel®• We
have gone into some detail via-a-vis Anselm's
Proslogion. for it was this piece of writing that was
specifically at issue in Berth's book on Anselm. If
one wished to look further among Anselm's writings for
apologetic intent, certainly chief among them would be
the (Air Deus Homo, in which Boso articulates doubts,
and objections to the Incarnation, which Ansel® then
seeks to answer. One may note that here some of the
doubts and objections of unbelievers are articulated
and replied to. Here, as in the i-roslogion, the
elements of thought Ansel® "borrows" from outside




"the Church", or "the Credo" play an important part.
v/e would conclude that there is a considerable
amount of evidence favouring the view that Annelm wrote
2
with apologetic intent in mind,
1. Gee, for example, John Mclntyre, St. Angela and His
Oribics: Ji Ro-intorpretation of the Our ueus homo.
Oliver and Boyd, " \dinburnb, 19See especially
pp$8ff.
2. ;e should point out that what we have described in
this chapter as apologetic intent should not be
confused with the rather specialized meaning "implicit
apologetics" has when used to describe a specific
type of aoolo, ;etic intent which Barth alleges Anselia




BAAIIi'S /I..,,; Or "LABIGII AxOiOu-^IOS"
■ AS IB ^.ulG5K> 1 . BIS AAJ JA.
So far w© have said little or nothing of Earth's
views of apologetics in his study of Ansela. Actually,
in describing the dogmatic method Barth "finds" in
Anselm, we have also been describing his apologetic
approach, that is, the way he sees, with approval,
.oiselm's dogmatic enterprise as having apologetic relev¬
ance. The apologetic relevance lies within the dogmatic
substance. Our job in the following is to try to des¬
cribe the manner in which this is so,"*"
vie have said that the apologetic relevance lies
within the dogmatic substance. That is, the apologetic
relevance is implicit in the dogmatic substance. It is
implicit in two senses:
One: There is no apologetic that lies outside
the dogmatic substance, even partially outside (for
example, in a way that the apologetic enterprise and
the dogmatic enterprise oveiALap at points). Further,
and as an extension of this view: there is no apologetic
enterprise separate from dogmatics having an independ¬
ence of its own. In addition, the apologetic thot is
implicit in the dogmatic enterprise (1) has no independ¬
ence from that dogmatic enterprise; it cannot stand
1. For what follows, see in the main,. A.F.Q.I.. pp.62-72.
192
independently, even at points; and (2) it has no
independent basis, that is^no other basis than the dog¬
matics Barth describes, i*e* no basis outside 'revelat¬
ion', for example, in philosophy*
This last point places this view of apologetics
in perhaps sharpest contrast from most views of apolog¬
etics in Christian ThoughtFor most apologetic
enterprises have sought some kind of common ground
between 'belief* and *unbelief* upon which to meet and
discuss with the latter* But in the case of the
apologetic venture Barth describes, no common ground
is sought, not even in the form of certain elements of
thought, or presuppositions, acceptable to 'belief
and 'unbelief'* In fact any such common ground is
"impossiblen, that is, methodologically inadmissible•
Fne one who believes and the one who does not are sep¬
arated by a gulf, across which only certain words can
be spoken* But the gulf remains, and each party
remains, as it were, on different ground*
Two: The apologetic intent is implicit in the
dogmatic substance in the sense that this intent is not
made explicit* The appeal is not made in an explicit
manner* As a consequence, the 'unbeliever* is never
confronted with an argument, or a line of thought which
intends to engage his own critical faculties* As a
1. As Apologetics is a complex phenomenon, which cannot
be done justice in a brief sketch, we are aware of
the over-simplification we must make at this point*
195
result, he is not invited to be present as a thinking
being, as one who uses his critical faculties in form¬
ing judgements about what is presented to him# ho
appeal will be made in an explicit manner, to which
he could apply his thought#
"Implicit Apologetics" seen from two vantage points#
What then is the activity, which is properly
the activity of do©aatics, yet also carries the apolog-
etic relevance# Here we shall divide our consider¬
ation roughly into two aspects# The first concei'iis,
in the main, the activity of the dogaatician# The
second concerns primarily the (alleged) activity of
the deity#
We shall take the first consideration firstly#
It is when Barth asks what relevance Ansolm's argument
in the ffoslogion can have for the insi>ions (the "fool"
who does not believe that there is a deity) that he
explains what we have described in the foregoing,
namely that it cannot be the case that there is any
appeal to be me.de on the basis of any common ground#
The believer and the unbeliever are separated by a
gulf# Using another metaphor, they are operating on
different levels altogether#^ In summary, the theo¬
logian as theologian can be of no help even if this
unbeliever should wish to cross this gulf from the
side of unbelief to belief. This re-echoes Barth*s
1# A#i?#Q#I#, p.&V, V'l#
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supposition that Anselm's process of thought can have
no effect, positive or negative on JUisels's (i.e# the
theologian's) faith#
Yet there is something he, as theologian, can
do# And here his work as dogmatician coincides with
his work as apologist# He can show how his beliefs,
that is, the A B C D's and the X which are taken from
the Credo, are not in contradiction. Yet he can go
farther. Hot only is there an absence of contra¬
diction, but there is something else, which he as dog-
aatician-apologist will "show" or produces he will
show the inner consistency of Christian statements,^*
What does this mean? Let us go back to where Barth
describes the activity of the theologian, in reference
to the beliefs he takes from the Credo, which he then
2
uses to "solve" his unknown X# The theologian takes
one belief from the Credo, and temporarily regards it
as an "unknown" (the X)« He then takes other beliefo
from the Credo, and 'proves' the X, that is 'establishes*
it in the sense o£ showing its necessity vis a vis
the beliefs selected, and already assumed as true#
The dogmatician shows, then, not only "inner
consistency" in the sense of an absence of contra¬
diction, but more than that, "inner consistency" in
the sense of the way that "Christian statements" are
shown to interlock in such a manner as even to be nec-
1# A.3T»C.^ >X»» p#69, ?0«
2# Gee especially A.F.Q.I.. P#55«
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essary to each other.
After the dogmatician-apologist has done his
work, the question could be raised: what value is this
to one that does not believe? Berth's answer is that
it has only the United value of removing an unnecess¬
ary stumbling block for the unbeliever,*** Yet, as we
shall see in our second consideration, which follows,
this "noetic ratio" produced by the theologian will
have another importance as well,
Thus this is one side of the apologetic activity:
exhibiting beliefs in an understandable manner, and
more than this, showing that they are an interrelated
and interdependent complex of beliefs, consistent with
each other, that is a body of "noetic ratio".
Yet there is another aspect to Berth's view of
"implicit apologetics". This is the role supposedly
played by the deity. As we have seen, in Berth's
interpretation of AriseIra, the 'key phrase* of Anselm's
•Prooiogion must be hoard as"word"for the argument to
bo effective, That is, it must be heard as an author-
itative"Word"of prohibition, not to think of a greater.
As we have remarked, Berth speaks of the phrase as
having a "revelatory" character,^ He refers to it
IL
explicitly as "the Word of God", We should note again
1, A,x',Q,I, p,66f,
'dm "this prohibition: he can conceive of nothing greater"
,>,x-« , I», p,?7,
'jm ^bia,, p»7S, n.d,
4, ibid,, p,151.
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that Earth is unable to support this rather peculiar
view, either directly, from a text, or indirectly.^
Thus we see that this phrase, the major presupp-»
osition of the argument, in Earth*s interpretation, not
only is one of the A fi G D*s which came from the Credo*
(in going to *prove* or establish the X, the existence
of the deity), but also, that this phrase, the chief of
the A B 0 D's must be considered as, and heard as "Word"
for the *argument* to be effective.
Yet who allegedly "speaks" this "Word"? It is
the deity. In t lis second aspect of apologetics we
are concerned with the role of the deity.
This alleged revelational activity of the deity
then stands behind Earth's statement about the active
role of "the objective ratio of the object of faith"
2 - •
vis a vis the unbeliever in apologetics. It is the
alleged revelational activity which is central he-re,
that is, vis a vis the 'unbeliever*• Earth refers
to this "objective ratio" as
... the objective ratio of the object of
faith that enlightens ... and teaches
truths that are beyond the power of one
human being to teach another. 5
1. see above, pp,123ff.
2. Here Earth is apparently using the terms "subjective
ratio" and "objective ratio" in place of "noetic
ratio" (of the theologian or thinker) and "ontolog-
ical ratio" (of the deity) respectively, dee footnote
Wo.l. on p.197*
9* A.F.0.1.. p.71. j
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One can be fairly sure Berth means by "objective
r- tio" what he means elsewhere by "Revelation", that is,
the Word in its primary form as "the Word revealed" •"*"
How close we are to Berth1s concept of preaching, that
is, the preaching and the hearing of "the Word" is
shown by the manner in which Berth continues:
Perhaps for Anselm theology had as much a
part in proclaiming Christ as preaching,
where the first and last presupposition
of the preacher must bo trust in the objective
ratio that ••. enlightens ^
Thus the 'unbeliever1 is to be treated as if he
stood "within the precincts of theology, ••• and
within the precincts of the Church", ^ not by reason
of any "power of his own subjective ratio existing from
creation and not obliterated by the Fall", but for the
reason of this "objective ratio of the object of faith
4-
that enlightens ..« and teaches"*
Thus it is that in Earth's view, tho apologetic
is effected by the alleged intervention of the deity
in the midst of theology, speaking his "Word" of revel¬
ation and in so doing, enlightening the hearer in and
!• C»h«1/1, p.124-ff, T.F. Torrance holds that the
"objective ratio" here is roughly equivalent to the
Word revealed*• cf his study of Earth's unselm
in his Karl Barth: An Introduction to His lilarly
Theology. 1910*1951* S*0.H*. London, 1962, o.lHaff.





through the 'boetic ratio" of the theologian in a manner
roughly similar to (the Barthian concept of) preaching,
in which the deity intervenes, speaking his Word of
revelation (the "objective ratio"), and in so doing,
enlightens the hearer in and through the words of the
preacher.
One sees a close similarity, then, between
Earth*s theory of preaching and his theory of "implicit-
apologetics". It is a similarity that also applies to
Berth*s theory of dogmatics.
We may note again that in the case of the
iroslogion. the primary element (but not necessarily
the only element) which must be seen as revelation,
and heard as "Word", is the key phrase: the deity is
"that than which nothing greater can be thought" and one
may note again that this "Word" takes the form of an
imperative, and a negative imperative, or prohibition^
at that: it is prohibited to think of a greater."'" A
major weakness in Earth's attributing this view of apol¬
ogetics to Anselm is th* t he is not able to substantiate
his claim (1) That Anselm thought of the 'key phrase*
in this manner, or (2) that this phrase has its source
in 'revelation*.
The hatare of this View of Apologetics.
It should be fairly obvious that what we have
described here as Barth's view of "implicit apologetics"
1. Hi above, pp.isjff.
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has little or nothing in common with the apologetic
intent we have found as most likely present in Anselm's
thought* ©hat is, vory little or nothing when one
stands back and looks at 'the whole*•
We may note that in this view of apologetics
(i#e* "implicit apologetics") the thinking process of
the unbeliever is not engaged* It is not an apologetic
that involves any thoughtful consideration on his part*
It is not an apologetic that approaches him as a think¬
ing being capable of reaching conclusions* The only
thinking involved is a "thinking along with" the
theologian, as the theologian draws his connections,
making "the Credo" into a body of "ratio" consistent
with itself* It is only when Authority intex-venes,
(if we return to Berth's understanding of the Troslo;;lon*s
argument^, that the apologetic can be effected* Here
then v/e have an apologetic of 'krisis*» an inbreaking
of judgement from above, in the form of a "Word" of
prohibitions "he shall not conceive of a greater*"
Thus, such an apologetic would seem not only to
avoid engagement of men's critical faculties, but it
would also seem to disrupt such critical faculties with
the alleged intervention of a deity's "Word" to the
effect "Thou shalt not think such and such*" In such
an arrangement all man's critical faculties, and
processes of thought are simply by-passed, and so
also, we would argue, the intellectual integrety of
man, who experiences, and reflects with the critical
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use of his thinking, upon what he experiences. If so,
it is an apologetic which does not respect man in his
wholeness, and in particular, this aspect of his whole¬
ness, which reflects upon, or "chews over" what he
experiences before "swallowing"«
as this same problem is involved in Berth's
theory of dogmatics, and his dogmatic method we will
return to this theme in Tort III of our thesis.
Section B.
IXVERGEDCE IE IEIKRPx<E1a11QL OF ABBELH;
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WHY?
In this study of the interpretation of Anselm, and
Earth's interpretation in particular, we might stand back
for a moment and reflect on the general scene of historical
work on the Proslogion. The most striking phenomenon one
encounters is the wide divergence of interpretation, so
wide as to become discontinuities of interpretation.
We may take as example, at one end of the spectrum,
Jonathan Barnes* recent study, The Ontological Argument
and at the other end, Earth's study. While Barnes considers
the arguments of Descartes and others, his study of Anselm's
is extensive and intensive. Yet he dismisses Barth's rather
sizeable work in one paragraph with no more regard than to
mention it as an absurdity. Barnes concludes his paragraph:
"Whether or not he succeeded, Anselm certainly
intended to present an argument for the existence
of God which presupposed no articles of faith; he
had no wish to indulge in the curiously futile
exercise Barth puts upon him".2
Here we have an interpretation where faith, and articles
of belief play no part at all.
If we go briefly to the other extreme we find nearly
a mirror image, that is, the same pattern, but in reverse.
Barth's attitude to interpreters such as Barnes, who see
Anselm's Prosloglon in the same genre with the arguments of
Descartes and Leibnitz, that is, as basically philosophical
1. Jonathan Barnes, The Jntologlcal Argument. Macmillan,
London, 1972, "
2. Ibid., p. 6.
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in character, is similarly dismissive without serious
consideration. The final paragraph of Berth's book:
"That Aneelm's Proof of the Existence of God has
repeatedly been called the "Qntological" Proof
of God, that commentators have refused to see that
it is in a different [class] altogether from the
well known teaching of lescartes and Leibnitz...
all that is so much nonsense on which no more words
ought to be wasted".
One may note that Barth has "wasted" very few words
in explicitly considering the views of such commentators.
He too has more or less ignored the other end of the
spectrum, not to mention those who stand between these
2
extremes.
To draw out the contrast further, Barth's interpretation
requires that Anselm begin his argument with faith, and
at that, faith certain of itself and (the existence o# its
object. More than tnat, faith must have certainty about
a body of beliefs, or a "Credo", which were presupposed at
the outset of the argument.
Here we are faced with a historical phenomenon in
itself. Two interpreters who have devoted time and
effort to an in-depth study of the same text feel confident
that they can not only ignore the other end of the spectrum
but dismiss it as absurdity or "nonsense". We are faced
with a discontinuity of interpretation. And one which
occurs in basically the same period of historical study
(1930-1970).
What factors help explain such a discontinuity, and
how might they help us understand both Anselm and Barth?
A.F.Q.I.. p. 171,
2. There are a few scattered footnotes, but not much more
than that.
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One may note first that the divergence of viewpoint
occurs at a most basic level. It is over the character of
Anseim's theologizing-philosopnizing. It concerns the
method of his thinking. It is about how he got from his
A B C B's, to his X; that is, how he got from his premises
to his conclusion as well as the nature of the constituent
parts.
The divergence would seem most acute, then, over the
issues of both Anselm's method and aim in his work.
One may note in passing that there are certainly other,
perhaps more moderate interpretations of Anselm falling
between tnese two extremes. Of tne more comprehensive and
extended interpretations, that of M.J. Charlesworth, stands
out for its historical and textual sensitivity.1 But
Charlesworth is certainly not alone in this middle ground.
For the novice approaching Anselm's text with the
guidance of these interpreters, the experience can be one
of confusion. For, and here we give only our own experience,
if one turns to either Barnes or a similar interpreter, one
who for the sake of simplicity, let us say, sees Anselm as
Philosopher, one comes away from it with the impression:
"that makes sense, there's a coherence in (Barnes's) view
of Anselm".
Yet after one turns to Barth, and reads, in depth and
at length, one also comes away from this interpretation with
the same impression: "this view of Anselm coheres, there's
1. Charlesworth, pp. 3-101.
2. Cf. the Bibliography in Hick and HcGill; as well as the
contents, especially the first half.
204
a coherence here too". The experience is one of intellectual
"double vision".
Yet what can explain two widely divergent inter¬
pretations, both of which have a semblance of coherence
and accuracy? Perhaps we can find several factors which
allows this kind of thing to happen in the case of Anselm's
text.
1. Lince there is a divergence in the understanding of
Anselra, perhaps Anselm's language and language in his day
might be considered. The Viennese Historian of Ideas,
Friedrich Heer, points out that in the realm of thought,
the meanings of words had a certain fluidity in Anselm's
time which they did not have a century and a half later
at the height of scholastic theology. In the later period,
a word had been defined into a clear, clean, neat meaning,
suited to the perhaps dry precision of thought of the major
thinkers of this later era.
Heer speaks of the twelfth century, but what he has to
say would seem to apply equally well to the late eleventh
century, Anselm's period. We will quote at length for he
takes some time to unravel what he has to say.
The twelfth century used Latin both as the instrument
of thought and speculation and as the medium of
creative imagination. Latin was the speech of the
intellectual world throughout Europe, a world at
first inhabited exclusively by clerks j_sic]» and-
when laymen came to join them they went through the
same preliminary education. The Latin of the
uncommitted twelfth century was far from being the
precise scholars' tongue it was to become when
Thomas Aquinas and the thirteenth century schoolmen
were wielding it as the chosen instrument of logical,
"purely scientific" and juridical thought, when each
word was restricted to a single meaning and ever more
rigorously and narrowly defined, until it was reduced
to a single dimension.
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The Latin of the twelfth century, and especially the
Latin of theologians and philosophers, was a living,
flexible language. hach word easily accommodated
several layers of meaning, often of great ambivalence.
An individual found in this "open'1 language room to
express the religious experience of his childhood,
of his people, and of a thousand years of history.
words were still ciphers, symbols, sacraments, a
b'undiino together of different meanings, signposts
directing attention to" sometjxLng beyond. The
schoolmen of the thirteenth century....had no use
for this sort of language: they tore it to pieces
and condemned it as "imprecise", "illogical",
"unscientific". Yet it was just this kind of
language that was eminently suitable for speculative
writing and for expressing in all its nuances that
spirituality, so instinct with intimations of God
and the natural world, which distinguishes some of
the most interesting thinkers of the twelfth century.
Heer includes consideration of Anselm among others in what
follows this passage.
While we cannot say that this applies in toto to Anselra,
it would seem to apply at least to a large extent, and more
generally, to Anselm's whole intellectual context. Anselm
himself was probably well aware of this situation, for he
devoted much effort to the study of words (for example, in
his de Grammatico). and to the range of meanings, for example,
of modal auxiliaries, and other key words of importance in
2
his time.
The problems which may arise from this linguistic
situation may become clearer when we consider the other
points below.
2. The divergence of interpretation which we have laid
out above centers, in our view, around the character of
1. Friedrich Heer, The Medieval World: Europe 11QQ--1350. Tr.
from the German by J. Sondheimer,Cardinal, London,1974,
pp. 97, 96; (emphasis added).
2. Cf. D.P. Henry's study, The Logic of Laint Anslem, Oxford,
London, 1967.
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Anselm's process of thought. Central to this issue is the
issue of method.
As we have pointed out at other points in Part 2
methodological concerns had an intense importance for Barth
in the period in which he turned to Anselm and wrote his
book.
As well as the heightened consciousness of method in
the sciences and the humanities in the first half of the
20th century, one may note also that Barth was at the
crossroads in his own theological method, searching for a
new path after his first and abortive attempt at Dogmatics
in 1927, Die christllche Lograatik.
But while methodological consciousness may have been
at a very high level in 1930, one could not and would not
expect to find the same level of concern or consciousness
at the beginning of Medieval scholasticism, in the 11th
century.
We would venture that Anselm was far more interested
in getting from A to X than in reflecting upon how he got
there. Of course we are not saying that there is no
reflection on method in Anselm, which there is. But rather,
that it was not nearly as acute a concern nor as sophisticated
a concern as it was for thinkers in Earth's period.
As a consequence of this, one could not and would not
expect Anselm to expend a lot of effort in cleaning up
ambiguities in what he had to say about his method, ambiguities
which may have occurred quite naturally given a fluidity of
meaning for terms.
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If this is so, if ambiguity exists in Angela's
reflections on statements about his own method, especially
his phrase fides quaerens intellectum. then this leaves an
open door to arbitrary interpretation.1
The same holds true for certain key words and phrases
in the heart of Anselm's thought itself. Such words as
fides, credo, intellectus. ratio, probare, and necessitas
are in our view vulnerable to arbitrary interpretation, and
are key words for any constructive study of the Proslogion.
Here, in our work we are seeking only to examine,
critically, Barth's scholarship concerning Anselm.
The problem involved here is complicated in Barth's
case by Barth's "word by word" approach to Anselmic texts.
Barth's word studies are notable for their overdependence
on the "root" for finding the intended meaning, and their
lack of attention to the context in which the word is used.
Thus when a key word is found in a second context, after
its meaning is initially established in the first context,
it is too easily assumed that Anselm means the same in the
second context.
An example of this problem with words is entailed in
our third point.
3,. In the marked differences between the interpretations of
Barnes and Barth, the part that faith plays, or does not play,
is, in our view, of central importance. Perhaps a difficulty
in understanding Anselm at this point is a factor in the
1. For a review of interpretations of this phrase, and its
companion phrase credo ut intelligajn. cf. John Mclntyre,
Anselm and His Critics, A Re-interpretation of the Cur




While Barnes discounts the importance of faith in
considering the argument, citing several 'authorities* in
doing so, Barth goes to the other extreme, and sees it not
only as a factor to be considered, but, more than that,
that a certain kind of faith, more specifically, faith that
is certain of itself, faith with no admixture of doubt is
Anselm's point of departure, and, at that, Anselm's
indispensable point of departure.
Unfortunately, Barth does not, in our view, really
inquire into the nature of .Anselm's faith, and assumes too
easily that it is the faith of certainty rather than faith
which searches, uncertain of itself or its object. For
example, Barth nowhere considers the content of Anselm's
opening jjrayer, where Anselm's faith, in our view, is far
from untroubled.
Barth does not allow for the flexibility or range of
meanings in this word fides, as it occurs in different
contexts in Anselm. Barth, thus, in our view, lias gotten
off on the wrong foot (and a very different'foot' from Barnes')
in interpreting the Proslogion.
Both writers, in fact, in considering Anselm's text,
have ignored Anselm's humanity, his involvement in his own
work, especially insofar as this could help in understanding
the character of his theologizing-philosophizing.
We are not saying that the three factors we have laid
out above are completely adequate to explain this wonder,
this discontinuity of interpretation. There certainly may
be others. Among them, perhaps, the 'Vested interests" of
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the interpreter in "having (Anselm) his own way", either
to support his own philosophical or religious quest, or as
a precedent for his theological quest. (One notes that
Barnes is a philosopher, Barth a dogmatician. It would be
still a far greater wonder if Barnes had taken the view
that Barth exposited, and Barth that of Barnes).
We have for purposes of discussion ignored a whole
range of interpreters falling between these two extremes,
interpreters perhaps far more helpful in discovering the
complexity of what Anselm was about. But by considering
these two in their extremes, the hope has been to come to a
better understanding of the factors which contribute to
divergences of interpretation and misinterpretation.
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Section 0.
EARTH'S GROWING ISOLATION AND A POSSIBLE MOTIVATION
FOR THE STUDY ON ANSELM
While up to now we have considered the nature of
Earth's historical scholarship in his study on Anselm, the
intellectual^ economic and political context in which this
study was written, and considered at more length separate
issues concerning his theses about Anselm's work, we have
not as yet seriously raised the question as to Earth's
motivation for the study on Anselm. In the following pages
we shall stand back from the foregoing issues, and pursue
a possible motivating force behind Earth's impetus. We
have spoken about the significance the study had for Earth,
i.e., that it was much more than a disinterested historical
treatise. Now we will consider one possible major motivation
for this study, of such importance for its writer. As
motivation is often a complex issue, we are not of course
excluding other approaches to this question. It is possible
for several motivating factors to stand out. Here we try
to sense the context, or more specifically the way Barth
fitted into} or perhaps refused to fit into^ the intellectual
context in which he found himself. From this we will draw
out a tentative conclusion. Our theme is basically the
need for methodological precedent, and the factors which
exacerbated this need. We shall consider these factors
firstly.
Barth broke off relations with more or less the whole
of his ideational setting, in this period 1929-1931» while,
in contrast, Drunner, Bultmann, Gogarten and Tillich in
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several senses maintained contact. Among his former
compatriots, there was no severance in intention or
actuality from their companions in philosophy and the
humanities. Brunner in his idea of eristics would still
relate to his contemporaries, would argue with them.1 For
Barth, even to argue meant, and here perhaps he was most
perceptive, meant standing on common ground. But why was
he acutely aware of this latter? For some reason, or
reasons, it mattered and mattered deeply that he should
share essentially no common ground with non-ecclesiastical
thought. We shall go into this matter further later in
our thesis. This implies a severance at a fairly basic
level.
In one area this severance cannot be carried to
completion, and Barth is resigned to this. The theologian
must express himself. And to do this he has to use language
technically adequate to express distinctions, etc. which
cannot be expressed in everyday language. Here the
theologian has to admit he has no recourse but to use the
available idioms. Barth would probably see this as technique
of exposition and nothing more. That is, the possibility that
use of non-ecclesiastical philosophical categories might
•contaminate' •Church1 thought is a risk that has to be run.
In what ways did this happen, this severance from his
contemporary context, indeed the modern conte/t, from 1790
onwards?
1. Barth opposed even this 'eristics1 along with explicit
apologetics. C.D. i/l, p. 28.
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Philosophical and Anthropological
When Barth refused any longer to consider the "I"
who considers this "Thou," when he sought to stamp out any
'positive* anthropological mode of thinking and consider¬
ation of man's involvement in theology after his 1927
attempt at Dogmatics, he left behind not only the chance
of contact and intercommunication with his philosophical
colleagues (Scheler, Buber, Heidegger) but also isolated
himself from the concerns of Bultmann, Brunner, Gogarten
and Tillich. There ceased to be a common concern in this
significant area, and thus the possibility of dialogue
here. In place of a possible common concern, there was a
continual source for friction and invective.
One could compare what we find in Barth at this point
with Gogarten's concern in this same period (Zahrnt's
wording):
"The problem of reality begins for man at the point
where he faces other men as his counterparts; all
decisions concerning his relationship with reality
are made in the sphere of his relationship to his
fellow men. Man discovers himself as an I only
when he is challenged by a Thou and becomes aware
of reality as a sphere in which he takes decision
and exercises responsibility. Only in this way
does he obtain an understanding of himself and of
his existence in history.1
Gogarten is concerned with the concrete human situation in
which man hears this "Word". Barth will have none of this,
or rather none of any contemporary anthropological insight
into this. This element is not entirely new, suddenly in
1928-32. It was earlier, in 1924 that the young Bonhoeffer
1. Zahmt, p. 56.
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reacted sharply to Barth's first lectures in Dogmatics,
and specifically about this concern, fearing that Barth's
approach "threatened and volatilized the due emphasis on
man's concrete, earthly plight".1 What may have only
been a fear in 1924 became an actuality after 1930.
Historical and Critical
By 1930 Barth has ceased to have common concerns with
the others in the Zwischen den Zeiten group in historical-
critical work also. While he affirmed the importance of
historical-critical work in theory in the prefaces to the
Romerbrief, one sees little evidence of this sort of
' "■ 1 1
activity even there. In Za^mit's view, by 1932 Barth has
not only set aside theological criticism of scriptures, but
2
historical criticism too. In moving in this direction he
in effect isolated himself from what were, and were to become
problems and questions of central importance for his
colleagues, and for Christianity in the 20th century as a
whole.
Leaving Behind His Former "Comrades in Thought"
In growing more isolated from the general ideational
context in which he found himself, he also left behind most
of his 'companions' of his Romerbrlef period, and his first
Dogmatics period (1924-1927): Kierkegaard, Overbeck,
1. Bethge's summary, in E. Bethge. Dietrich Bonhoeffer.
1967 (E.T. 1970), p. 53, (E.T.).
2. Zahrnt, p. 91.
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Dostoevski, etc.1 Perhaps less importantly, he had left
behind his comrades in Christian Socialism, Ragaz, Kutter
and others, whose names cross the pages of his letters
with great frequency and enthusiasm in the Romerbrief
period. He had left behind any active participation in
the political realm, the movements of his day (although
his interest remained)•
The Benefits of this Isolation
In detaching himself from the broad ideational context
especially the philosophical context, as well as the
narrower theological context, including the area of
historical-critical work, Barth also did in fact evade a host
of problems and questions being raised in each of these
spheres. Unweighted by such problems he could pursue his
own path relatively unhindered. Perhaps this explains in
part the 'unproblematic' nature of the Dogmatics, and also
why it was perhaps easy to produce so much, literarily,
as he did.
In pointing to a growing isolation one is not denying
that there were similarities and similar concerns between
Barth and his former comrades, but:
1. in several important areas, there ceased to be
commonly shared concerns: historical-critical,
anthropological;
1. One is not saying that he in fact left Kierkegaard behind,
i.e. his presuppositions, style of thinking, characteristic
concerns, as this is another question. But rather, he
ceased to have any sense of comradeship with Kierkegaard.
He did not conceive of himself as of the same cloth any
longer.
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2. the methodological difference overshadowed the
similarities which existed, and
3. although there were similar concerns, the framework
in which these concerns were raised was so
considerably different,
4. With this, one is not saying that Barth was unaffected
by the broad ideational setting nor the philosophical
and theological setting from 1800 onwards. This is
another important question we will consider elsewhere.
One is saying rather that he ceased to have 'comrade¬
ship ' and 'companionship' as a compensation for his
1
isolation, in this setting.
As a footnote to this growing isolation one could
mention at least one possible exception. Barth was
involved in conversation with certain teachers of philosophy
and science about issues of methodological interest. However
involved these conversations were, though, a passage in C.D. (I)
which takes up a list of scientific methodological tenets
2
and considers each, finally boils down to the fact that
Barth can accept only one of these and only in "a very
limited interpretation": the "principle of non-contradiction".
He makes clear, that it will not act as a restraint upon him.
For the remaining five 'postulates', they "can only remind
the theologian that he should know what he is doing when he
transgresses them, and that as a theologian he cannot escape
1. One possible major exception to this, i.e. Bonhoeffer, can
for the most part be set aside. Although they met as
student or just 'past student' and Professor a few times
over coffee in this period, Bonhoeffer remained a minor
figure in Germanic Religious Thought until the publication
of his The Cost of riscipleship (1937) and Life Together
(1938).
2« C.D. 1/1, p. 7ff.
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the necessity of transgressing them. Not an iota can be
yielded here without betraying theology...".1
Since the list was worded by H. Scholz, one of this
group, it would seem that Barth found really little
solidarity here either.
One might ask: What did Barth have to say about this
growing isolation? Did he recognize it? As to the
fracturing of the Zwischen den Zeiten group, he did comment
in 1938 in a sketch, autobiographical in nature, on the
"centrifugal effect" he had in his work, in talking of
"a painful change which has come about in the last
ten*years [up to 1938] [which] has involved the
loss of a host of theological neighbors, co-workers,
and friends whom I still possessed in 1928. ... We
quite definitely got on different roads. We are
still travelling those different roads today, and
at best can only greet one another from afar."2
He then speaks, as we have hinted, of "a certain explosive,
or in any case centrifugal, effect [which] seems to inhere
in [his work]".^ One notes in passing that Barth pre¬
supposes in this that he was the center, the central
figure in 1938, and that the others have only "spun off"
him. We will not argue the point here, as it is not our
major concern, but we see this assumption as debatable.
In any case the substance of what he has to say would seem
to support our thesis of a significant and substantial
isolation which had occurred by 1929-1931, the period in
which he turned to Anselm.
1. * P • ® •
2. K. Barth. How I Changed Mv Mind. Knox. Richmond
(Virginia), I#>6, p. 41. *
3. Ibid.
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But of what significance was this isolation for
Barth the man, a human being engaged in a highly demanding
intellectual task. We may gain some insight into this
if we turn to a very late work, which at points, in our
view, has the marks of autobiographical comment. In
1962-1963 Barth writes "An Introduction" to "Evangelical
Theology". In this sizeable book, he devotes, not a
paragraph, nor a series of paragraphs, but a whole chapter
to "Solitude", the solitude of the Theologian. In it we
find echoes in deeply etched tones of what we have been
talking about all along here.
He opens his discussion of the subject of solitude
with the words: "Whoever takes up the subject of theology
discovers himself immediately, recurrently, and inevitably
banished into a strange and notoriously oppressive
solitude". He continues in an autobiographical tone:
In our old church hymnal we used to sing with
emotion a song by Novalis containing the line,
"Be content to let others wander in their broad
resplendent, teeming streets". These words might
sound very appropriate as a slogan for theology;
however they would not be altogether honest, for
who at bottom would not really like to be an
individual in a greater crowd? Who, as long as
he is not the oddest of odd fellows would not like
to have his work supported by the direct or at least
indirect acknowledgement and participation of...all
men or at least as many as possible?-1-
He goes on to ^>eak of this isolation not only in terms of
2
isolation from 'the world', "but also in the Church".
1. Evangelical Theology, p. 110.
2. Ibid.
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We must note the autobiographical cast of this
passage, for although the book is not as a whole auto¬
biographical in intent, it often shows marks of personal
comment. We say autobiographical cast, for not only is
there an autobiographical element, i.e. the hymn of Novalis
"we used to sing with emotion", but when one stands back
from the passage, one must ask: Is this so? Does theology,
or better, has theology "inevitably" incurred a "notoriously
oppressive solitude"? We must simply say, no. Barth
speaks here of a deep solitude or isolation, almost
monastic, yet even more, individualistic alienation from
one's fellows. Even a monk is in the companionship of
his fellow monks. Has this always or even generally been
so? That is, such a deep isolation for theologians. Again,
we must say no. Exceptions there must be, and Barth may
be one of them.
Ve might qualify this, but only somewhat, by noting
a rather commonplace observation that large creative figures
in any field who "cut out a different path" must put up with
some isolation (e.g. Freud vis a vis Jung may be an extreme
example), yet it is more rare for this relative isolation
to become so nearly complete as, in our view, it has become
for Barth. For this reason also, we must consider Earth's
comments autobiographical, implicitly at least, even if not
directly. They simply do not apply generally, to other
figures. In what follows, we will see evidence of this.
What follows this passage is also of interest for
our purposes, for in it Barth outlines some of the causes
for this isolation. They are specifically Barthlan in
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character. It is in commenting on Tillich*s lack of
isolation that we get the best glimpse of this. For as
we have noted, it is not only isolation from others within
the Church, but also isolation from those in the companion
field of philosophy. In discussing Tillict^s Philosophical
Theology, Barth exclaims:
If only the philosopher, as such, wanted to be also
a theologian! If only, above all, the theologian,
as such, wished to be a philosopher! According to
Tillich, he should and can desire to be this. What
solutions! What prospects! "Would that we were
there".
This and similar attempts to do away with the
solitude of theology cannot possibly, however, be
carried to completion...1
Barth goes on to give his own reasons for why this is
"impossible" and the reasons hew close to earlier Barthian
lines.
By pointing to "this and similar attempts" Barth has
pointed out the fact that he and nearly he alone stands in
this isolation from philosophy, for nearly all the others
in the"Zwischen den Zeiten" group had some relation to a
sector of the current philosophical world. We include
Brunner here too for, he at least would try to speak directly
to philosophical issues. Barth is alone in his isolation.
He cannot even share the experience of isolation with his
former comrades. This factor heightens the personal and
autobiographical cast of these passages and leads us to
believe also, because of the deeply etched picture Barth
1. Evangelical Theology, pp. 112, 113.
220
paints with his words e.g.: Whoever...immediately
recurrently, and inevitably (is) banished into a strange
and notoriously oppressive solitude", to believe also
that this solitude was no small thing for this author.
It "must be endured and borne, and it cannot always be
easily borne with dignity and cheerfulness.1,1
This is the solitude we see Barth entering into
with the fragmentation of the Zwischen den Zeiten group
and his production of his book on Anselm. Here, in the
above, we see hira implicitly reflecting upon this
isolation at the distance of just over 3 decades. As
Barth has pointed out for us by reference to Tillich, et al.,
this isolation was not the only available option for
practicing theologians. It was only one option among many.
We must also note that while Barth isolated himself
from the adjacent areas of study, philosophy and the
humanities in general, in and with this same process he was
isolating himself from others in the Church. His movement
away from philosophy which became crystalized in 1929-1931
in his study of Anselm was also a movement away from Tillich,
Gogarten, Bultmann, and Brunner. The separation from
Brunner, for example, which was implicit by 1931 became
explosively explicit only a few years later with Barth's
2
angry 1 Klein*, a reply to Brunner. So in and with this
isolation from philosophy and allied humanities there occurred
at the same time an isolation from others in the Church, and
so, as a consequence an isolation from the concrete living
Church.
1. Evangelical Theology, p. 111.
2. "Nein.I Antwort an Bmil Brunner". 193^» cf. Zahrnt, p.66ff.
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We shall now go on to try to characterize this
situation with the aid of an image taken from a more
mundane realm. If one pictures the broad ideational
situation c.1930 as a ball park, a playing field, with
major and minor figures holding certain positions, having
a place of their own, it would seem clear that while
e.g. Brunner stayed to fight (his Eristics1) and Bultmann
e.g. Btayed to participate (in conjunction with Heidegger),
and while both, together with Gogarten and especially Tillich
remained to address the problems and objections which others
on the field raised,"'" i.e. to participate, even yet keeping
an element of independence and detachment, in contrast,
Barth had decided to leave the field. Continuing with the
image, he was over the fence and out to perhaps a distant
meadow, from which he intended to shout back to those on
the field. He had left not only the broad Ideational
context of his time, but that narrower area of it where
theology was being carried on.
In that more or less distant meadow, i.e., in this
isolation, methodological and otherwise, one could perhaps
understand how such a thinker without •companionship1,
without solidarity particularly in the area of methodology,
how this thinker, even much more than others could wish to
find •companionship', and even more than this, could wish to
find a precedent for this very isolation from his non-
ecclesiastical context, a precedent at the most basic, i.e.
methodological, level.
1. E.g. what was later to become Tillich's Theology of
Correlation.
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Certainly Luther, where he most differed from any
contemporary and accepted thought patterns turned to
Augustine and Paxil (i.e. in his thinking on gratia) which
had he not done so, would have left him, in the eyes of
his contemporaries, and himself also, without precedent
and support.
So Barth also, at this critical juncture, where he
differed so with his compatriots and with theology since
Schleiermacher, turns at this critical point to a large
figure in the past, and in his study of Anselm finds so
much of what later will sustain him in the method he
actually follows. V>'e venture that this increasing isolation
-was a major factor in leading him to find exalted signifi¬
cance in his interpretation of Anselm.
That Barth sensed this isolation is clear from what we
have cited. There is a feeling of desertion in his auto¬
biographical article of 1938.1 The others of the"Zwischen
den Zeiten"group have really deserted the cause. He is
the only one left. He is alone.
1. How I Changed ray Mind, p. 4Iff., especially p. 42.
'••••'
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Here in the conclusion of Part II we shall
draw together and review our research into Berth's
study of Anselm. e shall then draw what conclusions
seca appropriate.
. rth's /.ain Theses and its Corollary.
Let us begin with Barth's main thesis about
I
Anselm's theology and its cor/o^bry: All elements of
thought, presuppositions etc. used in this theology
-
come from 'the Credo', 'the Faith of the Church';
conversely none come frora outside 'the Credo'. That
is, this theology has no significant basis, even part¬
ial basis in any kind of philosophy. All of its pre¬
suppositions cone from'the Church's Faith| that is,
even its methodological rules and/or assumptions,
thus it is a theology built entirely upon 'what the
Church has received' in revelation. Yet it does not
argue "from authority". Thus scripture, as the text
of authority, is set aside, and as such plays no
positive or constructive role in this method. Co,
for example, there are no "proof texts", no statements
to the effect "...it is written". As we have pointed
out, this earns that 'the Credo' from which Anselm
(allegedly) draws all his basic assumptions consists
of the beliefs of the creeds and dogmas of the Carly
Church, (and their development); 'the Credo' does not
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includo Scripture. Thus, the content of this •Credo',
as Earth uses it, is Tradition. As, in Part III of
our thesis, we shall explore the place of Tradition
Earth's theology, it is important to point out
that here in Part II v/e are dealing with Earth's view
of the place of "the Credo"® Tradition in Anselm's
theology.
Wow we have stated what we see as Earth's main
thesis and its eorjfo j, Anselm draws upon the Credo'
for essentially all elements of thought, presupposit¬
ions etc. used in his theological construction.
Essentially none of these elements come from outside
the Credo?. ThuSj in Earth's viewj Anselm has 'kept
clean' of any significant participation in any philo¬
sophy.
Let us look at one of the passages in which
Earth articulates this view of his. In the following
passage Earth uses Anselm's term "rationes necessariae"
to refer to the A B C D's or basic elements of thought,
presuppositions etc., upon which Anselm allegedly builds.
.Throughout all Anselm's theology the
origin_of the rationes necessariae is_to be_
7ound somewhere other than where it ought to
fie found in a philosopher ... - namely, on
the same levol as that on which the question
to be answered is raised, within the__Oredo__
itself^ Within it, now this Article ancl now
Uhat Article figure as the unknown X which is
solved by means of the Articles of faith
a, b, c, d ... which are assumed to be known,...
1. A.l1'. „.l., p.55. (emphasis added).
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Let us now look at our findings concerning
several of these A B 0 D's in the text of central
concern in Berth's Anselrn, the Iroslogion. have we
found that all of the A B G D's here come from 'the
Credo', as Barth asserts? If not, is tuere evidence
that some of them have a source outside this 'Credo'?
Be are asking the question: Eow does Barth's theory
concerning Anselm 'prove out'?
When we turn to look at the x roslo ;ion and
Earth's interpretation of it, there is one of these
basic elements of thought, or A B G D's which stands
out among all others as of primordial significance.
It is the 'key phrase[''God is] that than which noth¬
ing greater can be thought." Barth specifically
names this as "the 'a* taken from the Credo by means
of which the existence of Cod now represented as X
is to be transformed into a known quantity from one
that is unknown (not disbelievedjbut as yet not real¬
ized)."1
So important is this 'a' that Barth almost
completely ignores any 'b' 'c' 'd' 's which may
accompany it. Thus Barth devotes over fifteen pages
2
to consideration of this phrase, while relegating
consideration of any other A B G D's to a mere foot¬
note.^ This key phrase or as Barth chooses to call
1. n»x' » « 1 • , p . / ■ .
2• A.m. .1., pp.75-39•
3. A.T'.c.I., p.78. n.5»
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it, "name of God" is thus of primordial importance
in Earth's interpretation of Ansalm's -roslo ;ion.
Thus, if this phrase, this alleged "name of God",
of such central importance in Earth's interpretation,
does not come from 'the Credo', it would appear that
Earth's interpretation is in serious trouble.
Yet just here, at this crucial point, we find
that Barth is totally unable to support his contention
that this 'key phrase' or name of God comes from 'the
Credo'. As we have pointed out In our study, above,^
he is unable to cite any evidence to support this
assertion; he can cite no text of 'the Credo' where
Anselm found, or from which he derived this phrase.
Additionally he can cite no indirect evidence.
Perhaps of equal significance, he cannot cite any
evidence that Axis elm was of the opinion that this phrase
came from 'the Credo' or the 'faith of the Church'.
It is of crucial importance to Earth's inter¬
pretation that this phrase, or 'name of God' be seen
as having its source in 'the Credo', the 'faith of
the Church' that is^in what 'the Church' has been
given in revelation. for Barth shall go on to hold
the view that at a crucial juncture in Ansela's argu¬
ment, this phrase must be considered revelatory: it
must be heard as "the Word of God"; it must be heard
1. See above, "The Question of the Source of the Key
Phrase", pp.ljlf-*-*
as a "Word" of prohibition, "this prohibition: he can
conceive of nothing greater.""'"
As we have seen in our study, Anselm's whole
argument, in Berth's hands, defends on this revelational
element. That is, it is dependent for its effective¬
ness as an argument on the alleged intervention of the
deity in an Event of revelation, in which the human
words of this phrase, "[plod is]) that than which a
2
greater cannot be thought" become the word of God,
a..:<d in so doing beco-.e a prohibition (to paraphrase}:
"You, man, arc permitted to think of nothing greater."
Thus this phrase becomes, in this (alleged) revelatory
transformation, a 'revealed rule for thought'. This
is crucial to the argument as Garth interprets it.
Aor apart from this Event in which the 'key phrase*
becomes revelatory, Aas©ls's argument has no force.
at the close of his study Earth speaks of this Event
of revelation.
God-gave himself as the object of his knowledge,
and God illumined him that he might know him as
object. Apart from this event then is no proof
of the existence, that is of the reality of God.
But in the power of this event there is a proof
which is worthy of gratitude,
C. .."Ulnae dieses nreigniss keinen Beweis der
xistoj M, d.h. der Gegonstandlichkeit Gottesl
Aber in Kraft dieses Ereignisses ein Beweis
der des Dank wert ist."3 5
G* a«•a., p.77.
2. Barth states this explicitly, A.A.... >1., p.lpl.
Gee also p.77f and p.82,
3* A.lVg.I.. p.171; German edition, p.198,
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Thus since this 'key phrase' allegedly becomes revel¬
atory and must be heard as "the Word of God", it is
crucial that the source of this phrase be, if not
Scripture, then 'the Credo', that is 'the Faith of
the Church', given to the Church in revelation.
let we have found that Barth is unable to cite
any evidence (1) supporting his assertion that this
phrase has its source in 'the Credo', or (2) that
this phrase has a revelatory character. .ft itionally,
Barth is unable to cite evidence that (1) -basela was
of the opinion that this phrase came from 'the Credo',
or (2) that Anselm viewed this phrase as revelatory,
as embodying a divine "Word" of prohibition.
how for Barth to hold that this phrase is a
prohibition, one word of this phrase, "posse" must
have the meaning "is permitted", so that in the negat¬
ive it means "is not permitted", i.e., "is prohibited.'1"*"
Yet while the word "posse" can mean both "to be poss¬
ible" (e.g. within the range of possibility) and "to
be permitted", we have found (1) that in the iroslogion
Chapter II and III there is no evidence to suggest
that '"posse" has the meaning of "to be permitted."
In fact we have found evidence which apparently makes
it impossible to interpret "poase" in t is manner,
For at the very point in the text where Barth sees
1, Here we shall summarize the results of our invest¬
igation of the nature of the 'key phrase' in
Barth's interpretation. Bee above, pp,H7ff.
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this phrase as articulating a divine "prohibition",
Anselm substitutes "nequire" for 'faon posse": "At certe
id quo maius cogltari nequit. . ."•*• As "nequire" does
not share the ambivalence of meaning of "non posse",
that is, as it can only mean "is not possible" (not
"is not permitted"), this would apparently confirm
that there is no sense of "is prohibited" in Anselm's
use of "non p03se" (or "posse" with a negative).
Thus on the basis of textual evidence it is impossible
to hold that this phrase embodies a "prohibition".
Thus concerning this phrase or "name of God"
(as Barth terms it) wo have found that it cannot have
the meaning Barth attributes to it. It cannot be
seen as a prohibition. And thus it canr.ot be regard¬
ed, as it must be regarded in Berth's interpx^etation,
as a divine "Word" of prohibition: man is not to
2
conceive of a greater. Thus it cannot be regarded
as a 'revealed rule for thought*.
If Berth's contention as to the nature of this
phrase is untenable, what of his contention as to the
source of this phrase# As we have already pointed
out, Barth is apparently completely unable to support
his contention that this phrase comes from 'the Credo'
or the 'Paith of the Church'. He is also unable to
cite any evidence that Anselm thought of this phrase
1. Prpslpgion, Chanter II, Charlesworth, p.116,
nes lp-16.
2 . A . x' . vl. I., p. 77.
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as coming from 'the Credo'• On the evidence avail¬
able we have argued"*" that the most probable source
of this phrase is the'pagan' Stoic philosopher, Seneca,
specifically his ^aturales Quaestiones. fwo copies
of this book were at Bee in the early 1100*s, about
2p years after Anselm's work on the Iroslogion. It
is thus highly likely that at least one copy was
present while Arise In worked on his j roslogion. i'ho
second most likely source, we have argued, is •the
philosophical Augustine'. One finds a phrase very
similar to Angela's key phrase in writings of August¬
ine writings basically philosophical in nature.
In summary, concerning the source of this phrase
the most significant of Anselm's presuppositions in
his rroslogion argument, we have found Berth's assert¬
ion that it comes from 'the Credo' completely unsupp¬
orted. ho text, and no indirect evidence is cited.
Berth's assertion that Anselm regarded this phrase as
"a revealed name of God" is also completely unsupported
Ho text or indirect evidence is cited here either.
Barth cannot even support his contention that the phras
%
must be considered a "name of God" or nomen del.
1. See above, pp.lj^-ff.
2. A.i1'. , p.77•
A.A. p.77. See note where, on close
inspection one finds that Barth cannot cite a
precedent for his use of these words, "nomen del".
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In contrast we have found that the most likely
source of this phrase is to be found in Seneca's
Aaturalec Guaestiones. that is, in the work of a
'pagan' philosopher. following this, the second most
likely source is the philosophical Augustine."*"
As to the nature of the phrase, as a prohibit¬
ion, embodying a divine "Word" of prohibition, and
thus having the nature of a 'revealed rule for thought',
we have found (1) no evidence to suggest this reading
of the phrase, and (2) we have found textual evidence
which mokes such a reading impossible. Anselm means
"is possible" by "posse"« not "is permitted". One
may note that this is the only presupposition of the
argument to which Barth devotes significant attention.
Are there then other "presuppositions" which
Anselm uses, and yet which cannot be claimed to come
from 'the Credo'. W© have found one, which is both
technically central and necessary to Anselrn's
procedure. for this reason we have called it a
•procedural presupposition'. It is Anselm's "greater
2
than" presupposition. That is, one 'entity' is
"greater than" another by reason of possessing aertain
attributes. It is not simply greater than the first
entity in particular respects, but rather, greater
1. See above, pp.i^ff.
2. Here we are reviewing the findings in our section
entitled "Anselm's 'Greater Than' Presupposition",
above, pp.l42ff.
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than the first in an absolute sense. A horse is
greater than a tree, for example, for it pos esses the
attribute of locomotion. rfhus a horse is on a higher
level of bein- vis-a-vis a tree.
In Ansela's argument, we have found this
"greater than" presupposition to be of central import¬
ance for his argument (regardless of which interpret¬
ation one is following). For it is upon the basis of
this assumption that Ansolm proceeds step by step
towards his conclusion. In our researc- , wo ve
(1) found this presupposition to be of crucial inport-
ance to Anselm's argument, and (2) we have identified
its source as Ileo-platonic philosophy. here If-.en we
have a second major presupposition which does not come
from 'the Credo'. It comes, as most probably does
the first mentioned, the 'hey phrase', from philosophy.
As we have identified two presuppositions,
one of which quite definitely comes from philosophy,
i.e., Anselm's "greater than" presupposition, and one
which most likely comes from philosophy, the 'key
phrase', we have thus outnumbered the presuppositions
regaining, which Barth has explicitly named and claimed
. ' y''; fi,;.
as coming from 'the Credo', (he names only one,
besides the 'key phrase', yet does not do more than
name it in a footnote).1 Thus both ISarth's main thesi
1. Cf. .ip.78, footnote C3»
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and its corollary are apparently untenable. ot all
of Anselm's presuppositions cone from 'the Credo'.
Some of central significance cone from philosophical
sources.
uiree Central Cub-theses in north's .,tudy of ^ciseli .
Let us now look at what we see as three central
sub-theses of harth's Study of Anselm* In north' s
account, (1) Anselm begins in faith, that is in the
fullness of faith, faith essentially untroubled by
doubt. (2) In faith, Anselri simply assumes the truth
of the Credo', as a whole, and in each of its elements*
There is no questioning as to the truth of its beliefs
prior to assent, nor subsequently. The process of
thought which allegedly takes place subsequent to
assent i3 a process of thought which essentially only
examines the "inner-consistency of Christian statements."
That is, one element of 'the Credo' is set aside as an
"unknown" X (temporarily unknown, yet believed as true).
This X is then "established" with the help of other
elements from the Credo', i.e. A B C D's also assumed
as true. The chief consequence of this exercise is
a "deeper understanding" of the "content" of 'the Credo',
that is a deeper understanding of the interrelatedness
of its beliefs, and their consistency with each other.
(3) As a consequence, this process of thought cannot
aid faith; it Cannot increase faith. Points (1) and
(2) concern Anselm's alleged methodological "point of
departure" in theologizing. Let us consider point (1)
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firstly. Anselm "begins" in faith, that is begins
in the fullness of faith, faith essentially untroubled
by doubt. This is the first major point Barth lays
out concerning Anselm's mode of theologizing. Barth
states that " it is because we possess the certainty
of faith that3 we nu3t hunger after the fidei ratio",
i.e. the rationality, or inner-consistency oi 1 the
faith*.1
Yet we have asked in our study of the Iroslogion:
is this so? Is Anselm's "point of departure" in the
j roslp; :ion characterized by "the cei'tainty of faith" {
here we shall summarize the findings of our study of
2
tae opening rayer of the rroslogion. Barth makes
much of the fact that Anselm ~ begins his , ros'lor ;ion
in prayer, addressing the One /ho's existence he wants
to inquire about. Barth takes this as rather, definite
indication of sure and certain faith. Yet, as we
have noted (1) Barth not once mentions or examines
content of this prayer,nor its character and mood.
While he devotes space to a line by line study of
Aaselm's arguments which follow this prayer, he devotes
not one sentence to the rtnr. text of the prayer itself;
(2) In our examination of Anselm's 'Opening Prayer*
we found evidence of much less than sure and certain
faith, Bather, here was a man asking, out of darkness,
1. A. if. p.25,21.
2. See above,pp.llOff.
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for help. It is the fall of Adam which Anselm speaks
of in this prayer: "Oh how hard and cruel was that
hall.... ihy did he £"'AdarJ deprive us of light o&d
surround us with darkness."1 Anselm then implores,
"Show Yourself to us. Give Yourself to us....I set
out hungry to look for You, Do not let aie return
2
scorned and empty handed." Is this the fullness of
faith? ve have argued, above, that the faith of
this rayer is troubled faith, the faith of one who
is "out of relation" with the One he seeks.
Thus even if Anselm, when he wrote this, nay
have possessed "the fullness of faith" he has chosen
to articulate a faith that is neither certain of
itself nor its Ob.ject; and he has chosen to begin
his theologizing in tnis manner. (One can see no evid¬
ence of a 'violent* transition of mood as Anselm
proceeds to begin his argument which immediately
follows). Ve cannot find the fullness of faith which
Barth speaks of at this point. If we do find it,
at the conclusion of the Proslogion, perhaps Anselm's
theologizing has helped him out of the "depths" he has
articulated in this prayer* (If so, and we have
cited evidence to this effect this argues against
1. Charlesworth, p.115.
2. Ibid., p.117.
3. See above, pp.llOff.
4. See above, pp.lH-ff.
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point (4-)» i.e. that this theology cannot be of aid
to faith). Given this evidence, we do not find
Berth's view accurate concerning point (1). Anselm
does not "begin" his theologizing in sure and certain
faith. Such faith is not his "point of departure".
Let us turn to point (2)f i.e. the second
sub-thesis we find in Barth concerning Anselm'a methodi
In faith Anselm simply assumes the truth of 'the Credo*,
as a whole and in each of its particulars. He then
builds his thought upon "presuppositions" taken from
'the Credo'. Thus there is no questioning of the
truth of particular beliefs of 'the Credo' either prior
to assent nor subsequently, i.e. in the theological'
process of thought
How is it that we make this last statement
about Barth's account of this method? In the process
of thought which Barth attributes to Anselm, Anselm
takes one belief and examines this belief vis-a-vis
other beliefs, also taken from 'the Credo* and assumed
to be true. He then seeks to "establish" the first
belief with the help of these other beliefs# Yet
what is the consequence of this process of thought?
The consequence is apparently to establish an inner-
2
consistency between "Christian statements". Thus
1. It would not be unusual for a medieval thinker to
assent to 'the faith of the Church* without prior
questioning. What concerns us here is whether




when the first belief is "established" or "proven"
. ■
using these other beliefs, this .leans that a logical
consistency has (allegedly) been exhibited as o: ist-
ing\betveen the first belief and these other beliefs,
Thus in this process of thought the theologian has
(allegedly) only understoo&jthe "content" of 'the
Credo' Dore^fully#. In short the theologian here
has only asked the question as to whether one belief
of the Credo' is consistent with other beliefs in
'the Credo'.
let this means that essentially t e only
question dealt with is whether, and how, ad to what
extent this one belief is consistent with other
beliefs,in the Credo', all of which are as uned
without question to be true. As a consequence, the
Question of truth regarding the beliefs of 'the.Credo
has not been raised prior to assent, nor subsequently
in the theological process of thought. fhe question
of truth concerning beliefs has tip place in this
theological programme, Only the question as to the
"content" and the "inner-consistency" of 'the Credo'
have a place here.
Thus it should be fairly obvious that such a
process as Barth describes can be of little help to
tue insiniens, the "fool" in the roslogion who
believes there is no Cod.
Mow, as we have found this account of Anselm's
methodology essentially inaccurate in its "main thesi
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and "corollary", in that we have found that not all
of Anselm's A3 C D's used in reference to his X come
from 'the Credo*; and that sone definitely come from
philosophy, we may go on to a second consideration:
Is there evidence that Anselm did seek to question
the truth of certain beliefs, that is to raise and
answer the question of truth concerning certain "beliefs
of 'the Credo'?
We might answer this question best by consider¬
ing another question: Is there evidence that Anselm
intended his argument as having validity, even limited
validity for an "unbeliever", such as the insioiens
or "fool" in the Proslogion? That is, did he intend
his argument to have some amount of validity apart
from faith and "authority" (Scripture)• That is,did
he se k to raise the question of truth concerning cer¬
tain beliefs and answer it in a manner which had some
degree of validity apart from faith and aut ority,
i.e. . cripture and 'the Credo'?
In answering this question we nay note three
things. We have found (1) that then is a signific¬
ant philosophical basis for Anselm's theology in the
ProslO; ;ioa. That is, if both anselm's 'key phrase'
and his "greater than" presupposition have their source
in philosophy, not in 'the Credo*, then here is a
partial basis for his theologizing which is independent
of faith, 'the Credo' or hcripture.
We have also found (2) that there were those
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present in Anselm' s time and in his proximity who had
literacy, latin learning, and capacity for theological
conceptuality, jot who stood outside the confines of
the Church, in doubt or disbelief.1 Therefore there
v/ere those to whom Anselm could have presented an
argument for certain Christian beliefs. here, one
may note, such a philosophical basis could have been
of relevance in such a task, for the people we have
described would have had at least some exposure to
philosophical reasoning, i.e. in the Cathedral Cchools.
Given a partial basis in his thought, philosoph-
i ride feh(!e«c«
ical in nature, and thus in/ihepw from faith,
'the Credo' and Scripture (i.e. 'faith and authority*),
and given the presence of unbelievers to whom theolog¬
ical argumentation could be of relevance, we might
now point out (3) that we have found a fair amount of
evidence of "apologetic intent" in Anselm's writing.
2
Here we shall review what we laid out above, as
"evidence for 'apologetic intent' in Anselm". Not
only were two notable pupils of Anselm, Gilbert Crispin
and iiodulfus, to offer proofs for Christian beliefs}
which were intended to function independently of faith
and 'authority', and thus show "apologetic intent"
quite unambiguously, we have also found evidence in
1. Gee above, pp.lS5ff and p,178f.
2. Gee above, pp,180ff.
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Anselm's writings. Thus we have found Anselm giving
an account of ais motivation for writing as follows:
"to answer for our faith against those who, not wish¬
ing to believe what they do not understand, nock the
believers,He goes on to say, in the sane place,
that his intention is to proceed "through necessary
reasons, and wit,.out making appeal to the authority
of Scripture, to prove those truths,we hold t rough
■
2
faith concerning the divine nature and its persons."
This last passage, seen in the context of the first
would apparently Indicate fairly strong 'apologetic
intent'•
We have also found evidence that An3elm is
concerned that his argument in the xroslogion shall
have validity for the insipiens who does not believe
there is a God. i'or when Gaunilo objects that the
key phrase, "[God isJ that than which nothing greater
can be thought" is incomprehensible for the unbelievero )
(thus rendering the argument useless and invalid for
the unbeliever), Anselm goes to considerable lengths
to refute Gaunllo's claim, showing how the unbeliever
can turn to nature (not revelation, or 'the Credo')
and form an idea of "that than which nothing greater
can be thought." Thus it is apparently quite import¬
ant to Anselm that his argument, at this critical
1. Gee above, p.lBJf.
2. Ibid,
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point, hay© validity for the unbeliever,(In backing
up his claim that the unbeliever can turn to nature,
and proceed, by analogy, to understand this phrase,
Anaelm cites a passage of Scripture, one which has
ofton been cited in defending 'natural theology'
((Ronul.20))1).
The final piece of evidence we cited, and
perhaps the best, was one pointed out by il.J.Gharlesworth.
In Gaunilo's criticism of Anselm's argument, Gaunilo
assumes that iuisela has presented an argument intended
as having validity for an unbeliever# Garth is rather
caustically critical of Gaunilo's (allegedly) faulty
understanding of Anselm's argument: Gaunilo has
completely failed to see the basic nature of Anselm's
2
argument. Yet Jnarlesv/orth observes (correctly in
our view) that
If Garth sees Gaunilo's attack as being a
complete misunderstanding of Gt. Anselm's
position, this is certainly not the way Gt.
Anselin sees it. In Anselm's reply to
Gaunilo he does not, in fact, anywhere
complain that Gaunilo's criticisms are ir¬
relevant or beside the point, but he confronts
Gaunilo's objections,•.and attempts to show
that they are invalid. In short, what Is
obvious in St. Anselm's counter-reply is
that he agrees completely with Gaunilo's
reading of the - roslogion argument as a
rational proof of the existence of God,5
There is considerable evidence then that Arisola intended
1. See above, pp,185If, and especially p,187f.
2. See a,l.c.I., p.131.
3. Ghorlesworth, pp,42~<
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his arguments to have at least soma decree of validity
for unbelievers. let this weans that he wished bo
raise, and answer questions of truth concerning
certain beliefs, and do this in so.ee decree of detach-
oent„ from authority, that is^ Bcripture and 'the Oredo',
and from faith. . Yet this means also that his arguments
were intended to aid and support faith, that is, to
help tho unbeliever toward faith, and to help his own
faith toward fuller faith, ie nave found evidence
t.mt Ansolm's i-roslogion has fulfilled this function
for its author, i.e. evidence which suggests t .at it
has brought him to greater faith.li
Yet this is the very thing that ca.i »ot happen
according to Barth. for point (4) in our sun. ary of
garth's sub-theses about Anselm's theological process
of thought, was that (according to Barth) this process
of t .ought cannot aid faith} it cannot help in bringing
an to fuller faith. "...The aim of theology cannot
be to lead ten to faith, nor confirm the in faith,
nor even deliver their faith from doubt, ^either
does the man who asks theological questions ask them
Tail -■'*
for the safe of his faith....""
The evidence which we have just cited in arguing
that iUisolra wishes to raise and answer the question of
truth concerning beliefs, and do so in a way that both
1. Bee above, r
• 114ff.
2 . ^.. » »» , p • 17 >
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helps the unbeliever toward faith and helps the
believer toward greater faith, would apparently
vV.';, "T'_.
indicate that Barth has misunderstood Anselm's
theological method, and misunderstood it at a quite
basic level. For Anselm, unlike Barth, or Earth's
pict.:ire of Anselm, apparently wants to honestly face
the question of truth regarding these beliefs. In
contrast, the process of thought described by Barth,
with full-hearted approval, avoids this very question,
-
_ •
It asks essentially only one question: How are the
• ■
beliefs of 'the Bredo' to be interrelated; how are
they to be understood in their interrelatednesa?
i
In summary we find both Earth's main thesis
2
arid it corollary concerning Anselm's method
essentially untenable and misleading, We also find
5
the sub-theses of Earth, laid out above, as
ocse rtially untenable and misleading. Thus in each
of its major aspects we find Earth's study of Anselm
to be seriously faulty and basically misleading.
T-or ac several features of the theological
method which Barth has outlined here in his study of
Anscla which call for additional comment,
1, Bee above,p.2. 3f.
2, See above, ;> * 225f.
5. See above,p.233.
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All through this work Barth has referred to
an entity called 'the Credo'. It is from this 'Credo'
that Anselm allegedly draws all the basal elements of
his thought. Yet what is this 'Credd? Of what does
it consistT It does not include Scripture. Scripture
and Credo are sharply distinguished. (This is necessary,
for Barth is aware that Anselra refuses to argue "from
authority", and by "authority" was meant Scripture in
particular).
By 'the Credo' or 'the Faith of the Church'
Barth has in actuality been referring to the creeds
and dogmas of the Church, specifically, to the creeds
and dogmas of the Barly Church, as developed in the
eastern Church. In short, what Barth has been
referring to by this term is Tradition, that is,
i'r dition over against Scripture. How why is this of
importance? Here we find (1) a theological method
in which cripture has no constructive role (only a
li itinr; role).1 Yet more significantly we find
(2) a theological method in which there is unquestion¬
ing assent to Tradition, i.e. ther . is no questioning
Of the truth of 'the Credo' beliefs prior to assent,
nor subsequently in this theological process of thought.
As we have already notedj essentially the only
question concerns the "content" of Tradition: how are
these beliefs to be understood and Interrelated? As
a result, 'the Credo' = Tradition is regarded, ipso
1. See below, pp.261ff
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facto, as an authoritative articulation of revelation,
The nethod Barth describes proceeds on this, assumption
(for the reason that it does not question these beliefs;
it only examines and articulates their content and
their interrelatedness, while yet asserting their truth,
and their accuracy in articulatin revelation). let
in displaying these "beliefs in this manner, this
process of thought implicitly assumes them to "be an
authoritative articulation of revelation.
Is there further evidence for this view that
we are presenting? Let us briefly review our examin¬
ation of one of Aneelm's A B C L)*s which allegedly
cane from 'the Credo' » Tradition, The hey phrase
"[qo& is3 that than which nothing greater than can be
thought" allegedly cones from this 'Credo'. IS this
4:
phrase, then, considered by Barth to be an authoritat¬
ive articulation of revelation?We have found this to
be the case. The 'key phrase' must be considered,
and nonrd as "the Word of Cod." The argument can
only be effective, in Earth's view, if the phrase is
so regarded. But one should note: here the human
forrn of "the Word of God" are the human words of
(what is allegedly) Tradition (i.e. not Scripture).
Thus (1) Tradition has a place of primordial import¬
ance in the method Barth describes; (2) It is implic¬
itly regarded as an authoritative articulation of
revelation; (5) There is some evidence that Barth. is
of the view that the human words of tradition are a
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human form of "the Word of God", (The key phrase being
an example of this); (4) She theologian's relation to
'the Credo' * Tradition is one of unquestioning ascent
there is no question of truth raised prior to assent
or subsequently in this theology.
That what we have just outlined here has little
to do with ^Anselsa's own actual procedure should be
apparent, if, as v/e have argued, Barth has misunder¬
stood Anselm's method at a quite basic level.
There is one further point we should aal.ee
before concluding our study of Earth's kn.seIn. As
Barth readily admits, Angela's argument corr.es to noth¬
ing, in his interpretation, unless God intervenes,
and speaks his "V/ord'j in and through Ansel...' s human
words#1 We have identified the central place where
this must happen. That is) Anselm's 'key phrase*
must be heard as "the Word of God." Barth states
that "apart from this event £in which God s -oaks his
WordJ there is no proof of the existence, tint is, of
2
the reality of God." Yet what this means, and here
we agree fully with Arthur 0. KcGill,-' is th-.t Anselia*
argument becomes in effect, "an argument from authority
dor it is only when Authority (i.e. God) interve: es,
and speaks his "Word" through. Anselm's human words
1. a. . .I., p. 1?1.
A • *1. J-' . . a . , p . 1 /1.
5. See above, pp,128ff.
'
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that this argument, so interpreted, has any effective¬
ness. Thus the argument is tot.ill do o.. out on
Authority for its effectiveness.
That this has little to do with Anselm's own
theological programme should again be apparent, if
we are correct in maintaining that Earth, has misunder¬
stood Angela's theology at this point (The key phrase
comes, if wo are right, from Seneca, a •pagan* philo¬
sopher, not from 'the Credo*)(and there is no evidence
that Anselra viewed this phrase as a prohibition, oven
a divine prohibition), If, as we are maintaining,
Barth has misunderstood the nature of Anseln's method
as carried out in his .troslogion, and misunderstood it
at a quite basic level, this should not mean that it
has not served Barth well in his own quest for a
methodology. while it does mean, if we are essent¬
ially correct, that Barth has no precedent in Anselm
e.g. for cutting himself off from all non-ecclesiastical
sources of thought (philosophy etc.), and for attempt¬
ing to base his theology solely on (what is alleged
to be) "the Word of God" as articulated in the 'faith
of the Church', yet, perhaps Barth could never have
reached the 'methodological crystalization* he did
except by misinterpreting this respected figure of
tne past. He sens this study as his most satisfying
production, as "a vital key, if not the key, to an
understanding of that whole process of thought that
has impressed mo more and more in ay Jriurch jo natics
24-8
as the only one proper to theology'.1 With this
'
thought in mind we shall now go on in fart Three of
our thesis to look upon Berth's own, theological
procedure. In doing so, we shall not simply pre¬
suppose that what we have found here in the method
Barth ascribes, with favor, to Aneela, he simply puts
into practice. Rather we shall let this study of
\ •. * * ^ ' " • ' „ ( , ^
Anseln suggest questions concerning garth's own
procedure. We shall find some remarkable similar-
"**."■1~d"""
■
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Our purpose in the next few pages is to describe
both what we shall be trying to do in Part III of our
thesis, and also what we shall not be trying to do.
In general terms, we shall, in Part III, be trying to
lay out evidence for the presence of certain basal
characteristics which we find in the actual working
procedure of Earth's theology. That is, character¬
istics in the manner in which Barth carries out his
theological programme. Thus our concern is with what
we find to be Barth's actual working method. His own
account of this working method will concern us only
at points, and only indirectly, for we find his own
account deficient in several ways, which we shall indic¬
ate. We might also point out that what we are con¬
cerned with are aspects of method, rather than, for
example, the specific "content" of his doctrines.
The content of his doctrines will concern us only
insofar as they can help us understand the method.
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Our goal is to exhibit evidence, and argue upon
this evidence, for biie resence of certain "character¬
istics of method." In doing so our aim (most often)
is not proof, fcnat is definite certainty, but rather,
exploration leading up to a statement of, for example,
the great likelihood that such and such is the case.
If one aims only for proof and certainty, this in our
opinion limits one in his explorations. That is,
what one can prove, or make a completely watertight
case for, in any given hody of thought is probably in
most cases quite limited in extent. In contrast, that
which one can give significant evidence for, and argue
for, that is, arguing for its -robabil-ity and great
likelihood (over against an opposing viewpoint concern¬
ing the writer in question) is, in our view, Just as
important as what one might be able to prove with
certainty. Go much for our aims in general. We
might now state what we shall not be trying to do in
Part III, that is, how we are limiting our study.
We shall not be trying to investigate the com¬
plete extent of Berth®S working method. To carry out
such a task adequately is, in our view, beyond bhe
scope of a single thesis. Rather we shall focus upon
several central and basic aspects of this method, which
in our view underpin the whole theological enterprise.
we shall limit our study additionally by consid¬
ering Earth's dogmatics of the period 1950 - 1942, that
is, approximately the first half of the period of his
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mature productivity, c.1930 - 1965* This period
includes tc Juurch Jot:" Lfcics, /el a er 1/1, I/i, II/l
and II/ -, Credo (1955) and dogmatics in Outline (1947).
Although the latter lies just beyond the period we have
named, yet it is of•methodological importance for our
period. Earth's study of Anselm, which has proved
so suggestive for our study of Earth's method, also
falls within these years, being composed in 1951.
firstly, we shall investigate the relation to
Tradition which exists in this theology, a subject
that has received relatively little attention in studies
of Earth. The importance of this subject cas been
suggested by Earth's rather unusual interpretation of
tjiselm, in which tradition, in the form ol 'the Credo'
functions in a central and highly significant manner.
i,ie shall be arguing that Tradition, and specifically
the oredal tradition of the Carly Church, and the
dogmas associated with it, are of central importunee
for Earth's own method, and that this method, as a
method, cannot be understood without careful attention
to this basic factor. This is not to deny the import¬
ance of exegesis of scripture, specifically . rtnian
exegesis. Yet this is another issue, and has received
p
treatment from many quarters. The methodological
1, The Relevance of AF.".I. f ee also below.
2U .jee for example Alaa3 -iunia, curl Earth's doctrine
of .iOly Scripture, .• .erduans, ,>r md Tap ids, 1 ..
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importance of tradition, in contrast to ^cri;ture, has
received a surprisingly s ..ail amount of attention,
among the major interpreters of Barth. In fact, as
a ;:iethoJ.olo i c ,1 issue it r- 1 . vhoc •. j-morod.
As a consequence, the ..anner in which this theologian
relates to Tradition in his theology has received rel¬
atively little attention, e shall refer to this
issue in shorthand form by calling it "the type of
relation to Tradition." questions about the type of
relation to Tradition occupy the central place in our
considerations in art III of our thesis,
hear the end of our explorations of the relation
to Tradition we shall be arguing several things.
Chief among tuem is (1) that "the relation to Tradition•
(specifically the Credal Tradition of the .nrly Jhurch)
is one of unthinking submission; and (2) that because
of this "type of relation to tradition", one may say
that Berth's theologizing is in actual fact character¬
ized by a type of fundamentalism not obvious to the
eye at first: a fundamentalism based upon creeds.
We shall go on from our investigation of the
relation to Tradition to consider several other aspects
of Barth's .method, which can be seen in fresher per-
*
spective, once the relation to Tradition has been laid
out. Of importance in this section of Part 111 is
Barth's "Ho" to Anthropology and philosophy in general.
If u&rth shall find significant basis for his theology
in tradition, and in scripture as articulated and
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interpreted by tradition, he is determined to cut
himself off from modern anthropology and philosophy,
especially as these disciplines might have given him
so :ie foundations upon which to treat theological themes,
and consider theological statements. here we find a
methodological motif which we found first In earth's
highly unusual methodological interpretation of Anselmi
all the basal elements for theology must come from "the
Credo" of the Church. Cone shell come from outside
these confines. This is what we saw as Berth's main
thesis about nnsela, and its corollary*"'"
We shall go on from this point to take up
another general theme concerning Berth's method: the
relation to "Word" which inheres in his theologizing.
If we found an unthinking submission to Tradition in
'Earth's actual procedure, we shall find that this is
accompanied by an unthinking submission to what is
alleged to be "Word", that is, to what is experienced
as "Word" in a revelatory event in the here and now,
in which the human words of scri ture become ''the Word
of God^within the subjectivity of the hearer.
we shall then go on to consider Berth's rather
peculiar view of Apologetics in which Dogmatics becomes
the apologetic by virtuo of the alleged action of the
deity.
Following this v/e shall consider a factor in
1. Jee above j pp«91£j P*93*
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Barth's manner of theologizing which involves appeal
to the reader on a subliminal level, that is, in a
manner which bypasses the reader's thought processes
and considered judgement. n© shall call this factor
"undertow", for like a subtle current .in the depths
of the sea surf it tends to "pull" a person in a cer¬
tain direction almost without his conscious awareness.
In our concluding section we shall look back
upon the development of Berth's method in historical
perspective, viewing it first in connection with the
political-social-economic context in which it developed,
and second, looking at its development by finding a
parallel in the revolutionary development of one of
the arts in this same period (1910-1950): .estern
Classical . usic. Here we shall find parallels with
Berth's development, as well as significant contrasts.
We shall also examine Barth's theology vis-a-vis
preaching, namely Barth's own preaching. Bor this
dogmatics was meant to serve "Church Proclamation",
the chief form of which is preaching. The question
we shall be asking is: what relevance was Barth's
peculiar type of theologizing to his own preaching.
We shall find results other than what one might expect.
This short section will leave us with the question:
■/hat was the purpose of this theology, since it does
not appear to us to have significant relevance for
preaching, in particular Bart.w's own preaching.
Lastly we shall give a retrospective summary
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of our major points and offer arguments against taking
this theology seriously as a viable, healthy and worthy
option in the twentieth century. We shall be arguing
that the manner in which Barth relates to tradition in
his actual dogmatic process is in fact most probably
a danger to tradition, This is somewhat ironic for,
tradition, specifically Early Church "orthodoxy" is
soiaething lie sought to preserve and maintain.
While the thrust of vdiat follows in Part III
is mainly critical towards Earth's manner of theology,
yet at the end of our study we shall find positive
things about Earth's productivity, yet not in his
dogmatics but rattier in his preaching. We find
definite contrasts between the two.
•Throughout almost the whole of Part III,
concerning basic aspects of Earth's method, our study
of Earth's Anselra has been a suggestive guide at many
points, prompting us to ask ourselves questions con¬
cerning Earth's actual working method that we would
probably not otherwise have asked. If he himself
found great methodological significance for his theol¬
ogy in his peculiar interpretation of Anselm,^" so also
have we, even if perhaps somewhat different ways.
That this book on Anselm has been ignored for a long
period of time, up until almost I960, may to some
extent explain why we are now able to explore aspects
1. uS3 above, pp.7Jff; and also below, pp.257ff*
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of Berth's actual method which have remained essentially
unexplored up until the >resent time.
Chapter I.
... J.,I.. :y u ,
Section A.
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THE RSLSVAIiOB OF BARTH'S ADS.GLH FOR UNBSRSTANDIMG
EARTH'S D^GSaxIJ i i-iTHQi); A., J A OOht^NT Oil film
JIGHIFICAAGiS OF WHAT THE METHOD IE EARTH'S AN3ELM
DuBE IwT IuV0L7E»
After studying Earth's book on Anselm extensively
in Part II we should again raise the question as to its
relevance for understanding Berth's method. Unless
one raises this question, one runs the risk of simply
assuming that the method Earth describes in his study
of Anselm is simply put into practice in his Ghurch
Dogmatics. One does not wish merely to make this
assumption. So here in this chapter we wish (1) to
examine tne evidence which suggests the relevance of
Earth's interpretation of Anselm for understanding cen¬
tral aspects of Earth's actual method; (2) we also
wish to ask about the nature of the method in Earth's
Anselia, most notably what this method does not involve.
The basic matter at hand here is method. How
are we to say that the rather curious method Earth finds
in Anselm (mistakenly in our view) is a help in under¬
standing method in Earth's major work, his Ghurch
Dogmatics. We could refer back to the opening of fart
II of our thesis where we studied, briefly, Earth's
own reaction to this question, along with the estimate
of the book's importance by major interpreters of
Barth, after the book's reissue in 1958.1 One can
now look at these statements in a slightly different
light, after the completion Part II in which we have
1. Gee above, p.72ff.
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investigated Barth's interpretation.
With reference to Berth's statement in the pre¬
face to the second edition of his nnseln, could it be
that with the benefit of hindsight, that is, the hind¬
sight of 50 years, he can see and understand basic as¬
pects of his own actual path*(that is, his working method
as opposed to his theoretical methodology! with heightened
clarity, if not also with the freshness of new insights?
If so, this would not be an uncommon experience of writers
in general,
e
Barth is quite emphatic in his forward to the
second edition of is .niacin about the relevance of his
book fox' understanding his method# He states, almost
with in tionce at this point, that is in 1958, that
ost of the commentators have completely
failed to see th t in this book on Artselin
I am working with a vital key, if not the
key, to an understanding of that process
of thought that has impressed me more and
more in my Church Do; goalie a as the only
one proper to taeology. 1
One wishes to point out how emphatic Barth is at this
point, almost 50 years late, to emphasize tne relevance
of his work on Anselm fox* "an understanding of that
process of thought" carried on in his Church no yiatics.
One says "emphatic", for one senses in the manner in
which Barth writes an impatience with his interpreters
over this issue, "host of them have completely failed
1. A.f.Q#!#, p.11. (We quote this passage again in
order to draw out something in addition to what
we said previously)#
259
to see... the relevance "• Earth could have continued:
--mil i-'T-r ir. ■ i- -,i, ^
"when it has been eo evident to see". This then,would
see to be implicit in Berth's statement: that it is
quite evident to Lin, t .t is, t o rolev rice o... hi;..
stud,y on Ansolni, for an underst. . li • ; ol his actual
i-iothoi in his church Jo;;?.-tics.
As we have seen, in our introduction to .art II,
interpreters of Barth after 1956-1960 are nearly unanimous
in the opinion th t Earth* s book on Anselm is crucial
for an understanding of his theological method. Let
us look at souo of these evrluations in detail, which
we have referred to only in general in the introduction
to Part IIf for then we can see something that may be
somewhat eur rising.
James Smart in his book The divided hind of
1
nodern Tneolony quotes Earth's statement about finding
"a vital key, if not the hey, to...taut whole process
of thought•.•" and devotes s >ace to a detailed study
of Earth's Ansola, entitling the section, "The Jontri-
2
bution of Anselm of Canterbury." He states that
"Earth's work on Ansela brought the final resolution
A
ox the roblem of where theology was to find its basis."
We wish to comment; on this last statement after consid¬
ering the reaction of other commentators•
1. Subtitle: ..,cl -arth . .tolf Jultnann, 1906-1955.
Westrainstor, Philadelphia, l9e$.
2. ibid., p. 194-ff.
5. ibid.« p.196.
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T.2. Torrance, another significant commentator
on flarth writing after 1958-1960 states: "It was in the
writing of this brilliant and extre...ely important little
work that Berth's underst nding of the fundamental nat¬
ure of theological method clarified and crystallised." 1
Torrance then devotes eleven pages to a detailed study
of Berth's Pncela* He sees it as "the decisive turn-
2
ing point in his thinking," as regards method.
hahrnt states, perhaps somewhat daringly, that
"Berth's own view [of his shift in method]] is that in
his Church dogmatics he was merely following through
to theological program 1 id down by hnseln of Ganter-
bury•" ^
we need not go o$. host other com. -.cm .tutors
re-echo these Views. earth has, in his study of
onseln, discovered or clarified (depending on the inter¬
preter) "the fundamental nature of hie theological
method" (Torrance). Here, he brought to resolution
"the methodological problem of where theology was to
find its basis" (cmart). In his Church dogmatics "he
was merely following through the theological program
laid down by Anseln of Canterbury" (Bahrnt).
1. In Barl Barth: .n Introduction to his ..arly
Theology, lylJ-l)')'l, B.C. 7, London, 196. , p.185•
2. ibid., p.182.
5. Bahrnt, p.90.
It would seem clear, then, that for Bar tlx. as well
as for the majority of later commentators, the book on
.hiselm was ce xtral and crucial in his own development
as regards method is of crucial importance. Thus it is
of central importance for understanding north's theo¬
logical method. 'Jo have then established, if only in
a preliminary way, the relevance of Earth's /tnselm for
understanding Earth's aethod#
fhe Abaonoo of . :.crir»t.i]te and Christolop:/ ia the ; cthod
in ~'t 'a •.•■nel'a.
fiie reaction of Barth, and the interpreters
raises' an interesting and perhaps significant question,
for while they arc unqualified in their view, both
Barth and t e commentators, that the method in the book
on .aiGQl' - is basic to understanding Earth's method, and
each seems to have considered this method in the work
on jigelm in detail, they have not noted what is missing
in this method, and what one . light have ex ected to find
given even only cursory knowledge of Berth's Dogmatics,
S eeifieally, they have not noted th t Christ-
ologyfor Chrlstologioal doctrine) and Scripture both
play no part and have no place in the . .ethod and pro¬
cedure described so approvingly in the book on Anselau
If one lias but passing acquaintance with the. -Jhurch
Dogmatics, one recognizes i mediately the significant
and highly visible place both of these have there•
Both Christology and Scriptures are typically aeen as
having an exalted place, in both matters of method and
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content# (One is not disputing this view in'- what follows)#
let in the .sethod outlined in Perth's .-nscl;::,
both Chriotology and 3criptures have no significant
place# In fact they are hardly mentioned. Of Christ-
ology, we can find only one reference, in passing, in
the first half of Berth's study, devoted to Anselm's
"theological Jcheme"•1
Scripture in mentioned, hut it plays no signif¬
icant, or perhaps more accurately, no constructive part
in this method. Scripture is seen as a 'referee at
the sidelines'. It acts as a limit in the sense that
it is used to determine "whether a theologouraenon is
admissible ox1 not".2 * If..it is a strictly theological
proposition, thrt is to say a proposition formed
independently of the actual wording of Scripture, Qtn
contrast to a statement that merely duplicates the
words of Ccrioture, and thus in (north*s-Aaselm's)
view "is not strictly a theological proposition,1'"!
then Bio fact tn.---t it does net contradict the biblical
text determines its validity. ..• If it did contra¬
dict the Bible, however attractive it might be on
3
other grounds, it would be rendered invalid."
1. "Behind the Doctrine of the Divine Word there is
naturally t .a h.iristolojy of the Roman Catholic
Church, which wo cannot discus:: here#" A.J?.Q.X#p#58
2. A.f.Q.I., p.33.
3. ibid. One would note that this leaves quite a wide
door open. 'lucre are many things, for example which
the writers of scripture did not know of and thus,
did not "contradict."
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This is the only real rolo ocripture plays*
Jor in the rocoss of * understanding* or 'proving',
that is, in the process of thought outlined in the book
on nnselm, tnere can be no "proof texts" in pursuing
the goal.1 In addition there is "the methodological
principle ... that when it is a question of intolligere
and orobare B>hat is, of proceeding accord : : 'co the
lethod outlinedj nothing can be achieved by an appeal
2
to t e authority of holy .Scripture*"
In the lace just cited "bcripture" and "the
Credo" are clearly distinguished. If we go on ten
pages, wo find tlx: t the source for the elements, the
A*b.C.i).'s which are used to • est blish* or 'prove*
the X all cor.e from "the Credo". Here, at this pointy
hcripture has no place* It is not mentioned.
It would then appear that hcripture has in fact
no significant constructive place in the method out¬
lined in earth's inselni. It remains, as it were, on
tne periphery, as a limit, hvon here, on the periphery,
it would seem to have a minor role. i'or the theologian
must only avoid contradicting scripture. This leaves
him a rather broad field in which to pursue his discip¬
line unhindered.
.hat we would conclude from this, that is, the
abse .ce of Ghristology, and the peripheral significance
1* ... I.Q.I*, p. 12, 43.
2, ibid.
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of ,cri ture, is that the theological method outlined
and expounded in Earth's study of Anselra can be seen,
and studied, independently of these two forecentioned
factors. In fact Jartlx sees this method in operation
in unsold*o - roclg ;ion and sees this "with approval".
That this /..ethod does stand inde xendently of Christology,
and that Christo^ogy is used only in conjunction with
this method is implicitly acknowledged by forrance, a
commentator quite favourable to Earth# ..hen Torrance
bepins the section followin;; his ova: detailed consider¬
ation of the method in Earth's nselm, he noints out
tiie fact tli-: t Berth has combined this method with
Christology:
It was with this fundamental conception of
tneological activity which he learned from
.uiselm that Berth turned to write his Church
Dogmatics. but it was characteristic of
Berth that lie combined it in the most inten¬
sive way with Ghristology." ^
one finds a faulty assumption in several sources,
namely that Earth's work on .uiselm has involved
Christolosy, or "signifies the Chrietological concent-
2
ration toki place in his work#"
..ore importantly, we find in Earth's rise In a
method taken up in nis Church Dogmatics which was
subsequently combined with a Ghristology, and where
subsequently hcripture was to have an in ortant pi; ce#
oa.cit.. p.193.
2# ,/e find this in Berkouwer, p.42,n.50#
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This would mean that- this method oould be studied in
its several aspects, as a so -orate consideration in the
study of Berth's theology.
m'urtlier Conclusions lap... tCo Aoregoing.
One could also conclude from the foregoing that
if Barth has in his own words found "a vital key" and
perhaps, more than that, "the key" to "that whole process
of thought" in his Church dogmatics, it is one which
does not involve Christology. That Christology was
"combined" with it later does not alter this fact.
It does not of necessity involve Christology.
Additionally, it does involve Scripture. Chat
is, not in any constructive sense. Scripture acts
only as a boundary or limit: something not to be in
contradiction with.
V/e may now raise the question as to what does
this method involve? We seo two major elements which
stand out above the rest, in the context of this dis¬
cussion. It involves "tradition, in a central and
basic manner. As we have described in Part II, in
this method, the theologian or dogmatician selects a
tenet from "the Credo", and sets it aside as an 'x*
to be 'established* or 'proved'. He then takes other
tenets from 'the Credo', and uses them as presuppositions,
as A.B.C.D.'s to 'prove' or 'establish' his X. .-'ill of
1. see above, pp.93ff.
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the elements used come from the Gre&o, this synthesis
of Belief handed down over the centuries. In short,
all the elements com© from Tradition."*"
Secondly, the method in Berth's Anselai involves
"revelation". That is, it involves revelation (in
specifically Barthian terms) in t...e sense of an "Bvcat"
which takes place in the 'here and now' in which one
hears hum n words and concents as " Word". That Barth
means an 'kvent' of revelation in the 'here and now',
seems clear from the conclusion of his iinseln where lie
sum arises hip view of the process:
God gave himself as the object of his
knowledge and God illumined his that he
might know him as object, -.part from
this event C^hno dieses Breignis J
ther is no proof of the existence, that
is of the reality of God. But in the
power of this event Caber in Kraft dieses
kreignisscs3 there is a proof which is
worthy of gratitude, Truth has o o en,
not faitli-needy man. C Bio VahfCheit hat
gesprochen, nicht der glauben wollende
hensch.J
1. Although Barth at one point (early in his study)
includes ccri.rture within "the Credo", it becomes
clear, as his study proceeds that: they are to be
distinguished from each other. Go, for example,
on p.40 of .i.e. / .I. they are referred to in a
disjunctive manner, as "Gcrirvture and redo",
When he finally turns to describing the ... j.C.i). * s
•taken from the Credo', one finds two things to
support this disjunction: (1) hone of the A.B.C.C.'s
he names are taken from scripture} (2) The contents
of the Credo are described as "Articles of faith",
■- ♦ * »: », p • 3c»331 (• - •
2. A.if.Q.I.. p.171, German ed., p.198. The last
sentence we have rendered differently from .iobertson
in the Cnglish edition in order to preserve perhaps
more closely the sense of the German.
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Jo we haves "God gave himself as object ... and
illumined him £ the theologian, AnsolnfJ ....
Apart fro... this event ... no proof.... In the power
of this event ... proof.... Truth has spoken...."
Epoken of hero t.ion. is an 'Event' in the here and now,
an ' vent' in which God has ;iven himself as object,
and illumined the theologian. The Event is indispon-
silble to the process of thought: apart from it there
is no 'proof', while with it there is 'proof'. It
is an Bvent which involves lord, as the last sentence
suggests: "Truth has spokeni! 3o we have: An invent of
n »*
revelation, which involves Word in a specifically
Barthian sense.
Thus we have a situation which could, at first
glance, seen quite odd. For while this process
involves revelation, end Event, that is an vent of
revelation in tiie here and now, in which human words
must be heard as "Word", this -recess does not involve
nc-'i -ture.
..e could go one step further and point out that
what has been, and must be heard as word is not scrip¬
ture, but tradition. The phrase in Anselm's argument:
"that tana which nothing greater can be thought" is the
2
central element which is "revelatory"y It must be
1. tee art II, where in studying the nature of the key-
phrase, we found that t as phrase must be heard as
"Word"for the argument to be effective. ny>0yc, , lipff.
£~* . 1«, p»7o>, note <e#
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1
heard as a Word of prohibition# Yet most importantly,
2
the (alleged) source of this phrase is'the Gredo%
It is one of a series of beliefs of tradition which
form the presuppositions in this process of thought#
Thus we have a process of thought which involves revel¬
ation, but revelation mediated through tradition, not
scripture#
Certainly there are other aspects of this method
which we could mention, which st aid in connection with
the two v/e have talked of# Yet it is unnecessary to
go into them at this point. The most significant
aspects in this context are the prominence of tradition
and the prominence of revelation# Of central signifi¬
cance is the fact that revelation is mediated through
tradition rather than scripture#
Our most central theme in fart III will be the
way tradition is regarded, the manner in which it is
appropriated, the place it has functionally in Earth's
theology, and the manner in which it is used polemically,
against those who would disagree with Earth.
ihid#, p.77.
2. ibid#, p.?8.
5# hee fart II, pp.223-248.
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Section 3.
•j-h. R;,:.az;VMQB OP BARTii'3 Ch-JjC A., J h A T-:i. JhL
Qh^hX;h^P02 OU.:l STUDY; ADD A GOhhENT Oil THE
CRE/jALIoTIC JPRAAElvORK OP HIC xhn-.ULOCxICAL
•.j.iiil^CrS. 1930 - 1W.
If we turn to Earth's works which stand alongside
the Church .Dogmatics in the period 1930 - 194-5» that is
roughly the period of his productivity which concerns
us in our thesis, we find an unusual occurrence: almost
all of the works of "book length have a crerfdalistic
framework#
If ono turns to those works concerned with theo¬
logy, o-r dogmatics proper, in fact, one finds that
almost without exception, Barth chooses a creed as the
frame of his work.
So in 1935 we find Credo, using the "Apostles'
Creed"• In 1938 we find his Gifiord Lectures, trad¬
itionally given upon a theme of theology apart from
'revealed theology', in which he takes up the Scots
Confession of 1560 as a framework# In 194-3, ihe faith
of the Church; A Commentary on the Apostles' Creed
according to Calvin's Catechism# And in 1945 we find
his dogmatics in Outline# again using the "Apostles*
1 2
Creed" as a framework. * Thus with the exception
1, Published in 1947, yet first given as Lectures in 1945#
2# In fact, using the bibliography compiled by Charlotte
von Kirshbaura we can find no other works of book
length, concerning dogmatics proper, which do not use
a creedalistie framework# We are, of course excluding
his xuiselm of 1931*
2?0
of hir, Gtfford Lectures, Barth has chosen one creed in
particular, the "Apostles* Creed", as his framework for
each of his extended works on theology in this period.
Although there are many periodical articles, some of
which are significant and important, and many published
sermons and 'open letters', the above mentioned works
are the only works of book length concerning dogmatics.
Since we wish to draw on some of these works in
Part III of our thesis, we should raise an important
question firstly: Are these works simply commentaries
on creeds, or the "Apostles' Creed" in particular?
That is, is what is involved only exposition of the
Articles, and perhaps the doctrines associated with
them, as they developed in the marly Church and down
through Western Christendom. Or are some of these
works Dogmatics proper, that is, Dogmatic Theology as
Barth conceived it, and attempted to carry it out in
his Church Dogmatics, yet hex'e, in these works, on a
smaller scale? Do they involve his Dogmatic process
of thought, and thus his method?
In the case of at least two of these works we
can be quite sure that it is a case of the latter,
that is, they are examples of Dogmatic Theology proper,
and are examples of Barth's theological method in act¬
ion. The two works are Credo of 1935» and Dogmatics
in Outline of 194-5.
What evidence supports this, namely that they
are to be seen as Dogmatic Theology proper, in which
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Earth's theological method is at work? Bach of these
works, Credo and Dogmatics in Outline begins with a
chapter setting out "the task". Here is described
what, in Garth'3 view, Dogmatic Theology should be.
Thus, we find in Chapter I of Credo a passage which is
reminiscent of much of what Berth said concerning (his
interpretation of; Anselia's method in his Anseln.
Dogmatics endeavours to take what is first
said to it in the revelation of God's
reality and to say it over ag- in in human
speech. To that end Dogmatics unfolds
and displays those truths in which the truth
of God concretely meets us.
The manner in which Berth continues is also re: iniscent
of his study on Anseln.
Dogmatics articulates again the articles
of faith; it attempts to see them... in
their interconnections and context; where
necessary it inquires after new articles
of faith, i.e. articles t oat have not up
to now been known or acknowledged....
Dogmatics is the act of the Credo deter¬
mined by the scientific method.appropriate
to it - credo, ut intelligasu
The chapter takes the form of prolegomena to the Dog¬
matic Theology that follows.
The first chapter of the other work, Dogmatics
in Outline fulfils basically the sa..e purpose, setting
out again what in Berth's view Dogmatics should be,
again, before setting out upon the task.
These chapters should not be dismissed as simply
'poor substitutes' for the exposition in Church wogEiatics,
1. Credo, 12.T. : tr J.3. Kcriab, Hftdder and Stoughton,
London, 1956, p.5»
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Volume One, for when a writer is forced to restate his
thinking several years after he has initially done so,
V
and restate it in briefer form, not only is it possible
to get a more concise statement, but also, there is the
possibility that in the intervening years what is most
important to him has become clearer, and his conscious
priorities will stand out in greater clarity.
In the course of studying Earth's method, and in
particular the relation to tradition we shall turn to
these two works, as well as the Church Dogmatics,
They are nob brief works, even if they have that appear¬
ance when compared with the Church Dogmatics, Credo is
200 pages in length, and Dogmatics in Outline, 150 pages.
To recapitulate what we have said above, we can
be quite sure these works are meant to embody Earth's
dogmatic "programme" even if in on abbreviated form#
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Section C.
A Bhl-.P 3U;:i:AaY OP T.IL TauOLQGICAL BCTHQD
r.ha^f.BD BY BAAid I:; ids xdQLBGuh^A TO
uiv.. CxlUdOd DOGBATIOS.
In the following it is our purpose to give a
brief summary of the main elements of Barth's method¬
ology as he presontedit in the Prolegomena, Volume I,
of his Church Dogmatics . While here we present our
summary of Barth's methodology« that is how he himself
sees or presents his method, our task in I art III is
not to ask as to how Barth presents his actual method
(i.e. the questions what is his methodology?), but
rather our question in Part III is: what is the method
which Barth actually uses as he proceeds. These two
do not, in our view, co-incide. Let us go on now to
describe Barth's view of his method.
Dogmatics, in Barth's view, is the critical
science by which "the Church" examines her proclamat¬
ion, that is, her preaching and her theology (dogmatics,
exegesis, and practical theology), asking this question:
to what extent is it faithful to 'the Word' witnessed
to by Scripture, and heard in Scripture.
Thus dogmatics is to be a critical science,
examining 'what the church says' in light of one criter¬
ion and one alone: "The Word of God". To what extent
is it faithful to this "Word"? We shall outline the
diversity of what Barth means by "the Word of God" as
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we proceed."*" Yet we may note at this point that in
this critical examination of Jhurch Proclamation all
other possible criteria are eliminated. No philo¬
sophical or anthropological criteria can be allowed
to coL.e into play. liven the operational criteria
used in "other sciences" have relevance only provision¬
ally and only to some extent. For example 'the prin¬
ciple of non-contradiction' cannot be binding upon
dogmatics. Thus when lleinrich Scholz, one of north's
colleagues, drew up a list of six operational pre¬
suppositions proposed as an articulation of those oper¬
ational presuppositions necessarily adhered to in all
the scienceSj Barth ponders each point arid finds he can
p
accept only one. Even this one, the principle of
non-contradiction he can accept
"only upon the very limited interpretation,
by the scientific theorist upon the scarcely
tolerable one, that theology v/ill not assert
an irremovability in the principle of
"contradictions" which it is bound to make
good,... The remaining sections of Scholz's
law can only remind the theologian that he
should know what he is doing when he trans¬
gresses tnem, and that as a theologian he
cannot escape the necessity of transgressing
them. Not one iota can be yielded here with¬
out betraying theology, for any concession here
involves surrendering the theme of theology.^
1. In our exposition, we are using the terms "Word",
"the word" and "word of hod" interchangeably.
..e have varied our wording only to avoid repetition,
not to indicate dif1 erentiations.




The passage gives indication of what we have been
talking of: Earth's determination that dogmatics shall
not be limited by, nor supported by, criteria other
than this one criterion: "The Word of God"* and this
alone shall be the criterion by which Church Proclam¬
ation is examined, and by which dogmatics proceeds,
as to Earth's rejection of criteria from philosophy
and anthropology, we shall examine this rejection in
renter detail in a following chapter."*" What is this
"Word of God" which shall be the sole criterion in the
critical task of dogmatics? It is to be found in
three forms, 'in Earth's schematization. Pirstly,
it is the revelation to which Scripture points. It
is a Word which "comes to meet man* in "the revealing
Acts of God", as these are attested in Scripture.
Thus "the Word of God", as revelation, exists prior
to, and in this sense, independently of, Scripture.
Scripture points man to this "Word".
secondly, Scripture is "the Word of God".
That is, Scripture becomes "the Word of God" when it
points to "the Word" in its primary form just mentioned.
What this means is that Scripture becomes revelatory
for roan when, in an Event in the here and now, it
points man to the primary form of "the Word". The
key concept here is "Event" ("Ereignis": event, occur¬
rence, incident). In this Event, human words become
1. oee below, pp#385-404.
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the Word of God, not by virtue of their worth as human
words, but because it ileuses God to use these human
words as a medium of his own self-revealing activity.
This hvent in .man's own present may or may not occur;
that is, when the human words of ocrlpture become "the
Word of God" this happens by virtue of God's own action
in the here and now. As,"the Word" ap roaches man
through Scripture from without, in this hvent, the holy
Spirit acts within wan, confirming this ".iord" which
man hears in the form of human words.
The third form of "the ;ord" is reaching.
Here the preacher proclaims "the Word" which is attested
in Gcri ture, and which he hears in Jcri ture. That
is, "the Word" in its primary form, as it is attested
in Scripture, is spoken again together with the preach¬
ers commentary and application to the present situation,
here, in the preaching situation, it is again in an
fivent t.,at the preacher's own words beco e "the .<ord
of God" for those assembled in *the Ghurch of God",
That is, human words of the preacher, as they proclaim
"the Word" witnessed to by hcri ->ture become "word" in
the invent in which it pleases God to confirm these
human words, coming within man the hearer, in the form
of the Holy Spirit, confirming the Word of revelation
spoken to him in his present context by the preacher.
These then are the three forms of "the Word"
in Garth's schematization: the Word levealed, the
Word Written, and the word i reached. As we have seen
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a key concept here is taat of Fventi the Gvent in
which the hutaan words of Gcripture and the human words
of the preacher become the Word of God# Because of
this view of Earth's hie theology has been termed
1 2
variously "occasionalistic", and "actualistic;i.
If "the 'Word of God" is to be criterion in theology's
critical task it is to be source in theology's con¬
structive work. In fact it is to be the solo source
from which theology draws the elements upon which it
reflects and with which it builds its thou ht patterns.
. o other source is to be allowed in this theology, e.g.
religious experience, revelation (or what alleges
itself to be revelation) other than "the ord", etc.
It v/ould appear then that theology's construct¬
ive task consists in exegesis of scripture, that is
Scripture in that it points to "the Word" and in so
far as it becomes "the Word". Further, the theologian
must avoid contradicting the text of Scripture as he
follows out the implications of his exposition of
"the ,ord". c-cripture thus has a 'limiting' role,
as well as a mediating role.
We have said that it would appear that theology's
constructive task consists in exegesis of ocripture,
that is, theological exegesis. This is the view of
Barth which one most commonly encounters both among
1. Gee Jerome Gamer, ^arl Barta, bands, London,19&2,p•vi•
2. ilartwell, p.^pf.
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his interpreters and his readers: a t eologian who
exegetes Scripture in a specifically theological (and
a specifically Barthian) manner.
In the remainder of fart III v/e shall find this
view faulty, by reason of being sorely incomplete.
No mention has been made nere of the significance and
importance of tradition and specifically the credal
tradition of the Parly Ohurch in this method. In fact
almost no mention of the subject of tradition: croeds
and dogmas occur throughout the whole of Barth's
lengthy Prolegomena, that is up until page 600 of the
second(and last) volume of this Prolegomena. e shall
investigate this situation below''"', yet at tais point
we would only say that in our opinion both the view
of Barth as "theological exegete" and also Barth's own
Prolegomena are misleading as regards Barth's actual
theological procedure: they show only one partof the
picture in so far as they almost completely ignore
the place tradition actually has in this theological
programme. One of the central tasks of Part III of
our thesis is to examine the place of tradition, and
to examine both the use of tradition and the manner in
which Barth relates to tradition in his actual theolog¬
ical procedure.
1. Gee below, pp.28Jff.
Chapter II•
Ohio PLAlortngA^oj .,CD TYPO OP c ;LAYIQIS
go TRAJJlYlUi.! 1.; BATH'S P...,0L0GY.
Section A.
279
: .0 . .> J.; y ftI - ..{. ■ Vk.
The first task in a lengthy section of a thesis
ouch as this might typically be to summarise the views
previously put forth concerning this subject, namely
the methodological significance and use of tradition
in Barth's theology. Yet even here we are faced with
a problem, that is, we are faced with what would seem
to be a gap in the interpretation of Barth. For if
one turns to the major interpreters of Barth, by which
we mean interpreters who have produced a book length
work on Barth's theology, we typically find little or
no treatment of this subject. That is while v/e find
brief treatments of Barth's view of tradition, we do
not find the interpreter's view of (1) the importance
of creeds and dogmas for Barth's methodological pro¬
cedure (2) the manner in which Barth relates to creeds
and dogmas, that is, tradition. Thus v/e typically
find no assessment of the mebhodo1 or;ical significance
of tradition for this theology.
If we look for the methodological significance
of tradition in iiartwell for example, v/e find only one
brief reference to tradition in his whole work, and
this merely summarizes what one takes to be Barth's
view of tx^adit ion, When v/e turn to Berkouwer and
1, Hartwell, p.71.
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von Balthasar, again we find, brief summaries of what
one takes to be Earth's view of tradition, yet one
finds no assessment by the interpreters of the place
and importance of tradition for this theological method.
The situation is almost the same in the work of
Torrance concerning Barth's development up to 1951*
liven though Torrance intends to treat the issue of
Barth's methodological development up through 1931?
that iSj up to the beginning of the Church Dogmatics^
one finds only one reference to the role of tradition
in Barth's theology, namely that theology is to approach
scripture through the history of the church's inter¬
pretation of scripture, i.e. with the guidance of
tradition."^" Yet in a work so concerned with matters
of method in theology, this subject is never again
taken up and explored for its significance vis-a-vis
Barth. In fact during the whole of Torrance's lengthy
and detailed treatment of Barth's miselm, not once does
2
the subject of tradition arise. That is, even
though Torrance must describe the A B C D's vis-a-vis
the X in Barth's anselra, not once does he ask where
these come from, nor what constitutes this 'Credo'
from which all these a B C D's are drawn. .liven where
Torrance makes reference to Barth's term 'the Credo'
he avoids any investigation of this key concept in
1. Torrance, p.122.
2. Of. Torrance, pp,182ff.
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Barth's interpretation of Anselm."*" .us we have seen,
the A3 C D's are in Earth's interpretation articles
of belief, which have their source in the creeds and
dogmas of the Early. Church, that is, tradition. To
summarize: Torrance avoids the question as to the
source of these a B 0 D's, and thus avoids the issue
of Tradition. In doing so he has. avoided discussion
of one of the most significant and also one of the
most obvious features of Berth's interpretation of
Anselm: 'the Credo' as the (alleged) source of all the
elements of Anselia'a thought.
Haner in fact is the only ma^or interpreter of
Earth we have been able to find who even gives the
2
issue of tradition in Barth extended treatment.
Unfortunately Earner does not follow up his investigat¬
ions and ask the question of the real methodological
A
significance of whet he finds Barth. saying.
Since the issue of the methodological importance
of tradition has in most instances been ignored, or
given minimal treatment among the major interpreters
«
of Barth, one of our tasks 'in Part III is to argue for
its importance and significance in Berth's actual
1. Torrance, p.191.
2. ,„>ee mainer, pp. 191-199.
p. iio quotes a passage from Credo which we find
important and treat below, (l,!9he Command to obey
iltion in Jrodo and Cc-imtics in ./ufclinefl")«
yet he does not follow uo his investigation.
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procedure in theology. If wo are somewhat near the
mark in our assessment of the importance of tradition
in this theological programme, we can only find the
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When Barth cones to 'sun up1 his methodology
in the Prolegomena to his Jhurch jo;. ;natics, at the
end of Volume I of this work, he describes the task
ox dogmatics as: "the unfolding and presentation of
the content of the Word of God," that is, the cont¬
ent of "revelation" mediated through Bcripture• When
he goes on to expand this formula in this final
*summing up* chapter of his Prolegomena, he speaks of
p
"tenets" (tenets of faith, or beliefs) in connection
with this "unfolding and presentation" process,
fhus he speaks of
tenets, in the understanding and elucidat¬
ion of which the dogmatic unfolding and
presentation of the content of the Word of God
must be carried out#2
fhus, in Berth's view, it is in the understanding and
elucidation of tenets of belief that this unfolding
1. S.D.I/2, p.853? also, p.869.
2* "Grundsatze" nay be translated as "axioms", yet
as the translator rightly senses, the context
indicates th; t Barth wishes to avoid any system-
atization based upon presuppositions ox- elements
of thought (i.e, philosophical axioms) having
their source outside 'the Word of God*• Bo
'tenets', as in 'tenets of belief' probably cones
closest to the intended meaning.
3. J,j,1/2. p.076.
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and presentation oi' the content of "the Word" must
take place. Yet where do these tenets cone from?
Where ore the,, to be found? What is their source?
Are they to be found in scripture? That is, are the
majority of them to be found in scripture? Barth
would be the first to admit that this is not the case,
at least with t.ie majority of the tenets of the faith,
lor example, he readily admits th t "the eternality
oi the ton" is not a belief to be found in bcripture,
but is rather a dogma of the .airly Church.^ (Chis is
not an insignificant tenet in Barth's theology, for
he goes on at length, for 37 pages, about "the
eternal Con").^
Yet if on the one hand on the whole or in the
majority of cases the tenets of which Carta speaks
are not to be found in Scripture, and on the other
hand his methodology makes use, in a basal and sign¬
ificant way, of "tenets, In the understanding and
elucidation of which the dogmatic unfolding and
presentation of the content of the Word of God must
be carr-ied out", we are faced with a puzzle. Chat
is we arc faced with a gap. She source for these
tenets is not named.
how one might expect dogma or creeds to be




terra "tradition". Yet nowhere in this "summing up"
does one find even the mention of these three, dogma,
creeds or tradition. One only finds the repetition
of "word of God... aford of God as revealed in icripture...
etc. etc."
This leads us on to another, larger puzzle.
Throughout almost the whole of the 1,500 pages of
Volumes 1/1 and 1/2 which raalce up Earth's .prolegomena
it is only in exceptional cases that these subjects,
dogma, creeds and tradition ever turn up.1 For
example, of the actual use of the word "Tradition"
("Tradition" in German) v/e are able to find, even
with the help of the index, only two brief references,
and these are in passing. Of "Dogma" in the sense
of Parly Church or Reformation Dogma one still finds
only a handful of references. Only when it comes to
creeds ("Eekenntnis" and "Ivonfession") does one find
an exception to this.
Thus Tradition as Creeds and Dogma have an
extremely low profile throughout the whole of Earth's
lengthy 1500 page Prolegomena. That is, such a low
profile that one could study this Prolegomena, and
study it in some depth without becoming aware of even
the possibility that dogma, creeds and tradition have
a deep and pervasive significance for this theological
programme.
1. There is one significant exception, which we shall
mention as we proceed.
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One could understand then, why in many quarters
Berth's theology has been seen predominantly in terns
of "Revelation", "Word of God" and "Scripture", that
is, primarily as a theology of an exegetical sort.
Yet we ore still faced with a puzzle. If
these tenets, the understanding and elucidation of
which, form a basic and significant part of Garth's
actual method, (as he acknowledges in Jredo,^ and in
the passage we have cited from the Prolegomena), are
2
not, on the whole, actually to be found in scripture,
and in contrast, actually have their source in tradit¬
ion, Bart Was not told us so. i'hat is, throughout
the whole of his Prolegomena, describing the method
of dogmatics, there is hardly any mention ox this
factor, i.e. tradition, and its importance for Garth's
Dogmatics. We find only one significant exception to
this. hear the conclusion of Earth's Prolegomena,
within a section entitled "Authority in the Church",
there is a subsection entitled "Authority under the
Word," Within this subsection one finds a brief
5
section devoted to "Confessions", that is, Creeds,
1, Gee Chapter I of Credo,
2, Even if many of those beliefs have, in the eyes
of many interpreters, roots in Scripture*
3, C.D.I/2, p.620ff.
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Alongside it one finds an even briefer section devoted
to "Church Fathers."* l/e have said "brief".
!To get an idea of the proportion of the
Prolegomena devoted to these two subjects, let us
imagine for a moment that the whole of the Prolegomena
could be reprinted in minute type, so that the whole
1500 pages could be reduced by using miniature type,
to take up 150 pages (that is, reduced by a factor of
10). Jims the 60 pages Barth devotes to an extended
treatment of "Church Fathers" and "Confessions" would
reduce proportionately to 6 pages. fhus if the
Prolegomena were reproduced in miniature type to take
up 150 pages, only 6 pages would be devoted to these
two subjects (She actual pages involved are 1500 and 60
respectively). In addition, one finds this brief
section near the end of the Prolegomena. 'Jhus the
views concerning creeds, dogma and tradition have not
been methodologically integrated with the other elements
in method, nor seen in relation to the dogmatic enter¬
prise all through the Prolegomena up to this late point.
(pp.620ff., in Volume 1/2). That is, the subject
(tradition) has been put off to such a late point in
the Prolegomena that one is not given a view of how
Barth sees tradition functioning in his method as he
unfolds his view of his method up to this quite late
point. 2he other concepts of importance to his method
1. C.D.I/2, pp.603ff.
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are all present almost from the beginning: Word of God,
Revelation, ■crirbure)Church and Preaching, This one
is absent - until this very late point. In fact for
the person who wishes to examine this element in
Barth's Prolegomena, it is a subject of such 'low
profile* that it is difficult to locate. As we have
already mentioned, if one turns to the term "tradition"
he finds only two references. If he turns to "dogma"
he finds a handful of references and a brief passage
concerning dogmas of the past. This passage is pre¬
faced by the remark that "we shall have to deal at a
later part of our .Prolegomena with dogmas, i,e. •••
with their relative authority and importance even for
dogmatics." ^ let Barth does not return to speak of
"dogmas". When he returns to the subject of tradition
it is under the rubric of "Confession". .iVen at this
point it takes some "dig ing" to find the actual place
no deals with tradition, fox* it is nowhere indicated
by Chapter heading or subsection title. Thus even
in a literary sense, tradition is given a very low
profile in the irolegomena.
Wo have in all this so far perhaps only stated
the pussle in starker form: Why does "Tradition" have
such a "low profile" in this lengthy Prolegomena?
Why does Barth even avoid the use of the term? (The
1. O.D.I/1. p.565.
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German, "Tradition", is used as far as we can tell,
only twice, in passing, in the whole of the :rolegoaena)•
And why does he leave the subject until the end (C.D.1/2,
pp#620ff) and thus absent from the main body of the
lengthy exposition of his methodology#
We can see two possible "solutions" to this
puzzle (1) Barth was not aware at this point of the
importance of Tradition to his actual theological
method; or (2) Barth, as a irotestant theologian, and
as a thinker typically seen in his own day as a
Reformer, or in the line of the Reformers did not wish
to emphasize or cake obvious the significant and
important place Tradition had in his thought, but
would rather be seen as a dograatician whose primary
and essential task was the dogmatic exegesis and
interpretation of scripture. (This in fact is the
piettire that predominates in many theological circles
up to our own day).
The (1) above is rather doubtful in our view,
since as we have pointed out Barth has found the method
he outlined in his book on Anselm of such a help in
his methodological thinking# He acknowledges this
as early as 1951 with the publication of the book#
As we have pointed out, this method, as outlined there,
operates almost exclusively on the basis of tradition,
that is the creedal tenets and dogmas wrought in con-
VI, p.55, 10?; (Gid.I/l, p.58, 117).
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function with them. Scripture has only a peripheral
place, and Ghristology, as such, is absent."1" Thus,
in Earth*a study on Anselrn, tradition has a predomin¬
ating place. Additionally, in his Qredo of 1935»
the tenets of tradition already have a quite 3ignific-
2
ant place, and this is acknowledged in that work.
For these tv/o reasons, and for the important additional
reason that tenets also have a significant place in
his Church Jo.p.atics, one could hardly say that by
1939 with the publication of the second half of his
Prolegomena, he would have been unaware of the sign¬
ificance of tradition, creeds and dogmas, for his
theology.
Phis would point us toward the second possible
reason we have suggested, namely t at as a Protestant
theologian who was seen in the line of the Reformers
he did not wish, in light of their "sola acrintura",
•
to draw attention to, or emphasize this aspect of his
method.
In so down playing the importance of tradition
in his account of his methodology Barth has most likely
misled a host of interpreters concerning the real
method, or a central and basic aspect, of the real
method, involved in his theologizing,
1.- Gee above, pp.261ff; pp.265ff»
2, See below. pp.334ff.
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In order to find his own account of the import¬
ance of tradition for his theology we will have to
turn to his other works, especially Credo of 1935»
Dogmatics- in Outline (194-5) and of course his Ansoln
of 1931•
Summary .
Our purpose in this brief chapter has been to
look at the place given to (Erudition; and in particular
the creeds and dogmas of the Early Church in Earth's
Prolegomena to his Church Dogmatics. In summary,
what we have found is that Tradition, Greeds and Dogmas
have a very "low profile" in Earth's account of his
methodology hero. ihat is, one might read through
these 1500 pages and hardly notice the (relatively)
very brief treatment of this subject# In addition,
this subject is almost totally ignored until almost
the very last point in his account of his methodology.
One has to read through almost 1,200 pages before
finally arriving at this relatively short segment of
the Prolegomena devoted to Teachings of the Church
1 2
fathers and "Confessions".
As a result of this the whole issue of Tradition
has the appearance of an after-thought in Oarth's
Prolegomena. It's as if Earth has said: "Oh, we
1. P.P.1/2. p.603.
2. P.P.1/2. p.620.
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should consider this too, while we are on the subject
of methodology• I had almost forgotten."
•Hie consequence of ignoring this issue for the
first 1200 pages of the Prolegomena and leaving it
until the end is that it has not been integrated into
Earth's consideration of other methodological concerns
throughout the major portion of his Prolegomena. It
has not been seen in relation to his dogmatic enter¬
prise as a whole.1 Thus, as we have already mentioned,
we shall have to turn to other works, Credo, derv.iatics
in Outline, and Ansela in order to find evidence of
Bart ' own views regarding the importance and place
of tradition for his dogmatic enterprise.
1. e small explore relevant portions of the section
of the prolegomena concerned with dogma and
"Confessions" at several points in Part III.
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Section C,
'i'HB OOhhAIID TO ODLY gRADITIOff
IJ QR.CDQ AI9D DOGi-IATICS IS OUfLIhE,
In the following we shall look at the importance
of tradition and, more importantly* the kind of relat¬
ion to tradition inherent in Barth*s theology, by turn¬
ing to a place in which Barth replies to a series of
questions concerning "the place of tradition" in theol¬
ogy, He has oust given a series of lectures, publish¬
ed under the title Credo,1 It is in ec once an
abbreviated form of his dogmatic process, in which he
ho.s used the ".Apostles* Creed" as his framework for
his dogmatic enterprise. One may note that these
lectures were not simply expositions of dogma, but,
as is made clear in the first lecture, they in fact
are meant to embody Earth's dogmatic process of thought,
The time is 1935» just three years after the publicat¬
ion of the first part-volume of his Church dogmatics,
and just four years after his completion of his study
on Anselsn, She place is Holland,
In what follows, we have a "considered reaction"
to questions concerning the place of tradition in
theology, That is, while on the one hand, we do not
have a lengthy formal exposition, which one might
exp©c-fc in a work of dogmatics, we do not, on the other
1, C,i,, Credo, Uodder and Ctoughton, London, 1936,
Hdcrman edition, 1955J.
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hand, have simply an "off the cuff" series of remarks#
The reply Barth gives is a reply to written questions.
So one can assume that he has had come time to consider
his reply. In addition, supporting the contention
that it is a "considered reaction", the reply is a
composiy replys the composite answer is meant as a reply
to all of the questions concerning tradition. So some
amount of "considered thinking" must have gone into
this reply.
One finds, in this reply, two strands of thought.
The first states that tradition stands on a lower level
than scripture. It must be seen as having only
"relative authority". It is not to have the same
authority as scripture, while yet it has authority in
its own rightThis part of Berth*s reply would
seem to re-echo many Protestant statements about the
primacy of scripture in the face of "tradition".
Yet there is another part to Barth*s reply.
Here the emotional tone changes. Here something would
seem deeply at stake for Barth. How are we to
consider our relation to tradition? Barth picks up
one of the Ten Commandment a and hurls back his answers
2
"Honour tfjy father and mother."
Bow, at this point Barth could have token at
least two pathss He could have said: "Yes, honor.
1. Credo. p,179,f.
2-*- Credo. E.T. p. 181.
295
Here honor should mean 'to hold in respect', 'to listen
attentively', even if one should then disagree. One
can respect and honor those he does not agree with*
There is freedom in the Church to disagree, as long
as one genuinely searches for truth."
Yet Bartk does not continue in this way at all.
Barth first statest "...The whole question of tradition
falls under the Fifth Commandmenti Honor thy father
and mother."*" He then states, somewhat puszlingly,*
"There is no question of bondage and constraint. It
is merely that in the Church the same hind of obediences
as, I hope, you pay to your father and mother, is
demanded of you towards the Church's past, toward the
"elders" of the Church. That is quite simply an
ordinance.^
If one sets aside for a moment the question of j
how Barth tidies to force his view point, or rather
legislate it, one say ask* what is the import of this
passage? It would seem to be that tradition, the
elders of the Church, are simoly to be "obeyed", that
is, in all essentials, "obeyed". In addition, this
is an "ordinance". Yet this is much more than
"listened to with respect" or "held in esteem". For
where one listens with respect, or holds in esteem,
one can still disagree.
l.ibid.
On*cit«. p.181. (Earth's emphasis).
German Edition: "hs geht um keine Bindung und u




Perhaps at this point we could step back from .
this passage, and look at what Berth has done. One
sees three moves that Earth has made. First, Berth
picks up one of the Ten Commandments, namely the
Commandment to "honor your father and mother.0 This,
in itself is a move. For he might have approached
the problem in a different manner. He might have
avoided drawing upon material of law, that is, material
of a "legalistic" nature. Yet this was his first
move, to appropriate the fifth commandment#
His second move was to alter "honor" to "obey".
The commandment, in Berth's interpretation, calls for
"obedience". As we have already mentioned, he might
have taken another path in interpretation, and might
have said "'honor', yes, this should best be under¬
stood as 'to respect*, 'to hold in esteem*." Yet
Barth chooses to make this move, from "honor" to "obey".
The third move was to make this commandment
binding, that is obligatory? "Obey,..this is simply
an ordinance." One may note that obedience can be
fre ly given, given by choice and not in response to
a demand. Host parents, perhaps, would not demand
obedience, especially from young adults (and most
young adults would not accept this demand even if it
were made), What one wishes to point out is that
obedience, in its primary, family, setting can be
offered on the part of the offspring out of freedom
1. That is, from "ehren" to "gehorchen".
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of choice. If for example after the youth has thought
over what a parent wants him to do, and, for example,
finds this abhorrent to his conscience, or values, he
can choose not to obey. Perhaps, much more to tho
point, the parent ma,/ refuse to demand obedience.
lie may refuse to "lay down the law" in this respect.
He may allow his offspring to have minds of their own,
and sake their own decision, in individual instances,
whether to obey or not,
Yet Earth's third move is quite in contrast to
this. he says "Obey...this is simply an ordinance."
As an ordinance is something that is legally binding,
and from the context, Earth is talking in terms of
those "in the Ohurch", his meaning would be: This
obedience is legally binding for those in the Ohurch.
Barth is 'laying down the lav/" with regard to "obeying
tradition"•
Thus in contrast to the alternative we have
s elled out, where obedience is not demanded, but is
offered out of freedom, here, with Barth, obedience
is demandedi it is seen as an ordinance, that is as
legally binding upon those in the Church.
It is with this third step or 'move' that we
see the nature of this obedience of which Barth speaks.
It is spoken of as an obedience which is binding upon
'all in the Church'. It is to be soon as a lav/, an
"ordinance".
Thus disagreement with (the main linos of)
1, German edition: "Ordnung" (regulation, order).
German Mition, p. 156.
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tradition would moan breaking an ordinance. Disagree¬
ment with tradition is not allowed. Shis would be
disobedience, tL t is disobedience in the realm of
thought, or "noetic" disobedience.
It Is with this third step in which one is. in
effect ordered to obey, that one sees that this is not
the obedience which adults, even young adults might
offer to their parents, but rather the obedience of
childhood. tor young adults are usually allowed to
consider and think over what they are to obey. dhould
they, after considered thought decide they cannot obey,
usually they arc free to take this option not to obey.
Obedience is. not binding*
let north's view of obedience differ:: from this
view i)ust at this point; Obedience is binding, and that
means, regardless of one's own thought processes and
decisions. Thus this obedience resettles the obed¬
ience of childhood in which the parent, perhaos for
the safety of the child, leaves no room for disagree¬
ment and makes obedience binding#
The crucial difference we see between these two
types of obedience is that the first (that typically
offered by young adults) allows for a process of thought,
on which basic a person decides whether to obey or not
to obey. Obedience is offered willingly and freely.
The obedience of which Berth speaks in contrast
is binding, and does not allow disobedience, that is
disagreement. Thus any process of thought on the basis
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which a person would decide whether to 'obey' or riot
is rendered simply superfluous. There is no place
for considered thought in Berth's view. What is
called for, oven, do:landed here is unquestioning obed¬
ience.
Thus we have here an authoritarian intenuretat-
1
ion of a commandment, which has been laid down or
2
legislated in an authoritarian manner. One finds
this, we may note, at the heart of the relation to
tradition.
fire Cross-Jctegor;/ • ove.
There is a 'move' of another type which Berth
makes here. We say a move 'of another type', for this
move is essentially different from the three moves we
have just described. The move we wish to describe
consists essentially of picking up a segment of tradit¬
ion or scripture and, taking it out of its initial
context, crossing to a different context with the same
segment of tradition; that is, crossing categories,
and doing so in a limiting manner, a manner which would
limit or inhibit freedom.
Barth picks up a passage that has probably had
1. The move from "honor1" to "obey", that is to "obey"
in the sens© of unquestioning obedience.
2. The attempt to portray this unquestioning obedience
as law, or an ordinance. Thus it is not to be
seon as offered willingly and out of freedom, but
seen, rather, as demanded, and as binding.
■
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a certain ' authority * in the early years of his hearers,
an * authority* in addition to its 'authority* as
Scripture. That is, an. authority which it lias gained
through its use in childhood years of Christian house¬
holds, Thus, even if the coamandraent has not been
articulated in childhood years, (which it most likely
has), is .as been enforced, most likely, repetitively.
In Continental households, the effective force of this
command is generally acknowledged to be considerably
stronger than in British, and especially American,
counterparts. Co Barth has picked up a 'commandment *
that has both the * authority of Scripture' and the
overtones of childhood experience behind it.
His 'hove" is to cross from the realm of the
family to the realm of the Church with this commandment•
Her© there exists a similar situation. That is, there
is a similarity between the relation of parent and
Child on the one hand, and the relation of the oldest
generations of Church thinkers and the younger gener¬
ations, that is, between 'the fathers', and "younger"
thinkers. As one feels this similarity, Berth's
move would, in our view, gain emotional leverage.
His application would feel fitting, or "right".
Yet this only begs the question. Is what may
be considered good and appropriate for childhood, even
early childhood, that is, unquestioning obedience, is
this automatically to' be assumed as good in this other
realm? One does not; see how this follows.
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We will run up against this tyoe of "move",
especially in its Halting or inhibiting force, again
and again in Earth's thought.
Oilier Instances of Berth's Use of the fifth Command¬
ment vis-a-vis .Tradition.
Is this simply an emotional outburst, an ill
considered statement by Berth? It would seen not,
for (1) he uses essentially the same formulation in the
first Chapter of Credo, a chapter devoted to methodology.
In addition (2) Barth chooses to use essentially the
'same formulation ten years later in the Opening Chapter'
of his dogmatics in Outline,^ The fifth Commandment
is invoked again in what would appear as Berth's
attempt to legislate a relation to tradition, and one
of the particular kind we have described,
Summary,
As we have seen, the relation to tradition
involves, not respect or holding in esteem (in which
case, disagreement even basic disagreement is possible)
but obedience. This obedience (which may, of course,
include respect and holding in esteem) is obligatory"
and is "an ordinance". Thus, as noetic obedience is
binding and obligatory, disagreement is precluded.
As there is no freedom in which to arrive at one's own
decision, there is consequently no place for considered
1. E,l, p.13.
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judgement, that is any process of thought h,/ which one
arrives at a Judgement as to whether to "obey or not
to obey". Jhus what Barth tali's or hero is unquestion¬
ing obedience* that is, unquestioning; assent to trad¬
ition* As such it is akin to the obedience of
childhood* in contrast to tho obedience of a young adult,
where considered judgement typically has a place.
Criticise One.
What is involved hero is a childish concept of
"honoring"• That is, it is "honoring" from a child*s
point of view. He has not yet developed 'a mind of
his own* with which to think.things over and arrive
at considered judgements about what is resented to
him* He is taught to obey "without question". As
he grows, he learns that he can disagree with his
parents, and yet still respect then* He can still
hold them in esteem and respect their views, even if
he is forced to disagree at particular points.
Perhaps a parent who does not allow for disagree¬
ment as the child grows into a youth and a youth into
a young adult is really inviting revolt and repudiat¬
ion, and a consequent alienation. So also, perhaps,
1. There is only one qualification offered by berth,
one which does not alter what we have outlined in
its essentialsJ as long as tradition is not in con¬
flict with scripture* "I accept what interprets
this witness (Scripture) to me. I reject what con¬
tradicts it." Arcdo. p»16i. Here/one wishes to
point out, tho subjectivity of the theologian is
involved* One need not enumerate the diverse and
contradictory beliefs found to "interpret Scripture"
to the hearer, nor those beliefs thought not to be in
contradiction with it.
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a Tradition, which does not allow for disagreement,
is inviting repudiation by its offspring. This is a
theme we shall explore briefly near the conclusion of
oux' thesis.
Criticism Two.
If Barth is speaking of entei^ing into a binding
relation to tradition in which one simply obeys (the
main lines of) tradition, we have one question: in
response to what demand does one do this sort of thing,
(chat is, enter into this type of relation). Who
demands this and where? As a Protestant, one is hard
pressed to find a source for this alleged obligation.
Barth in fact avoids raising this type of question,
the primary and basic question in this matter. That
Barth avoids this primary question is of significance.
Por here, at the beginning, his case would appeos: to
be weakest, that is, without apparent foundation.
In the sections which follow concerning the
x-elation to Tradition in Earth's theology, we shall
place the statements we have just treated next to other
statements about Tradition. Tor example when Barth
comes to treat another Barly Church creed, the
Nicaean Creed in his Church dogmatics, he will state
at the outset that its formulations "...must be
p
restored to an unconditional validity...'.' In short
1. See below, pp.51?ff; pp.530f.
• C. D. i/l, p. TcV4- •
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we shall be treating an aspect of Barth's operational
procedure which he has not openly admitted to, and
reflected upon in his own account of his theological
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When we speak of Barth's relation to Tradition,
specifically to the Creeds of the Carly Church, we
night specify at this point which creeds we inean.
Yet first we might note one thing. Our concern lies
primarily with how Barth regards and treats the
beliefs enclosed within these creeds. Oince Barth
will often treat these beliefs without explicit refer¬
ence to the creeds our concern lies with how the beliefs
of these creeds are treated. as to Barth's treatment
of the text of these creeds, this exegetical task, in
which ho deals formally with certain portions of creeds,
occupies limited space in his theologizing. To limit
ourselves to studying Jiarth's formal treatment of the
text of these creeds would be to curtail our study,
and perhaps miss some of the most significant aspects
of Barth's manner of relating to tradition. In short,
our concern is primarily with the manner in which Barth
treats the beliefs enclosed within (and/or considered
to be implied by) these creeds, regardless of whether
Barth is treating trie text of a creed.
By the creeds of the marly Church we mean
specifically the "Apostles' Creed", the Idicaean Creed,
both in its original form adopted in AD 3^5 > and in
its form as adopted at Constantinople in AD 381# In
the background lies the Chalcedonian Creed of xu) 450,
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and even further in the background, the Athanasian
Greed.
Although Earth apparently finds the "Apostles'
Greed" the most useful framework in which to carry on
his theologizing - he uses this creed as a framework
for his dogmatics in both Credo and dogmatics in
Outline, as well as choosing to treat it yet again in
connection with Calvin's Catechism in The faith of the
Church (194-3) - it would appear that the kicaean-
Constantinoplian Creed has even more importance for
his theologizing. One could readily see why this
would be so. It is the hicaean-Constantinoplian creed
which articulates a complexity of beliefs concerning
Chrlstology and the Trinity, both of which occupy highly
important and prominent places in Earth's tneologizing.
The "Apostles' Creed" is much less developed in this
respect.
One can look at the special prominence of the
Gicaean Creed in Earth's theology from another angle:
its importance to Earth in asserting a wide range of
"orthodox" beliefs over against nineteenth Century
Libex'alism. Thus, at the place where Earth first
takes up the text of this creed and treats it at length
(in the portion of his doctrine of the Trinity treating
"God the Son"),'L he speaks firstly of its primal
importance for his task: for "into this creed were
I. C.d.X/1, pp.•
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taken up the decisive determinations on the theology
of the Trinity made by the Council of Nicaea in 385"
and reaffirmed by the Council of Constantinople in 381,
Earth continues:
"We call it the document of the most
importance here for the dogma of the
divinity of Christ,
1. because, of the three early Church
symbols formally received by the
deformation, its determinations in
particular are in this respect at once
the most trencnant and the most
succint;
2. because...it pelves us conclusively
the result of early Church discussion
on the divinity of Christj...
4. because it asserts unambiguously,
what liberal Protestantism refuses
to listen to, and what, for that
very reason, must be restored to an
uncondi tional validlty.... 1"
Although one should not diminish the importance of the
first two points in this passage, it is to the fourth
point that we shall turn ouin attention. here there
would appear to be a deep determination lying behind
Earth's words: a determination to 'ram through' these
cred&l beliefs over against 'liberal Protestantism'.
Since the latter has "refused to listen to" the assert¬
ions of this creed they "must... for that very reason..,
2
be restored to an unconditional validity."
Thus it would appear that when the subject of
liberal Protestantism arises, it is at this point that
-*-• C.E.I/1. p.484, (emphasis added)
8. Emphasis added.
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Earth's relation to these creeds (and this one in
particular) comes into sharpest relief. One might
paraphrase Earth here: over* against liberal Protestant¬
ism, it is imperative that the assertions of this creed
be restored to an unconditional validity.
Further, one finds implicit in this passage
two aspects of Earth's relation to creeds which we are
exploring in this section of our thesis: (1) an imper¬
ative: these things mu3t be believed 5 and (2) an imper¬
ative which would claim that these creeds must have an
unconditional validity.^ What we have found here is
that Barth wishes to assert these two things just where
'liberal Protestantism' is concerned. This suggests
that tradition, namely credal tradition, shall be
wielded as a weapon over against liberal Protestantism#
We have been suggesting here that the Nicaean-
Oonstantinoplian creed has the highest importance
among the early Church creeds for Earth's theology.
Yet even if the "Apostles' Greed" lacks the detailed
formulations so important to Earth's theology, one
should not conclude that it has a less exalted place
as regards its "authority" to articulate the truths
of revelation. Both would appear to have equal
authority in Earth's framework of theology. As to
the Chalcedonian and Athanasian Greeds, these lie in
1. We shall examine this "unconditional validity" below,
pp.354ff; pp.363ff.
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the background. much less attention is given to them.
The spotlight returns again and again to the beliefs
and formulations of these first two creeds.
In this connection we might note another passage
where the "unconditional" importance of these creeds
are asserted. In the first chapter of Credo, a work
of dogmatics which uses the "Apostles' Greed" as its
basis, Barth says that while dogmatics is the task by
which the church makes critical examination of her
Proclamation past and present, this relationship is
revcrc&ble. That is, Proclamation (and by this Barth
means what "the Ghurch" has proclaimed, not only in
preaching, but in its creeds, dogmas and theologizing)
..ay have to "call dogmatics to order", instead of
being "called to order"by dogmatics. Thus wits obvious
allusion to liberal Protestantism, Barth states;
Certainly... dogmatics can deteriorate and run wild.
It can actually be that, instead of calling to order,
dogmatics has to be called to order and corrected by
tae Church's proclamation that has kept to better ways."^
What is this proclamation which has "kept to better
ways."] It is clear, by the way in which Barth con¬
tinues that it is "the Creed" or "the Confession",
1
Just as along the whole line of Church service, the
function of the Confession is necessary, so also this
function of the Confession is necessary: the scientific
1. Credo, p.6f. (emphasis adued).
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examination of the Church's proclamation with regard
to its genuineness#"^
We might note immediately that here the Greed
has precisely the same function as "the Word of God"
as Barth describes it in his Prolegomena. That is,
it is the criterion by which the Church examines the
genuineness of her Proclamation (her theological utter¬
ances and preaching, past and present)# This suggests
(1) that Barth has not given a full account of what
shall be the criterion for the critical task of
.Dogmatics in his Church Dogmatics. In that place he
has only named "the Word of God" and specifically,
"Scripture as the Word of God" as fulfilling this
function. This also suggests (2) that since 'the
Creed* fulfills the same function as "the Word of God",
Barth may actually operate upon the assumption that
'the Creed', like Scripture, is a human form of "the
Word of God". We shall investigate this is uo near
the end of this part of our thesis devoted to Earth's
relation to Tradition, namely the supposition that in
this theology, the credal tradition of the harly Church
is regarded as a fourth form of "the Word of God"
(along with the Word Revealed, the Word Written,
^GcriptureJ , and the Word Preached).**
1. Credo, p.7#
2. Gee below, pp.563ff.
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Introduction,
At this point we shall briefly study the manner
in which Barth treats two beliefs which are regarded
as of considerable importance in his theological frame¬
work, Since on the one hand, these two beliefs, the
belief in a "Virgin Birth", and the belief in a literal
"Second Ooming" at the end of time, have posed consider¬
able problems for both nineteenth Century, and Twentieth
Century man, in a significant number of cases, both
within 'the Church' and outside it, and, on trie other
hand, these beliefs are regarded as of considerable
importance in Berth's theological enterprise, it is
important for us to look at how Barth approaches these
beliefs. Does he acknowledge the problems encountered
in these beliefs; is the question of truth concerning
these beliefs raised and dealt with, that is, does the
question of truth have any real si xificance for this
theology? These are the questions we shall be asking,
We may note that we encounter these beliefs
primarily as credal beliefs in Berth's theology.
That is more often than not, these beliefs are treated
in tie context of the creed, that is in conjunction
with other credal beliefs, i'or example, in Dogmatics
in Outline and in Credo, these beliefs make up two of
the beliefs of the creed, that is, the "Apostles' Creed",
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which Barth uses in toto as a framework for his
dogmatics in these works* Thus they are treated as
credai beliefs, even though they may have firm roots
in Scripture.
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The "Virgin Birth" in Dogmatics in Outline,
We shall turn first to Earth's treatment of
this belief in his Dogmatics in Outline, and then
proceed to Credo and the Church Dogmatics. when
Barth approaches this part of the creed in Dogmatics
in Outline. he admits that this belief is one that
is problematic not only for those outside "the Church",
but for vast numbers within "the Church" as well.
Barth acknowledges this in the way in which he opens
his chapter on this part of the creed, concerning the
Virgin Birth: "We have now come to one of the places,
and perhaps .indeed to the place, at which at all
times, and even largely within the Christian community
offence tias been taken." He then admits that he is
aware of the "uneasy feeling" as to where he is going
next (in the creed), and that his audience might be
2
"brought up short by what is coming now." One might
expect that tae writer would articulate some of the
problems involved with this belief. That is, he




might, at minimum, point out some of the reasons for
this "uneasy feeling" he speaks of, or explain why,
in his view, people are "brought up short" when
approaching this belief. In short, one might expect
a writer,at this point, to consider the question of
truth concerning this belief.
Indeed, the ambiguous manner in which berth
continues after this opening might lead one to
expect consideration of the question of truth concern¬
ing this belief. for he says "...we want to approach
this section of the creed just as peacefully and
objectively as in the preceding sections ....
1
Here too our concern must simply be with the truth...."
Yet what does he mean? kor this is of method¬
ological significance. Does he mean: the question
of truth shall be our concern too, that is, historical
and ontological problems with this belief? The
answer quite clearly is: "no". 3arth has no intent¬
ion of raising questions of truth concerning this
belief, as is made clear by the way he proceeds from
p
this point onwards. What then does he mean by
saying: "Here our concern must simply be with the
truth."? Apparently he means that his concern shall
be with this belief. It shall be presupposed as




shall be with "The truth of the conception of Jesus
Christ by the Holy Spirit and of His birth by the
Virgin Mary..." (The opening sentence of the
prefatory paragraph of this chapter).
As Earth proceeds, the question of truth is
quickly replaced by a question of a very different
kinds "Must we believe this?" The answer, which
follows immediately is simply: "yes".^ This "yes,
[v/e must believe this}" is left standing, without
any attempt to support it, or any assurance that he
will attempt to give some rationale for this "ought"
subsequently, We may note two things, then,
firstly, the question of truth is never raised as
Barth proceeds. It has been completely avoided.
And secondly, the remainder of the chapter centres
around another question: How should this belief be
understood? That is: What should be the meaning
of this belief. Thus Barth begins his third para¬
graph with: "If we wish to understand the meaning of
•conceived by the Holy Ghost, and born of the Virgin
xiary',..." from this point onwards, this is the
only significant question: How should this belief
be understood?
The consequence of this procedure is that
the belief is asserted dogmatically in the face of
1. Ibid,
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Earth's admission of the serious problems encountered
in the church in believing this belief. In addition
it is not asserted as the personal belief of the
writer and lecturer, concerning which others are free
to arrive at their own conclusion, but rather as some
thing that must be believed. 'Thus, the belief is
not only asserted dogmatically but asserted in a
legalistic manner.1
One further question could be asked. How
important or significant for Barth is the belief in
the Virgin Birth? Can one, for example, consider
the belief in the Incarnation (or "the mystery of
the Incarnation", In Earth's words) and hold this
apart from a "virgin birth"?
Barth observes that tradition has never
insisted that God had to take this path of necessity
(that is, that God had of necessity to become incarn¬
ate through a "virgin birth". The deity could have
taken other paths to accomplish the same task. "But
Barth intersects, immediately, "that cannot mean that
we are free to affirm it or not affirm the virgin
2
birth ". Here'again, as in the opening of the
1. While one may grant that the tone of the passage
is not dogmatic at this point (Ibid., p.95)» yet
the "Siiessage" of the passage, especially when seen
in its context, is. This should be obvious from
the other points we have raised, in connection




chapter, the belief comes to the fore as something
that must be believed. There is no freedom in which
one could choose not to affirm it.
In the final paragraph, which concerns specif¬
ically the"virgin birth"in distinction from the
Incarnation, Barth says: "One thing may be definitely
said", namely, that where people have shied away from
"this miracle, a theology has been at work which has
ceased to understand...the mystery [that is, the
Incarnation!...and has essayed to conjure away the
mystery of the unity of God and man in Jesus Christ,
f ind thusD trie mystery of God's free grace". In
contrast to this, "where this mystery [of the incarn¬
ation! ias been understood,...the miracle [of the
Virgin Birth! car.;© to be.. .recognized. It became...
an inward necessity at this pointBarth ends
•his chapter with these words.
Thus Barth sees this belief as a necessary
correlate of the Incarnation. Hot to hold it,
would threaten the whole of the Incarnation, and
with it the whole of grace. So, in Earth's scheme
of things, it is not only a necessary belief, but a
belief of the highest priority. This evaluation
would be in line with hahrnt* s view: "Tor [Barth!




The "Virgin Birth" in Oredo and the Church dogmatics.
When one turns to Credo and to the Evurch
dogmatics one finds Berth's approach to this belief,
essentially the sane as wo have described it in
dogmatics in Outline. There is one minor difference,
however, when one comes to the Church Dograatics. We
say "minor" for if it were not for Berth's method,
things might be different. We refer to Earth's
procedure of beginning with the "actuality" of revel¬
ation, and the", but only then, going on to ask about
the "possibility" which 'lies behind' this alleged
actuality. 'This is the methodological path Earth
takes with the belief in the "virgin birth" also.
For it is, for Barth, as it stands in both Scripture
and Creed, one of the "actualities" of revelation.
Thus Barth begins by presupposing the truth of this
belief. It is regarded true and asserted as true
before historical questions, for example, questions
of possibility are raised. As a consequence of this
procedure, the question of truth is regarded as settled
at the outset, that is, by beginning with the alleged
actuality of this event.
If Barth shall go on, after this initial move,
to ask about the "possibility" which lies behind this
(alleged) actuality, one might ask: What significance
do such questions have, in light of this initial move.
That is, once someone has decided that something is
'actual, how significant is it to ask, subsequently,
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"Is it possible."
What one would argue here is that, given Barth's
initial move, where the decision about this belief's
truth has been made, prior to consideration of any
problems, (and made thus in a dogmatic manner), any
subsequent considerations • of historical problems,
etc., will have the nature of a superfluous academic
oxercise. That is, since the belief has been pre¬
supposed as true a-priori, that is, before questions
of truth are raised, any subsequent examination of
questions of truth has a superfluous nature. If,
in contrast, Barth had asserted tae belief te. tativel;/,
in his initial step, with the readiness to revise his
assertion following historical questioning, then such
subsequent historical questioning would, in our view,
have real meaning and significance. Yet this tent-
ativeness (despite appearances to tae contrary at
times) is not cnaracteristic of Barth's procedure.
In its place one finds the certainty of dogmatic
assertion. Thus, even taking into account Berth's
articulation of historical difficulties with this
belief, we still find this belief treated essentially
in the sa. e manner as in Jopraties in outline, where
we found that:
1. The question of truth has no significant
place;
2. The belief is one which must be believed
in the Church, and;
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3. ihe only real question concerns tlio proper
content of the "belief and its possible
relationship with other beliefs;
4-. The belief itself is regarded as both
necessary and fundamentally important.
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•The 'Jecond Coming;' in Credo,
Belief in the ^schaton or 'the Second doming
of Christ', in the form it stands in the creed has,
like the "virgin hirth", proved to be a problematic
belief, within the 1ecclesia* as well as without, in
both Nineteenth and (Twentieth Centuries. Yet here
in Credo,^ Barth does not acknowledge the presence
of problems, as he has with the Virgin Birth. In
fact nowhere in this account is the question of truth
about this belief given even passing notice.
One finds the doctrine treated in a 'literal'
manner, that is, that the risen Christ, who has
ascended, will return at some future time. He will
return from where he is "inaccessible" to ear and eye
in the present, and will return in a manner which is
accessible to ear and eye. Barth makes a clear
distinction, in his treatment, between the present,
and the future in which this 'second cooing' will
happen. "(This present...means contemporaneousness,
! having of Jesus Christ as contemporary." Yet he
is "in concealment" sed et ad dexteram i)ei" in our
present. At this future time, "He will return
1. Chapter 12, pp.117-126.
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fro;r. the concealment into which he there entered."
Barth quotes, in an unproblematic manner: "He comes
again in the clouds of heaven with power and great
glory" (Matthew 24:50), and perhaps not wishing to
miss out on the imagpy of 'judgement in-breaking
from above1 follows this, by quoting another passage
from Matthew: "As the lightning cometh out of the
east and shineth even unto the west, so shall the
presence of the bon of Kan." (Matthew 24:27) •"*" ho
problems are noted in connection with these passages,
nor their visual aspects.
he then continues to interpret this 'second
coming' as the inbreaking of judgement in which dhrist
will come as judge of 'the quick and the dead'.
There is no 'realized eschatology' here. ihe hist¬
oricity of this belief is asserted in an unprobiemetic
and dogmatic manner.
The 'Second doming' in dogmatics in Outline.
.....I I... .i ii i .I'.'i'iii js,
In Dogmatics in Outline one finds no signifi¬
cant differences. In "this future coming...He will
issue out of the hiddenness in which he still remains
O
for us today...""" (Here though, Barth does acknowledge
problems with Hew Testament visual imagry).
1. Both passages in Oredo, p.121.
2. Dogmatics in Outline, p.155.
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Dcaeme: the Church Da^matics^,
This is not a minor or insignificant belief
in Barth's theology# On the contrary, it is a major
belief, comparable with the Incarnation# Barth's
plan or 'blueprint1 for his Church Dogmatics revolves
around major three doctrines. That is, it is laid
out in trie form of three Doctrines (following the
■Prolegomena and the Doctrine of God) t the Doct±ine
of Creation, (which comprises Volume III), the
.Doctrine of Reconciliation, (which comprises Volume
IV), and lastly the Doctrine of Redemption, which
was to comprise Volume V, but which was left undone#
Just as the Doctrine of Creation concerns the *act of
Creation' at the beginning of time (along with allied
concerns), and the .Doctrine of Reconciliation has as
Its centre the Incarnation, so the Doctrine of
Redemption was to have this eventat the end of hist¬
ory as its centre# here the revelation of God was
to be made manifest to all men, that is, revealed to
the body's eye, and no longer only to the 'eye of
faith',1 Thus, in Barth's scheme of dogmas, this
one is, if not 'first among equals', perhaps 'second
among equals'.
let for a doctrine of such central significance
in his own dogmatic scheme, we still find that he has
1. Dogmatics in Outline, pp. 134—155#
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not even taken notice of the difficulties vast multi¬
tudes in the churches, in the Twentieth Century, have




S i ..h.Jj BohlhhS AG "T'iUTHS Qg RELATION"
UPON \ .IJi; BAR!':I BUILDS ,.T3 1' I .OLOSY,
In Berth's operational procedure in his
dogmatics, he typically begins with the "actualities
of revelation". These '^actualities of revelation" are
regarded simply as "givens", as simply "there",
is upon these "givens" that he subsequently builds
his theology. Thus, for example, one of his subsequent
theological "moves" is from "actuality" to "possibility".
That is, if such and such is an "actuality", Bsrth
shall raise the question: What is the "possibility"
which lies behind this actuality; i.e. what possibility
is actualized here? One finds the normal procedure,
of investigating the "possibility" (of something being
the case) in order to proceed to the question of its
"actuality", reversed in Barth's procedure• The line
of thinking here, essentially, is: if something is
actual, it must also be possible; we must find what
possibility has here been actualized, so better to
understand the actuality. Thus, the quest is for
further understanding of the content of revelation.
What is of importance here is Barth's manner
of beginning: He begins by presupposing the truth of
these "actualities" or "realities" of revelation,
As we have remarked, they are treated as "givens",
as simply "there". The question as to their truth
does not arise, in any significant sense, either prior
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to the statement as to their truth, nor subsequently.
Our question at this point in our thesis is:
What is the source of these "actualities" or "realities
of revelation", which Barth begins with and subsequently
builds upon? More specifically, is credal tradition
a source of these "actualities"?
What we find is that a surprising number of these
"actualities of revelation" have their source in credal
Tradition, that is, in the creeds of the aarly Church,
and in the dogmas of the Early Church which developed
in close connection with these creeds.
Thus very early in Earth's Church Dogmatics, in
his Doctrine of the Trinity"*" one finds that credal
beliefs (and their articulation in the dogmas of the
iarly Church) have a place of central importance.
Thus, for example, we find credal beliefs, especially
those of the hicaean-Constantinoplian creed, under¬
pinning Earth's Doctrine of the Trinity. This Doctrine
and its Christology occupies a highly significant place
in Barth's Dogmatics, as its early placement in his
Dogmatics suggests."*" hero we find a whole nexus of
credal beliefs (many of which have been taken up and
given more explicit articulation in Early Church dogma).
Barth in fact devotes almost thirty pages to an expo¬
sition of the second article of the Kicaean creed in
1» c.j.l/l, pp.339ff.
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his treatment of "God the Son","*" and nearly thirty
pages to the formulations of the same creed concerning
the iioly Spirit in his treatment of "God the Holy
Spirit,"2
Let us look at one of the beliefs which Barth
regards as an "actuality", yet which has its source
in credal tradition, or rather in Sarly Church dogma's
articulation of credal tradition; the eternality of
the Son, And let us look at it with this question
in mind; Does Barth treat credal beliefs as "actualities
of revelation" even when such beliefs are not to be
found in Scripture? That Tradition has a relation-
ship to 3cripture} one is not denying (even if this
relationship should at times be quite tenuous). Yet
our question is this: Shall Barth treat beliefs of
Tradition as "actualities of revelation" even where
he himself admits that such beliefs are not to be found
in Scripture?
Let us look then at Earth*s treatment of "the
eternality of the Son" (that is, existence before,
and after the incarnation), Barth admits that this
belief "is not to be found in the Biblical texts".
Its source is named as the dogma of the marly Church,
Yet Barth goes on immediately to declare the belief





as a truth. Subsequently he builds upon this belief.
In summary, we may note that (1) the belief is
not to be found in Scripture; (2) Berth acknowledges
this; (3) Its source is named as dogma (the dogma of
the Early Church); (4; It is at the outset simply
declared to be true that is declared to be an
"actuality"; (5) essentially no problems about the
truth of this "dogma"- "actuality" are raised either
prior to this, or subsequently; (6) The question,
Iiow shall this belief be (rightly) understood? is
essentially the only real question. One may also
note that this dogma is in close association with
2
credal tradition.
Thus here Earth begins his process of thought
by presupposing the truth of this belief, regarding
it as an 'actuality' given in revelation. Yet its
source is not in Scripture, but rather in i'radit ion.
As one goes through the Church Dogmatics one
finds many other alleged "actualities" which form the
"point of beginning^for Earth's theologizing. A sig¬
nificantly large number of these alleged "actualities"
are in fact appropriated or borrowed from 1'radition.
That is, they are often statements appropriated from
the credal tradition of the Early Church, and from
1. Ibid.
2. as Earth points out in his exposition, C.D.I/1,
pp.4?4ff.
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dogmas closely associated with these creeds. This
also applies even if these tenets of belief at points
had roots in Scripture, or were "interpretations" of
Scripture. The form in which they ore appropriated
is the form they had in Tradition.
examples of dogmas and Credal Beliefs As: uned and
Treated as mutualities.
Here there are too manyto list. Yet we may
point out a few. As we have already mentioned, a
whole nexus of beliefs concerning the Trinity are
treated as "actualities" in Volume I of the Church
jognatics. We have oust pointed out one: 'the
eternality of the Son" The "Virgin Birth" and the
"Conception by the Holy Spirit", considered already,1
have a central place in Berth's treatment of the
Trinity.
As one might expect, the beliefs of the Hicaean
Creed have a central place in Earth's dogmatisation
upon the Trinity. One of Earth's statements as to
why it has this place is sug estive for our concerns:
"...because it £the Nicaean CreedD asserts unambig¬
uously, what liberal Protestantism refuses to listen
to, and what for that very reason must be restored to
2




Thus there are a host of dogmas which are simply
asserted as having "unconditional validity" in this
dogmatics# Dogmas concerning the second person, for
example, include (in Volume 1/1) "Begotten of the
lather" (p,48?)» "Begotten, not created" (p,492),
"the Only-begotten" (p,486) "Homoousia" (pp403, etc.)#
•The dogmas concerning the persons are developed in a
way which attempts to avoid the 'Modalism* opposed in
the creeds, that is, as modes of existence, rather than
modes of activity# The presupposition at the root of
Earth's procedure is that the tenets of these creeds
are (1) correct; (2) true and (5) unambiguous#
Other sources for earth's "Actualities of Bevelation".
One would not deny that some of Earth's
"actualities of revelation" come directly from Ocrip-
ture. Others would appear to come from the develop¬
ment of dogma, and creeds after the period of the Early
Church. Still others would appear to be of Earth's own
making, at times derived inferentially from other beliefs."*"
1# Tor example "the hiddenness of God" in C.D.II/1
would appear to be an "actuality of revelation" in
that it is a "statement of faith"(p.183) which can
only be made on the basis of revelation# This
hiddenness "is one of God's properties'Xp'ISh),
Thus here "the hid lenness of God" is treated as a
tenet of belief which "we confess" in faith (p.184)#
Yet its source is not to be found in any literary
document# In the form that Barth articulates it,
it would appear to be a specifically Barthian ' art¬
icle of faith', given in revelation, and so, an
"actuality" of revelation. This 'article of belief'
one may note forms the basis of a sizeable portion
of Barth's exposition of his "Doctrine of God"
(C.D.1I/1, pp.179-205).
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As our purpose is to investigate the place of the
credal tradition of the uarly Church in Earth's thought,
we shall return to our main theme at this point.
Tradition vis-a-vis I-crioture.
One is not saying that interpretation of
Scripture does not have a place in Earth's Dogmatics,
even a highly visible place. It is evident that it
does. Rather, what we wish to point out is that a
sizeable number of the "actualities of revelation"
which form the basis of Berth's thought have their
source, by and large, in tradition, that is in the
credal tradition and the dogmas of the Early Church.
If there is much interpretation of Scripture
in Earth's exposition of these "actualities" (often
novel exposition), and in their development (very often
novel development), this is a separate consideration.
One should still not overlook the fact that the source
of these alleged "actualities" is in tradition. In
saying this one is not denying that credal tradition,
at certain points, has roots in Scripture, and at points
is an interpretation of Scripture, even a "selective"
interpretation of Scripture, picking up some elements
here, ignoring other elements there. Yet at many
points, as Bnrth admits, these beliefs are not to be
found in Scripture.1 They are peculiar to tradition.
1. We have cited one, concerning which Barth admits
this, "the eternality of the Son". C■ ..j. 1/1, p.475•
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Han-the-less, even at these points, where the beliefs
are not to be found in Scripture* v/e find Barth no
less adamant in asserting them, that is, in simply
"declaring" them bo be true, and proceeding to build
upon them,"*"
Jhrough i'radltion to Scripture.
_
It is at this point that we sight look at how
Barth sees the dogmatician relating to Scripture
through tradition, and how there is a "sola" regard¬
ing creeds in Berth's theological programme# Thus
v/e learn, in the "methodology Chapter" of Credo
(Chapter I) that theology is "Creed-bound". And
this means that theology approaches Scripture through
the Creeds. In fact, it is only through the creeds
that one may approach Scripture. Cue cannot go
around the creeds to Scripture itself. I'or any
"appeal on the part of Dogmatics to the very Bible
itself is forbidden by the fact that CDogmatics3 is
itself confession-bound...and therefore brings to the
confessions.•.that respect which children owe by God's
command to the words of their human fathers." This
statement should highlight the significant place creeds
1. An example follows Earth's "declaration" of




have, vis-a-vis scripture, in Earth.1 s theological
programme. Earth's theologizing seen in the light
oi" this passage, takes on a different appearance from
the usual, for in typical views of Berth's theologizing,
Scripture is usually seen as the only determining text*
"Barth the theological exegete" is the usual picture*
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As added, support for our contention that tenets
from credal tradition form a significant number of
the "actualities" or "realities" or "truths of
revelation" which are treated as "givens" in Berth's
theology, let us go to the "methodological chapter",
Chapter One of Credo (1936). here Creed and Dogmatics
are seen as standing in close connection.
The work of dogmatics consists in that it
"unfolds and displays those truths in which the truth
of God concretely meets us. It articulates again
the articles of faith...to make them plain in their
interconnections and context,"^ how our question
is whether the alleged "actualities", the "actualities"
revealed in revelation actually have a credal form
in Earth's thought, that is, have the form of credal
beliefs. In the above passage there is a fairly
clear connection between "those truths in which the
truth of God meets us", and "the articles of faith"
which dogmatics articulates in a way as to "make them
plain in their interconnections and context," That
is, Barth is apparently equating "those truths in
which the truth of God meets us" with "the articles
of faith" in the Greed.
1. Gredo, p.3.
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This equation is confirmed in the paragraph
just previous to the one we have cited, where he speaks
of the dreed itself. Qui* question, again, is whether
the articles of faith or the tenets of the creed are
to be identified -with the "truths11 of revelation which
form the basis of Barta • s dogmatics. ilere in the
paragraph which precedes the one we have just cited,
Barth speaks of "the truth, which is identical with
God Himself, and which the believer has heard and
received__in the for: :__of iefinite_truths,_ in t .e form
of articles of faith.Now in this passage, "has
heard and received..." implies Earth's concept of
revelation. This is confirmed in the way that Barth.
continues: "...the disclosure of this truth is a free
gift that...comes to meet the believing man. It is
p
God's revelation." Thus the "definite truths" in
this passage can be understood as the equivalent of
"those truths in which the truth of God concretely
meets us" in the next paragraph (i.e., in the first
passage we quoted and are examining). Thus by "those
truths in which the truth of God meets us" Barth
means the sa.:e as the "definite truths" in the second
passage we cited. In this passage they are equated
with "articles of faith" that is, the tenets of the
Creed: "the truth...which the believer has heard and
1. Credo, p.2. (emphasis added).
2, Credo, p.2.
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received in the form of definite truths, in tne form
of articles of faith.
In summary, that which "is first said to
2
£ dogmatics!! in the revelation of God's reality" is
3"heard and received in the form of definite truths."
Here we have the "truths" of revelation, or the "actual¬
ities" of revelation of which we have been speaking,
how here in the "methodological chapter" of Credo,
Garth has clearly equated these "definite truths" of
revelation with the articles of faith in the Creed,
that is, with credal tenets. Thus what appeared to
be an equation in the first passage ("those truths
in which the truth of God concretely meets us" (equals)...
"the articles of faith")is now quite definitely an
equation.
In addition, the dogmatic process of thought is
described in terms of these "articles of faith".
That is, talcing these articles of faith as its "raw
material", that is, as "givens", dogmatics seeks "to
unfold and display" these beliefs "...to make plain
11 u
their interconnections and context."
how one inigi-t ask, is this simply a spurious
methodological account? One finds very little talk
of this in the prolegomena of the Church no,;-;:atics.
1. Credo, p.2. (emphasis added).
2 . C v-e Jo





In reply to this question, one would point out that
here we have almost a complete reduplication of the
method Earth has found with such favor, in his study
of Anselm. For here too, it was a matter of talcing
elements from 'the Credo1, that is, taking •articles
of faith' and examining them in a way as to show forth
their "inner consistency". This was at the heart of
t ie dogmatic method in Earth's Anaelm.
Now we can return to the Prolegomena of the
Churcn jo:;,.:atics and understand the passage in Earth's
summing up of his work where, as we have previously
noted, he speaks of:
"tenets, in the understanding and elucidation
of which the dogmatic unfolding and presentat¬
ion of the cor#ent of the Word of God must be
carried out." 4C-
We have previously noted two things about this passage
in particular, and Berth's Prolegomena in general
(C.u.I/1 and 1/2): (1) Earth does not identify the
source of these tenets (to which he refers in this
passage) which form the basis of his theologizing; and
(2) Barth has also said little or nothing of the place
and significance of credal tenets during the course
of his account of his methodology in the Prolegomena.
Thus, in trying to understand the importance and
significance of credal tenets, or the tenets of credal
1. Bee above, pp.236ff.
2. C.I).1/2. p.876.
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tradition, we have had to leave Earth's Prolegomena
to the Church Dogmatics behind, and have gone to
Earth's statements in Credo, with additional refer¬
ence to his study on Anselm,
In seeing the central importance and signifi¬
cance of credal tenets for Earth's actual method, we
have also seen that the "actualities" or "realities"
or "truths" of revelation" in their form, as human
word3, are actually, in a significantly large number
of instances, tenets of credal tradition. As these
"actualities" in the form of tenets of belief are
used in the form of basic presuppositions in Earth's
thought, and are subsequently built upon, they are
an aspect of method which is of paramount importance
for .;arth' s tneolo
1. Again, we might repeat, that we aro not holdingthat all of the "actualities" or "truths of
revelation" Barth builds upon come from the creeds,but rather, that a significantly large number of
them do.
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U..lUI....IwG SUBDloOIOn TO TRADITION.
In this interim suraaary, we shall now try to
bring together our research into the relation to
tradition in Berth's actual method in his Dogmatics,
.and in so doing also review aspects of his method¬
ological work on Angela relevant to this research#
4/pc
first we shall review briefly the/relation to tradit¬
ion in Barth's Anselm, especially in reference to
the "actualities" in Barth's Dogmatics# We shall
then list our points concerning Barth's relation to
tradition, and consequently review our research
point by point, drawing what conclusions seem approp¬
riate.
In this aspect of Barth's working method with
which we have been/here in Chapter II (i.e# Tradition),
we find a strong parallel with the method which he
"found" in Anselm, and looked upon with so much favor.
What we refer to specifically, is that in Barth's inter¬
pretation of Anselm, the latter "began with", that is,
used as his "point of departure", elements of thought,
or A B 0 D's, taken from "the Credo" of the Church.
On closer examination of Barth's interpretation we
found that these A B C D's, these presuppositions
allegedly used by Anselm as the basis of his thought,
were in Barth's interpretation, in fact "tenets of
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belieftauten from tradition, t at is the credal
tradition and dognas of the marly Church."'" ...one
of these A 13 C D's in fact cane directly from
.cripture. Scripture was only relevant as "so; .e-
thing not to be in contradiction with" as one
roceeded."
When one turns to Berth's Dogmatics, one finds
a parallel to these A 30 D's in the alleged "actual¬
ities" or "truths of revelation". The arallel one
finds wit n berth's .basela is that in the Church
Dogmatics these alleged "actualities" have essentially
the same place and essentially the sane nature as in
Barth's methodological study on /inselm.
Tney have the sane nature: While we are not
claim!..g that all of the (alleged) "truths of revelat¬
ion" have their source in credal tradition, yet we
have found that a significantly large number of then
do have their source in the credal tradition and
dogmas of the barly Church. Oven when many of these
beliefs have some "rootage" or basis in Gcripture, it
is in the form given to these beliefs by tradition
that Carta uses them. They have the sane place in
his thought: As we have pointed out, these "actualit¬
ies" form the "beginning point" of Barth's thought.
They are that from, which Barth proceeds, that upon
1, wee above, pp,261ff; especially pp.26*5ff.
2. bee above, pp.261ff.
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which he builds. It should not be totally unexpected
then if Barth's attitude toward these alleged "actual¬
ities" is much the same as his attitude toward the
A B G D's in his Anselra study. (In the following we
shall be referring specifically to those "actualities"
which have their source in the creeds and dogma of
the barly Church).
We lay out the following as a sua ary of the
points concerning the relation to tradition in Barth's
Dogmatics, here seen in connection with his views as
they occur in his book on Anselm#
1. The tenets of the credal tradition of
the carl,y Church are assented to in an
unq asstioni; r: . aimer •
la. The question as to their truth is not
raised subsequently. The question as
to historical truth occupies no signific-
ant place.
lb. The ere ds of the uarly Church are
assented to as a whole, that is, in toto.
The whole extent of credal tradition of
the Barly Church is assented to in this
manner.
2. They are not only assented to but assertedj
and asserted in a dogmatic manner. These
credal beliefs thus have the character of
dogmatic assertions in this theology.
3. They are taken and used as presuppositions
upon which Barth builds his thought (not
alone upon these assertions, but signif¬
icantly and centrally upon these assert¬
ions.
4. The beliefs of these Early Church. creeds
are asserted in toto as necessary belief's
for both Ghurch and Theology, and thus
are seen as unconditionally binding upon
both Church and Theology.
5. Conclusion: As a consequence of these
factors, (1) - (4), we find that
unthinking submission to credal tradition
is an integral aspect of Earth's working
method. It is an aspect to be found at
the very basis of his theology, at the
very point that he "begins" his
theological process, that is at his
methodological 'poi-nt of departure•'
As such, this aspect: unthinking sub¬
mission to tradition, is of central
importance for understanding Karl Earth's
theological method*
Bow we shall consider each point separately,
summarizing our research.
1. If we find in Earth's Anselm that the whole
extent of "the Credo" is to be assented to, and
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assented to in an unquestioning manner, that is, in
a manner in which the question of truth about either
the whole of "the Gredo" or its particulars shall
not be raised antecedent to ascent, or subsequent!;,-,
we have found essentially the same actual method
followed in Garth's dogmatics.
To review: In Garth's Anselm we have found
the method he describes to consist of taking tenets
from 'the Credo' or credal and dogmatic tradition of
the early Church and using these without raising
the question as to their truth either prior to their
U3e or subsequently. They are assumed in an
unquestioning manner and used in an unquestioning
manner. The process of thought in which several
A 3 C D's are used vis-a-vis an X, does not raise
the question of truth of this X in itself, but seeks,
essentially, only to show the inner-consistency
between the A B C D's and the X, that is, it seeks
to understand the X vis-a-vis the A B C .D's.
In addition Berth speaks of an assent to 'the
Credo' as a whole, as a necessary prerequisite for
theology. It is not an assent to certain beliefs
in particular, but an assent to the totality of 'the
Credo'. Thus, Barth says that "A science of faith
which denied or_even questioned the Faith - the Credo
of the Church - would ipso facto cease to be feither
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'faithful' or 'scientific'."'*' Barth also says that
"Any theologizing upon the acceptance of the Credo
in faith can he nothing more than a description of
taat acceptance, that is, of the Credo accepted. It
2
cannot he...a basis of our acceptance of the Credo ."
This quite clearly indicates that theologizing does
not raise questions of truth concerning individual
beliefs, or give reasons for its acceptance of certain
beliefs vis-a-vis the question of truth,
we might point out again that in examining
Anselm's thought vis-a-vis Berth's quite unusual
interpretation of Anselm we found Berth's interpret¬
ation concerning these matters untenable and essent¬
ially wrong. That is, even if Anselm may have
accepted most or all of the beliefs in "the Credo",
(and even this is open to question) there is substant¬
ial evidence that he did wish to raise the question
of truth concerning these beliefs subsequently, and
raise it vis-a-vis presuppositions, not all of which
5
were taken 'from the Credo*, as Barth assumes."
Thus, this view of Barth*s can be attributed
to iinselm, in our view, and in the view of most inter¬
preters of Anselm, only by misinterpreting Ansela at
«I»> p#27. (emphasis added and parentheses
around "the Credo of the Church" were removed for
emphasis),
.1., p,28,
3, Bee above, pp.236ff; especially pp,238-242.
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several key points (points we have studied in Part II)
What we have here then is most probably Berth*s own
view of theological method.
To review our research into Barth* s own
theological procedure with reference to point (1):
we have found unquestioning assent to the beliefs of
the creeds of the arly Church, we have found an
absence of any significant questioning both prior
to .tilis assent, and subsequent to tais assent.1 We
have found that this applies to essentially the total
extent of the two main creeds in question, the
"Apostles' Creed" and the bicaean-Jonstantinoplian
Creed. (That is, one finds, for example, questioning
as to t e roper exposition of these beliefs, but not
questioning concerning the truth of the belief itself)
2. and 5.: We shall consider points (2) and
(5) together: (2) The beliefs of the Carly Church
ere ds are not only assented to unquestioningly, but
asserted dogmatically; (3) they are taken and used
as presuppositions upon Which Barth builds his thought
Thus we have typically found crodal beliefs
simply declared as "truths". There are typically
no problems {articulated and dealt with prior to the
assertion of their truth, nor subsequent to the assert
ion of their truth. That is, they aro not only
1. What we mean by "significant questioning" is
questioning that could actually have a bearing
on whether or not to accept the belief; or upon
two certainty with which the belief is held.
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assented to in an unquestioning manner, but also
asserted, and thus, dogmatically asserted.
Thus in our study of Barth's treatment of
"the Virgin Birth" we have found that, while Barth
states at the outset that "our concern must simply
be with the truth",1 what he means is not t at lie
will be concerned with the question as to whether
this belief is true, but rather that his concern will
be with tnis belief considered as true. Thus we have
found that no questions concerning the truth of this
belief are dealt with prior to its assertion as a
truth, nor subsequently ( aor; .atics in Outline, ; ,95ff).
Barth simply begins by asserting the belief to be true.
Subsequently he builds his theological construction
upon this presupposed truth (relating this belief to
other beliefs, likewise declared as truths, and asking
essentially one question: What does this belief mean,
when seen in the context of other beliefs?).
he have found essentially the sa e methodolog¬
ical procedure in regard to the belief in "the Becond
Joining." In fact the same methodological procedure
is applied to essentially the complete extent of the
beliefs of the Apostles' Jreed (O.f. Jredo and Dogmatics
in Outline). To summarize: trie beliefs are dogmatic¬
ally asserted, and subsequently used in the form of
1. Dogmatics in Outline, p.95*
w
presuppositions, upon which Barth builds his theology.
h. Are these creeds then, for Barth, binding
upon Church and Theology? In Credo Barth sees
obedience to the central texts of Church tradition
as a binding obligation: The Commandment, Honor your
Father and mother is se n as a commandment which
applies to the decisions of the "elders" of the church*
"Honor" is changed to "obey" in Berth's exposition.
And this obedience to (the main lines of) tradition
is seen as "an ordinance" ("eine Ordnung")* In
short, obedience is seen as binding and necessary#
Vie have found that in Berth's treatment of the
"Apostles' Creed even just at the point where one
might expect a Twentieth Century theologian to relax
this type of binding obligation toward the creed,
namely over the belief in the Virgin Birth, even
here, this belief "must" be believed.^ The belief
in a "Cecond Coming" at the end of History is treated
in essentially the same manners as necessary and
binding.
As to the other major Early Church creed of
high importance to Berth's theology, the Licaoan
Creed, Barth states that its formulations (after
their neglect in nineteenth Century Liberalism) "must
1. Credo. -j.T., p.181; German text, p.156; see above,
PP*295ff; especially p.JOlf.
2. Dogmatics in Outline, p.95.
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bo restored to an unconditional validity" ("unbe&ingt
geltend geaacht warden muss").1
Even if Barth shall not tow such a "hard line"
when talking of Confessions in general, in the
2
2 rolegoaena to his Jaurch Jopaatics, yet when it
comes down to specific creeds, that is, the Early
Church creeds in particular, specifically, the
Uicaean Creed and the "Apostles' Creed", Barth act¬
ually cioen this hard lines These creeds, in
their total extent, are binding upon the Church and
its Tneology.
5. Conclusion: Unthinking submission to
credal tradition. As the beliefs of these marly
Church creeds are assented to without the question
as to the truth of their beliefs being dealt with
prior to their assent, nor subsequently in any
significant manner (point 1), and as these beliefs
have the nature of dogmatic assertions in his
theological framework (point 2), tnat is, dogmatic
assertions which form presuppositions upon which he
builds his theology (point 5), and as the beliefs of
these creeds must be believed in the Church and in
its Theology (point 4), this leads us to the conclus¬
ion that the relation to Tradition, specifically
credal Tradition, in this theology is characterized
1. G.D.I/1. p.484; K.J.I/1, p.445.
2. C.f. 0.1). 1/2, pp,647ff.
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"by unthinking submission. One :;uot believe these
things without t linking, that is, without question¬
ing their truth# Any thinking done is done on the
presupposition of their truth.
If one should object to our assessment and say
"ye3, but", such of what is asserted in creeds (1)
either has some rootage in scripture or (2) comes
directly from scripture, and therefore by going to
scripture Barth escapes an unthinking; submission to
tradition, we would say "no", he does not, in our
view, escape unthinking submission. For scripture
only becomes revelation, becomes "the Worn of God"in
an Event ("fireigniss") in nan's personal present.
In a chapter which follows we shall look into the
nature of man's relation to "the Word of God" in
this theology. there we shall find that when
Scripture becomes "the Word of God" in this alleged
Event, (1) it is only in such an Event that
Jcripture becomes "the v'ord of God^' and owl.. fanus
does it :.ave the nature of autnor itat ive revelat ion.
(2) Yet this alleged Event is an experience of man.
specifically it is an event in which man experiences
a divine validation of certain human words of script¬
ure. now, as this is an experience which is alleged
to have a divine cause, one might wish to have some
1. Gee below,pp.405-414.
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detachment in which to arrive at a critical judgement,
(1) about this alleged experience, and (2) about what
is allegedly validated in such an experience. Yet
both of these things are methodologically inad- issible
in Barth's theological frauework. One may not stand
back from this experience and try to use his own
in,:.e,ondor.t critical judgement concerninj-; (1) whether
such an. event has occurred and (2) concerning what
has allegedly bee..: validated in such an event. To
do so would introduce "foreign" criteria into dogmat¬
ics, criteria which ar- not identical with "the Word
of God". As a consequence, there can only bo
unthinking submission to is experienced as "the
./ord of hod". Klasc tunia, in his work, . harl ..Earth's
doctrine of ol.r ncrioture1 concurs: "..hen this
divine act of revelation occurs i.e. this ..vent ,
God Almighty sneaks to us, and his authority is fact¬
ual in spite of the defective medium i.e. the human¬
ity and fallibility of scripture . The final
authority of lis speaking is there, and we can only
~ -i
submit." It is unthinking submission, for nan is
denied any criteria independent of this "Word of God"
with which to arrive at considered judgements about
' h h " .; *<
such an alleged experience.-'
1. herckians, Grand fapids, 1962.
2. Ibid *, p.l/k,;.
9. e shall go into this subject in greater depth
below, pp.405-414.
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Our point is this: unthinking submission to
(credal) tradition is accompanied by unthinking sub¬
mission to what is experienced as revelation through
Scripture# ihus, if one should say that Barth goes
(from the creed) to Scripture with the question of
truth, this in our view, is not accurate. It would
be more accurate to say that barth goes to his exper¬
ience of "tlx- ,.ord of Godi' v/hich .ay or ay not,
depending on God's action, occur, lie must, accord¬
ing to methodological principles submit unthinkingly
to what aile, ;adly becomes revelation in tuis exper¬
ience (i.e. this ..vent in which tue fallible words
of Scripture allegedly become infallible revelation)#^
Thus unthinking submission to -fradition is accompanied
by unthinking submission to man's experience of "the
Word of God" us God allegedly "speaks"' to him in an
hvent, through the words of scripture.
At the root of the problem here is this: the
source and the criterion of Dogmatics coincide; they
are identical. "The Word of God", as witnes el to
by Scripture is both criterion (the sole criterion)
for dogmatics and source (the sole source) for dog¬
matics. fhus tilere can be no criteria about this
criterion-source# ilor can there be any criteria
about (1) man's experience of the alleged .vent in
which Scripture becomes this criterion-source, or
1. dunia, op.cit., pp.l?5ff#
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(2) the noetic content of such, an experience, i.e.
the content of what is alleged to be "the Word of God"
in this experience.
If we have seen that there is unthinking sub¬
mission both in reference to credal tradition, and
in reference to (what is alleged to be) "the Word of
God", perhaps this is not simply a coincidence. In
a section which follows, we shall ask whether credal
tradition is in fact a fourth form of "the Word of
1
God" in Garth's theological fraraework. (That is,
does Barth operate upon the assumption that credal
tradition is, like Scripture, a form of "the Word of
God"? We shall find evidence that this is so.
And further, that unlike Scripture, which must bocome
"the Word of God" before it is infallible in its
articulation of revelation, we shall find evidence
that Barth assumes, that is, operates upon the assumpt¬
ion, that credal Tradition is "the Word of God", and is
infallible In its articulation of revelation, even
apart from any divine Bvent. If these things are so,
that is, if Barth operates upon these assumptions,
then it is easier to understand why there is unthink¬
ing submission to credal tradition in Barth's theolog¬
ical framework.
Finally, we have said that unthinking submission
(to Tradition and tc what is alleged to be "the Word of
od") is an integral aspect of Barth's method. We
1. Bee below, pp.363-576.
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have said this for the reason that it is involved at
the very point where Barth 'begins' his theologizing*.
that is, at his methodological point of departure.
This of course does not mean that it is involved only
at to beginning of his theology,(the first volume
of his Jhurch Qogmatics,^ but rather that it underlies
his whole theological enterprise, as it proceeds,
volume by volume, Thus it does not occur at some
point distantly removed from his "point of departure",
where it could perhaps be seen as superfluous or
irrelevant to his enterprise as a whole. Rather it
is involved at the very root of his theology, specif¬
ically at the very point at which Barth assimilates
what will become "presuppositions" or "premises" upon
which his theological edifice is constructed. Thus
it cannot be seen as a superfluous aspect of his method,
but rather as integral to that method.
V/e have now drawn out our first conclusion from
the several points we have summarized concerning Barth's
relation to Tradition: The relation to $credal> Trad¬
ition in Earth's theology is characterized by unthink¬
ing submission. In what follows, we shall go on to
examine other aspects of Barth's relation to Tradition,
and from these aspects, together with the ones summar¬
ized here, draw out a second conclusion.
Section H,
T.;. 1 L 1 OLXTY OF ORSDAL -.n.Jiil. ..
Wow that we have summarized, several points
about the relation to Tradition in Earth's theology,
we may go on to lay out a further point. The net
result of what we have been describing in this section
on "the relation to Tradition" is a process of thought
which considers creeds, that is, the Creeds of the
marly Church, as infallible. They are infallible
articulation, of revelation. How do we come to this
view?
In the methodological chapter of Credo, Earth
speaks of revelation as "the truth, which is identical
with God Himself, and which the believer has heard
and received in the form of definite truths, in the
form of articles of faith. ...oven the disclosure of
this truth is a free gift that positively comes to
meet the believing man. It is God's own revelation,
As we have previously pointed out, north goes
on to describe the task of his dogmatic enterprise as
one which "unfolds and displays those truths in which
the truth of God concretely meets us. It articulates
again the articles of faith...(in order to) make them
plain in their interconnections and context... dogmatics
is the act of the Credo determined by the scientific
1. Credo, p.2. (becond emphasis is adi.edj.
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method appropriate to it - credo, ut intelligaia.
We have seen what this phrase "credo, at
intelligam" has meant for Berth, in his interpretation
of Anselm, In essence, beliefs of 'the Credo',(or
here the creed) are ascented to in an unquestioning
manner, never to be questioned as to their truth again,
Cubsequently, in the process of thought, one belief
is examined with reference to several other beliefs,
not examined for its truth, but, essentially, for its
content, and for the manner in which it can be related
to other beliefs,
Ifj in Berth's Anselm, the content of 'the Credo'
is assented to in an unquestioning manner, never again
to be questioned as to its truth, we have found the
same in our study of Berth's treatment of selected
beliefs within his dogmatics. Our final conclusion
was that this relation to tradition required unquest¬
ioning submission to tradition, specifically, the
credal tradition of the harly Church,
We have also seen that the creed is, in north's
view an articulation of the revelation of God, an
articulation "in the form of definite truths, in the
form of articles of faith," And further that these
"definite truths" from the creed form a basal and
central element in the dogmatic process. i'or the
work of Dogmatics can be described as taking these
1. Credo, p.3.
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"definite truths" and "making them plain in their inter¬
connections and context".
an articulation of the revelation of the deity;
and (2) which articulate truths which form material
upon which dogmatics builds. Additionally, we find
(1) an unquestioning and unproblematic assent to the
credal beliefs of the Barly Church together with (2) a
dogmatic assertion of the same. We also find (3)
Earth's view that these creeds are binding upon all in
the Church. for these reasons, and for the additional
reason that, in practice, we cannot discover a place
where Barth finds fault with these harly Church creeds,
it would appear that in this process of thought the
creeds of the ^arly Church are regarded as infallible,
and as infallible articulation of revelation.
rrr* *-*•■*-*•*
*******************
The Cultural (Conditioned-ness of Creeds tendered
Insignificant.
One question naturally arises: How does Barth
deal with the question of cultural conditioned-ness
of Tradition, that is credal tradition. Does he simply
Ignore the question? The answer is"nof Yet he deals
with the question in a manner which intends to render
it irrelevant and insignificant♦ In the relatively
brief section devoted to "Confessions" near the end
of Earth's lengthy Prolegomena,"1" he admits and acknow-
1• C.D.I/2, p.&20ff.
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ledges the fact that the makers of creeds suffered
limitation, due to their cultural setting.'*' Earth
goes on at length about this limitation, that is,
about the fact that the creedmakers were conditioned
to some extent by the cultural-political-social
context in which they worked out creeds.
The key word in Earth's exposition here is
"limitation" that is limitation in the sense of part¬
ial determination. lor suddenly, in the midst of
this exposition, Earth makes a transition and talks
another limitation upon the creed..alters: the limit-
P
ation of the deity.The creediaakers (allegedly)
experienced limitation from this source as they sat
in their cultural context. It is this limitation
which counts for Earth. lor this (alleged) limitat¬
ion by the deity involved a determination of their
thought. That is, the limitation of the deity took
the form of a determination imposed upon their thoughct.
The effect of this transition from cultural
determination to divine determination (that is
proceeding to this additional factor) is to render any
cultural determination insignifleant and essentially
irrelevant. The import thus appears to be: even if
man was limited by his cultural context, the limitation




doctrine resulted, non-the-less. We can, as a con¬
sequence, ignore the question of cultural conditioned-
ness.
One sees here a theme common in Barth's
theologizing: "man's confusion" yet "God's providence".
If one looks further, one finds that Barth's whole
exposition concerning the limitation of the deity
embodies a specifically Barthian theory, and one that
rests upon a dogmatic assumption. That is, it rests
on Barth's theory of theological knowledge, in which
man experiences a determination ox his thought, flat
is, as man encounters what is allegedly "Word" and is
passive in the face of this, the theory is that his
thought undergoes a control and determination, and
this means a limitation, in which man is limited and
determined by the deity in his revelation.
That the deity goes about determining people's
thought in this manner is a Barthian theory of divine
activity. It is also a theory which Barth character¬
istically refuses to substantiate. It thus takes
1
the form of a dogmatic assertion.
What we wish to note here is that it is specif¬
ically a Barthian theory which allows Barth to disreg¬
ard any concrete questions of cultural limitation and
determination upon the creedmakers and their creeds.
The alleged limitation and determination of their
1. We have gone into this aspect of Barth's thought
in a chapter which follows. See below, pp.405ff;
especially p.GlOf.
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thought by the deity renders this question in effect
insignificant and irrelevant. If any cultural fact¬
ors have affected the work of the creedmakers, the
action of the deity in imposing his determination
upon their thought processes has (allegedly) assured
"right doctrine". Barth still has "infallible"
creeds, but only by reason of his dogmatically asserted
theory of theological knowledge.
Let us return to our main theme, the "infalli¬
bility of credal tradition", and now look at a con¬
sequence of this view. If the credal tradition of
the Early Church forms an infallible articulation of
revelation in Earth's thought, and this infallible
articulation has a central place in Earth's dogmatic
process^this means, among other things, that extra-
scriptural material is given the status of "infallible
doctrine". lor as Barth, is the first to acknowledge,
the creeds of the Early Church embody beliefs which
are not found in ,cripturef
Thus for example, the eternallty of the Con,
a belief we have mentioned previously, is a belief
which Barth himself says "is not to be found in the
Biblical texts." It is to be found in the creed
adopted at the Council of Nicaea, and is definitely
implicit in the form given this creed in Constantinople
2
in 381 A.I). How if one were to say this belief is
1. C.c.J/1, P.475.
2. Early Christianity, Documents edited by loland K.
Sainton, Ilostrand, Hew York, I960, pp.165-166•
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aii inter rotation of Scripture, as Earth does, it
would seem equally true that it is an addition to
Scripture. For even Barth will acknowledge that
the belief "is not to be found in the Biblical texts."
What this means is that extra-scriptural mater¬
ial, this belief and many others like it embodied in
the creeds of the Early Church have been given the
status of infallible articulation of revelation.
They are (1) assented to without question, (2) not
questioned subsequently, (3) asserted dogmatically
as normative, as what "must" be believed in the Church,
and (4) built upon in his dogmatic process. While
one is not saying that there are no exceptions to
what we have laid out, which there may be, this would
appear to be 'the rule'I
One say then point out one significant differ¬
ence between credal tradition and Scripture in Berth's
thought. Scripture may in fact make mistakes;
Creeds do not. While Creeds, the creeds of the Early
Church are infallible in this theology, Scripture is
not infallible. Barth then can take the view that
there was no Garden of Eden, but he cannot, or will
not take the view that there was no Virgin Birth.
Creeds are binding upon him in a way that Scripture
1
is not. One may note in this connection that
1, Whether Barth says creeds are fallible or infallible
is not the point of our inquiry. Our question has
been to ask how are they actually regarded in uses
Are they regarded in practice, that is, as his
CO: ltd • . »
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Barth's theory of ocrituro as human words which
become the Word of God in the present through, an
invent in which tie Holy Spirit is active, allows him
a certain freedom in regard to Scripture, a freedom
which, one nay note, is not allowed with regard to
sarly Church Creeds. Shis freedom, a freedom from
being bound to a 'literal* interpretation of scripture,
and having also the freedom to ignore parts of
Scripture most robably is due to Barth's theory of
Scripture as that which authoritatively becomes the
Word of God for man In man's own present. for not
all of Scripture can become the Word of God at any one
tine, but rather, this portion, and perhaps later that
portion. There is no guarantee that all portions of
Scripture will become the Word of God. Thus there is
freedom to ignore portions of Scripture. Yet in
contrast the Church must stand by and uphold the
complete extent of the beliefs embodied in the Early
Church Creeds. One is nob free to ignore (or radic¬
ally reinterpret) "the Virgin Birth" or "the Second
Coming."
actual method operates, as infallible? Our answer
has been : Yes. As we have already mentioned Barth
speaks of the limitation and fallibility of the
crecdraakers, yet he goes on to speak of a factor
which renders these affairs insignifleant: the alleged
limiting and determining activity of the deity.
Thus what statements Barth may make about the
(theoretical) fallibility of creeds, should be seen
in this context.
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We would conclude fro® the factors we have
cited that even if Barth will not coxae out and say so,
he does in fact hold the position and operates upon
the assumption that the Creeds of the early Church
are infallible. In this, they differ from Scripture
which is not infallible.
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Section I,
jhUhlCIGN iw REVELATION; 0:1 -DiiL IRAJITIOH
. . - UPORT . g .. Og TH . J OF OOP.
Now we might go one step further. If Early
Church creeds are infallible, then arc they an
infallible articulation and formulation of revelation?
If so do they not then effectively become a fourth
form of the Word of God in Earth*s theological prog¬
ramme, alongside the Word Revealed, the Word Written
(Scripture) and the Word Preached? If these-things
are so, what is the effective authority of the credal
tradition of the Early Church, over against the author¬
ity of Scripture? These are the questions we shall
explore in this chapter.
For our investigation of these questions, let
us go firstly to the "methodological chapter" of Credo
(1935). Here Barth speaks of revelation, and speaks
of it as
...the truth, which is identical with God
Himself, and which the believer has heard
and received in the form of definite truths,
in the form of articles of faith...Even the
disclosure of this truth is a free gift that
positively comes to meet the believing man,
It is God's own revelation,1
If one asks the questions what is another name for
this revelation, which the believer "has heard, and
received in the form of definite truths", and which
1. Credo, p.2.
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"comes to meet believing man", it would appear to be:
"the Word of God". let we are acquainted up until
now with only three forms of "the Word of God"; 'the
Word Revealed, the Word Written (Scripture) and the
Word Breached. But, by both the context and the word¬
ing of this passage, it is fairly clear that Barth is
not referring to Scripture or preaching here, as the
form in which revelation is mediated to believing ran.
Rather, it is the creed to which he is referring.
The subject at hand in the context surrounding this
passage is the creed. how one may ask: in what form
has the believer received the revelation of God? He
has received it "in the form of definite truths, in
1
the form of articles of faith." And where does one
find these articles of faith? The answer is obvious:
in the creed.
Thus the believer receives "revelation" "in
the form of articles of faith". Here, then, it
would appear that Barth has implicitly acknowledged
that there is a fourth form of "the iord of God"in his
theological scheme: the creed. Is there other evid¬
ence which might support this, namely the view that
Earth's theology operates upon the assumption that
"the creed", or more specifically the credal tradition
of the Early Church is a fourth form of the Word of
God. At this point we might refer back to v/here we
examined the "givens", or "actualities" i.e. "actual¬
ities of revelation" upon which Barth bases his
l.(i?roin the passage we have just quoted) Credo, p.2.
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theological construction. What we found was that
a surprising majority of these alleged "actualities
of revelation" were in fact ci'edal beliefs or Barly
Church dogmas which articulated credal beliefs. Thus
the form which revelation or the Word of God took at
this primal and basal level in Barth's theologizing
was that of credal beliefs (and ;Sarly Church dogmas
formulated in close connection with credal beliefs):
Trinity * eternality of the Son, etc.( see above, psx? ft; •
Ixi short, if Garth wished to base his theology
on (what v/as allegedly) "the lord of God "(a. id one sees
no reason to doubt this repeatedly stated wish)we have
found taut the form revelation or"t e ord of God"took
was, in a significant number of cases, credal beliefs,
we might also go to Barth's book on Anselm in this
connection. In Barth's interpretation of Anselm,
we find that Anselm's most central presupposition,
that is, the chief among his A B C D's must be regarded
as "the word of God" in order for the "argument" to have
force. as we have pointed out in Part II, Barth
speaks explicitly of the 'key phrase' of Anselm's
Proslogion as "A Word of God within the context of his
revelation, to which also belongs the revelation of
his existence"."^ The 'key phrase' is "that than
which nothing greater can be conceived";('aliquid quo
maius nihil cogitari potest'^). Yet where does this
A.P. p.131. Bee above, pp»226ff.
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phrase, which must be considered the Word of God, come
from? It comes from 'the Credo'. But what is the
content of this (Credo', in Berth's mind. We can find
no evidence that Scripture is involved in 'the Credo'
(directly at least). The form which the content of
'the Credo' takes in Barth's Anselm is that of early
■J.'rurch beliefs; creeds, and dogmas constructed in
close connection with these creeds."*" Here, then, is
a theological method in which parts of tradition,(e.g.
the key phrase, allegedly taken from 'the Credo') must
be regarded as"the Word of God. One wishes to point
out, in this connection, that Barth is most vague about
how this phrase can be seen as having its source in
'the Credo'. That is Barth merely states this to be
the case, and leaves his statement hanging, with no
support. We have found some amount of evidence which,
in fact, suggests that the source of this phrase is
•pagan' philosophy (i.e. non-ecclesiastical thought),
2
and not any such 'Credo'.
Thus in Barth's interpretation of Anselm we also
have a view of a theological method which (1) uses the
credal tradition of the marly Church as a basis ('the
Credo') and (2) in which basic elements of thought
upon which the theologian builds must necessarily be
considered "the Word cf God", while yet the source of
1. See above, pp.223ff.
2. ^ee above, pp.i34.ff.
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these basic elements is the cre&al tradition of the
Early Church#
how we might return to Earth's dogmatics proper.
What we are saying is that in Berth's actual procedure,
in his dogmatics, the "actualities of revelation" upon
which „arth bases his theologizing, are to be found in
the form of beliefs of credal tradition.; and that this
occurs in a significant number of places. This
suggests t at the form of "the Word of God"upon which
earth wished to base his theology at these points,
was not one of the first three forms of "the Word of
God", which are explicated in Earth's Prolegomena,
but a fourth form of "the Pord of God,' whose existence
is not ex licitly admitted by Earth:"the word of God"
as credal tradition.
Now we might go one step further. If credal
tradition is an articulation and formulation of revel¬
ation, as we have just found, it is also infallible
in its articulation and formulation of revelation.
This was the conclusion of our explorations in the
preceding chapter. Yet^if creeds are an infallible
articulation and formulation of the revelation of God,
then it would appear that they are an infallible form
of "the Word of Godi'
Are they treated as such in Earth's actual
procedure? One notes that the alleged "actualities
1. Of. above, pp#55^562.
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of revelation" in Berth's thought are treated as
"livens". They are not to he questioned as to their
truth prior to their use, nor subsequently. They
are not to be examined with 'the tools of reason',
nor supported by human means. Thus, for example,
the line of reasoning is not from "possibility" to
"actuality" but rather just the reverse, from "actual¬
ity" to "possibility". (That is, one presupposes the
"actuality" and from this derives its "possibility").
In snort one finds these beliefs taken from credal
tradition treated as infallible. The only real
question concerning tnese beliefs is the question as
to their content. and correct exposition.
Yet if credal tradition is used in this manner,
and there is additional evidence that Barth regards
it as infallible, this suggests rather strongly that
Barth operates unon the assumption that credal tradit¬
ion is "the word of God." That is, credal tradition
does not have to become"the Word of God"in an mvent
in man's own present, as do ocripture and Preaching,
but rather, that even apart from this went;it is the
t *
Word of God. If this is so, Barth's ^occasionalism'
or 'actualism' is absent just at this point. The
creed can be drawn upon in utter trust in its reliabil¬
ity as an articulation of the revelation of God.
One does in fact find what appears to be utter
trust in the reliability of these creeds. Nowhere
can we find Barth rejecting or even taking exception
1. Gee above, P*325.
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to the beliefs articulated in these Early Church exceeds,
(specifically, the Apostle's Creed, the Niceno-
Oonstantinoplian Oreod, and, more or less In the back¬
ground, the Chalcedonian Greed)# One is hard pressed
to find any questioning of the beliefs of these creeds
over and above a purely 'academic' exercise. In
place of real questioning of these beliefs, we find,
essential^ an unquestioning submission, of which we
have spoken above We also find these beliefs
treated as "givens", as "actualities", unproblematic-
ally built upon in Berth's theologizing#
While one notes that Barth is of the opinion
that these Early Church creeds do not contradict
Scripture, and in fact are seen as authoritative inter¬
pretation of Scripture, yet if what we are suggesting
is sb, there is a significant difference between
creeds and Scripture# Scripture in Earth's theory
becomes "the Word of God! It becomes this at points,
in the Event in man's present, in which the iioly Spirit
acts within man, validating and confirming the human
li 11
words of Scripture as the Word of God. Yet the
total extent of Scripture does not become the Word
2
of God in this Event. In contrast, it would appear
that Barth operates upon the assumption that the creed,
in its total extent is the Word of God. If this is




accepts as true from Scripture, and in contrast his
inflexibility about the question of truth vis-a-vis
©reeds.
Tee consequences of Such a "i osxtionl'
Even if we set aside the question as to whether
for earth creeds are "the Word of uodi' without having
to becone thus through God's action, it would appear
that wo still have here an infallible articulation of
revelation. That is, it would appear that Barth
operates upon the assumption that the creeds of the
Early Church are an infallible articulation of revel¬
ation*
If so this places credal tradition in contrast
with Scripture, which is not infallible. That is,
Scripture makes mistakes; creeds do not. As we have
pointed out, for Barth, there was no Garden of Aden,
yet there was a Virgin Birth.
let there is another consequence of this oper¬
ational presupposition of Earth's regarding creeds.
If creeds are an infallible articulation of revelation
this means that extra-scriptural beliefs have been
given infallible status. For if creeds are an inter¬
pretation of Gcripture they also are,at pointstan
addition to it. As we have mentioned, Barth is the
first to point out that not all the beliefs of Early
Church tradition are to be found in Scripture. The
belief in 'the eternality of the Son', for example,
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is one which Barth admits "is not to he found in the
Biblical texts."1 "She 'Trinity" is in this category as well.2
We would conclude, then, that there is a fair
amount of evidence that Tradition in these three places
(h e Apostles' Creed, the Iliceno-Gonstantinoolian Creed
and, in the background, the Jhalcedonian Creed) has
been given infallible status. And further that the
total extent of these three sources are effectively
considered infallible articulation of revelation,
thus raising extra-scriptural beliefs to the status
of infallible articulation of revelation.
We would also conclude that there is a fair
amount of evidence that credal tradition functions in
Berth's scheme as a fourth form of "the lord of GodJ
unlike . cripture, which is a human and fallible artic¬
ulation of revelation, and which at points becomes "the
ii
Word of God, it would appear that the credal tradition
of the ..arly Church is an infallible articulation of
revelation, and thus in toto, and not Just at points
is'the Word of God."
Been from this vantage point it would be diff¬
icult to say that credal tradition had less authority
than Scripture in its articulation of revelation.
Whether it actually has more authority than Scripture
in this theological framework, we would leave an open
question for the moment. In any case, the totality
1. Q.B.I/l, p.475*
2# C.p.lA p.332.
3» 6 °W# pp.373f; also,pp.360f, and p?,516f.
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of the content of these creeds is binding upon the
church in this theological programme* whereas the
totality of the content of Scripture i3 not. That
is* one is not bound to believe all the things believed
by the writers of Scripture* and thus all the beliefs
in Scripture (e.g. the belief that there was a Garden
of sden) * yet one isi bound to believe the total extent
of these creeds (including the belief in the'Virgin
Birth* and a Second Coming'at the end of history).
While Scripture is additionally a 'rule of
faith' in the sense of a limit for theology: something
not to be in contradiction with* yet so are these
creeds. In fact it is in these creeds t. at the ortho¬
doxy Garth wishes to reassert receives basic articulat¬
ion. Garth is as aware as anyone else that not all
of this orthodoxy is present in Scripture.1
This suggests that the credal tradition of the
■;arly Church has become a 'canon within the canon' for
Earth. That is, among all the beliefs one might find
1. Barth in 1935 remarks: "In tine eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries* time and time again, arose
the pos ibility of rejecting the Nlcene Creed*
orthodoxy, scholasticism, the Bathers of the
Church... and the confessions of faith - all
with a flourish of a trumpet - with a consequent
adherence to the Bible. I am thinking of
G. .. enken, J.T. Beck* Hoffiaan of rlangen* Adolf
Schlatter, all men of genius. It is a strange
thing, but this procedure, which appears to be so
consistent with scriptural principles has always
resulted in a very "modern" theology....They had
freed taemselves of the dogma of the Church* but
not of their own dogmas and their own ideas."
Credo, pp. 180-181. Quoted from Earner, pp.193-194.
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in scripture, those which are taken up into these
creeds receive •canonical' status. Thus even if one
might hold that, in the case of the Apostles' Greed,
all the "basic beliefs are to be found in Scripture,
(even if this might be so), the fact of primary
importance for Barth would appear to be this; that
these beliefs, and not others from Scripture, were
asserted by the Barly Church. Here we find a 'canon*
of beliefs in the context of Scriptural beliefs.
If one goes on to the fiicene Greed it becomes
increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to main¬
tain that all the beliefs here are actually to be
found in Scripture. If many of these beliefs are
interpretation of Scripture, they are also additions
to Scripture, As Barth finds exalted significance
in this creed in particular, i.e. the JSicene, espec¬
ially in its Christological and Pneumatological beliefs,
here extra-scriptural beliefs become part of Earth's
'canon of beliefs'. With reference to the beliefs
of Scripture these credal beliefs form a 'canon within
(and outwith) the canon'. One adds 'outwitb the
canon' (of Scriptural beliefs) for the x'eason we have
just referred to: not all of the beliefs of these
creeds can actually be found in Scripture.
If credal tradition was effectively considered
an infallible articulation and formulation of revelat¬
ion, and in fact functioned as a fourth form of"the
Word of God*in this theological programme, and if
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Barfch operated upon both of these assumptions, it is
not difficult to see why this should have happened so
covertly in this theology, and why Bartfa might have
avoided self awareness concerning these things. For
to give any part of tradition infallible status,
especially the status of infallible articulation of
revelation, has typically bean abhorrent to Protestant¬
ism* Any notion which might bring tradition up upon
the same ground with Scripture, as, for example a rule
of faith has usually been strongly opposed within
Protestantism.
Any notion that tradition that might bring
tradition up upon the same ground with Scripture is
also in contradiction with Bartl^s own statements
about the status of tradition. In one of his respon¬
ses to questions concerning tradition following his
lectures which make up his Credo (1935) he states:
..•The Reformation Scripture-principle
placed the Church permanently under the
authority of the prophetic-apostolic
Bible-Word; and it did that in the opinion
that in this human distinction between the
Church and Holy Scripture as teacher of the
Church, there is expressed the abiding lasting
difference between the Lord of the Church,
and the Church as the assembly of believers.
This barrier between Scripture and Church
which points like a sign to the barrier
between the Church and its Lord, has, in
Roman. Catholicism been overstepped.
Tradition is not revelation.1
1. Credo, p.180.
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If we are correct, or nearly correct in our
main point in thir> chapter, namely that Barth operates
upon the assumption that the credal tradition of the
i_,arly Church is a fourth form of the Word of God^ and
is regarded in fact as an infallible articulation of
x'ovelation, then it is regarded, in effect, as revel¬
ation# We find it somewhat ironic that Barth has put
ilis vfov/s concerning tradition so clearly just at this
point, i.e. Credo (1935)» in a work where his operat¬
ional assumptions would appear to be in utter contra¬
diction with these stated views.
.Further we find more than a little evidence
that Earth's theology operates upon assumptions about
credal tradition which give credal tradition, in
many respects, roughly equal status with Scripture.
As far as its authority, there is at least one respect
in which credal tradition would seem to have an
authority of a higher sort than Scripture. For
there are extra-scriptural beliefs in creeds which
must be believed (since the creed in toto is binding
upon the Church), while there are beliefs in Scripture
which are not binding upon the Church. It would
appear that Earth's theory of "the Word of God" gives
him a certain liberty in his approach to Scripture.
5?hat liberty is not present in his approach to these
Creeds.
It would be at least historically understandable
if Barth were forced into this covert position by
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fighting against a liberalism which exercised its
liberty in ignoring the beliefs embodied in these
creeds# As to whether this was a good thing, even
good for the very things he wished to preserve and
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How at the end of our study of the relation
to tradition in Berth's theology, we shall bring
together several aspects of our research, and examine
the following thesis: that there is an implicit fund¬
amentalism at the very "basis of Earth's theology, a
fundamentalism in reference to creeds rather than
scripture, and thus what could be termed "credal
fundamentalism". The term "fundamentalism" admit¬
tedly has unfavourable connotations; it is typically
seen as a pejorative term. Yet it is also a descrip¬
tive term. That is, "fundamentalism" usually involve
several factors fairly consistently. As to the term'
pejorative connotations, one wishes to acknowledge
their presence, yet one would also point out that in
the last few years this term has become one which
many would take upon themselves, perhaps with some
pride, or at least without hesitation. Thus one
sees more than a few people including church leaders,
choosing to call themselves "Ihmdamentalists", and
holding a "World Congress" under this banner. Thus
it would appear that the term has a descriptive
function, as well as both favourable and unfavourable
connotations.
If there are unfavourable connotations involved
with this term we wish to lay this factor out in the
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open. Our purpose is not simply to "fling* a term
at Barthianiem, but rather ask (1) to what extent does
this term apply?;(2) are we using the term in a fair
or an unfair manner?; and (3) in what ways might the
fundamentalism in .Berth's theology differ from other
types of fundamentalism? We would, of course, admit
that our intent is "critical" at this point, as well
as descriptive. We shall look at these questions
as we proceed. Yet our first task is to list the
results of our investigations which lead us to use
the term "fundamentalism", and specifically "credal
fu.-ida. c"talisa" with reference to .Berth's theology.
We have found (1) that creeds are infallible
in Barth's framework;^ (2) They are infallible
articulation of revelation; (2a) As infallible
articulation of revelation, there is considerable
evidence that they constitute a fourth form of"the
3
Word of God in Barth's operational framework;
(2b) They are infallible, or inerrant in their
'literal' meaning. That is, they are infallible in
their originally intended meaning. No radical
reinterpretation or demythologizing of these beliefs
can be allowed. (3) They are binding upon both Church
and Theology, Not .just certain beliefs are seen as
binding upon the Church and theology, but creeds
1. See above, pp.354—332,
2. See above, pp.363-376.
3. See ibid.
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in toto.1 (4) As such these creeds form a "canon
within the canon", that is a canon of beliefs which
must be believed. As such, therefore, they constit¬
ute a list of "fundamentals" or "fundamental beliefs"
to which Church and Theology are bound.
In short, we have here: an infallible articul¬
ation of revelation, which is inerrant both historic¬
ally and doctrinally, in its 'literal' meaning, that
is in its originally intended meaning. The beliefs
enclosed within these creeds are "fundamental beliefs"
and are binding in toto upon both Church and Theology.
If fundamentalism in its usual formSjtypically involves
(1) an inerrant text, and (2) a body of beliefs
regarded as (a) fundamental, (b) necessary, and (c)
infallible, then we have found these same elements
2
in Barth's theological programme as well."
Now we might go on to point out how the credal
fundamentalism we find in Barth's theologizing differs
from most other forms of fundamentalism. The most
obvious difference is that, in Barth's case, the
inerrant text is not Scripture but creeds, specifically
the creeds of the Barly Church. It is here that one
finds the beliefs which are fundamental, necessary and
infallible. We shall reserve comment on this aspect
of Barth's theology until the conclusion of our thesis.
1. Bee above, pp.5y+7ff»
2. for jfl sea #1 and fj-2 above, p,3?$ ; for if2a see ,/4
above, p. ll<\ ; for y2b, see #3 and above, p.37Sf;
for y2c, see yl and y2 above, p.3"?£.
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Another significant difference between Berth's
type of fundamentalism and many other types of fund¬
amentalism is Earth's disavowal of any attempt to
substantiate these beliefs from outside texts of
authority (i.e. scripture). Thus, for example, in
a form of fundamentalism which involves a belief in
the inerrancy of scripture, arguments are often
a.
offered to support this belief. Arci^bological
evidence is sought, for example, in an attempt to
support tho accuracy of scripture, especially the Old
Testament. Arguments may also be offered in support
of other beliefs, arguments, for example, for the
existence of God, etc. What v/e are referring to
here are attempts to substantiate what has already
been asserted dogmatically, and what would be held
to be true, dogmatically, even if no (extra-scriptural)
substantiation could be found. Yet when we turn to
Earth's theologizing we find a definite contrast in
this respect. Thus if we are correct in maintaining
that there is a credal fundamentalism in Earth's
theology, it is one which is not accompanied by
argument in support of its claims. If beliefs are
dogmatically asserted, here, in Earth's theology,
this dogmatism is not modified by subsequent argument¬
ation in support of the truth of its assertions.
There is yet another difference between the
credal fundamentalism we find in Earth's theology and
most forms of fundamentalism. While in most forms
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of fundamentalism, a position is taken up quite
explicitly concerning the "fundamental beliefs", for
example, by issuing a declaration, listing these
fundamental beliefs, and setting out tie position
in regard to them, Barth, in contrast does not (to
our knowledge) even set forth his position concerning
the methodological importance of credal tradition.
In fact, as wo have already noted,3* what no says
concerning the "authority" of Tradition, (which
includes credal Tradition) is in contradiction with
the actual position we find him taking up concerning
the ,arly Church Creeds as he carries on his theolog¬
ical enterprise. Thus what we have been concerned
with here is a "position" taken up by a theologian,
yet not fully acknowledged, and even at tines disavowed.
In contrast, in most forms of fundamentalism, the
fundoraentalistic position will be made quite explicit,
for example, by the publication of a declaration
listing the specific beliefs deemed 'fundamental'.
If we are correct in holding that Barth's
theologizing involves this type of fundamentalism,
it is one which lies at the very basis of his thought.
For as we have seen, a significant number of the
"actualities of revelation" upon which this theology
is built are taken from credal tradition and the
dogmas which developed in close connection with credal
1. Cee above, pp.37;kff.
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tradition. For this reason one would argue that what
we have described as credal fundamentalism forms an
integral part of Berth's process of thought. For it
is involved at the initial step in this theologizing,
that is, at the point where Barth begins with the
"truths" or "actualities of revelation".
This then forms the second terminus of our
study of the relation to tradition, namely that Berth's
theology involves an implicit fundamentalism, one
that might be called credal fundamentalism.
1. Our first terminus or goal in the study of the
relation to tradition in Barth's theology was
to show taat this theology involved unquestioning
submission to credal tradition.
Chanter III.
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A. Introduction.
In the four sections which make up Chapter 3
we shall devote consideration to four different
aspects of Berth's theological programme• Although
each of these sections takes up and examines a separate
and distinct aspect of Barth's Theological programme,
asw»
the selections are arranged in a way that one theme
leads on to the next. Thus Barth's "No" to Anthro¬
pology leads to asks Why did he say "No"? Was it
A.
something to do with the nature of man's proper relat¬
ion fco revelation or "the Word of God" in t lis theo¬
logical programme. lifter answering this question
with a tentative "yes", v/e then go on in the next
section to consider in more detail, "Han's .delation
to 'the word of God'" in this theology. This relat¬
ion is of central importance for the following section,
where we look at Barth's /onception of Apologetics.
Our findings in this section, "Dogmatics as Apologetics",
are, subsequently, of central importance for our fourth
section "Theology as 'Word'." Thus, while each of
these four sections attempts to consider a separate
aspect of Barth's method, each section has a relation¬
ship to the theme of both the preceding and the following
sections.
pS4
We have grouped these aspects o.f method under
the title "Man, Revelation and Theology", since we
are concerned here with aspects of method in which
man, his relationship to what is alleged to be revelat¬




BATH'S "HQ" TO L'JKllQrQLOGY.
In looking at the problem of Barth' s relation to
philosophy, and the humanities in general, and at a
changing relationship and attitude 'over "kke crucial years
of 1928-52, one is aware of a many sided problem, and the
difficulty of doing the problem justice in the limited
space we can devote to it. That there was a basic shift
of attitude is clear. There is little argument among
scholars that in the period 1927-52 there was a great
visible shift in Berth's ideals about doing theology.
One has to say "ideals" for what actually happened in his
actual doing of theology would have to remain a separate
consideration.
One of these methodological ideals, as one can
sense from Earth's very unusual interpretation of Anselra,
is that theology should shed any substantial dependence
on, or participation in schools of philosophical thought.
More basically theology must "cleanse" itself of any
philosophical presup osltions. Most centrally, it must
shed itself of any anthropological presuppositions, and
any anthropological basis whatsoever."''
1. Robert Shoffner, in his book, Anseln Revisited, which
has cone to hand too late for us to use It in our
research, is very much of the view that the abandon¬
ment, and dismiss il of anthropology, (that 'is indep¬
endent' anthropology, one which stands 'independently'
of revelation) was at the heart of the methodological
issues at hand in Earth's study of Anselm.
of. Anselm uevisited, A ,-j;udy of the Role of the
Ontologies! .rgunent in the writings" of ilorl Earth and
Charles Hnrtsnorne. Brill, Leiden. 1974-. p^Off.
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This shift of intention in ideals about doing
theology and its significance for Barth comes out very
strongly in the preface to his renewed attempt at doing
dogmatics, Die Kirkliche dogmatlk, Volume I, Part 1,
published in 1952, that is about a year after his work
on Ansolm was published. The manner in which he ex-
pres ws himself shows a depth of determination and
indicates that in Earth's view something crucial and
basic was at stake.
...To the best of my ability I have cut out
in this second issue of the book everything
that in the first issue Chis Christliche
Oogmatijc of five years earlier! might give
the slightest appearance of giving to theology
a basis, support or even a mere justification
in the way of existential philosophy...
Because in the former undertaking I can only
see a readoption of the line
bchleierraacher-iiitschl-Hermann, and because
in any thinkable continuation of this line
I can only see the plain destruction of
Protestant theology'and the Protestant Church...
I can therefore only say No here.l.
he any note the vehemence implicit in this state¬
ment "...I can only see the plain destruction of Prot¬
estant theology and the Protestont Church..." This is
not a minor issue in Barth's mind. ce may note also
that it was not existential philosophy in particular
which he was objecting to. For "the line of
dchleieraacher—aitschl-Hermann" was not involved with
existential philosophy. Rather we see here the larger
issue of the theological use of (non-ecclesiastical)
1. 1^*1$ p#ix,x.
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philosophy, and philosophical anthropology as central*,
/Of * 3
that is, elements thought, presuppositions and construct¬
ions which have an independence from theology, and thus,
for Barth, stand independently from 'the Word1•
In the following we shall examine how philosoph¬
ical anthropology fared in all of this, for we feel this
to be not only central here, but a sound indicator of
Earth's attitude toward non-ecclesiastical philosophy
in general. he will try: (1) to indicate briefly
the change of attitude to this field of study and its
relevance for doing theology? (2) to look at the
intellectual context in which this occurred, that is,
the options that were actually open to Barth and other
Germanic thinkers, and (5) to venture a supposition
as to why Barth took the track ho did.
After Berth's first attempt at dogmatics, the
Paristliche Dogaatik of 1927, hriedricli Gogarten, in an
article reviewing the work, lifted up for examination
an implicit I-'ihou anthropology which Berth hod made use
of in his theological exposition. Barth subsequently
ceased work on his Dogmatics, and in the period that
followed was to re-think the whole of his methodological
basis for his dogmatics. It was in this period that
his study of Anselm became so important to him.
He discovered in his first attempt at dogmatics
what became in his mind a fatal flaw. In hahrnt's
words, he found*to his horror**that man, the listener,
or hearer of the word had boon "bound up in the concept
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of the Word."*" Th t is, that there was an anthropolog¬
ical element, a participation in contemporary anthropol¬
ogical efforts in his Dogmatics. That Earth, in con¬
trast with eac i of his ma^or contemporary theologians,
saw a threat here, and a threat which had to do not only
with philosophical ant}tropology in particular,but phil¬
osophy in general, can be seen frost a passage from the
first half-volume of his restart in Dogmatics which
appeared five years after his first attempt in 1927•
...I must regard the anthropology Cwhich
Gogarten fails to find in me J as harmful,
because with it I do not see how we are
to avoid the danger of handing over theology
afresh to some sort of philosophy and so
loosing the real theological theme. 2
■The use of the words "harmful", "danger" and
"loosing the real theological theme" suggest that we
have found a basic and deeply felt issue in Earth's
mind. And we may note that anthropology is here at
the centre of the issue of the relation of dogmatics
to philosophy,
The ostensible reason, then, for Earth's avoid¬
ance, even abhorrence of anthropology is that it would
swallow up theology with its own concerns, and the
more basic themes of theology would be lost, that is,
obliterated.
While the student of history can understand the
concern, given Earth's own interpretation and under-
Eakrnt. p.58ff.
2. C.D. 1/1, P.145JC.
389
standing of Nineteenth Century liberal thought, in which,
according to Barth, theology was totally transformed into
anthropology, yet one must note that Earth's reaction to
this interpreted state of affairs is quite different from
that of his rancor contemporaries.
AhT. idGi. PLCG-I GAL OPTIONS.
The second concern in these pages is to set out
some of the intellectual context and the options actually
open to Earth."*" It was not that there was an absence
of creativity in the anthropological sphere in t e 1920's,
nor a lack of alternatives to Nineteenth Century anthro¬
pologies. There was, for example, tne work of Scheler,
Husserl and HeideggerNor was it that there were no
schools ox- strands of anthropology which were hospitable
to the Judeo-ChrIstian heritage. Martin Buber's I and
Thou had appeared in 1922. There was the work of
ferdinand Ebner and Eberhard Grisebach which proved
suggestive for Gogarten and others. The neo-Kantians,
Cohen and Hosensweig, also participated in the search
x
for new ant ropological insights, Barth was acquainted
with both of the latter in the early 20's, and in fact
attended Cohen's lectures as a student in Marburg.
1. In our Introductory Chapter on the Philosophical
Landscape of Germanic Europe we have layed the
groundwork for what we describe here, bee above
pp.31ff•
2. See above, pp.31ff.
3. cf. Martin Buber's "The History of t e Dlalogical
Principle" in Between Man and Man, S.T., Macmillan,
New York, 196$, p.209ff.
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Bultraann had found insights in the earlier
Heidegger; and even if Heideger's work in itself was
not essentially hospitable to the Judeo-Christian trad¬
ition, Bui tularin found those insights suggestive and
helpful.
One cannot simply label all the above "existent¬
ialist anthropology" and think that it was all somehow
monolithic or homogeneous and denigrate the whole, as
nihilistic or a product of current cynicism. where
there was a Sartre there was also a Buber. Where there
was a Heidegger there was a Jaspers. One could make a
distinction between "social" anthropology, e.g. Buber,
Bbner, Grisebach, and,i:i contrast,what we right call
"non-social" anthropology, e.g. Sartre, Heidegger.
■That is, the former in contrast to the latter placed a
high value on interpersonal relation, and interdependent
living in the world.
Within the anthropological sphere there was also
the development of depth psychology. Again it would
be a mistake to sec this as monolithic or homogeneous,
or lacking in creative dive sity. Where there was a
Freud there was a Jung and an Adler. It would also be
a mistake to think that those who case after these three
left all their assumptions unquestioned, or for that
matter their major hypotheses. Perhaps there are
birth pangs and teething trouble in any field. There
are too many who would dismiss depth psychology by
simply citing a few obvious mistakes of Freud, or a few
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remarks felt to be obnoxious or degrading to being
hunon*
Again,within this field, one could not say that
there were no strands of thought which were hospitable
to the Juc$jo-Christian tradition. One could cite
Jung, as one of the forefathers of this field, as one
who would be quite sympathetic to the JucjSo-Ghristian
tradition. Thus one sees a v/ide diversity of options
open to the theologian in this era. One also sees
each of the other major theologians formerly of the
Zwischen den deiten group ranking use of contemporary
anthropological efforts. Bultraann with Heidegger,
Oogarten with Abner and others, Tiliich with exist¬
entialism generally, and Brunner with his own 'independ¬
ent orders of creation.1 We find none of these theo¬
logians recoiling in horror. One would be arguing
here that there were anthropological options relevant
for theology in this period. In Bultiaann, Gogarten
and others in the Zwischen den Zeiten group we see some
ox these options actually taken up and used.
One notes that Earth's attitude to contemporary
anthropology is anything but positive. For example,
in the whole of the Church Dogmatics, that is, in over
5000 pages, brimming with references to writers contemp¬
orary and long past, there are only three references
to Freud. These occur after 19^5 and in what could
be called Berth's exposition of his doctrine of Man.
What is significant is thct there are only three refer-
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enees, each of which is negative to Freud, and tare
possibly basic misunderstandings of Freud*s work#
In contrast, there is a ten page section in the
same volume devoted to the study of the views of Mary
Baker ;ddy, an American spiritualist and founder of
2 ,
'Christian Science". (The Blumhar&ts, two South German
spiritualists of the late Nineteenth Century who were
so influential on the early Barth, reappear in this
section of writing. The latter reappear, interestingly
enough, throughout the Dogmatics•)
Berth's doctrine of Creation, which is mostly
an exposition of his Doctrine of Kan was composed almost
forty years after the publication of the major port of
Freud's work (i.e. 194-5-55 vs 1910-1920). Certainly
there was enough time fox* Barth to consult secondary
sources and give consideration to such a germane thinker
of his own time and his own -Germanic context.
What is of more specific interest here is that
in the period 1930-194-5 in which Barth rethought the
foundations of his theologizing, produced his prologomena
and published half of his Church Dogmatics, anthropology,
i.e. anthropological considerations in any real sense of
the word are conspicuously absent# That is, the sub¬
jectivity of the theologian, the theological thinker
and reader receives no consideration in terms ox the
tools av liable for this in his own context.
1# K.D.. III/l, p.332, IIIA, p. 150,177.
£h!Jk» 11J/4* pp.4-14-4-22#
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One would wish to qualify this statement that
there is no real consideration of the 'I' who considers
the 'Thou* , the object of theology, but qualify it only
slightly# Certainly the subject of nan arises at
points in this period 1932-1942, tut arises not so much
for consideration as for condemnation, That is, man,
especially in the first half of C.b.II/1 is seen as
basically only a negative factor in theological know¬
ledge. lie can make basically only a negative contri¬
bution. he is a factor to be overcome by gratia. Xet
in all this, man is rarely lifted up for consideration
in himself# There is no developed anthropology, only
fragments, and these, basically negative toward man,
remain in an undeveloped state. We may note that this
period includes the first two volumes of the four
volumes of the Church Dogmatics. This is therefore
no momentary absence of anthropology. This qualifi¬
cation does not altor our basic supposition, that
Barth intended to avoid any use of, or participation
in contemporary anthropological efforts. If anything
it underlines the need for some framework on which these
semi-anthropological fragments can be related to each
other, or brought into some coherence. This is wholly
lacking in I3arth's wox-k.
why hid Barth deject Anthropolofr/?
The question could now be raised as to why
anthropological questions and the problem of subject¬
ivity are ignored, or more than that suppressed.
The stock Barthian answer was that theology was
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in danger of being; swallowed up by anthropology*
Reference was made to Nineteenth Century liberalism,
where supposedly, this happened all across the board.
The alarm was sounded. 'The ship of protestant theology
was about to founder if anthropological questions were
allowed an entry! This answer we may note was not at
all accepted in theory or in practice by other major
Germanic thinkers of this era, for they made use of
anthropological concepts and anthropological frameworks
rather continually, and affirmed their right and the
need to do so.
If we search for a deeper reason we can only
venture a supposition. It is suggested by a comment
made by John Bowden in his small biographical book on
Barth.
He somehow avoided the fact that Christian¬
ity (and Judaism before it) did not start
from a miraculous x*evelation from heaven,
bypassing all human faculties, and an exalted
book, but was worked out through human lives
and histories and insights in a process which
always has been and always will be imperfectly
carried on. 2
Only if one conveniently avoids the problem of
human subjectivity can one blithely assume that his
thoughts reproduce the thoughts of the deity and so
therefore assume an identity between the two (despite
all protests to the contrary).
1. ef.the passage cited above, p. P*3&8; wi. also p.>
2. John Bowden, Karl Barth. 3.C.M. London, p.116.
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If one temporarily avoids the problem of human
subjectivity, perhaps one can hold this view for awhile.
If one wants to keep on holding this "objectivist" view
what better way than by denigrating anthropology as
such, and, going further, attempting to banish it
altogether from the theological thought worldl
This banishment or attempted banishment occurred
in the 1928-32 transitional period*"*" When Bartfy to
his "horror" found that he was considering the listener
in and with what the listener was listening to, or in
his terms, that man was bound up in the concept of the
"word",2
But why could this have aroused such "horror"?
One would want to experiment with the supposition that
the attempt to know man's subjectivity concretely, that
is, the atbesot to have a concrete anthropology would
face one with the difficulties and the ambiguity of
knowing in the theological realm.
John Baillie's story of a man hunting with a
friend is suggestive here, The two hunters startled
a strange bird. The first said, "Oh, that's a
woodcock." His companion said, "That's not my idea
of a woodcock." "ierhaps not", was the retort, "but
its God's idea of one."^ The story, while perhaps a
1. as we have noted above, Shoffner is of this view.
See p«535, note #1.
2. Zahriit, p,$8,f.
3. The Sense of the Presence of God, Oxford,London,
19^, p.m.
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crude example of the mentality we wish to lift out for
examination is noxjf- the -less an example of the type of
omnj^sient objectivism we find in Barth. T-his negation
of the distance between the human mind and the mind of
the deity inherent as an assumption in Barthianism,
could not be so easily, nor blithely made when one has
to take into account man's subjectivity. If one can
successfully ignore this problem, and as a bonus, push
it off the field without arguing for its irx*elevance
one can more easily enter the Bartiiian frame of mind
about the ease of theological knowledge.
Rather than say that liberal thought had poor
anthropology, that is, poor insights, inadequate,
faulty or misleading views, and emphasize the search
fox" new or better insight into man Barth exexited his
energies to try to ran anthropological inquiry off the
field. Anthropology as such was seen as a threat in
Berth's theological enterprise, and viewed with grave
suspicion (as we have seen above). Other of his
contemporaries did not share this suspicion. Bultmann,
Gogarten, Brunner and i'illich each in his own way held
anthropological insights in high regard, even as indis¬
pensable to a viable, credible theology in the twentieth
Century.
Why then was Barth so opposed to it? Why the
deep suspicion? Why the attack on the discipline
itself? Why was the listener no longer listened to
(in contrast to his first attempt at Dogmatics in 1927)?
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One wondersi firstly, how anthropological insights e.g.
insights into tie nature of man's subjectivity, and
into interpersonal relationship could be regarded as
irrelevant when a writer writes his prolegomena to a
large scale work in which man's subjectivity does indeed
come into play. It was not lack of space for such
considerations. The prolegomena takes up two part
volumes. One wonders secondly why anthropological
i
insights would be seen as a threat to t e integrity
of his theological enterprise, to the extent that he
would repudiate a fellow writer for his emphasis on
1
the importance of contemporary insights into man,
Gogorton, bke w-iter in question,had drown on the
insights of an Austrian, Ferdinand libner, has Wort
und die goistigen .lealitaten - Pneumatologische
fragmente published in 1921. The letter's anthropol¬
ogy certainly could not be termed hostile to the Judeo-
2
Christian tradition.
What one wonders is why anthropology was treated
as (1) irrelevant and (2) even a threat, instead of
possibly a genuine help, in doing theology, and as a
field whe:ce the theologian could participate critically.
It is interesting to note in passing that the
Swischen den heiten group of theologians fragmented
in this period. Buitsann and Tillich had left the
1. cf. Zahrnt, p.;38,59.
2. ibid.
group in the late 20's, Gogarten was repudiated (c.1950)
and not long after, Brunner was strongly attacked (1934).
Is it pure coincidence that the fragmentation of this
group coincided with Berth's disavowal and repudiation
of anthropological efforts? (That is in a period when
these others affirmed links with other disciplines, and
"contemporary culture". In the case of Gogarten, it
is more than coincidence. In the case of fillich,
one notes the latter's objection to an "antihumanistic
attitude wnich I must regard as a denial of the Protest-
"1
ant principle" in Barthianism in the early 1930's.
In the case of Bultaann, one can see In retrospect a
strong dissonance between the two on this issue reflect¬
ed in Borth's article "Bultmann, on Attempt to Under-
p
stand Him". In the case of Brunner, one notes that
the "Hatur&l Theology" that Berth attacked with his
pamphlet "Kein" in 1934 is quite tied up with Brunner's
view of the "orders" or structures of human existence,
that is, with anthropological considerations which have
an independence from purely revelational theology.
There is friction therefore between Barth and
each of these writers, and it would appear that this
friction becomes moot heated at this point: when it is
a matter of man seeking an understanding of himself
without recourse to 'revelation'•
1. On the Boundary. Collins, London, 1967.
(first published 1936), p.41.
2. In Korygme and Myth. Vol.11, B.P.C.K., 1962.
pp.Spff.
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To return tc our main concern, what we are
suggesting in our supposition is that conscious use
of anthropological concepts would he a threat to the
level of certainty, or the type of certainty that a
thinker such as Barth expects to have in the theological
noetic realm. And concurrently, the fear that anthro¬
pological insights in themselves would not lead to
healthy doubt in the midst of faith but rather that
they would lead instead to the annihilation of faith
itself. That people have this fear does not mean that
the fear is fully justified. Nor does it follow that
the annihilation of faith necessarily follows from
anthropological insight. .'hat this ay : ave happened
with certain individuals or strands of thought in cer¬
tain periods does not in itself prove a necessary conn¬
ection, nor does it say that this has always happened.
Nan's "Ji-dlv, • lelationship" to "the ..ord of bod".
The view that v/e -are putting forward, namely
the great likelihood that Barth has attempted to banish
anthropology in order to retain his extreme ' objectivist
view of theological knowledge, in which it is allegedly
unproblezaatic for the human mind to duplicate divine
thoughts and structures (the human noetic ratio, and
the divine "ontological ratio") is suggested by those
passages in the Church dogmatics where Barth seeks to
make obligatory a certain type of "binding" to "the
Word", that is a type of binding to "the Word" in which
there is 110 "distance" or "room" for man to use his
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critical ^judgement concerning ..is experience of what is
allegedly "Word". That is, there is no detachment
allowed for here.
It is in perhaps the most strongly worded pass¬
age about the importance of being "bound" to "the Word"
that we hear that any alternative to this type of bind¬
ing eliminates the possibility of certainty in theolog¬
ical knowledge, and can only and in doubt, tnat is, dis¬
belief.1 That this type of binding is of methodological
importance for Barth can be seen (1) fro:;: tne vehemence
of his expression and (2) from its place, at the outset
of his lengthy section on "The Knowledge of God" in which
the actuality and possibility of knowledge of God are
considered within the framework of his theology proper.
It is a type of binding of man to "Word" in
which no detachment is allowable. That is, there is
no "distance" between man and "Word" where any anthro¬
pological questions could come into play, questions of
perception and/or distortion of perception, seen in an
anthropological perspective. It is an area where man
2
is now allowed the use of his critical faculties.
It is in the same passage where Barth insists
on this tight "binding" to "the Word" as a necessity for
theology that he states that any alternative to such
"binding" eliminates the possibility of certainty in
1. 0,D.II/l, p.6, 7,
2. O.D.II/1. p.74,
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theological knowledge and "leads inevitably to uncer¬
tainty. .• and therefore to doubt.""'" It seems clear
that what Barth means is unless one is so bound, one
2
will end up in disbelief. The implication is that
one will lo/se the whole of belief unless he is so
bound. And not only the individual believer, but "the
Church". Thus the whole of "the Church's" belief is
seen at risk here.
It is precisely here, where the "you" (or Thou)
of raan is bound to "the Word'that Barth saw the problem
with his first attempt at Dogmatics. He had allowed
anthropology to have a say precisely here. He had
included raan in his concept of "the Wordj' and had allowed
x
anthropology in precisely at this point.
What one would note, then, is the manner in
which anthropology is "elbowed out" in Earth's attempt
to m ke"binding" upon man this being bound to "the Word^
that is in such a way that nothing can intervene between
man and "the Word'. The Thou who hears can only bow to
what he hears. He is not allowed to stand back from
this experience of hearing and look at his experience,
that is, with an understanding of himself, with anthro¬
pology. Thus he is disallowed the use of his critical
faculties and judgement about this experience.
1, J.D. II/l, p.7.
2, This would seem to be implied in those two moves,
first to "uncertainty" and then to "doubt". Thus this
last "doubt" does not mean uncertainty, but disbelief.
These two follow "inevitably".
3, dee above, p. 66-71.
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It would appear then, in our view, that to allow
the theologian a genuine and operative anthropology
would moan that the theologian could not he hound in the
manner that Barth describes in O.D.II/1, He would, in
his hearing of "the Word", have to maintain some detach¬
ment, some distance in which to take into account how his
own subjectivity is involved in his "hearing". He would
nave to use his critical judgement about this experience
of hearing.
And this is what Barth seeks to disallow, that is
any distance or detachment from what is experienced as
"Woi'&i' for the consequences of this, in Berth's view, is
uncertainty which necessarily leads to disbelief. Thus,
if the theologian intends to articulate and present the
Church's belief, such detachment and 'distance' is seen
as not only a threat to the individual's belief, but as
a threat to the belief of the Church. (If one were to
take issue with this line of thinking of Earth's, it
would be with this assumption that "uncertainty" about
belief, that is, intellectual uncertainty leads necess¬
arily to doubt, that is disbelief. Lack of being sure
could just as well lead, after thoughtful re-examination
to becoming more sure.)
In this supposition about the reason for Earth's
'Bo' to anthropology we are arguing that here is a
significant reason, if not the central reason Barth has
sought to drive anthropology off the field: it threat¬
ens the certainty of theology. Additionally such a
40p
threat to certainty leads, in Earth's manner of reason¬
ing, "inevitably to uncertainty in the Knowledge of God,
and therefore to doubt."
Gonelusion.
It seems clear from the statements of Earth we
have cited that he will not allow any place for anthro¬
pology in his theology, that is for any borrowings from,
ox* any participation in the concerns of, philosophical
2
anthropology or depth psychology. He will isolate
himself from all contemporary attempts in anthropology.
As to why this is so, we have ventured a supposit¬
ion: to allow anthropological considerations a real
place in Earth's thought would be a tnreat to the type
of certainty Earth seeks in his theology.
As motivation is a complex issue, and nay involve
more than one factor, we are not arguing that this is
the only factor in Earth's "Ho" to anthropology, but
rather that it was probably a significant factor, if
not the central factor.
Postscript to the "ho" to Anthropology.
As a postscript we might note again the irony
of the situation vis-a-vis Berth and anthropology that
we mentioned at the close of our survey of the Germanic
1. O.u.II/1. p.7.
2# It is a completely separate issue as to whether and
how far Earth really did make use of philosophical
anthropology, for example existential anthropology,
and to what extent this element lies in the form of
unexamined presuppositions in his thought*
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Philosophical landscape.* Berth has tried to drive
anthropology off the field in his Dogmatics, attacking
Briedrich Gogarten in particular for taking up the
I-Phou personalism of thinkers such as Sbner, Grisebach,
Rosenzweig and Buber. let when Berth exposited his
Doctrine of Man in Volume III of his Church Dogmatics,
both he and the last mentioned, Martin Buber, agree that
each other*s views of relational reality nearly coincide.
One could argue then about the source of Berth's concepts
of relational reality, but this in beyond the scope of
our thesis.
1. Above, pp.J9ff, especially p.42.
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Section 0.
, AD'S TO "IhD \1QiD OF GOD"
I.. BAA'f* 3 x . iULOGIGAh lilQGRAnnE.
In the following we v/ould like to summarize
what wo have laid out concerning the relation to "Word"
in the previous chapter and, in addition, fill out our
account of this relation. It is a relation of
central significance for Earth's Theology and thus for
understanding his actual methodological procedure.
In the preceding chapter we have described the
"binding" relationship to "Word" or "the Word of God"
which Barth makes normative for his theology and
which he sees as a necessary prerequisite for Theology.
In Volume II/l of the Church Dogmatics, where this
relation to "Word" concerns Barth most directly, we
may note firstly that this consideration comes at the
beginning of his account of "The Knowledge of God."
That is, it conies at the beginning of his account of
how it is that God is loiown (this forms the first
section of his "Doctrine of God"). The relation to
"Word" thus has a place in this exposition which suggests
its significance and importance for the whole Doctrine
of God which follows.
Perhaps a clarification is in order at this
point. When Barth is speaking of this "binding"
2
relationship at the beginning of Volume II/l, he
1. See above, pp.599ff.
2. P.P.II/l. pp.Aff.
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speaks of "word" or "Word of God" without any additional
reference as to the form of "the Word" which he is
speaking about. There is no mention specifically of
Scripture here,^" nor specifically of'the Word revealed",
that' is of the primary stents of revelation,
Incarnation, etc., nor specifically of the Word preached.
Thus v/e would conclude that he means to speak of "Word"
as mediated, that is of "Word" as man encounters it in
its three forms ( the Word revealed, the Word written,
2-
or Scripture, and the Word preached J. In support of
this 'reading' of Barth, one would point out that he
*
talks of the "mediated" character of this knowledge.
Yet his point seems to be that it is mediated knowledge;
it does not appear important to name again the 'source'
through which it is mediated. Thus he is speaking of
a binding to "Word" as mediated (through Svent, script¬
ure and i reaching). He is not, for example, speaking
of a binding to Scripture per se.
To summarize what we have tried to lay out in
4
the preceding chapter the relation to Word is one in
which man is bound to this Word in such a manner that
1. Ibid, pp4-l>.
2. See Volume 1/1, the chapters devoted to each.
3. C.D.II/1, p.9.
4. See above, pp.399ff.
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leaves no "distance" between man and "Word", distance
in which man could stand back and reflect upon what
he experiences as "Word" or which is aliened to be
"Word". There is only one thing he can do: obey.
To loosen this relationship, or to "escape out of the
constraint of the Word" would, in Berth's view, lead
"inevitably to uncertainty" ana "therefore to doubt",
i.e. unbelief."1"
This 'obedience' is not}in the main obedience
to a com.end. or an imperative but an 'obedience' to an
indicative. As its place in a chapter on "The Know¬
ledge of God" suggests, it is noetic obedience which
is entailed in this view. It is the"obedience of
thought"which is central.
Yet in this type of binding relationship there
is no detachment in which one can stand back and
reflect upon what allegedly approaches him as "Word",
Earth's concept of "Event" is of importance at this
point. That is, an Event of revelation in the here
and now, in which man hears human words, (the human
words of Scripture or Preaching) as" .voi'd. Before "the
Word" experienced in this manner, man can only be
passive, that is, receptive, and obey. As we have
remarked, he cannot stand back from this experience
and reflect upon it.
Thus there is no "room" in this relationship for
1. ^.i).II/l, o • / •
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anthropological questions, that is for the use of
anthropology, as we lave pointed out in the foregoing
chapter. There is likewise no "room" for philosophical
episteraology, for theories of knowledge to come into
play, or in Earth's words, "a theory of knowledge...
where consideration of the truth, worth and competence
of trie Word of God...can for a time be suspended.
But this is the very thing which...must not happen".1
As this passage suggests, there is no 'room' here for
man'3 critical faculties to come into play in consider¬
ing the experience of what allegedly approaches him
as "Word". He cannot step back and ask: Is this true,
is this good?
In Earth's 'summing up' of this first section he
states explicitly that one cannot step out of this
"binding" relation to "the Word of God", and from out¬
side this relation use one's critical faculties regard¬
ing what allegedly happens there. For
"'From outside' means from the point of view
of a human position where truth, dignity
and competence are so ascribed to human
seeing, understanding and judging as to be
judge over the reality and possibility of
what happens here."
Barth continues:
But this is the very thing which is excluded
by the inner understanding of what happens...





The "first step" was entering into this binding relat¬
ionship to 1 ord'. Thus to step outside this relation
ana use one's critical faculties is a possibility which
is excluded in this programme of theology.
One notes how the use of one's critical faculties
are characterized in this teumming up1. To use one's
critical faculties allegedly means "to be jud;e over".
Thus Barth attempts to put man, that is, the man who
would use his critical faculties, in the "guilty"
position of passing judgement upon what is (allegedly)
the activity of the deity. This characterization is
convenient for Berth's purposes, for so c.-araeterized,
it would apeear that man is passing judgement upon
the deity. This is not an untypical Barthian move.
But this is a characterization, and allows no room
for using one's critical faculties in the sense of
"forming judgements about" such and such. This use
of one's judgement does not necessarily imply a super¬
ior position. In any case, even if one were to 'allow1'
this characterization of the use of one's critical
faculties, they are used concerning what allegedly
occurs in this event. That is they are used vis-a-vis
a human experience.
Barth not only wishes to deny any dignity to
human critical faculties, but, in his characterization,
wishes to denigrate and impugn them as guilty of passing
judgement upon the activity of the deity.^ This is a
1. The characterization is continued in the same para¬
graph, C.B.II/l, p.51, and recurs at points through¬
out Volume II/l.
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denigration of a central and integral part of man,
that personal centre of his perception and willing
and feeling out of which he lives.
Let us return to our theme: the nature of this
binding relationship to Word. It is a relationship
in which as we have mentioned, one experiences a
determination of one's thought. In Earth's summary
he states this viev; quite unambiguously: "We have had
to understand the Knowledge of God bound to the Word
of God as an event utterly undetermined by man but
utterly determined by God as its object."*"
Yet this is an alleged noetic determination,
that is a determination of one's "knowledge", and thus
a determination of one's thought. One wonders how
Earth can know that his knowledge is utterly deter¬
mined by God, if he cannot step back from this exper¬
ience of determination and look upon it with his
critical faculties. How can he know, for example
that this event is "utterly undetermined" by man.
This like many other statements in this context remains
in the form of a dogmatic assertion.
It is interesting to note that with this dogmatic
assertion (that this knowledge is "utterly undetermined"
by man and its counterpart, that it is "utterly deter¬
mined" by the deity;, Earth has eliminated consideration
of other factors, immanent in the human cultural-social
1. J.E.II/1, p.31.
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context which might "determine" one's thou ht, or even
cause such experiences as 'a determination of one's
thought'. Consideration of these factors is dogmatic¬
ally eliminated by the import of these two dogmatic
assertions. In a chapter which follows ("Undertow
in Theology"), we shall try to lay out one pos, ible
cause for such an experience, which lies within maris
own cultural context.
oh -,iU/ .-J C;.- CLU .
In this relation to "Word", one is so bound
that he is only to obey noetically what he experiences
as "Word". In addition there is no "room" in this
binding relationship for him to step bach and use his
critical faculties concerning (1) this experience or
(B) the alleged noetic content of this experience,
hot only cannot the question of wort i be raised on
this ground but the question of truth as well. Mali
cannot be fully present as man, that is with his
critical faculties intact. He must in fact leave
them behind or "outside" as Barth acknowledges when
he enters "inside", that is into this relationship.
Essentially the only thinking man can do concerning
what presents itself to him as "Word" is to think or
rethink the noetic "content", and verbalise this in
human concepts and words.
This then is a relationship in which one obeys
without prior, or subsequent critical thought. as
such, the relation to "Word" in Barth's theological
programme is 0rxe of unquestioning obedience. It is
this for the reason that there is only room here for
unthinking submission to what is experienced as"Word.
If one cays, as Herbert Hartwell does, in
support of iiarth that this relation to'Word" involves
no sacrifice of the intellect, and says this "not
only because man's faith enquiring into its object
is itself a rational activity but...the object of
man's faith, the revelation...is a rational event";1
this in our opinion,is simply verbal subterfuge.
Even if one's mind is engaged in rethinking and
"reflecting, upon" the alleged content of the revelation
in this event, and even if the revelation is "rational"
or consistent with itself, it is still a relation to
what is alleged to be "Word" in which one must' cast
aside one's critical faculties and cease fx*om using
one's judgement concerning (1) such an experience in
itself and (2) the alleged noetic content.of such an
experience. It remains a relation to 'Word' of
unquestioning submission.
w.. . a !,.• ill1hI*XIw:< : j..hh.., 2 . u
JQIHGIDB.
The relation to Word, as we have here attempted
to describe it, is of central importance for under¬
standing the broad extent of Berth's methodology.
1. Herbert Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth,
Duckworth, London, 1964, pp. 4.6-4-7%
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i'or not only does man encounter "the Word of God" in
Scripture and .. reaching, but also in tradition and in
dogmatics itself. As we have already mentioned, one
encounters "the Word of God" in the creed, that is,
specifically in the creeds of the early church. In
his c.aptor of Credo, devoted to methodological issues,
Barth clearly states that revelation is "the truth,
which is identical with God Himself, and which the
believer has heard and received in the form of definite
truths, in the fori:: of articles of faith... -.ven the
disclosure of this truth is a free gift that positively
comes to meet believing man. It is God's own revel¬
ation.""^ It is quite clear from the context taat
this revelation is "the Word of God". If tradition,
and specifically the credal tradition of the early
church is a form of "the Word of Godj' something which
Barth will not openly acknowledge, but is an operative
assumption of Barth nevertheless, as this passage
rather clearly indicates, then one can understand how
it is that the Barthian relation to crodal tradition
is one of unthinking submission. i'or what is involved
here is what we have been talking about in the present
chapter: unthinking submission to what is allegedly
"the Word of God". Since the credal tradition of the
early church is actually regarded as a form of'the
Word of God"in Earth's theological programme, we may
1. Credo, p.2.
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elqw understand the unthinking submission to tradition
in a new way: as unthinking submission to (what is
allegedly)"the Word of Godi
There is yet another form of the Word of God
in Garth's theological programme. It is Dogmatics
itself. . e shall lay out our evidence for saying
this in a following chapter ("Theology as ' ord'").
Here too we shall find that unthinking submission is
present, or rather, "expected.1
1. Gee below, pp,4-26ff.
4-15
Section D.
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:or many readers, and even interpreters of north,
apologetics is thought of as forbidden in this theology,
as simply out of the question. Apologetics as such,
in fact, would seein to go entirely against the grain
of Barth's thought. Thus iobert »illis, in his lengthy
aud quite scholarly work, The Bthics of Aarl Garth,1
concludes that "Barth's position... deliberately rejects
\ P
both toe possibility and the necessity of apologetics'.'"
This is not an unusual view of Barth's attitude toward
apologetics.
Yet, if we were to accept this conclusion, and
stop here, we would niss out not only on Barth's quite
positive attitude toward a particular conception of
apologetics, but we would also raiss out on possibly
some of the most significant and some of the most
interesting insights into Barth's own conception of
tie character of Dogmatics, that is, the character of
dogmatics as "revelation", as "Word", or "the tiord of
God".
firstly, let us turn to the question of apolog¬
etics. Is Willis correct in holding that Darth rejects
both the possibility and the necessity of apologetics?
1. Brill, Leiden, 1971.
2. Op.cit., p.W7.
416
We would point out firstly that if Barth shall reject
certain conceptions of apologetics, which he does,
this does not mean that he does not offer another con¬
ception of apologetics as a substitute for the concept¬
ions which he has rejected.
Thus in Volume 1/1 of the Church Dogmatics,
where lie soundly rejects the broad range of options
which have usually been grouped under the term
apologetics,1 (which for the sake of convenience we
have termed "explicit apologetics") he does not come
to a dead halt, but goes on to describe a conception
of apologetics he considers important and worthy.
He "has rejected all apologetics which would make
its appeal in an explicit manner, argue in an explicit
manner, which make use of presuppositions acceptable
to both 'belief' and 'unbelief, and which essentially
involve "argument" of any sort. Thus even Brunner's
"eristics" receives a forbidding "nol". Brunner, in
his "eristics" would attempt to "smash the axiom of
reason". Barth goes on to state that apologetics of
these kinds are "ineffective" because they are "irres¬
ponsible" and are not "up to date". As our purpose
is to examine and explore the conception of apologetics
which Barth favours and seeks to advance, we shall not
pursue his grounds for dismissing explicit apologetics
1. O.D.I/1, ppplff
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at this point,^ but bather refer the reader to a source
where in our view a sound account of this rejection is
2
given*
We have already examined the view of apologetics
which has emerged in Berth's study of Anselm, and
which we have regarded as a guide to Earth's own views
for the reason that it is an. extension of Earth's
interpretation of Anselm. we have found it to be an
extension of Earth's own creation, with little or no
reference to Anselm's actual work* It is also an
extension upon which he looks with favour.
Here in the Jhurch dogmatics we find views, first
put forth in the book on Anselm, given a more definite
elaboration. At this point we shall presupposo an
understanding of "implicit apologetics" as we have
4
described it in i-art II. Far from the rejection
of trie possibility and necessity of apolo etics in toto,
as illis sug ests, here in the Ohurch Jogmatics, v/e
find ail alternative to the views of apologetics which
5
Barth has rejected* As we have seen in iart IX% it
is the alleged role assumed by the deity vis-a-vis tne
work of the theologian which is of crucial importance*
1. Bee O.b.I/1. pp.jiff.
2. Bee Avery Dulles, A history of Apologetics*
Jutchinson, London, 19?1, pp*2?lff.
p. ^ee above, pp*191ff,
4, Bee above, Ibid,
5. Ibid.
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Thus it comes as no surprise when in Volume 1/1 of the
Ghurch Dogmatics Barth says that "there has never bean
any other.effective apologetic...than the unintended
one...which took place when God Himself sided with the
witness of faith." Here again, the activity of the
deity is central. Yet in reference to what? What is
this "witness of faith" to which Barth refers? It is
the actual work of the theologian* It is important
to be clear about this point. i'or "the witness of
faith" might mean several things: Bcripture, Greeds,
Dogma, even the ^erson who 'witnesses'. Yet in this
passage Barth quite clearly means the work of the
theologian. <e say this for the following reason.
Barth has just said, in the beginning of the paragraph
2
in question, "Ho!" to Brunner's eristics. He con¬
tinues, saying that "Really responsible, up-to-date
theological thought...will reveal itself to be such
x
by being.•.the witness of faith against unbelief" •
It is in this sane paragraph two sentences later, that
Barth speaks of the deity siding with "the witness of
faith". Thus we should understand by this phrase:
theological thought, i.e. dogmatics. We can now
paraphrase this passage: It is when God sides with
the words of the theologian that the apologetic is
effected.
1 . m D . 1/1 , p. 31 •
2. Ibid.
G.D.I/1, p.31. (emphasis adedj.
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T ere is an implication here, n....:ely, that it
is i.. a.:. " • ,vo.-:t ■' (Greigniss) that this occurs, that is,
an Gvent in the Barthian sense of an Gvent of revelation
in the present, in which, one hears human words as "Word",
as "the Word of God". Goes one find evidence that
"Gvent" is involved in tnis conception of apologetics?
In trie paragraph following the passage we have cited,
Barth says that what "unbelief" expects of faith is
"Gvent". And he continues: "It is not in our power
to cause this event"."*" This rather clearly indicates
an event allegedly caused by the deity, or Gvent in
the sense we have just described it. That this element
or aspect is central to Barth's view of apologetics is
supported by the way Barth closes his whole discussion
of apologetics and polemics (that is after his rejection
of other views of apologetics): "Apologetics and polem-
2
ics can only be an .event, they cannot be a programme"
One might ask: does one find additional support
for thinking that it was Barth's view that theology in
aarticular,the theologians own work, is that which
becomes revelatory in the "Event" which has been refer¬
red to here? Between these two references to "mvent"
we have just cited, we find Barth saying:
So far as...theology is really and effectively
apologetic and polemic, it is so because its
distinctive work...is acknowledged, strengthened
and blessed by God as a witness to faith.
1. C.D.I/1, p.32.
2. G.G.I/1, p.33.
3. G.I). 1/1, p.3k. (emphasis added).
420
e note that t is view of apologetics is placed in
direct contrast to one which "negotiates" with "unbelief"
"on the basis of common presuppositions". How to
answer our question! is it really theology; itself, in
contrast with Jcripture, which becores revelatory in
the "Svent" referred to? This would appear to be con¬
firmed, for in this passage, it is when " theology's
distinctive work" is, we nay say, validated1 by the
deity that it becomes really and effectively apologetic.
Thus we have two instances where it is the work
of the theologian i.n particular which is "validated"
by the deity in this conception of apologetics. The
implications of this view of Barth will become more
important as we proceed.
he find no evidence that Barth has changed his
view of "implicit apologetics" as his Church dogmatics
proceeds. Thus he speaks of apologetics as "implicit,
2
incidental aid supplementary" in Volume 11/1* here,
as in Volume 1/1, apologetics rests solely on "revelat¬
ion".
Tne view that the theologian plays a part in
apologetic activity, that is, only to -the extent of
showing the "inner consistency of Christian statements"
3
as we have outlined already in Part II, is to be found
1. Barth uses the term "validated" in other similar
contexts.
2. C.D.II/1, p.8.
p. Cee above, pp,193ff«
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again in Volume 1V/3 where "even in respect of the most
obstinate unbeliever it can be accomplished that the
inner-consistency, said to that extent, the meaning of
the Gospel message is intelligible to him"."*"
While we are not, of course, saying that the
apologetic aspect of Earth*s dogmatics was as important
to Barth as dogmatics qua dogmatics, nevertheless,
there is a definite view of apologetics here. It is
one in which dogmatics itself has an apologetic role
to play. In short we find a concept of "Implicit
Apologetics", in essentials the sane as we have found
in Berth's book on Anselm. We shall now conclude our
study of Dogmatics as Apologetics by briefly comparing
Barth conception with that of other theologians, and,
drawing out an important contrast.
J Jn.,JhUoIOh.
Our account of dogmatics as apologetics would
be incomplete if we did not at least give mention of
other conceptions of Apologetics worked out by theolog¬
ians contemporary with Barth, in which dogmatics
itself was intended to have, or did in fact have an
apologetic function. Barth's conception of dogmatics
as apologetics in fact is only one conception among
many others in which Dogmatics, Systematic iheology or
Biblical Theology can fulfil an apologetic function.
1. G.D.I//5, p.848.
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Here we can only give mention of some of these other
conceptions, as it is not the task of our thesis to
give a full account of these conceptions.
One notes that almost all the major Germanic
theologians of the first half of the twentieth century-
have chosen to place apologetics within the substance
of their theologizing. That is, their theologizing
is intended to function, at least at points, as
apologetics. Apologetics is not se.n as a separate
discipline, distinct from Dogmatics,•Systematic Theology
or Biblical Theology.
One might -wonder why Biblical Theology is
included in this list. So we might begin with Rudolph
Bultmann. -u UBven though Bu/ffljmann ofte claimed
apologetic intent, for example, in his demythologizat-
ion programme, interpreters often beg to differ with
him. Barth's comment upon this issue, may in fact,
be of interest. In an article entitled "Rudolph
Bult.mann: An Attempt to Understand Him", Barth remarks
that even if "Bultmann and his disciples are annoyed
if we call him an apologist", he wishes, Just as
L
Bchle^ermacher wished, "to make Biblical exegesis,
theology in general, and preaching in particular, rel¬
evant and interesting for its cultured despisers".
Barth, apparently neutral in attitude at this point,
rather than judgemental, goes on to say "Surely theolog¬
ians have always been apologists in some sense; they
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could hardly help it.""*" Avery Dulles in his concise,
yet scholarly work, A history of Apologetics, is in
full agreement with Barth's view. Other Germanic
theologians which should be mentioned here are (1)
Paul Tillich, with his conception of correlation, in
which O;stematic Theology co-relates with non-church
civilisation by responding to the questions it raises
concerning Christian thought; (2) hull Brunner, whose
theology often intents to take the form of attack
upon thought systems and/or ideologies which apparently
oppose Christian thought. Because of this character
of his thought Brunner refers the term "eristics"
rather than "apologetics". .igain the (eristic form
of; apologetics lies within the dogmatic-theological
substance; (5) Beyond Bultaann, TillichjBrunnor, there
are a host of other thinkers both within and without
Germanic Theology who have conceptions of apologetic
intent, varying significantly with the views of those
we have listed, yet many of these thinkers in their
own way see Apologetics as a function of Dogmatics and
Systematic Theology
1. noted in Avery Dulles, A 1story of Apologetics,
Hutchinson, London, 1971 ♦ p.254.
2. here one might mention Friedrich Gogarten, and the
Americans,H. Richard and Aeinhold Miebuhr. among others
One might also look at the manner in which John M
Mclntyre finds apologetic significance in the dogmatic
of Anselm's works, specifically his Our Deus homo.
Anselm's method is seen as highly significant for
the dogmatics of our own day. See St. Anselm and
his Critics: A Reinter rotation of t!Te Our Deus Homo,
Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1954. This work has
proved suggestive at several points for our own prob¬
ing of Barth views and his .interpretation of anselm.
5. For further material on Protestant Apologetics in
(contd..•)
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In reviewing the above alternatives to Barth's
theory of dogmatics as apologetics, we sec In each of
these alternatives, almost without exception, a defin¬
ite contrast with Barth's conception. In each of these
other conceptions, that which would fulfil an apologetic
function is presented directly to the reader. That is,
it is presented, in the main at least, in a aianner in
which lis critical faculties can operate upon the mat¬
erial . For this important reason, what is involved
in these non—Barthian conceptions is what one might
term explicit apologetics; that which would effect the
apologetic is "out in the open", and presented in a
1
manner which invites critical examination.
Here we find the most significant contrast with
Barth's theory of apologetics. The apologetic here
is not explicit. And it does not invite critical
examination. In fact, as this theory of apologetics
sits within Barth's theological programme, it not
only avoids inviting critical examination, but forbids
it. No human criteria can be used in examining the
validity or worth of what alleges itself to be revel-
2
ation or "the Word of God". As we have covered this
aspect of Barth's thought in the foregoing chapter
the twentieth century, see for example Guiles,
oo.cit., pp.2plff.
1, While this may not be true in each case, it would
appear to be true in most cases.
2. Bee above, pp.4G?ff.
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devoted to consideration of man's relation to "the
Word of God" made normative in Earth's theology,1 we
need not repeat again all what we found there. We
might point out that the type of sacrifice of the
intellect we found there, in the Barthian relation
to Word, a relationship which involved unthinking
submission to what was experienced as "Word", has now
gained an additional significance with our findings
in the present chapter. For here we found that it
was t. .oology itself, the theologians own formulations
and declarations, which were to become "the Word of
God" in the (alleged) "Event" in which "God Himself
(sides) with the witness of faith" confirming human
words as the divine Word.
So not only must an unbeliever submit unquest-
ioningly to the human words honored as authoritative
in the churches, that is Scripture, but also he must
submit unquestioniagly to the human words of another
and contemporary human being, the theologian, as his
2
words allegedly become "the Word of God". If all
this poses difficxilties for those somewhat within the
churches (as in our view it does), how much more
difficulty would it pose to someone totally outside
the churches? In our opinion, more than a little I
1. Gee above, pp.405-414,




f .SGLOGY AS "WORD" ; SO(i .ASICS AS
- .. RD . _ Ggg&
As Barth's own views on Apologetics have helped
us see, there is in fact a fifth form of "the Word of
God" in Berth's operational framework in which he
carries out his theology. Dogmatics itself forms this
fifth form of "the Word of God'j that is in the list of
forms which include the Word Revealed, the word Written
(Scripture), the Word Breached, and as we have found
1
above the Word Confessed (in the Garly Church Creeds).
One may note at the outset that if this is so,
that is, if Barth actually operates upon the assumpt¬
ion that Dogmatics itself is a fifth form of"the word
of God, this might explain Garth's somewhat fideistic
relation to his own productivity: it has become, for
him, authoritatively "Word of God". 'Thus there is
no need to add any justification at many points for
the sometimes peculiar views he holds. If he is of
the view that he has articulated "the Word of God" in
his dogmatic programme, and regards his results as
"the Word of God", then one could understand (1) why
his theology is so declarative at significant points,
that is declaring such and such to be the case, with
little or no attempt to substantiate why he thinks
1. oee above, pp>363f£.
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such and such to be the case; (2) one could also under¬
stand why his theology typically has the character of ,
preaching.^
Further, since the relation to "Word" in this
theological programme is one of unquestioning submiss¬
ion, this means that the theologian himself "submits"
unquestioningly to the results of his own work. The
consequence of such a procedure would appear to be a
surprising absence of constructive self-criticism.
One's own critical judgement need not be exercised
even towards one's own work. Humanly speaking this
would seem to result in a surprising lack of respons¬
ibility for one's own thinking. From the theologian's
viewpoint though, in such a scheme, the responsibility
for his work "rests on the shoulders" of the deity.
Thus,in such a scheme, the theologian becomes
a mouth piece for the deity. His own words are
(allegedly) endowed with divine authority. If what
we are saying is so, we are saying that Barth at
points
^ operated upon the as gumption t nut what lie was
saying as a theologian was a human forra of "the Word
of God". As we shall see Barth refuses to acknow¬
ledge such an operational assumption, and in fact
at many points declares himself to be opposed to such
an assumption,(as we shall see in what follows^
Nevertheless, there is evidence which points us in
1. Gordon Clark among others points this out.
uee Clark, p.8.
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the direction we have already suggested. we shall
now go to the text of Earth's writings and lay out our
evidences.
The passages in Volume 1/1 of the Church
.uognatics concerning apologetics which we have already-
treated in the chapter concerned with "Dogmatics as
Apologetics" give us evidence of this view. Here we
found that it was "when God Himself sided with the
witness of faith" that the only really effective
l
apologetic took place* We also saw, in the fore¬
going chapter, that by "witness of faith" Barth
2
clearly meant the work of the theologian. we saw
also that Barth's theory of "Event", as a revelatory
Event in the here and now, was involved in this con¬
ception, Yet these views almost exactly replicate
Earth's theory of how the human words of Scripture
become "the Word of God" in an Event in the here and
3
now.
We have found that these views on apologetics
in G.D.I/1, which we have just described, very closely
replicate Earth's views of apologetics which were
exposited in his study of Anselm in this same period.
Here also it was a matter of theology itself becoming
"the Word of God".4- We saw also which portion of
1. G.D.I/1, p.31.
2. See above,pp.4i8#
3. See G.D.I/1, p.lllff,
4. See above,pp.
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Anselm's "Ontological Argument" allegedly had to become
" .ord" In order for it to be an effective theological
argument, namely, the key phrase, "that than which no
greater can be thought." This phrase, in Earth's
interpretation must be heard as a divine "Word" of
prohibition: "thou shalt not conceive of a greateri'"*"
As we have seen in our study of Earth's interpretation,
we can find no real evidence that Anselm considered
2
his argument in this light. Thus we have two
documents in which there is evidence for the view that
dogmatics is in fact considered a fifth form of"the
Word of God «
Now, we might ask, does one find evidences that
Earth holds this view in particular instances, that is,
that his own words, even his own peculiar theological
viewpoints, are human words which are "the Word of
God" and might become ""Word of God" for others, for
his readers?
In his "summing up" of his methodology at the
end of the Prolegomena, Ghurch Jop;natics, Volume 1/2,
Earth goes on at some length about nan's relation to
"the Word of God" itself, and speaks concerning
"obedience to the Word". A "tight" and binding
'bbedience to the Word" is declared mandatory as an
1. (our paraphrase of Earth's rendering of the phrase)
See above, pp,123ff.
2. See above. pp#l23ff, and pp.H7ff.
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element of theological method.^
Barth says that he himself cannot make this a
binding command upon his reader* He can only present
"a challenge...a consilium, not an ultimately and
2
absolutely binding command." But aarth goes on to
say: "If our decision does in fact acquire for others
the force of a binding command," this is another matter.
fox' "what this means is that it has pleased God to
ratify our decision as the right one, and to use it
x
to declare His will to others."
Here we find Barth quite aware that what is at
issue is his own methodological viewpoint, a viewpoint
in fact concerning "word" itself, or rather obedience
to "Word". As we have described in our chapter
devoted to "The Relation to Word" it is a specific
type of obedience that Barth sees mandatory: a binding
to "the V/ord of God" in which there is no critical
distance from what alleges itself to be the Word of
God, Consequently, we have here a s-. ecifically
Parthian methodological viewpoint. And it is just
this metiiodological viewpoint which, as it were, sits
on the page in potentiality, the potentiality of being
"ratified" by the deity, of being used "to declare
1. ;>© have examined this "tight" binding relation to
"Word" above, pp.399ff» and pp*405ff.
2. 0.D.I/2, p.859.
3. G.B.I/2, p.860. (emphasis added).
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[^God's3 will to others", in short of becoafag for
ot.iers "t ••© ,;ord of God'.' One says this for the
'ingredients' are there: (1) God 'ratifying* human
words, using human words 'to declare His will to
others; and (2) this ratification shall happen in an
..vent in the specifically darthian sense. ifor these
■words are, so to apeak, "waiting"!or something to
happen.. This is clearly implied by the phrases
"If our decision does in fact acquire (jfca the force
of a binding command)" it is because of God's activity
of 'ratifying* these words to the reader.
One would not expect Barth to give other reasons
as to why his viewpoint could acquire bindia force
upon the reader, as he shuns modern anthropology.
Yet he seems quite certain that his own methodological,
viewpoint could acquire binding force by divine action,
the same divine action by which human words become
"t iq Word of God": "ratification".
For our fourth evidence we shall turn to a very
lata text, evangelical Ideology: An Introduction (1963).
As not only "Word" Is involved in such an Bvent in
which human words become "the Word of God", but the
holy Spirit, which works within man, 'validating'
these human words, it is not unusual to find more
evidence for the view that Barth thought of theology
as a fourth form of the Word of God in a chapter on
"the Spirit". In this very late work, evangelical
T'heology: An Introduct Ion, Barth opens his chapter on
"The Spirit" with these words:
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;q cannot overlook the fact that we ventured
some very extraordinary statements in the
last throe lectures....Taken by themselves,
of course, they may have been...interrelated
in and mutually confirming. Nevertheless,
in their wholeness as in their particulars
they were obviously statements that were not
supported by what is usually considered
sound evidence. They could not be derived
from any points outside the sphere of reality
and truth they represented#
Barth then asks the question:
What is the power hidden within these assert¬
ions which establishes 0..-I illuminates them.
In other words, how does theology come to take
and hold the place described by them - a place
which seems to the onlooker to be situated in
mid-air? 2
as tuis lecture is entitled "The Spirit", one can
anticipate the answer to this question. The chapter
is devoted to describing Earth's view of how theology,
as a nexus of interrelated statements, unsupported as
v/hole in any human way, receives its support from the
holy spirit. Thus the Spirit "waits to vivify and
illuminate £ theology' s^) affirmations which, however
3
right they may be, are dead without the Spirit.
1. As one who had the opportunity to be present when
Barth presented this lecture in America in 1962,
one was impressed not only by the freshness of his
delivery but the liveliness of his exposition.
Much of the characteristic rhetoric of the Shurch
dogmatics finds no place here,
2. .-/vrangel leal Theology: An Introduction. Holt,




What one would wish to point out here is that
it is specifically theology, theological construction,
which receives its "support", in this hovering position,
from the Holy Spirit. It seeks no support of human
making hut awaits this "support": the vivification and
illumination given "by the Spirit.
What one finds of interest here is that even if
divine activity vis-a-vis theology is spoken of in
more subdued terras than in the passages we have cited
in the foregoing, it is the work of the theologian in
distinction from the words of Scripture, and the words
of preaching, which receive what amounts to divine
validation.
Again we would point out that this dovetails
neatly into Barth•s framework concerning human words
becoming "tae Word of God", for in the alleged Event
in which this happens, it is the Spirit which works
within man, validating human words.
With the evidence we have laid out, there would
appear to be fairly firm ground for holding the view
that Barth operated upon the assumption that theology,
and his theology in particular, was in fact a fifth
form of the Word of God, that is alongside the Word
Revealed, the Word Written, or Scripture, the Word
Preached, and the Word Gonfeased (in the Early Church
Creeds). We have found evidence for this in three
separate documents, his study of Ansela 1951*
his Prolegomena to the Church dogmatics of 1952 and
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his evangelical Theology of 1962. In addition we have
pointed out at least one instance in which the human
words for which Barth clearly expected divine confirm¬
ation embodied a viewpoint which was clearly Barth's
own.
A Jontradiction between Barth's Otate eats and is
Operational as uraptions.
If we are correct about the issue at hand,
there is then what amounts to a contradiction between
what Barth says he is doing, and the actual assumptions
upon which he proceeds. There are passages too
numerous to enumerate in which Barth denies that
theology can be more than human speech having only
provisional nature. We might cite one of the passages
in the Dogmatics in Outline (1945)» In his introduct¬
ory lecture describing "The Task" of Dogmatics, Barth
goes on at length about the provisionality of Dogmatics,
its nature as "an attempt" which is "preliminary and
limited." As the attempt at Dogmatics can only be
a human attempt, so also, the words of Dogmatics can
only be human words. One can have no "absolute dog¬
matics fallen from Heaven." One can have only "a
p
human earthly dogmatics." This passage is typical
of Barth's insistj^nce that the words of Dogmatics can
only describe the word of God; they cannot become "the




We find then that what Earth says concerning
the nature of Dogmatics, and the assumption upon
which he operates in his actual theologizing, are in
considerable contradiction with each other.
Chapter IV, ■■;{
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Chapter IV,
"UCJhihgQW"!,. T.IOOLOGY? A GfUDY OS'
A h.ai'.ilAII fBCKHIQljii] 01?' WRITING.
One finds a recurring experience in reading
Barth, V/e are of the opinion that it has something
to do with the character of Berth's manner of writing#
Oe shall try to draw this experience out into the open
by comparing it to another, far more mundane experience.
•The experience we have in mind is that of swimming in
the surf just off the sea shore. Quite often one can
leave his comrades at one point on the beach, go in
for a swim, yet after swimming for a time suddenly look
up, and find that all has changed. One finds himself
perhaps just as far from shore, but in a totally diff¬
erent place from where he expected. His friends are
no longer "just over there" on the beach. They are
missing. One experiences, very naturally, a sudden
sense of bewilderment and disorientation. "How is
it that I find myself here, when I thought I was over
there, or where I left my friends? Oan't I swim
straight?" One finally finds his way back to his
friends and, after telling his experience, is told
that this very often happens when there is a current
in the depths of the water which pulls him in a certain
direction, yet with such subtle strength that he would
barely be able to sense this. Thus, while the waves
v/ere rolling inward over him towards the snore, this
subtle yet strong current was carrying him down the
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shore. "Undertow is what it's called," said one of
his friends. While he "battled the obvious, the waves
on the surface, it was what was de per and less obvious,
the undertow, that carried him in an unexpected direct¬
ion.
Let us return to our experience of reading
Barfcb. one often picks up a certain passage, and
"wades through" it. After a perhaps lengthy period
of reading, he sots the piece down. He wants to
consider what Barth has said, and arrive at an opinion
about it. let .just at this point he nay, we do not
say necessarily, experience a sense of bewilderment,
even a sense of intellectual disorientation. He' nay,
though not necessarily, cay to himself: What Barth
says certainly feels right, it feels fitting. let
I do not, and I cannot agree. Perhaps ho subsequently
uncovers the reasons he cannot agree, and these
satisfy him as being sound. His experience then is
one of internal dissonance, as if, using another image,
in an earthquake, one part of him would- go in one
direction (his feelings), and another part of him
would go in an opposite direction.(his decision making
center, or thinking). There is friction between
these two. Perhaps also there is a cense of bewilder-
-7
ment and disorientation: "How did I get here." mat
7
is, wiiy does this feel right* And why would I hold
this position which Barth favours were it not for my
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ll
own tninking and good judgement.
What we are suggesting is that there is often
a strong "undertow" in Earth's theology. That is,
Earth often picks up terms or concepts with strong
emotional connections, ingoing battle" against some
position or v/ay of thinking. lie may take the term
tv '
or concept out of its original context and, for example,
hurl it into anothercoaatext, a context that bears
some, perhaps incidental, similarities with the orlg-
inal context. let for the latter reason, we would
hold t at the term or concept hurled, would have the
sane or similar emotional connections. he shall
airsue t is idea further as we proceed.
Like icebergs moving through the sea, one-
tenth se n, nine-tenths unseen, we would maintain that
terras with strong emotional force make their way
through Earth's text, with perhaps one-tenth of their
'import' or force obvious, and nine-tenths not at all
so obvious.
If we leave behind the image of icebergs and
return to our sea experience, we arc venturing that
certain terms and concepts with deep emotional connot¬
ations set up an "undertow" for the reader, that is,
1. For the person who would agree with Earth, after
"due process of thought", of course this hind of
dissonance probably would not occur. But, we would
maintain that the 'undertow' would be as influential
and as forceful a factor for the one who agreed with
Earth, as for bhe one who disagreed with Berth.
2. ;_>ee "belowj p.440; p.444f.
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a pull upon the fe lings, which would pull him in a
certain direction, perhaps quite strongly, even poss¬
ibly until he finds himself in a new "position".
Thus we find what we could term a strong
emotional appeal in Barth's writing at points, even
at crucial points. It is more difficult to deal with
than most emotional appeals, for it is often not
obvious at first reading that it is an emotional
appeal. That is, just as the swimmer battles the
waves on the surface, yet is careled unwittingly by
a deeper, less than obvious current, so the reader of
Barth also, we venture, in battling with the obvious,
"intellectual" concerns as he wades or swims through
the Barthian text, can be carried on to a Barthian
conclusion by this deeper, not so obvious, emotional
pull upon his feelings. We do say "can" be carried,
for naturally the background of the reader and his
present "position'as Protestant, Catholic, Conservative
or Libertil will determine, to a great extent, how much
emotional force certain terms and concepts will have.
Yet we would venture that either for (1) the person
whose religious and theological upbringing was some
form of Christian "Orthodoxy"; or (2) whose present
position is some form of Christian "Orthodoxy", the
emotional force of Barth writing will be quite strong.
We would hold this to be so because of (1) the import¬
ance and place of 'Tradition' in Earth's thought
(2) the forceful manner in which 'Tradition', that is
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"Orthodoxy" is used in waging his arguments. In what
.follows we shall explore several possible examples of
"undertow".1'
,x;, . le of undertow: .'he Oharacterization of ..atural
fr.eolo.
One finds undertow at a any points in iiarth's
writing. Most often one finds it when a viewpoint
or stance is characterised in such a way as to make
it appear abhojjfent 'blasphemous', 'heretical', or
wrongly prideful. Its the characterisation which
would seem to carry weight and effect an emotional
pull, or rather 'push', away from the viewpoint or
position at issue. Thus when Barth considers natural
theology, he speaks of it as a'sphere of activity*, and
1. We would note that v/e too have used a term with
an undercurrent of emotional connotations.
"Undertow" in its. usual setting is a word some¬
times uttered as a word of caution against
serious danger• Danger of 'feeing carried out too
far from shore to return. We shall still use
the term, not go back and strike it out, yet
acknowledge its emotional content so that for
exa pie a reader can then .judge for himself
whether this emotional' undercurrent or undertow
is appropriate or not. although here the stakes
are not high in our view, we would point out
that a writer such as Barth rarely brings to the
reader's conscious attention the emotional
import of his words.
2. One is not saying that Barth is alone in using
words and concepts this way, but rather that he
had a remarkable ability so to use them.
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characterises it thus: "Whatever v/e think of natural
theology's character...this sphere arises and exists
in the fact that man denends on himself over against
God."1
how one can follow this, and it makes sense up
to a point, even to one who does not share Garth's
abhorre ;ce of natural theology. But while one can
see that Barth is somewhat accurate in pointing out
that in natural theology "man depends on himself",
in that it obviously involves man's use of his own
skills, critical judgement, and other Capacities,
this "de ending on oneself" is characterised, not
only in this passage but in the larger context as
well, as "depending on oneself over against Bod".
That is, its as if "depending on oneself" is 'hostile'
to accepting divine help, or necessarily excludes
any element of depending on the deity. 'The one
is depicted as automatically excluding the other.
One may note in passing that there are many natural
theologies in which religious experience forms an
important part, and thus the natural theologian
would seem, in part, to depend on the part the deity
plays in his theology also.
More to the point is the manner in which Barth
continues in this massage* "But this means that in
1. O.B.II/l, p.168.
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actual fact he makes himself equal to God."1 One
can see how it might be to Earth's advantage to
characterize natural theology in this manner, for in
this characterization it would seem that man is so
blown up with pride that he not only repudiates Gods
2
grace, but considers himself "equal to God."
fhe emotional undertow here, one would venture,
is quite intense. Per, at least ior most Protestants
and Catholics something successfully characterised in
such a manner would be quite abhorrent.
What stands behind this characterization,
especially this last sentence, man making himself
equal to God] It would seam that it has to do with
Berth's theory of religious thought, suggested probably
by Feuerbach's views on religion, in which man isolates
out what he considers the 'highest' in himself and
forms his conception of the deity out of those attri¬
butes he finds .in hiraself. I'hat this is what Earth
has in mind is suggested b his next sentence. "For
the man who refuses His grace, God becomes the substance
of the highest that he himself can see, choose, create
and be. It is of this that he gives an account in
natural theology.(One may note in passing that
somehow Earth's theology is completely exempt from
1. Ibid,
2, The previous sentence implies this. This sentence
following this confirms that Earth meant to imply
this: "For the man who refuses His grace, God
becomes..."
5. CJ.D.II/1, p.168.
these dynamics I) But then let us return to Barth's
characterization. If man has attributed his 'highest'
and 'best' to the deity, and the deity is seen primar¬
ily in terns of these attributes, then Barth's state¬
ment about man making himself equal to Bod would, at
first reading at least, seem true in a distant almost
poetic sense, there would appear to be some truth in
Barth's words. That is, they would 'ring true' to
to reader. They would feel true, oven if on closer
examination Barth's statement must be regarded as
essentially wrong.
Bo if one considers Berth's words as having
a poetic looseness, one can then understand how they
might "ring true" for many readers. For. if Barth is
sneaking very loosely one can sense a connection •
between "making himself equal with God", and this
process of attribution he points to. This might
explain the effectiveness of his maimer ox writing#
Yet Barth doer not intend to speak loosely,
that is in an inexact, 'poetic* sense. he is intent
to drive home his point as literally true: "But this
.eans that in actual fact... he males himself equal
to God". Here Barth's accusation would seen to come
undone. Tor even in the case of the 'natural theolog¬
ian' v/ho isolates out the 'highest and best' in man
and attributes it to the deity, and even if the deity
were thought of only in these terms, (1) the theologian
would be aware that man has only a small or limited
portion of each of these attributes in comparison
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with the deity; and (2) he would be aware since he
must distinguish between qualities which are and are
not,'highest and best', that nan has qualities which
are not 'tin highest and best'*and which he does not
attribute to the deity. These attributes which he
does not attribute to the deity remind him that be is
indeed man. Thus, although this process of tnought
it
may indeed"elevate" man, as Beuerback suggests, he is
not in any sense the "equal" of the deity even in this
frame of reference.
If Barth's characterization would appear at
first succes ful, i.e. as a successful 'slam' at
natural theology, could it not be (1) because of the
'poetic' import of his words; (2) how this 'poetic'
import has some. albeit very loose, connection or
relevance to what he is describing, and (5) once this
connection is intuitively sensed, the passage, Initially
at least, 'rings true', or feels true*
The consequence is that unless the reader is
on his uard, and pauses to analyse Berth's words,
the 'slam' hits home. Natural Theology is then char¬
acterized as something 'abhorrent', even, 'blasphemous',
for a. rotestants and Catholics alike.
..'mother i. do of Undertow.
Before proceeding we should refer to another
passage in Berth,to which we have already given attent¬
ion, which, in our view, involves undertow. In
Berth's crossing categories with the 5th Commandment
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and using it to indicate or reinforce a normative
relation to tradition, one also sees undertow as a
factor which could push one into simply accepting this
rather unusual application of the 5th Commandment
vis-a-vis "obeying" tradition. We have tried to
explore the dynamics of this in the place v/e have
discussed Earth's usage of this Commandment."*"
"Guilt by Association."
We might point out what in our view is involved
in most cases in which undertow would tend to be
effected. Several terms might be applied} v/e shall
use one. It usually involves, in our view, "guilt
by association," That is, a type of thinking or a
theological view, which Earth opposes is "guilty",
wrong, and to be rejected by virtue of being success¬
fully associated with a view or conception which, in
its usual context, actually has been rejected or has
been considered wrong or "heretical" e.g. in "orthodox
thought." Or it is associated with a term or concept
which is considered "wrong" or undesirable by a con-
sidex»able number of people among those whom Earth
wishes to address, Examples of such terms or concepts
might be: "docetic", "pelagian", "synergistic", etc.
What is significant in this connection is that
in such "guilt by association", the actual "association"
1. See below, p.233fc See also our laying out of the
cross category move, p.
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with the "undesirable" term or concept occurs in a way
taat avoids involving the 'considered judge .eat* of
the reader. That is, it is an implied association.
Thus it is not accessible to thought, unless the
reader (1) stops to analyse the attempted association,
(2) is able to identify the term of abuse implied, and
then O) is able to examine for himself, apart from
tae text, hue validity of this association.
how we mag' go on to examine what is in our- view
an example of undertow, effected by the implication
of a 'term of abuse' or an "undesirable" term or con¬
cept, a.J its associations.
Undertow effected by implication, by a concept i lied.
Before we go on to explore this example, let
us lay out our view of' the manner in which undertow
might be effected by implication. That is, even if
the tori;, or concept which would tend to effect under¬
tow is mot explicitly used, or •slung at' what Barth
wishes to oppose or drive off the field, is it poss¬
ible for undertow to be effected by the implication
of such a concept; That is, if the implication is
present that such and such an ("undesirable") concept
is involved in something Barth opmoses, and, of course,
this "undesirable" concept is actually considered
undesirable in its primary or normal context in the
eye3 of a significant number of readers, then cannot
this implied connection tend to effect undertow?
Perhaps we could give an example of what we mean
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from the realm of polities. in the late I960* s, when
the iiserican Vice President^ Gpiro Agnew, was spewing
forth quite a bit* of rhetoric about students and
university "intellectuals" he referred to them as "an
effete corps of elite snobs", how. as more than one
news commentator pointed out, looking back on the use
of this phrase, even though "effete" meant "tired" or
"worn out", it had actually laplied something quite
different to much of the public. When interviewed
concerning what this phrase meant, a large number of
people replied; "effeminate". How if this tera act¬
ually implied, or "cor; .unicated" (i.e. "came across
as") "effeminate" to a significant number of people,
as appears to be the case,(and if it be accepted that
this implied term is a term of abuse, concerning the
masculinity and 'potency' of students and university
•intellectuals'), then it was an implied Lena, and
its "undesirable" connotations,which effected, or
would tend to effect, undertow. Thus, while the
actual terra of abuse was not spoken, it had been
successfully implied*in the minds of many people.
naturally, when investigating actual instances
of this phenomenon in Berth's theology, we shall have
to ask if others have found such an "undesirable"
concept implicit in Earth's exposition, so as to
cross-check that it is not simply our own subjectivity
which is involved. We shall investigate a possible
example of undertow involving the implication of a
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concept in what follows.
"Synergism" in'the nowledge of God"; An example of
Undertow .Probably effected. by a Concept Implicit in
Uarth' s ncooslbion.
If one finds that the "pull" or undertow that
we have spoken of is sometimes effected by- an under¬
ground notion of thought, that is a notion or concept
implicit in what is presented, or normally and usually
connected with What is presented on the surface, we
can now speak of what we see as a significant example
of this.
Here, to repeat, the concept which effects the
"pull" is not named. It is not made explicit; yet it
is implied, and therefore present in an unexplicit
manner•
Of course our own subjectivity is involved in
such an assessment (that is, with the question: Is
this implicit, as a notion of thought lying just
beneath the surface of the text?). Thus we will look
at how J major interpreters of Barth react to the
material in question.
We will first try to describe what one finds
on the surface,that is,explicit, which is in close
connection to this subterranean notion. What one
finds, put in brief form, is that in Barth's exposition
of (his theory of) "the Knowledge of God", which forms
the first half of C.J.II/1, there is here a theory in
which knowledge of the deity is to come about in a
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.inner - ilea Involves no positive contribution on .ian's
port.
Thusf whenever Barth runs up against a theory
of knowledge of the deity (1) which stands independ¬
ently of 'revelation', for example, natural theology; or
(2) which involves even an element of independence
wholly belonging to man, for example, mans use of his
own critical judgement concerning what alleges itself
to be revelation, one finds a strong negative reaction,
in fact very stx^ong negative reaction, along with an
attempt to explain away any such independence, out of
which man. could make his own contribution to knowledge
of the deity. To paraphrase Earth's reaction: it is
bad, very bad, for man to think this way.
Yet what is this that is very bad, wrong, or
'mistaken/* It would ce n to be this: for man to
think that he could contribute, out of his own resources,
in a positive and significant way to his own knowing
of God. Thus there is no creativity on man's part,
no initiative, no 'enterprise' which is to be under¬
taken -which is not totally dependent on what is "given"
to man in revelation.
This 'ban' on any element of man's 'independent'
creativity and enterprise means, among other things,
that he can have no independent judgement concerning
what is allegedly "Word" or revelation. That is, the
use of his own critical judgement as an exercise of
his own independence is to be condemned and disallowed
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in this theological framework.
Thus this attempted 'ban' on man's independent
creativity, independent (judgement is made to apply (just
as strongly to any 'theology of revelation' as to any
'natural theology',
What is condemned here (in C.D.II/1 first half)
is any "cooperation with grace" on the part of man,
that is cooperation in the sense of any independent
contribution man can make to his knowledge of God.
If one asks: what is the subterranean notion
implicit here? It would very much seem to be
synergism. That is, in the way Barth frames and pres¬
ents what he opposes, he has linked up what he opposes
with those same elements many protestants have normally
opposed, namely, synergism: synergism as a human enter¬
prise in which man is seen as contributing out of his
own 'resources' to his salvation. This may take the
form of "cooperation with grace". For most forms of
Protestant orthodoxy and in fact most forms of Protest¬
ant thought, synergism is an abhorrent form of thought.
It is something to be avoided at all costs.
Thus Barth has linked what he opposes in the
realm of noetic concerns, the realm of knowledge, with
a notion, synergism, which has its normal place in the
salvific or soteriological realm.
Now we might raise the question: is this only
our own subjectivity at work here, that is in seeing
"synergism"as the notion that he's barely hidden "just
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beneath the surface" and thus the notion which would
thus tend to effect an emotional pull, or "undertow"
at this point? In this connection we would loolc at
the two major 'Reformed' interpreters of Barth as they
treat this section. It is significant that both
Borkouwer and artwe11 see 'synergism' as the concept
(or notion) which Barth is opposing here, in his
theory of the Knowledge of God. They are quite def¬
inite in saying thic^
It is interesting to note in this connection
that the Roman Catholic interpreter, Bans Urs von
Bulthasar, does not react in this manner to this
exposition of Barth. Yet this is as one might expect:
as a Roman Catholic thinker synergism would not 'raise
his hackles'. It would most likely not be an object¬
ionable concept. Yet the manner in which both
Hartwell aiid Berkouwer explicitly name as "synergism"
that which Barth is opposing, in his theory of know¬
ledge, that is, repeatedly, and in a quite definite
manner, suggests quite strongly that it is not just
our own subjectivity at work.
What is involved here is a crossing of categor¬
ies, that is a picking up of material which has
'authority' or weight in one area of concern (sotei'i-
ology) and crossing with this notion, or material into
1. Berkouwer on p.194; (and on p.196: Barth opposes
"every form of religious autonomy and synergism").
Hartwell on p.52 (in reference to the section of
II/l on natural Theology), also p.172, Bee also
p.186.
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another area of concern ('episteraology' if one uses
the tern very broadly).
•here is a similarity, but not an identity,
between what synergism describes in its normal soter-
iological, context, and what it would describe in its
new, *episteaological' , context: that is, a cooperation
'with grace towards an end. The emotional pull, or
"undertow", would be effected when a writer describes
certain processes of knowing in the sa:.-e terms in
which synergism was condemned initially. (Of course,
one is aware that the force of the emotional pull or
undertow depends to a large extent on the 'authority*
or weight the opposition to synergism has).^
What we see here, essentially, is "guilt by
association". These processes..of thought involving
man's contribution to the knowing of the deity are
condemned by association with a concept usually
abhorrent within Protestantism, synergism: man's
contributing to his salvation by his own efforts.
Conclusion: "undertow in Garth's Theology">
What we see wnen language is used in such a
manner as we have tried to describe here is an example
of the anonymous aphorism: "Language can be a substi¬
tute for thinking." Language is used in such a way
that the writer would 'win* his point without appeal
to man's thinking and decision making process. The.
1. Certainly other factors may be involved as well,
which perhaps one with competence in 'depth
psychology' could, explore*, ee for example, icik
dc lieson on "Guilt and Initiative" in his study of
Luther. Gf. pp.2S7ff* and pp.265ff in Youv; , an
Luther, Gorton, Bew York, 1962.
453
thinking process of the reader is Involved only in an
incidental and supplementary way.
We would venture that when the reader corses to
read Earth he is more likely to he affected by what
we have called undertow, than in other texts. Because
of the way Barth addresses his reader, somewhat in the
ianner of a preacher-prophet, who calls for personal
decision, on© would be of the opinion that this
text would tend to involve the whole person far more
than most theological texts. Thus the reader is more
likely, to be 'present' with his feelings as well as
his thinking processes. lie is therefore probably more
vulnerable to "undertow11 hero than in reading most
texts.
What we see then is a hid:en factor in reading
Barth, Undertow or rather the factors which would
effect it, are not 'out in the open' where the render
can deal with them, lift them up for examination, and
arrive at a decision about them. The undertow 'pulls'
him where he feels, and pulls him in a manner which
can only be articulated with difficulty. iis we have
seen, it is often cloaked in writing that sounds
'objective', and 'factual'. The characterization of
natural theology (above) does not sound emotional.
The 'facts' are reported almost in the manner of a
news report. Thus there is often little hint on the
surface of what lies 'beneath.
1. Hark draws this out. Lee Ulark, p.8.
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What one senses here is a writer of unusual
sensitivity to the nuances and emotional force of words
and concepts of the language he wields,1 an almost
intuitive sense of what approach will yield the most
emotional 'leverage' in a given situation.
what one also senses is often a startling lack
of self-awareness about this very factor in his being.
One gets hints of this lack of self-awareness at
several points. J?hus v/e find Barth sneaking in a
quite rhetorical manner, for example, and yet denying
he is doing so in the same breath. He writes, in
his Gifford Lectures,: "fixe Lcottish Confession
presupposes that Jesus Christ is our life, and we also...
will likevd.se have to presuppose this - and do so in
no rhetorical sense but in all seriousness id in
reality." How he could have said "and we do this in
no supezdicial sense", but he chooses the words
'rhetorical sense'. As G, Clark who cites this pass¬
age observes: "How, Christ nay be the . rince of our
life, the cause of our life, and his' glory may be the
end of our life, but it is rhetoric and not literal
2
statement to sag that Jesus Christ is our life."
Barth seems to lack self-awareness about the emotional
import of his usage, as well as the similar concern of
literary node.
1. Often translators have to amend their translation
with footnotes as to how this phrase alludes to this
or that situation on idea. Or else he speaks of his
need to do so in a preface to the translation.
Of. .evolutionary Theology and nrotest- bought.
2. Clark, p.9.
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While one would not decry the use of -noetic
iaaflgy* and the use of ©vocative phrases in religious
thought or theology, one would argue that these can
be both fairly and unfairly used against one's oppos¬
ition. We would find Berth's usage unfair for the
reason that it is hidden, that is, unacknowledged
and inaccessible to the reader. It remains inaccess¬
ible to his thinking process; and he can make no decis¬
ion about it unless it is lifted up into the open by
himself or an interpreter. In summary we find this
element in Berth to be an attempt to 'ifin' his point
without engaging the thinking process of his reader.
We see it therefore as an unfair.'means'to his'end'.
iostscri t:
n oOukCn jU..i Oiiunn) x*u ■ ■-1X ux*
i
j... i.. j . „ . ..J.HAX'X v/i-i - o.. J, , x .... . -...
Is it possible that there may be something more
involved in "undertow", something which night explain,
in some instances at least, what Barth has described
as "a determination of ones' thought" by 'the Word'. ?"*"
That is, if one were to be absolutely passive in the
face of the emotional force of undertow, is it not
possible that one would experience a determination of
his thoughtV ; That is, experience a determination of
his thought along certain lines, in a manner that all
"synergistic" modes of theological knowledge, for
1. Jee our discussion of this above j pp.41Of.
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example, would not only be felt to be wrong but, if
one allowed this undertow to dominate his attitude,
remaining passive before this emotional force,one would
experience a determination upon himself to consider
these "synergistic" modes of theological thought as
•'wron ;'; the consequence v/ould be that only the
allegedly "non-synergistic" modes of thought could be
considered as "right'1, 'correct"♦
.ere then we see at least the possibility that,
given the passive posture normative for nan in Barthian
thought, one might experience a determination of uis
Uaou; ;ht. let he would experience this by reason of
forces entirely immanent in man's historical-cultural
setting, that is as a result of forces and dynamics
having nothing to do with revelation, "word" and
" .Jvcnt" ,
If this is possible, as we are arguing it is,
then we have found at least one, among -possibly many-,
ways in which man may "experience a determination of
his thought", that is, from factors having nothing to
do with 'revelation1 or '-Event*• Unfortunately, in
such a theological programme as Berth's, a person has
no means of reflecting upon such experiences as would
present themselves as *a determination ox his thought'•
What we have wished to point out aex*e is that, given
a posture of pure passivity which is normative in
Berth's thought, there are most likely many types of
forces which would determine one's thought, and from
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which one v;oul<i receive an experience of a determinat
ion of one's thought. Jlmply to assume th.t one is
being determined, by 'the ford* or revelation strikes
one as more than a little naive.
Chapter V.




UPHEAVAL Hi GiSRKARIG BURQPB AND THIS
Uf Bail's "RALaTICA' TO IRaOIIICH.
At this point in our thesis we might stand bach
from the central themes of our thesis and look at the
political-social-economic setting in which the theolog¬
ical method we have been describing has developed. Our
purpose is to set certain factors from both the setting
and Berth's theological method side by side, and ask
the question as to whether there is a possible
connection between them. Our aim is not to "reduce"
this theology to historical causality in the sense of
a total reduction. Rather, we wish to explore the
possibility that aspects of a person's thought can be
more fully understood if one understands the context
or setting in which they came about. If a person's
thought is to some extent, or in some respects,
affected, or conditioned by his setting this is not
intended to imply a total determination.1
1. One is aware that as he himself is emphasizing
economic factors in what follows in this chapter,
he is most likely conditioned to some extent, or
at least sensitized, by the economic difficulties
of the present in Britain and the Western world
generally. The distinction between "completely
determined" and "partially conditioned" is
important to us also I
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Proce/dural Notes.
We shall then (1) look at certain central aspects
of the setting in which. Berth's thought developed;
(2) ask the question as to whether Barth was sensitive
to these factors (or aspects); and (3) look at a
central aspect of Earth's method in light of these
historical factors, vis-a-vis a possible connection.
In our introduction, we have briefly sketched
three events which in our view are important in under¬
standing the political-econoaic-social setting in
which this theology developeds The Great far, The
Inflation of 1919—1923, and the Depression of 1929-1933#
At that point we took up one of these events1 and in a
preliminary way went into some detail, (1) concerning
the event itself and (2) concerning Berth's reaction#
We did so (1) in order to examine how such an event
could affect people and (2) to examine one of these
events, in the context of the other two listed, in
order that we might refer to it at points throughout
Part II and the early parts of Part III. In the
present chapter, we shall group all three events
together yet shall concentrate our attention on the
two economic catastrophes 1919*-1923 and 1929-1933.
Thus for the first of these events, the Inflation of
1919-1923 v/e shall refer' back to our examination of
this event in Part I. Por the second event, the
Deoression of 1929-1933 v/e shall have to go into more
detail in the present chapter# If some of the material
1. The Inflation of 1919-1923. See above, pp,17f-f.
460
in Part I is explicated again here, one does this in
order to bring these issues into another context from
the one in Part I, that is, in order to explore a
specific concern which we were not able to articulate
yet in that Background Section, yet now having given
our views concerning Berth*s theological method, we
are now able to do so# We shall list our sources for
what follows in a footnote at t is point
The Unsettling Setting,
The Great War of 1914-1919 is typically seen
as the one event which, in the first part of the
Twentieth Century, shook Europe and shook it to the
depths# One is not disputing this# One does not
wish to diminish the significance of this event if one
goes on to set alongside it other events which also
shook Germanic Europe# That the Great War left
much of Europe in ashes, that the human suffering can¬
not be calculated, and the loss of human life, which
can be calculated, was very great, one does not wish
to dispute or diminish* it is certainly the most
obvious factor which deeply shook Europe and Germanic
Europe in particular# Yet the events which shook
Germanic Europe did not stop there#
1# Hajo Holborn, A History of liodern Germany: 1640-1945#
Gyre and Spottiswoode, London 1969 (a recent and
highly respected work, comprehensive in intent);
rurker, vnrooe 1919-4p, .eidenfcld .aid micholson,
London, 1969 (A respected work by an Oxford Historian);
waiter Laqueur, Weimar; a Cultural history# 191S-^^i
Weidenfeld and Lic^olson, London,1974. Others as cited#
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If t ore had bean an untroubled recovery from
the or, the situation night have been fee? different,
hut Europe, and in particular, Germanic Europe, was
not to have an untroubled recovery from this event in
which it had essentially been defeated and very nearly
destroyed.
If economic' difficulties, even economic
catastrophe, seem less tangible sad loss dramatic than
war, perhaps because physical violence and destruction
are not usually present, one should not conclude too
hastily that the effects of economic crisis, ovon
catastrophe upon the broad masses of human beings were
significantly easier to bear. One says effects of
economic crisis and catastrophe upon people; that is,
in this case one is speaking of survivors of an
unprecedented war.
One night find an analogy on a smaller scale.
If we think of a person who has been involved in a
nearly fatal automobile crash, and look in on this
person several weeks later as he is recovering, only
to nave someone inform him that he is redundant, and
his savings have been wiped out by the costs of the
accident, the impact of this news, one would venture,
would be considerably deeper than for one who has all
the time been on his feet.
Germanic Europe was not yet on her feet, in the
early 1920's, or rather after having been brought to
her knees by this war was slowly getting to her feet
•
when the first economic crisis set in, ,4s we have
described in Part I in a section on "The Inflation of
1919-1923this crisis escalated quickly into what
most commentators have seen as a catastrophe; the
effects were deep and lasting. 'The historian Hajo
Holborn has commented1
The inflation of 1919-1923 was a nightmarish
experience to most Germans, and the panic
caused by it was likely to recur whenever the
economy entered critical days, d
Yet this was not the last, but only the first
economic earthquake. If "the panic caused by it was
likely to recur whenever the economy entered critical
days", her critical days wore not over. As Germany
v/as struggling to her foot after this first economic
catastrophe, a second was to envelop her not more than
six years later. It v/as dissimilar from the first,
and to this extent may have proved a puzzling exper¬
ience, for deflation rather than inflation v/as involved.
Hero we shall go into some detail for we have only
noted this event in passing in Fart I,
Thus, in 1929, before the Wall Street Stock
Market Orash, unemployment had already risen to crisis
proportions with 2 million workers unemployed. It
1, cf above, pp.i7ff,
2. ilolborn, a history of Modern Germany: 18-i-Q—1923.
ayre and Spottiswoo&e, London, 'l9w» p.GOO, *
had. risen steadily in the previous two years, 1927-
1929* Id the Wall Street trash was to precipitate
a depression in this situation, economic Historians
point out that this happened in large part because
Germany, and German, industry in particular, was heavily
dependent on sizeable loans from Hew York. Phase were
2
withdrawn after the crash.
After the crash, both the agricultural and the
industrial life of Germany were to deteriorate quickly,
until those unemployed numbered 5 million workers in
the Summer of 1950 and remain near 6 million workers
well into 1953, that is for a period of over three year
Unemployment among the basic labor force had risen,
not to 6>t or 8$, crisis proportions in our own time,
but rather to 45,* - 55s* Germany was again in the
midst of economic catastrophe#
One might note that the Swiss writer Barth,
formerly quite active in Religious Socialism and prob¬
ably de ply sympathetic with these workers, was at this
point engaged in his crucial methodological study of
Anselm, that is, from the Summer of 1930 untile the
Summer of 1951# He was in this period Professor of
theology in Bonn, thut is in northern Germany#
1# Holborn, op#cit,« pp#639—640#
2# R#A•0• Parker, Kurope 1919-45, Weidenfeld and
Hicholson, London, 1969, p#214#
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If one stands back for a moment what does he
see? Germanic iSurope has experienced a second
•economic earthquake', one similar in magnitude to
the first. Like the first it has cut right across
the whole social structure of the land,
t
The "unsettling" effect of both of these economic
catastrophes which we are attempting to lap* out, was
in all probability heightened by the apparent inability
of Germany's political leaders to deal with these
crises, ihat is, from the viewpoint of the vast
numbers of peoples who experienced these events, and
their effect upon the material basis on which life
depended, the experience of extreme uncertainty was
most probably not compensated by confidence in the
ability of the leaders to cope with these crises,
ihus inflation raged for four years before any decisive
and effective measure was taken, that is, any measure
which reversed this trend, Ike second crisis was
also to rage, essentially unreversed, for four years
until the German nation found a "resolution" of sorts
in "National Socialism" and its economic programme.
Thus the effect of these crises must be seen
both against the backdrop of a devestating and unpre¬
cedented war, and in light of a form of government,
a democratic republic, which was essentially new to
1, cf below.
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the German people, whose leaders were an arently unable
to cope with these crises for long periods of tine,
ire "unsettling" effect of tre crises themselves was
most probably heightened by this apparent lack of
effective leadership•
if "Angst" had become an especially important
word in German life in tnese times one can understand
here at least some reasons why. for on top of a war
which had threatened the physical existence of many
with destruction, these economic catastrophes threat¬
ened their physical existsace in another manner. It
had brought into jeopardy the means by which, and the
basis upon which they have fed and housed themselves,
fhat is, among the many other factors involved in an
economic crisis, the very basis of their physical
existence has been thrown into question. 'the primit¬
ive needs, without which even cave man could not sur¬
vive, nave been threatened.
ihus, for vast numbers of people and that
included "intellectuals" as well as workers and
employees in middle and upper classes, the economic
firmament was experienced as unstable, undependable
and unsettling. These events had an unstabalizing
effect.
fhe View of 'General1st* historian s.
- " """—— 1 xsr
At this point we might stand back from the
situation we have been describing and turn to
* gerieralist* Historians concerned with this period of
Germanic history and ask the question whether in their
estimation these econooic crises had the deep and
persuasive efiect upon life in Germany which we are
suggesting* If for example in the opinion of ,gener-
alist* .istorians these economic catastrophes signif¬
icantly shaped the political life of Germany, vis-a-vis
the "successful" takeover of Hazism, we have a sounder
basis upon which to see these economic catastrophes
as deeply significant in the lives of the German people.
(j?hat is, in answering our question as to the depth of
the effect of these economic events, upon the lives of
the people of Germany, 'hie effect of these events upon
the political life of Germany should give us some
indication of their impact).
Firstly we might lay out an issue which we have
only mentioned in passing: namely that the mass of
people who peopled the landscape of Germany cannot
simply be seen as a homogeneous mass. Certainly
t.-ere were "blue collar" workers industrial and agric¬
ultural; white collar workers of government and
business; officials of private industry and state;
leaders of industry and state, and so forth. Yet
there were also those involved in the arts, the
humanities and the sciences, those creative, explorative
and articulate• In talking of the broad masses we
hevo also been talking of a Heidegger, a Buber, a
Schoenberg, a Planck. And we have also been talking
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of Bartb for wlio:. Germany was "hone" in this ■ eriod,
1921-1954. In short, in talking of the "broad masses
who peopled Germany, we have also been talking of those
who are often loosely termed "intellectuals". They
also shared Germany's plight in this era.
Let us then ask ho;; the Historians viewed the
plight of these varied masses of German people in. this
era. e have already cited the Historian "olborn's
statement about the Inflation crisis of 1919-192pf
namely that
..he inflation of 1919-1925 was a night¬
marish experience to most Germans, and
the panic caused by it was likely to recur
whenever the economy entered critical
days. 1
In iolborn's view the effect of the Inflation crisis
for most Germans was both deep and lasting: the panic
caused by it was likely to recur whenever the economy
entered critical days. as we have noted, the German
economy did in fact re-enter perilous days, not more
then 6-7 years later.
Let us now turn to another Historian concerned
with this period, H.A.G. Parker, and look with him
upon these economic crises. levy briefly, it is
Parker's view that these economic crises form a factor
of considerable import-ace in understanding the sudden
swing toward one extreme of the political s ectrum in
1. kolborn, o ,cit., p.400.
the "brief period, 1930-1933, that is the "triumph" of
Nazism,*"
Parker points out that as late as the election
of 1928, the extreme left, namely the Communist Party
had far more popular suo ort than the Nazi Party,
Dhus, i:i the election of 1928, the Nazi's did very
poorly compared with the Communists:
,C.j,A,P, (Nazi Party): 0,810 million votes,
il,i),P, (Communist Party): 3*200 million
votes, 2
fhe Jocial Democrats, the solid supporters of repub¬
lican government, retained their primary place with
9*1 million. One notes, in fact, that the Nazi Party
was at its lowest ebb at this point, in 1928, that is
before the economic crisis deepened into catastrophic
Depression, Pox*, by way of contrast, four years
earlier, in 1924, the Nazi's had commanded a sizeable
vote of almost 2 million votes, vis-a-vis the Communist
vote of 3*6 million. Proa this low ebb of popular
support in 1928, the Nazi vote was to undergo a swift
and dramatic change, Thus two years later, in 1930,
that is, immediately after the Hew York Stock market
Crash., the Nasi vote had suddenly risen from 0,810
million to 6,333 million, Shere was a swing to both
political extremes at this point for the Communist
1, coo .vurope 1919—13, p,212,
2, All voting figures quoted from R,A,C» Parker,
gurope 1919—45, p,222.
vote also rose, from 3«2 million to 4.5 million. The
'center* parties were losing ground; and with, them the
democratic structure of the Weimar Republic was slowly
sinking.
It was two years later, in the decisive elect¬
ion of July 1932, that it was finally evident which
political extreme would triumph in this political
upheaval. In July of 1932 the Nazi vote L d risen
.aticully from 6 million votes to 13 million votes.
In doing so, it nad outpolled its nearest rival (and
supporter of the Democratic Republic), the social
Democrats, by almost 6 million votes. It had actually
captured over 1/3 of the total vote, and in so doing
had secured the largest number of seats in the
Reichstag. It was now in a position to take power.
One sight note the swing to both the "right"
and the "left" extremes of the political spectrum in
these four years. for example the Com unlst Party
had risen in popular vote from 3.2 million in 1928 to
4,5 million in 1930, and still higher to £.0 million
in December of 1932, thus coming-in third among the
multitude of parties. In the opinion of most histor¬
ians, disencnaiitment with Republican Government, with
the Weimar Republic, in its Democratic form, had
s-owbulled.
1, Because of the political pluralism, with votes yet
being divided up between numerous parties, the Kazis,
while they did not have an absolute majority, had
enough power in hind to fox»ce their way from this
point.
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Now we might stand back from this brief sketch
of Germany's drift into totalitarianism to look at
how our them© of economic upheaval and crisis fits
into this picture#
in the view of most historians the economic
upheavals and crises 1919-1955 were a significant
factor in the drift of the German people toward total¬
itarianism. SUA.G# Parker states this view most
strongly•
The great question of these years 1919-1959
is; how did hitler secure control of
Germany? Germany was the only advanced
country, advanced that is, in its standard
of living and its level of education, that
fell into the hands of an irrational
dictatorship# The most plausible explan¬
ation lies in the economic fluctuations of
the period between 1913 and 1935 and their
social and political consequences# It is
clear that opposition to democracy rose
and fell in. harmony with movements in
prosperity,1
Parker goes on to explore this theme, stating that;
These violent fluctuations and the hard¬
ships they brought would have tested the
power of survival of any old-established
suid revered form of government# The
democratic Weimar republic was new and was
not revered#c-
Parker sees a complex set of forces at work in this
setting, yet sees these economic upheavals and disas¬
ters which we have been describing as the factors which
1# R. xt , J # Parker, Purope 1919-4-5« p#212
2# Parker, p#215#
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most deeply affected the Gere:an people,
We have taken this side-track into the political-
social sphere in order to ask the question as to whether
those economic crisos were events which were ie.ply sig¬
nificant ' for the groat masses of Germxi people,
With the help of Historians llolborn and Parker* we can
now say more definitely? yes. If these economic
crises had such a pervasive influence on the course
of Germany's political life, this can be seen us an
indication of how deeply these events shook the vast
masses of German epeople.
As we have pointed out, these vast masses of
people included not only 'blue collar' and 'white
collar' workers, officials of industry and government,
and so forth, but also involved those in the humane*
ities, the arts, and the sciences, creative thinners
of this period, keen from another aspect, these
vast masses included church-goer*, clergy and theolog¬
ians, that is, those who were to find Barthianisn so
welcome in this period,
he come lastly to Berth himself, is there
reason to believe that he, as most others, found these
events unsettling, deeply affecting?
The Question of the effect of these .conoaic irises
up on Earth,
At this point we may refer back to art I
where we explored Earth's letters for his reaction to
the Inflation of 1919-1923#"*" Here we found that
Berth's reaction was one of amazement and shock.
i'aere is on the one hand wonderment over how day to
day life actually continues in the face of these events.
In May of 1923 he writes: " . ,.Everything moves on in
its course. lhat is the remarkable thing. One
stands amazed and shocked. One feels that he is
2
completely in the dark...." On the other hand,
there is not only wonderment over how life in general
goes on in the face of these events, but how people
and specifically Darth himself goes on, in the face
of these events. We find this latter both in his
letter* of May 1923, and in his letter of December 1923.
In May: "...One feels that he is completely in the
dark, and yet lives on nevertheless in his corner,
itself relatively transparent, and humanly speaking
he draws his life out of this corner."
fhe inflation is to rage on for another seven
months. In December of 1923 Barth first writes
generally; "On the whole, man is not to be destroyed,
even though in individual instances he takes a severe
beating." he then goes on to speak specifically of
himself: "One notices above all in oneself how
indestructibly one noes on living in the midst of all





the apocalyptic events•" (Bartl *3 emphasis). 2his
last sentence is somewhat cryptic, yet the general
sense would seem to be wonderment, a .iaze cnt over the
fact that one "goes on" living in tUo midst of these
p
"apocalyptic events,"" while countless others aro
simply "ground under the wheels.
Loth of these comments, first in the letter of
".ay 1925» and then in the letter of )ece;.:ber 1923,
appear to be highly personal, that is, as reflecting
how Lqrth himself as a human, being is reacting to
these events.
i?roin Barth's comments, one would venture that
he, like many others, found tnese events deeply
unsettling. If he refers to his own amazement and
lL
•smock over these events, perhaps he has.articulated
his own reaction well enough. One need not add more•
.-.lien the second economic crisis occurs wo find
Berth in Bonn, entering upon his study of Anselia, and
reformulating his method. We have no reason to
think t.-at Berth should have been less sensitive to
this second economic crisis than to the first. It
seems unlikely that a man of 37 years (in 1923) should
1. p.158.
2. Given the poetic looseness one finds in Barth's
letters generally, there is no reason to take
"apocalyptic events" in a literal sense.
3. Barth's remark in the Hay letter, that "it is quite
impossible for anything else to happen that
countless people should silently be ground under
the wheels." R.I.k., p.l'l-1.
R.'f.n., p.l'rl.
,
e.i.mje substantially, in this respect, by the age of
44,1
jCOuo.,ic Instability ami Ideological stabilization.
file question could be raised: .by does one go
on at length about economic factors in a thesis concern¬
ed with religious thought? Essentially because both
concern people. Here our concern has been with people
who could not find stability, even relative stability,
in an important area of their life. Yet among these
oeoole were a writer and many willing readers who, in
this very situation, were actually to find stability
and settledness in another way. One wishes at this
point to olace these two things side by side, the
economic-political situation and the theological
elements, the relation to tradition, in the hope that
one could better understand why this theologian, in
tne context of his hearers, in this period might opt
for a type of relation to tradition which we have been
outlining in our thesis, that is, a relation to trad¬
ition in which all e ssentials are regarded as
"settled" and not open to question.
Berth*a -■ . , i . y ui . ... . -• • -..ion.
Gould it be that a creative thinker, the
theologian Garth, formerly an active 'Religious
p
socialist' sensitive to this crisis not only as. go
1. (Barth's letters during this period are not yet
published)•
2. IhiTt IT pp.51f«
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how it was "unsettling" for himself, but also for the
vast mass of workers on whose behalf he had labored
ten years before, and surrounded on every side by crisis,
economic and political crisis, nignt find solace in
turning to the work of another creative thinker,
ft. anselm of Canterbury, in which he was to find an
ua crisis, and in which ne was to find fir;.,
foundations in the midst of b;;is situation of rapid
cuonge and upheaval, that is, firm foundations outside
the economic and political arena? In addition,
could it be that ^urth found these firm foundations
in wuat he (in our view, mistakenly) saw as ..uiseln'a
relation to tradition, a relation to tradition bant
we find hin making his own after c«1930? dais is a
sup.-osition of course, namely tnat harth found solace
in this tine of 'testing' in turning to Anselm, and
further, in making his own the relation to tradition
he "found" in hnselia. Yet there is evidence which
points in this direction. ..right years later, in 1)39,
he speaks of the satisfaction this study of .cieelm Las
given him: "Among all my books, 1 regard this as the
one written with the greatest satisfaction.""'' Of
course one grants that this study of anselm .:.ay have
been highly satisfying for other reasons also, in
addition to the one we are suggesting. let is it
1. iiow I Changed "y find, Knox, Richmond 1996, p.43«
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possible that Barth has found here in Anselra a peace
and tranquility that transcended the crises that
surrounded him and his fellows on every side?
Even at this very point, in the summer of 1930,
as Barth embarked upon the composition of his book on
Anselm, the political firmament of Germany was slowly
disintegrating within the context of the catastrophic
Depression which has come upon it# 'Hie Muller Govern¬
ment has resigned in March (of 1930), unable to push
its harsh economic measures through the Reichstag#
Only four months later the Brunning Government tries
to force its economic measures by Emergency Residential
Decree, after their defeat in the Reichstag, only to
have this Decree legally quashed by the Reichstag#
The Brunning Government falls, the second Government
to fall in five months# Elections are called as
political violence, murders and street riots increase#
The Government has collapsed in the face of devastating
Depression.
Barth, undoubtedly sensitive to this situation,
retires to his study and ponders Anselm# What does
he find? He speaks of "the absense of crisis in
Anselm*s theologizing" and how this characterizes the
whole of Anselms work# The context in which Barth
speaks of this "absense of crisis" is perhaps of pert¬
inent significance. For it tells us why in Earth's
477
mind crisis is absent front this theology* It is
because "Anselm always has the solution of his problems
already behind him ... through faith in the impartial
good sense of the decisions of ecclesiastical authority"?"
It is Anselm's (allegedly) unquestioning ascent to 'the
Credo1, the decisions of ecclesiastical authority,
which cotaes to the fore here. Thus it would appear
that in Earth's mind "the characteristic absence of
crisis in Ansel®'s theologizing" is directly connected
with, and can be understood only in terms of Anselm's
(alleged) relation to tradition (that is, 'the Credo*,
as embodying the decisions of ecclesiastical authority)#"
In this relation to tradition, all basic quest¬
ions (regarding, for example, the truth of elements of
Tradition) are regarded as settled at the outset.
The elements of 'the Credo' are never to be called into
question subsequently. A page later Earth states
that "A science of faith, which denied or even quest¬
ioned the Faith - the Credo of the Church - would
"A
ipso facto cease to be either 'faithful' or 'scientific'."
It is hero that Barth finds the reason for the
c
absence of crisis in Angela's theologyt there is
(allegedly) only unquestioning assent to 'the Credo',
1. A.A.0.1.« pp.25, 26.
2. This connection becomes clear in the context of
Earth's writing# Gf A.F.Q.I., pp#25» 26.
3#a»F.Q»I». p.27. (emphasis added)
or Tradition in Anselm's theology. All the essentials
are regarded as settled, intact and not open to quest¬
ion. The task of theology, in this regard, is only
to reflect upon the elements of 'the Credo', drawing
out their interconnections and in so doing seeking
for deeper understanding of the Faith, "the Credo
that has already been spoken and affirmed."
It is interesting to note that it is precisely
at this point that we have found Barth most at variance
with other interpreters of Anoelm, and also unsupoox't-
able, namely, as regards what amounts to a fundanental-
p
istic relation to 'the Credo' or Tradition.
Here in the midst of an unsettling situation,
one which, as we have seen, oust have been unsettling
to Barth as well as multitudes of others, we find that
Barth has found stability and settledness. He has
found it in Anselm's (alleged) relation to Tradition,
and he has subsequently made this relation to
Tradition his own.-5
Our supposition is that this move into such a
relation to tradition can most likely be understood
more adequately when it is viewed against the backdrop
1. A.F »Q) .X . , p • 2*7 •
2. Gee above, Fart IIj pp.236ff.
5. As we have been attempting to show in Fart III it
is this element of Berth's interpretation of
Anseln, unquestioning assent to 'the Credo' or
Tradition which Barth has taken over and made a
central and basic element of his own theological
method.
of the chaos, confusion, upheaval and change which has
destabilized the whole life-world of the people who
inhabited Germany.,
Conclusion*
In supporting our contention that economic and
political factors ought to be taken into consideration
in understanding this basal element of Earth's
theology we have pointed out that Earth,like most
other people in Germanic xhirope was sensitive to these
events, and in the case of the Inflation of 1919-1925
we know that it made a deep impression upon him*"*"
We have also seen that surrounded on every side
by crisis, political and economic, in 1930-1931 Earth
was to find a "characteristic absense of crisis" in
Anselffl's theology, and that he himself was to name
the reason for this absense of crisis: the type of
relation to tradition he found in Anselm's thought*
We have tried to show in Part III that this
relation to tradition which Earth allegedly finds in
Axiselm forms a key to the process of thought in
Earth's Dogmatics: it is a basal element of his 'work¬
ing method in his Dogmatics*
What we have tried to do in this present chap¬
ter is to go back to the context, that is, the polit-
1. is we have pointed out,letters from 1924 onwards
are not yet published, or are in the process just
now of being published. Thus we have dealt with
Earth's reaction to the first crisis, rather than
the second*
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ical and economic setting, to see whether there are
factors there which could help us better understand
the type of relation to tradition Barth has taken up.
Our contention is that by understanding factors which
deeply shook the life-world of people in this place
and period, one can better understand why they should
seek factors, even if in another sphere (theological
as opposed to political), which would give stability
and some amount of "settledness" in a deeply "unsett¬
ling" situation, There is} in fact, a "settledness"
and stability to be found in Barth's type of relation
to Tradition. There is no questioning of these
"essentials" of the faith; there is only unquestioning
assent. Essentially the only question is the quest¬
ion of content.
One has chosen to avoid a "tight" argument in
regard to the theme of this chapter and chosen instead
to place these two things, the political and economic
setting and the relation to tradition side by side,
selecting factors from each which seem relevant, and
placing these together with what evidence we have been
able to find, for example from Barth's Anselm and his
autobiographical article of 1939* Our aim has been
(1) to argue for the contention that the extremely
unsettled economic and political situation should be
taken into account in trying to understand why Barth
took up the type of relation to tradition we are
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describing in Part III,"*" and further (2) to argue for
the great likelihood that these factors did in fact
influence the development of Earth's thought, at this
very basic methodological level, the type of relation
to tradition he took up and put into effect#
Post Conclusion#
If we have found factors which were unsettling,
even deeply unsettling for the Germanic people in our
brief study of the economic upheavals against the back-
2
drop of the Great V/ar, we shall in a following chapter
find additional factors}unsettling in nature}which
will "build into" the factors we have laid out# That
is, when taken together with the economic factors, the
1# Of course in looking at other factors which might
have shaped the development of Berth's method one
could also look at the rise of Nazism, and at the
possibility that Berth's thought took shape over
against this threat to the integrity of Protestant,
and Catholic thought in Germany. Yet one should
note that Hitler took power in 1933 only after a
large swing toward national -Socialism in the
elections of 1930 and 1932# Yet Earth's crystal-
ization of this type of relation to tradition
shows forth in his Anseln which was written between
the Summer of 1930 and the Summer of 1931» that is,
before the surge toward Nazism had taken shape.
Yhis does not rule out the possibility that Barth's
reaction to National Socialism shaped the course
of his methodological development aftex* c,1930#
Yet this is a separate question#
2# below# pp#483ff#
unsettling effect is heightened, making the need for
finding solid, "settled" factors a need of great signif¬
icance.
The additional unsettling factor which we shall
explore in a following chapter is the "unsettlevant"
accomplished in the realm of theology, that is,
accomplished by the 'Dialectical Theologians', Barth
chief among them. he refer to the revolt against 19th
century liberalism in which the latter was,to a great
extent}overthrown. Very briefly, what we shall say
in this later chapter is that these "unsettlers" had
so rent apart 19th century liberalism and so left it
broken into pieces, in this first period 1915-1925»
that surrounded with their destructive results, with
essentially no constructive effort accomplished, they
themselves might have found their own "unsettleeient11
of the theological realm unsettling. Thus, for
example, near the end of this first period Barth was
to turn to Heppe's Dogmatics and highly prise its
orderly exposition (in contrast to the 'disorderly
exposition' of a Luther). Here was order and settled-
ness in the midst of the "unsettloment" Barth had both
experienced and accomplished. This theme of finding
settledness and stability we shall pursue further in
this later chapter.^
1. below#^ tcie section which follows#
*W.3
Section B>
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We have been trying to explore and draw out
several themes in our thesis, themes which interlock
at points and are interrelated, Now it is time to
select two of these themes and try to elucidate them.
We are choosing to do so by finding a parallel in
another discipline, as organic and changing in its
development as the discipline of theology.
While many lecturers in Historical btudies
state that in the course of their work, references
must be made outside the narrow confines of the spec¬
ified area, to other historical movements, processes
etc., we note that this intention often lacks fulfil¬
ment, We do not propose to follow such a precedent.
In the midst of our study, we choose to put this
concept to work.
Our intention then is to elucidate and draw
out two of our themes as we discover both a parallel,
and within this parallel, a contrast with the process
by which Barth became Barta. Central to both the
parallel and the contrast is the relation to tradition
which we have been exploring in our thesis.
Though one here crosses a boundary into another
4S4-
discipline, that of the creation of music, and the
historical discipline concerned with this, one is
not unaware of the difficulties of being "out of his
own depth," If we shall stumble at times in under¬
standing what has gone on in this other discipline,
this is a risk we recognize and choose to take. We
shall indicate our sources fox4 the history of music
1
at this point in a footnote.
We find a parallel with the development of
Earth's theology in the development of Western . .usic
in the first half of the Twentieth Century. Let us
turn to these composers and look firstly at their
2
setting. These composers inherited a world in
which music and literature were closely bound up.
In the nineteenth Century, Romantic 'writers often saw
music as the highest expression of their ideals. for
their part, composers often saw themselves as articul¬
ating the highest ideals of the ideational realm,
concretizing these ideals fluidly into anisic. Both
1. Joseph : achlis, Introduction to Contemporary . usic,
Norton, hew fork, 1962 (a standard work),
Ronald Jay Grout, A History/' of western a usic, Norton,
hew York,1910 (a major and respected work in this
field); Alfred Einstein, .rustc in the Romantic .ara;
A -Istory of Lusical Thought/£n'"tLe lQth CenturyT
i.orton, new York, 1947. Other sources as cited.
2. Our main source here is Alfred Einstein's respected
work, husic iri the Romantic Era: A History of
nusical Thought in' the "uineteentn Century, . orton,
Lew York, I'j^y. Bee" pp. 20ff.
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composer and writer peopled roughly the sar.e thought-
world, though with major and minor scuffles between
them (e.g. Wagner and l.ietzsche against Brahms).
Yet there were uniting bonds: l.T.A. Hoffmann, for
example, whose very early Romantic novels were a
stimulus both to the literary and the musical sides
of this commonly shared ground. This common ground
between art, literature and philosophy is something
rarely seen in our own century. Thus, for example,
the off and on ideational friendship between Wagner,
the composer of Operatic usic Dramas, and nietzsche,
writer and philosopher, does not so .ehow seem out of
place in the nineteenth Century, where, if there were
this kind of friendship (i.e. ideational kinship)
between, for example, a Sartre and a Schoenberg, in
oiir own time, this would seem much more remarkable.
There was, apparently a fragmentation
between the humanities and the arts near the end of
the nineteenth Century. We shall find this frag¬
mentation of the arts and the humanities reflected
in the development of both figures with whoa we shall
be concerned: Igor Stravinsky and Karl Barth.
We shall try to lift out parallels and cont¬
rasts in the development of these two men in order
to illustrate and elucidate Earth's own development
in two major dimensions: (1) Earth's relationship to
nineteenth Century Protestantism, and (2) Earth's
relationship to Tradition. We shall also investi-
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gate a third dimension after treating these two:
Barth's relationship to the humanities, philosophy
and anthropology in particular.
If one should say that such a comparison
between a major theologian and a major composer is
futile, since composers compose music, and do not
reflect upon their work i.e., are not also thinkers,
this simply is not true, While, admittedly, some
composers of the early Twentieth Century remained
literarily silent, the central figures were usually
quite articulate concerning the issues they faced."'
A Basic Pattern in the Development of Barth and
Stravinsky.
The basic pattern one sees in t :e development
of both Barth and Stravinsky is (1) a revolt against,
and repudiation of}their immediate predecessors; this
was followed by (2) the establishment of a relation¬
ship with a more distant past*
Let us look firstly at Stravinsky's development
with these two aspects in mind. In the eyes of an
historian of Western Music, the three ballets of
Stravinsky c. 1910-15 Orhe firebird", "Petrouschka'j and
"The kite of Spring) do not represent a minor disagree-
1. Of. for example Sohoenberg's lengthy writings on
composition. Stravinsky himself has been quite
prolific literarily about issues concerning the
nature and purpose of music, in disagreement with
alleged nineteenth Century viewpoints.
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meat with the immediate past, nor indeed a major dis¬
agreement# Oonsclous revolt and repudiation would
be more fitting expressions. Stravinsky was appar¬
ently well aware of his "differences" with "estab¬
lished" musical practice, and later acknowledged his
fears concerning the reaction of the "established"
musical figures of Ravel, Debussy etc., to the
premieres of his ballets in Paris at this time.
It was music that intended to have nothing to
do with the music of the immediate past, and thought
of itself as purified of Romantic sentiment, finesse
and elegance. Historians, though, will usually
point out how dependent Stravinsky and others were
on the immediate past for the "tools" with which they
smashed this past. For example new methods in
orchestration,(the way a composer could wield an
orchestra), developed by Stravinsky's teacher, Rimsky-
Korsakoff, Richard Strauss and others, were taken over
1. He found that his fears were somewhat unjustified.
Taken seriously ill with a possibly fatal infect¬
ion, he remarks that Diagelev, who produced the
ballets refused to visit him, possibly for fear
of catching this (possibly lethal,) infection.
Yet both Ravel and Debussy came. Puccini also
came - to pay a visit to this young Russian who
was in effect overthrowing their own mode of
musical practice. (The musical public of Paris
had been less than tolerant towards Stravinsky's
Ballets. A raucous riot had taken place at the
preraidre of "The Rite of Spring"). Of. Stravinsky's
autobiographical note, intended as an addendum
to his autobiography, issued with a special record¬
ing of his Petrouschka (1911) in 1962.
See G.B.S. ho. M.S.6552.
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and used in order to give vent to the musical forces
nltnin him.1
fuming to a ore distant fast*
After this disruptive period in the musical
realm which involved revolt and repudiation, there
was a turning to a more distant past; a turning for
resources needed for construction. Here (beginning
at about 1920) we find the beginning of a period of
quite self conscious Neo-classicism: a conscious
attempt to work within self-imposed limitations,
limitations which were regarded as having their source
2
in this more distant Classical past. As to what
1. Barth also used aspects from tne immediate past
in order to smash this past. It could be argued
that his use of certain elements taken over from
..ierkegaard, Overbeck and Bostoevsky enabled him
to fracture iinetemth Century Liberalism.
2. Stravinsky was only one of a number of composers
who turned in a neo-classical direction (Hindemith,
ioulenc, Hon eger etc.). The term "Leo-classical"
is a broad one, indicating the use of musical forms
tanen from Classical, baroque and even pre-baroque
periods (that is from c.1600-1790). let perhaps
Just as importantly, it was capturing the spirit
of composing which they found in this period.
According to the i'eo-classical composers, music
in this period had little or nothing to do with
the expression of feeling, whether personal or
communal. . usic wa3 to express "musical ideas"
(motifs and patterns formed by the arrangement of
notes) not emotion or visual image. Laturally the
historical accuracy of this view of the .eo-classicists
concerning music of the Classical and naroque periods
is open to question. If one doubts that this
^eo-classical turn was important or prominent in
Ctravinsky, it was not less than prominent in his
own mind, //hen, later, after this :ieo-classical
period, a critic chided him for imitating i.ozart,
Stravinsky replied: "Imitate ozart? I stole himl"
(From concert notes, BBC hadio Three, pOth Lovember
1974. deported there as a reliable quote).
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this Neo-classical turn meant, in concrete terms, we
shall explore this as we go on to compare the manner
in which otravinsky appropriates from the Classical
past with the manner in which Barth appropriates from
his Classical past, that is from Early Church Tradit¬
ion. But let us first look at Earth's development
up to 1932, and its similarities with the development
of Stravinsky.
Cae xarallei with Earth's development.
Here we find a parallel with the development
of Barth, which we have described in Part I of our
tresis. In Barth too we find conscious revolt, even
repudiation of the imiaediate past,with the publication
of the several editions of his hosierbrief. .e nave
also found that after this period of revolt and repud¬
iation (c.1915-1923; there was a turning to a more
distant past, specifically to the orthodoxy of marly
Church creeds and dogmas. We find this clearly as
he begins to lecture on dogmatics in 1924, and prog¬
resses toward his methodological study of Anselm in
1931, where 'the Credo* or the articles of belief of
the Jarly Church have a very prominent place.
delation to Tradition; the Contrast.
If we find Barth appropriating the whole of
the main lines of 'the Credo' of the Early Church,
that is the whole of Carl/ Church tradition, in a
relationship which is 'binding', obligatory and
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unquestioning, we find a much looser and perhaps more
facilitating relation to "Classical" tradition in
Stravinsky and the i.eo-classicists.1
The 'Credo' of the Classical period of music
contained many aspects: Classical harmonic practice
Classical rythmic praotice, Classical forms, that is;
rather rigidly prescribed formats for the lay-out of
the music. The Classical 'Credo' also contained a
conception of what music was meant to be. One
should say "conceptions" for naturally there was a
diversity of viewpoint, yet a diversity which usually
converged at important points.
Yet it was in the interpretation of this
Classical conception of music that Stravinsky and the
eo-classicists drew most aeavily upon the 'Classical'.
Thus, in this (interpreted) conception, music was not
2
the vehicle of feeling, as it was for the Romantics;
nor was music a means toward expression of literary
or ' rogrammatic' ends. The highest musical express¬
ion was seen as occurring in music which had no extra-
musical associations (e.g. Bach's Brandenburg Concertos,
hozart's Symphonies)•
1. In the following, "Classical Tradition" and "Class¬
ical period" might be misleading terms. Stravinsky
and his fallow iieo-clas3icists meant by this term,
essentially The Baroque and Classical periods of
music. That is, roughly, from 1600-1790. At times
they also included the Renaissance Period under
this heading.
2. here their interpretation is usually seen as most
open to question.
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Yet on the other hand, if Stravinsky and the
Leo-classicists drew heavily on what they saw as the
'Classical' conception of music, they felt little
obligation to use other aspects of 'the Credo' of
the 'Classical' composers. For, needless to say,
they chose to reject, in the main, the accepted har¬
monic practice of the 'Classical' composers. This
applied equally as well to rhythmic practice, or
'respect' for bar lines, ,/ith form (the layout of
composition) they felt free to use what they found
worthy, and freely adapt what they did not.
ihus the Clas ical 'Credo' was a source which
was drawn upon selectively. It was not viewed as
something "binding, imperative and authoritative.""'"
It was not assented to in an unquestioning manner.
In summary, there is a looseness in this relation to
the past, to tradition, a freedom to select what is
found to bo of value, to set aside what is not.
delation to tae ..ineteenth Century.
Another contrast within this parallel between
Barth and Stravinsky concerns relation to the recent
past, the 19th century which was repudiated in the
initial period. In contrast to Barth who never
essentially revised his opinion vis-a-vis nineteenth
Century Liberalism, (that is, it re ained repudiated
1. earth's words concerning the creeds, O.D.1/2. p.648.
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more or loss in toto as he took his 'Neo-classical'
turn), Stravinsky came to reassess aspects of 19th
century practice. Perhaps as an expression of newly
found fondness for the repudiated 'fatners' he
composed a full ballet in which he took up the music
of Tchaikovsky and "re-composed" it, preserving both
themes and elements of the harmonic structure of
Tchaikovsky's music, yet altering a bit here, a bit
there until it had a distinctive Stravinskian character
Here the anger and the repudiation had been transcended
A selective and critical appreciation of the recent
past had emerged. ..e find no such critical apprec¬
iation emerging in Barth after c.1920. nineteenth
Century Liberalism remained for him, up to the end of
his life something essentially to be abhorred. It
remained a serious "wrong turn" in the development
of Protestant Theology, which he along with others
had to "set right". In contrast, Barth's former
comrade, Bultmann, found much worthy in ineteenth
Century Liberalism, while yet not all of Nineteenth
Century Liberalism could be seen as worthy. Bultmann
was not alone among Barth's former comrades in finding
worthy elements in this recent past; Tillicii and
Gogarten also found elements of value. Rather it
would appear tliat Barth was essentially alone, among
the major figures of Protestant theology in his almost
total abhorrence of this recent past.
H. "ho ...jaiser de la x-'oe" ("The fairy's Kiss"), 1928.
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A possible Reason for the "neo-classical" 'Turn in
art . a .1 ..jtravinsl"/.
Why could a Leo-classical turn seem attractive
and even needed, for both of these figures? After
a period of fracturing the recent past, a period of
upheaval, and loss of stability (in each respective
field), one could wall understand if there were a wish
for stabilizing elements, for deep "ballast"; the wish,
for example, for a distant past, where everything
seemed "settled". In typical Protestant (and Cath¬
olic) views, and from Berth's viewpoint, most .a^or
questions of dogma received their basic s .ape by the
end of the 'Classical' period of Christian theology
(be period of the iSarly Church creeds and dogmas).
Orthodox belief had received rather definite formul¬
ation, at least in its essentials. There was a
"settledness" here, where basic questions of belief
had actually been settled. Likewise, for Stravinsky,
and his fellow Leo-classicists, the nature Baroque
and the mature Classical periods of the history of
music had a "settled" quality. Here there were
settled, well established forms and procedures. Thus
in both fields there was a stabilizing quality which
could be gained by a "Neo-classical" turn. fhat each
of them had done in their respective fields had been
quite "unsettling", not only for their contemporaries,
but perhaps also for the "unsettlers".
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T..e .,uest for t e "Autonomy" of tho discinline:
^mother parallel between Garth and ....>traviQGi:.y.
In this Neo-classical turn which each ade in
'
ills own way one .sees another parallel, and within
this :arallel, a contrast. Gach was concerned in
his own way with the integrity and "autonomy" of his
disci-line. 4;is was against the bac.drop 01 the
hineteentu Century, in which each saw his own
discipline as threatened by being subsumed under, or
appended to other discipline®.
in the view of the neo-classical composers,
.usic wa^ in danger of loosing its essential integrity
and hod actually lost its essential integrity at point
in the nineteenth Century by being subsumed to "extra-
musical •• aterlal or ideas.
Shis had happened to the most re arkable degree
in their view, in the productivity of diehard aoner,
mere music had been taken up into a'hi her" art form,
and had become completely subservient to the ai; .s and
goals of this "higher" art form. The art form in
question was the tusic drama. The central ai.: of
the husic brana was the embodiment and expression of
specific ura.v.atic Content, for example, Germanic myth,
t e idea of the Super-man, etc. The era:a was the
centre. The i usic was only a means to an end, that
is, a oans of express! ; the uraa.
%
It was not only in Wagner that the Geo-class-
icists saw this happening. It was, in their view,
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happening all across the board, albeit in other ways.
. usic was subservient to extra-musical material in
the Ton® Poems of a Liszt Just as much as in the
"bone Painting"of a Debussy and a kavel. In the
formert music was subservient to extra-musical mater¬
ial » for here music was only a means of giving express¬
ion to the "story" or literary idea of the Tone Poem.
In the latter, in Debussy and lavel, music was seen
as subservient to the "picture" it was to "paint".
Thus in Debussy's La her, for example, music was to
evoke the sea. Again an extra-musical element had
become central. In all of these examples, music
was seen as a . .oars, toward extra-musical expression,
not as an end in itself. It was seen as a means to
other e ids. It was thus in danger of losing its
essential integrity, in danger of losing its ability
to stand on its own, apart from drama, story or image.
faus we have a parallel of sorts with the way
in which Barth, and others, viewed the tgeological
situation viz-a-vis the 19th century, In which theol¬
ogy too was seen to have its "autonomy" at stake,
that .is, threatened with being swallowed up into
"anthropology" and philosophy".
V/hat is of interest in this parallel is the
contrast, that is the contrast between the type of
"autonomy" pursued by Barth and that pursued by
Stravinsky.
In Btravinsky's development, this aim was
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pursued in a stronghanded and definite .manner yet
in a manner which did not involve cutting off rolat-
ions with adjacent fields, Bhus one finds a
co-operation, and a series of .joint efforts specific¬
ally with those 'disciplines' which threatened the
independence of music as a separate art. Go one
finds collaboration with dancei the ballets of the
early period were followed by ballets in the neo¬
classical period (for example, Pulcinella, a ballet
based on a 're-composition' of music of the 'Classical'
c o ■ > o ■ i or a. - er;?;ol e s i).
Yet in all this, music "related" to these
other disciplines in a way that if the other discipline
was 'subtracted' from any particular collaboration,
the music left over as a remainder would stand on its
own.qua music. $hus even today, when the choreo¬
graphy and even the story behind the ballets are set
aside, the -music' is typically seen by critics as
capable of standing on its own, apart from any extra-
musical allusions.
»
Here is a 'model* of autonomy which is in
definite contrast to Berth's pursuit of autonomy.
For in Earth's pursuit of, let us for the moment call
it "autonomy", as we have noted throughout the thesis,
t lero was a nllon of any collaboration with other
disciplines, and in fact what amounted to a severance
of relations (with anthropology, philosophy in general»
historical criticism etc). in 0xtr view, this bears
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more resemblance to an "isolation" than to "autonomy".
Of course one might call it autonomy vis-a-vis other
disciplines, and if one should wish to use the word
in this anner, the observation could be made that
this is the "autonomy of isolation" not the "autonomy
of relation". This is the autonomy of the monk who
leaves his monastery and wanders out into the aesert,
thus breaking off relations not only with the world
but with his fellow religionists, as a consequence
it is an autonomy untested by any relationsai rlsned.
Conclusion,
In this chapter we have seen a parallel between
Barta and Stravinsky in the manner in which they have
related to the distant past, or tradition. . ore
importantly there appears to be a very similar pattern
of revolt and repudiation of the recer.t past followed
by a turning to a more distant past. Here we have
seen a parallel. let within this parallel, a con¬
trast: namely in the manner in which each has related
to this distant past, or tradition: Stravinsky,
selectively; Barth, unselectively, in that he approp¬
riates and dogmatically asserts essentially the whole
of the Early Church orthodoxy. There is a looser
relation to tradition in Stravinsky, one which is not
binding, one which allows him to select according to
what he can honor, and find useful.
We have also seen a parallel in the attempt of
each to re-establish his discipline as a discipline
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•in its own right' that is in a way that preserves
its independence vis-a-vis other disciplines. Yet
within this parallel we have also seen a contrast;
namely in the character or type of independence
sought. Stravinsky sees and brings about a
co-oneratlon and collaboration with the very discip¬
lines which, in his view, threatened to subsume music
to higher aims and goals. The co-operation and coll¬
aboration between musip and the other disciplines was
to occur in such a way as to preserve the independence
of the discipline of music (In many interpreters views
this aim was realized; the music of Pulcinella, and
t >© earlier ballets, The lite of Spring, etc. have
remained long after the literature and dance have been
forgotten),
The independence or "autonomy" from other discip¬
lines which Barth has sought has had a very different
c aracter. Rather than co-operate or •collaborate'
with other disciplines out of its own independence,
theology, in Barth's hands, has been more like a monk
wao has left the world and even his monastery behind,
and has wandered out into the desert,^ into a "nofcor-
2
iously oppressive solitude." This so called
1. We have used a metaphor which 1»H»L. Parker, an
interpreter quite favorable to Barth, has used
in describing Barth's "path". See the last para¬
graph of Parker's biography, in connection with
his introductory chapter, in Karl Barth, -erdmans,
1970k
2. Barth's own words concerning "fhe Solitude of the
Theologian' in Evangelical Theology: An Introduction,
p.110.
499
1( ••'7- '\q>r —' -r" ;'-V v" ' ' - ''V : ' * f ") ,•} .
"autonomy" pursued by Barth is perhaps more accurately
seen as a type of isolationism, in which co-operation
with other disciplines is a^hriori eliminated as a'
possibility.
If there is a close similarity in the parallels
we have pointed out in the development of both Barth
and Stravinsky (despite the strong contrasts we have
found within these parallels) we ore not arguing that,
in t eir revolt-repudiation and their consequent neo-
classicism, they were actually part of the sa e cult¬
ural forces connected with the breakdown of "the 19th
ce tury syntheses". This is a question beyond our
scope and competence. Yet the similarity does .
suggest something less than this, that is, it does
strongly sug est that there were inner dynamics
"immanent" in the development of each, which in all
probability s..a ed the development eae underwent •
jq have suggested that the ..oo—classical turn might
very well have been taken when the un-settling char¬
acter of the revolt and repudiation might in the end
have been quite "unsettling" even to the "unsettlers".
ii'irm 'ballast" or stability had to be sought for the
'constructive" part of their task. bur aim here has
been to examine the manner in which each related to
one of the chief sources of this firm ballast, that
is, the manner in which they related to tradition
in this 'heo-classical' turn. It is at this point
that we have found the strongest contrast between these
tv/o figures. in drawing out this contrast our aim
' ' •/ •' .V, * ' * >*
has been to illustrate and elucidate the most central
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In the following, we shall summarize several
aspects of our research into Barth's theological
method. Drawing upon this material we shall then
state seven. . reasons for our opinion that this
theolo ical programme should not he taken seriously
as a real option for theology.
e shall firstly sun; :arize a certain aspects
of our research concerning man's relation to tradition
in this theology; secondly, certain aspects concerning
nan's relation to (what is alleged to be) "the Word
of God". je shall then go on to state our reasons,
point by point. (After stating our first point vie
shall have to lay out and summarize additional mater¬
ial) .
Unthinking gubaission to tradition.
In Part III of our thesis, we have found
unthinking submission to the crodal Tradition of the
Jarly Church to be a primary and basic aspect of
Garth's method. Why does one say "a primary and basic
aspect"? Since beliefs taken from these creeds form
a significant portion of the presuppositions of this
theology, upon which Garth subsequently builds his
work, the unquestioning assent to these beliefs con¬
stitutes an aspect of this method which is lo ,foully
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prior to tie use of these beliefs in his theologizing.
Bar this reason, we see this aspect of Garth's
procedure, i.e. an unthinking submission to credal
beliefs as a primary and basic aspect of his actual
procedure. tie have not held that all Berth's
basic presuppositions cone from credal tradition,
but rather, we are looking at those which do; these
form a significant number of the whole.
Thus One finds unthinking submission not only
to beliefs which cone directly from Scripture, but
also to beliefs which even Barth will acknowledge,
are not to be found in Bcripture. If these credal
beliefs are held to be an-"interpretation" of Bcript-
ure, they are, as formulations of belief, also
additions to scripture. They are the human opinions
of the marly Church about Gcripture. Thus even
where one might hold that certain crodal beliefs
have only some "rootage" in Gcripture (e.g. that
they are only to soiae extent "implicit" in Gcripture)
yet even here, the formulations of belief are those
human formulations of the Garly Church. It is to
these beliefs as well that one must submit, without
question, in this theological procedure. One must
submit, for the beliefs of these creeds are regarded
as necessary and fundamental for both Church and
Theology.
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Unthinkin,.: Submission in man's Relation to What is
Alle -odly "She .ord of God".
V/e have also found, an unthinking submission
to what is alleged to be "the Word of God" in this
theology. That is, when, in an Svent (Greigniss)
in nail's present, Scripture becomes "the Word of God",
through the alleged action of the deity, in which the
holy -pirit acts within man, validating or "witnessing
to" the words of Scripture, hero also we have found
an unthinking submission.
In our study of nan's relationship to"the Word
of God'in Barth's theology, we have found that it was
methodologically inadmissible for one to step back
from the experience of this hvent and use his critical
acumen (1) concerning whether or not such an ...vent
has occurred in his own "present"; and (2) concerning
the content of what was allegedly "the Word of God"
in this event. -That is, it is methodologically
inadmissible to try to stand back from the experience
of t lis alleged hvent and use human criteria in eval¬
uating this experience.1 As a consequence, one must
not only (1) submit unquestioningly to the content
of what is allegedly "Word of God" in this experience,
but (2) he must also do this concerning an experience
he cannot evaluate with human criteria. This exper¬
ience was one in which one experienced a determination
x. ive, pp#405ff, especially pp.408ff.
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of one's thought, that is a divinely imposed deter¬
mination to think in such and such a manner."*" As
one example of this, we found that for Earth, Anselm's
"key phrase", "that than which nothing greater can
be thought" becomes and is to be regarded as)"the
..ord of God". And the meaning or import of these
words is that of a divine prohibition: "Man shall
not think (or conceive) of a greater." One may note
that Barth is forced to interpret "non posse" as "is
not permitted" rather than "is not able", (he have
found this interpretation textually untenable, Gee
above, p.:u#).
15
how-does Barth know that this "the Word of
God"? Can he step back from his experience of an
Event in which this phrase has become, for him,
"the ..ord of God", and reflect critically upon this
experience, using human criteria. Since it is
4f"'
methodologically inadmissible to "step back" and
use his critical faculties concerning such an exper¬
ienced Event, the answer would have to be "no",
fhus if we are correct in our "reading" of Anselm's
phrase, i.e. that the phrase has to do only with a
limitation immanent in human conceiving, and nothing
to do with any prohibition about what man may think,
then one would see the possibility that Earth's
misinterpretation of this phrase is due to a lack of
1. See above, pp.41Of.
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critical examination concerning the experience of
such an alleged event. we cite this as only an
example of the problems involved in Barth's type
of relation to "the word of God".
.mi, ,.^ar
We have found that in this theology both man's
relationship to credal tradition and his relationship
to what is experienced as "the Word of God" involve
unthinking submission, that is, methodologically
. opessary unquestioning obedience to t:xe noetic con¬
tent of both credal Tradition and what is experienced
as "the Word of God". In the case of the latter,
(the word of God), we have also found an uncritical
approach to tao experience of the alleged .vent of
revelation.
POIIif Oiht This then forms our first point:
there is an unthinking submission to what is alleged
to be revelation (in the case of "the Word of God")
as well as what is implicitly regarded as an author¬
itative articulation of revelation (in the case of
Warly Church creeds).
Yet our first point leads us on to another
observation. We shall here sum .arise in more detail
what we have described at certain points of Part III
of our thesis. Concerning both the man's relation¬
ship to "the Word of God", and man's relationship to
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iarly Jhurch creeds, we have found that in each case
man is "bound so tightly to the "content" of each
that there is no "distance" between nan and these
"objects", that is, "distance" in which man could
stand back and use his critical faculties concerning
chose "objects". inat is there is no "space" or
room for critical questioning to arise concerning
e.g. the truths of the assertions of the nearly Church
creeds, or the truth of what is alleged to be "the
Cord of God" in an experienced event• -inere is not
even any room for the question as to whether one has
experienced such an vent. That is, there is no
place for the critical questioning of the h nan exoor-
ionce of such art alleged .Jvent•
.. at we have found in place of critical quest¬
ioning is unquestioning obedience. In the case of
nan's relation to "the ford of Cod" this obedience is
an explicit part of carta's declared methodology.
We shall now review this in more detail. At the
close of Berth's ...rolegoasna (C.J.l/2) in a section
into ded, in -tart, to "sum up" his methodology,
forth states that "he are not investigating [[the norm
of dogaaticsj but its method, and therefore iht obed¬
ience which dogmatics must render to the work and
action of Cod is taking place in ilis Word," This
• 2




x.iat is, it is an obedience which is a methodological
necessity in this theological programme. (Barth also
states that "this obedience is to be described and
understood as strict and complete. * •")•"*"
That this methodologically necessary obedience
to the experienced "Word of God" precludes critical
questioning is also evidenced in Barth's writings•
One cannot "escape out of the constraint of the ..ord"
fox- t is would lead "inevitably to uncertainty" and
• d-* a ■: . .a" ■ v a ' 2. ■
"therefore to doubt", that is, unbelief. At this
point we may note again what we have just previously
-A
pointed out, namely that critical questioning is
precluded not only concerning (1) the content of
such an experienced event, i.e. the content of this
alleged "Word of God" but also (2) concerning the
occurrence of such an alleged /vent (and thus of
man's experience of such an ...vent). Concerning (1)
critical questioning of the content of such an exper¬
ience, Barth states that there no room for theories
of knowledge to come into play, (e.g. a philosophical
epistemology), "a theory of knowledge...where consid¬
eration of the truth, worth and competence of the
ord of God...can for a time be suspended....this is
ZL
the very thing which must not happen." Concerning
1. Ibid.
2. This whole massage (.the three quotations) occurs
in J.->.II/1, p.7.
5. mec hoVf, pp.50Jff•
G.J, ii/l, p. 5.
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(2) critical questioning concerning the alleged
Jvent, and concerning one's experience of this alleged
Bvent, Barth explicitly states that one cannot "step
outside" this relationship in which one is "hound"
to "the Word of God."
'Prom outside' means from the point of view
of a human position where truth, dignity,
and competence are so ascribed to human
seeing, understanding and judging as to be
the judge over what happens here. But this
is the very thing which is excluded by
the inner understanding of what happens...
as we are taught...by our first step.1
ThJLs "first step" is a methodological step, into a
binding relationship to the"Word of God", out of the
"constraint" of which one must never escape, lest
one fall into "doubt" that is, disbelief.
ow althou Cttftnot expect Barth to be
explicit about his operational as uaptions concerning
creeds, as he has bean here concerning "the ..ora of
God" (those that we have laid out remain unacknowledged
in his Prolegomena, and are^oftea)contradicted by his
statements), non-the-less we have found that the man¬
ner in which Barth approaches Barly Church creeds
almost exactly reduplicates the manner in which he
approaches "the Word of God" (as v/e have just described).
That is, it is as if Barth were approaching "the Word
of God" itself when he approaches these creeds. (Shis
C.D.II/1. p.51. Bee above, pp.407ff.
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would not be difficult to understand if, as we have
argued, these creeds are an authoritative, even
infallible form of "the v/ord of God"^). i'hat is,
his methodological procedure is essentially the same,
even if one must search harder to find explicit
statements which confirm this procedvire. Here too
one is bound to the "content", bound in such a way
which precludes "distance" between man and the creed,
"distance" in which questioning of the truth of
elements of the creed could have any meaningful sign¬
ificance. Here also obedience to the creed is an
operational (methodological) necessity. One is not
2
to escape out of the constraint of the creed.
Dogmatics is "Greed-bound...and therefore brings to
the Greeds...that respect which children, owe, by
•3
God's command to the v/ord of their human fathers."
Je have looked at the nature of this "respect" owed
by God's command, which Garth describes in more
detail in the same work (Credo),4 and we have found
that Dogmatics is Greed-bound in that it must not only
"honor" the Greed (as one is commanded to honor one's
• t
father and mother in the fifth Commandment), but
1. Gee above, pp.363ff.
2. There shall be no "end runs", around the creed,
directly to Gcripture (that is in a way that
avoids or obviates credal beliefs). Gee Credo p?,f.
p. Credo p»8.
4. Gee above, pp.293ff.
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"obey" the Greed. "This is simply an ordinance."
( "Grdnung") Thus one gust obey, without question¬
ing. Here too we nave found evidence that unquest¬
ioning obedience to creeds to be a necessary aspect
of Earth's operational programme. We have found
evidence of this not only in the statements of Earth
o
which we have examined in Chapter II of Part III,
but we have found evidence of this in Earth's actual
operational procedure (I.e. in our examination of
his ap roach to specific credal beliefs). Here as
in man's relation to "the Word of God" in this
theology, man is so bound to the content, in this
case, to the content of the creed, that there is no
"distance" between .an and creed, in which critical
questioning could take place.
As our research concerning credal 'Tradition
was to some extentt suggested by a comment of Dietrich
Eonhoeffer, we might acknowledge our debt to his words
by including them at this point, for they view these
issues from a slightly different critical perspective.
Earth and the Confessing Ghurch have
encouraged us to entrench ourselves behind
'the faith of the Ghurch' and evade the honest
q estion, »hat 13 our real and e.sonal belief....
To say 'Its the Ghurch's faith, not mine can be
a clericalist subterfuge, and outsiders always
consider it as such....We cannot like the *
Gatholics\Ldentify ourselves with the Ghurch....
1. Gredo, p.181.
2. Above, pp.515; 319; Wf, 509.
5. Above, pp.51lff.
4, Letters and apers frora Prison (first edition),p.180.
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Since we are quoting Bonhoeffer to acknowledge
our indebtedness, ratiier than as support for our case
we need not comment, except to say that Bonhoeffer
touched upon what, for us, has been "the tip of an
iceberg", the lower regions of which we have been
exploring in our thesis. If Barth does not identify
himself with 'the faith of the Church' he comes so
close as to leave no significant distance in which
to critically question the basal elements of this
'faith'. We may now state 'point two'.
PQIM? TWO. We have now drawn together and
summarized enough elements from our research to state
our second point: There is a lack of critical detach¬
ment, both from "the Word of God" as "heard" in an
experienced ?Cvent, and from the beliefs of the Garly
Church creeds in this theological programme. That
is, there is a lack of critical detachment from those
elements of thought which will form the presuppositions
upon which Barth builds his theology.
BOIFT THREE. Brom the same research we shall
draw out our third point: At the most basic level of
this theology, that is, at Barth's methodological
"point of departure", i.e. at the point where Barth
assimilates these presuppositions upon which he shall
build his theology, there is essentially no place for
the exercise of human critical judgement concerning
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both the truth and the worth of the presuppositions
upon which he builds his theology* Such a place is
denied to human critical judgement by reason of
methodological procedure, specifically, unquestioning
obedience to the content of (what is alleged to be,
or experienced as) "the Word of God", and unquestion¬
ing obedience to the content of Sarly Ghurch creeds.
iuln'i 1'QUR* Our fourth point is orawn from
the sane research, together with the previous points:
Man in his wholeness cannot be present and active in
such a theological enterprise. He must, as a pro¬
cedure of method, lay aside those critical faculties
by which he could arrive at considered judgements
concerning (1) the truth and worth of the basic
theological presuppositions, and (2) the truth and
worth of his religious experiences, specifically the
experience of "the Word of God". He must lay aside
his critical faculties before entering upon such a
theological programme. This is required by the
method of this theology at its methodological point
of departure, that is at its very root. The conse¬
quence of this is a significant denial of man's human¬
ity. He must lay aside a central and essential part
of his humanity, when entering upon such a theological
enterprise as is to be found here.
513
PQIHT TIVB. Our fifth point we shall first
state, and consequently establish: There appears to
be a pure heteronomy at the very basis of this
theology, a heteronomy essentially unmodified, by any
element of autonomy. That is a religious heteronomy
ih ; an1 a relation to his experience of "the »,ord of
God" and to the content of this alleged Word of God.
One finds this same heteronoray in man's relation to
harly hhurch creeds in this theology. It consists
in an unthinking submission, or unquestioning obed¬
ience to the content of the experienced "Word of God"
and the content of the ^arly Jhurch creeds. This
unquestioning obedience as we have just noted is a
ethodolo -ical necessity in this theological programme,
specifically at the "point of departure" of this
theology. Thus we say? this theology is founded upon
a heteronomous relation to the sources which it uses
as its own basis. We would add one comment: such a
heteronoray is unnecessary, and is thus an unnecessary
devaluation and denigration of man's humanity.
Let us examine this point in light of the
evidences we have already laid out and in connection
with a passage from the conclusion of Barth's
Prolegomena, Jhurch. Jog,unties, Vol. 1/2,
At the conclusion of his rolegomena; Bartn
acknowledges that a heteronomy is inherent in his
theological method, and says this specifically in
connection with "the obedience which dogmatics must
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render to the work and action of God t king place in
His Word,"1 Yet he goes on to say that this heter-
onomy is modified by a compensating autonomy. The
autonomy consists in this: man's free decision to
obey the <ord of God. Thus this obedience is "the
fully free decision belonging to the human subject
2
of dogmatics." Because this autonomy is involved
in dogmatics, the heteronomy, which Garth has already
acknowledged, is allegedly transformed into theoriomy.
This is possible, for "autonomy cannot be understood,
any more than heteronony, as in antithesis to
taeonony.
With this last statement we shall not take
isue, Yet we do take issue with Berth's supposit¬
ion that the heteronomy he has described, and which
we have described in our thesis in a more expanded
form, is in any way significantly modified by the
autonomy he has referred to. Vfe say this for the
following reasons: (1) The obedience to "the Word of
God" he refers to is explicitly acknowledged to be a
necessity in his method. He refers in t is very
context to "the necessary obedience...of dogmatics






to be understood and described as strict and complete.
(H) „,i-ice tiiis obedience is a ..eco scary aspect of
forth* a theological programme, even if nan nay have
this freedom, to choose to obey or to disobey ''the
ore! of God", ,.n nasi lay aside this freedom if he is
to vo .tor upon this theological programme# do must
.
• .v. ■ .• • , ,
in fact choose to repudiate this freedom before enter-
ing upon such a theological onterprlse for the si lo
reason t .at obedience is a necessary and basic aspect
of this tueology, s ecifically unquestioning obedience
As a consequence, once a man has entered upon
such a theologic i enterprise and assented to its
"ground rules", we cannot see how the heteronomy
carta acknowledges (and which we have explored in
more detail) is in any significant way modified by
any autonomy. he say this specifically with refer¬
ence to the methodological "point of departure" of
tiiis theology. Hare, specifically, we se a heter-
onomy in man's relation to (what is alleged to be)
"the Word of God" and to credal tradition. It is
a hetoronoay at the very basis of earth's t neology.
As such heteronomy is unnecessary in most
contemporary Protestant theologies, we can only see
this basal aspect of Earth's theology as an unnecess¬
ary devaluation and denigration of the fullness of
nan's humanity. Here he must remain in religious
1, Ibid.
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childhood, similar to earl;/ biological childhood in
t .at here the child has not yet realized (brought
into actuality) his potential to form judgements
and make decisions about truth and value. Thus we
would see this heteroncmy at the root of Berth's
theology as a childish denigration of the fullness
of .nan's humanity.
To these five point3 we may now add two more.
■ < ' ■ .• ...- . v.'
They are different in nature from the first five, and
thus we point out a shift here.
PQIiiT SIX. 3ecauso of the manner in which
creaal tradition is apparently regarded in this
theology it is doubtful whether this theological
method,and consequently the theology built with its
use could be considered acceptable, generally, within
Protestantism. «Ve refer to what we see as an operat¬
ional assumption in earth's theologyi na ely that
the credal Tradition of the Carly Church is an infall¬
ible articulation of revelation, and as such is an
infallible form of "the Word of God." Such an
assumption would apparently place one part of the
Church's Tradition on equal footing with Scripture
(scripture in fact in Berth's operational programme
is a fallible form of the lord of God, where ,arly
Church creeds are apparently infallible). Thus, if
Barth does in fact operate upon this assumption, and
if his theological programme involves this assumption,
it is difficult to see how this theology could be
generally acceptable within Protestantism. One says
this for the reason that Protestant theology has
rather consistently rejected any notion that any part
of Church Tradition should have an authority equal
or superior to that of Scripture. In Berth's theo¬
logy it would appear that the credal Tradition of
the Jarly Church does have an authority at least equal
to that of Scripture•"*"
POI1JT SBYaxi. Berth's Theology which tries
with ardour to preserve tradition, may, in our view,
by that very ardour, in fact, be a danger to Tradition.
That is, if this theological programme were to be
taken seriously as a real option for theology, and
further as the only real option for theology, (which
it claims its method to be), it tends to present
Twentieth Century man with a black and white choice:
submit, or repudiate. That is, submit, without
question, to essentially^ the whole of ;,arly Church
credal Tradition, or repudiate the sane whole. There
is apparently no middle ground. The whole extent of
these creeds are presented as necessary and binding
for Church and Theology.
1. See above, pp.560f, and pp,375f.
2. See for example the preface to the second edition
of Earth's study of Anselm (written in 1953)»
i* . .b . ' .j »I«, p.11.
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Dietrich Bonhoeffer's comment on the nature
of Earth's approach is of significance here: "kriss,
Yogel, oder stirbl"1 There is erhaps no equivalent
in English which can do justice to the poetic aptness
of tnis phrase (a quotation from Goethe): "Eat "bird,
or diel" It is usually translated as "take it or
2
leave it." let perhaps the German alludes to some¬
thing deeper than this usual English Translation would
indicate. "Friss Yogel, oder stirb", " .at bird, or
die*" That is, "eat, consume swallow whole, do this
or go empty away...even unto death." A bird has no
teeth, it cannot chew before swallowing. It must
cither swallow something whole, or spit it out. Yet
this bird is confronted with this dilemma: "Eat!, or
die." Is not this somewhat similar to the dilemma
which Earth's theology would pose, if taken seriously
as a real option, or more particularly, the only
option for theology? Here also, it would appear,
one is confronted with a dilemma: Consume the whole,
without "chewing it over", or leave off, go away...
even unto death. That is, we have found no place
for "chewing something over" prior to}cr subsequent
tOj the assent to the central Christian beliefs in this
theology. We can find no significant "place" in this
1. Letters of 5th Hay 194-4. Cf. Letters ana racers
fro .rison, The wilurged riition, E.G.--., London,
1971, p.286.
2. In the "Enlarged Edition" of 1971 it is translated
as "like it or lump it." Cf. oo.cit., p.286,
'
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theology for the exercise of human judgement concern¬
ing the truth and worth of these central Christian
beliefs ait sr prior or subsequent to their accept¬
ance . tiie aain task of the mind in this theology
is apparently to re-think 'the Crodo', 'the faith of
. .
the Church' in order to sea its interconnections, and
correctly understand its content.1
As Twentieth Century man has most often
resisted submitting without question to religious
dogma (and rightly in our view), one v/ould hold that
■
the dile a which Berth's theological programme poses
to modern an is i, fact a threat to the very tradit¬
ion he sought to preserve. For it moans that if most
people in our century were aware of the extent of
that to which they would have to submit, without-
questioning (that is, the broad extent of the beliefs
of the Early Church creeds), they would, if this
were the only theological option before them, more
t an likely repudiate the whole of Christian belief,
p
rat er than submit in this manner. Yet because
Earth's theological programme does in fact, in our
view, pose such a dilemma, one would hold that this
theological programme should not be regarded as a
sound option for theology in our time,
1. Cee for example, Credo, pp.2ff.
2. One would not argue with the fact that there are
considerable numbers of people in our century who
would and do submit unthinkingly to various forms
of dogma, v/hether this is a good or healthy
phenomenon is a separate question.
520
Section 3,
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In that we have argued that Earth's theological
programme should not be considered seriously as a
real option for theology, and have thus argued for
its rejection, for the reasons wo have given, perhaps
in arguing for its rejection one risks "throwing out
the babe with the bath water." In what follows, we
shall (1) sake a distinction between the two, "babe"
and "bath water." In doing so, we shall (2) turn
to Earth's sermons, where what we shall call "the babe"
receives, in our view, the best articulation. At
this point having turned to Earth's sermons, we shall
raise a question about Earth's theologizing: has
Earth's Dogmatics■necessary for preaching, and specif¬
ically for Earth's own preaching? he raise this
question as a question of more than a little import¬
ance. for Earth has claimed in many places that his
Dogmatics exists in order to serve "Church Proclamat¬
ion," Preaching, in Earth's view, is the central
and most crucial form of "Church Proclamation,"
Yet the question we shall ask is whether Earth's
Dogmatics was actually relevant and necessary for
" ' ' '
■ "•*
1. See Church Dogmatics 1/1, pp.plff and pp.98£f
for example.
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preaching, specifically for 3arth's own preaching.
If the answer is essentially "no", then serious
questions must arise as to the relevance of this
theology, namely its relevance to its most central
declared aim: to serve Church Proclamation. Thus
here we shall offer yet another critique of oarth's
Dogmatics,
Let us turn then to our distinction between
"babe" and "bath water"♦ By the "bath water" we
refer to the frame of reference in which liarth has
done his theologizing# In Part Three of our thesis
wo have attempted to describe several central as;ects
of this frame of reference: a relation to tradition
of unthinking submission; a relation to what is
experience as "the »ord of God", also characterised
by unthinking submission, etc.
The "babe" that we refer to figuratively In
this metaphor is also the one we refer to literally:
the one who came, trie one who reached out, across to
man, the one who approached man not from above or
below, but (we are choosing our imagery consciously)
approached man from within man's own setting. e
find the best articulation of what we refer to here,
not in Barth's Dogmatics, but in his later sermons.
Let us turn to those sermons in order to draw out
what we mean. There are two collections of published
sermons, comprising nearly thirty sermons which Barth
preached between 1954 and 1964. home, but not all
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of these, were preached in the prison chapel of the
Basel Prison."'" Since there are a considerable
number of sermons, preached over a considerable
period of time (10 years), and since not all of them
were preached in a prison setting (at least three
were either in a local church or in a University
p
Chapel service), we have a fairly reliable indicat¬
ion of the preaching of Berth's most mature period.
(ise have chosen to turn to these thirty sermons from
Earth's late period rather than to the two published
collections from his early period, for the latter,
for the most part, ore-date the publication of the
first volume of Earth's Church Dogmatics in 1932 and
thus could not, even theoretically, reflect Earth's
theologizing after 1932.^)
Earth's Preaching and Parth'3 Dogmatics; Contrasts.
Let us then turn to these later sermons of
Earth, in order to explicate further what we mean by
"the babe". In doing so we shall draw out contrasts
with what we find in the Church Dogmatics.
Here in Earth's later sermons, Christ has
become Brother, He is among men. He speaks with
1. Deliverance to the Captives, Harper and Row, Hew
fork. 'and'Call for God, Haroer and Row, Mew
York, 1965.
2. See for example, Deliverance to the Gartiveo,
pp,60ff, pp.93ff~ pp.lOlff, and most probably
pp.l36ff.
3. for these early sermons, see Karl Earth and cduard
Thurneys en, God's .parch for - .an (19 35)» and
Come Holy Spirit 11934-), both published by
I. and T. Clark, Edinburgh,
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authority yet in a way which does not threaten man's
integrity, his personal centre. he does not s eak
in a ;aimer which would overwhelm nan or in a ''Loud
Voice". He does not speak as an alien, a visitor
from "outer space" (although his transcendence is
preserved). He speaks with sensitivity to the
problems and traumas that ran actually encounters.
In contrast, even in the second half of the
Church Jo, y-atlcs, (C.J.III and IV) the Hnristos
appeal's essentially as an alien in nan's situation.
One would point,, for example, to north's inagry in
entitling a section of his Bog ;.atics "fhe Way of the
Son in the i'ar Country"* lie comes, even here,
essentially as an alien. He is not also, whatever
else he nay be, really one of us. And he is only
"on a visit". Trie import and significance of this
imag£y, and more like it, is not diminished by the
repetition of any dogmatic formulae about "fully
God and fully man".
Let us now turn to the first half of the
Church uoryiatics, that is to that part of the noprat¬
ios which has been our concern in our thesis,
Volumes I and II. It is here that we find the
greatest contrast, one would almost say, discontinuity
with what we have Just pointed to in the irison
/orrnons. Was Christ Brother here? Was the approach
of the deity to man so characterised here (in Volumes
I and II of the Church Dogmatics) I vie do not think s
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One should not be mislead by much emphasis on
"Incarnation" and "Chrlstology". Incarnation, yes#
. .. it it is a "descending upon"man from above# It is
a'breaking in upon him. i'hls appears as a condescend¬
ing move on the -part of a deity# It is not seen as a
reaching out to nan, a reaching across, i.e. an
approach without threat, (as, in contrast, it is in
the later seix.ons)
One notes also, (although this is a lesser
natter), that, as barth talks of Ohrist as brother,
in his rrison oermona, .Barth himself talks as a way¬
ward brother to fellow wayward brother; and is explicit
and open about how he views this situation, he we
have noted at several points Barth*s approach to his
listener (or reader), in his Church Dogmatics, we can
only note a great contrast here, in the manner in
which Berth approaches those human beings he finds in
prison and chapel pew. He speaks firmly and with
authority,.. .but not as Authority. lie approaches
his listeners as one a ong their midst, not condescend¬
ingly, "from on high." He says "we" and he ■ .eans "we".
1. As a child one has very similar experiences,
experiences of intrusion "from above", i.e. his
parexits, home of these experiences are happy;
others are not. Some parents encourage and foster
adulthood. Others, perhaps unknowingly, do not.
One would venture that arbitrary intrusions "from
above", i.e. intrusions which one could not "make
sense out of", and use his powers of Judgement
about, however limited, these sorts of intrusions,
whether we are talking of biolo,ylcal childhood or
religious childhood, would only orgetuate c i:shook.
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In the passage we have chosen, below, Barth
meditates upon the two criminals crucified with
Jesus, and draws out his conclusion that this was the
first Christian community. He ends his sermon in
this manner:
And now, dear friends, we are not asked in
the least if we want to he such people,
thank God. We are such people, all of us -
you in this house called a prison, with all
the burden that brought you here, and with
your particular experiences in this place -
those others of us outside who have different
experiences and yet,,are, believe me, in the
same predicament,•.•
Barth reiterates the promise of forgiveness he has
already explicated. Those in the prison are invited
to share in Communion, and the sermon closes.
Whether one agrees with Barth here is not to the point.
Bather, that when Barth says "all", he means "all",
lie speaks, embracing his own, and their, situation.
Barth's Dogmatics and Barth' s Breaching: Was '1'his
Theology necessary for This I reaching.
How we come to perhaps the most significant
characteristic of these sermons of Barth, Perhaps
we could draw it out by asking the following question:
If one had come to these sermons first, with no acquain¬
tance with any of Berth*s other works, could one have
expected to find what up to now we have explored in
1. Deliverance to the Captives, Harper and Wow,
p#83*
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the Ohurch Dogmatics, that is, the credalistic char¬
acter and cast of the Dogmatics, and more specifically,
the particular kind of "tight" and binding relation¬
ship to creeds which we have described in Chapter Two
of Part Three?
What we wish to lift up for examination here
is another characteristic of these sermonss they are
not "doctrinal" In character, Barth did not choose
to preach "doctrinal sermons" when he had the chance,
more than this, there is almost a total scarcity of
references to doctrines, There Is no attempt to
simplify or "popularize" those dogmas which Barth
spent four decades recasting into a Bartalar, shape.
He does not take for example the material presented
in the lectures of Dogoatics in Outline and try to
preach a simplified version of them.
The character of these sermons is quite in
contrast to these options. They have the essential
character of carefully wrought improvisations upon
the theme of a short passage of Scripture, One sees
a freshness of approach, said an expressiveness which
this improvisatory nature allows. If this is so,
there is an interesting similarity with the sermons
of Luther, and those of Zinzendorf two centuries later,
a freedom of exposition, an •earthiness' or contact
with common mundane human reality, and aa absence of
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dogma as such#"*"
One is not saying that at points there aro not
dogmas beneath the surface of this preaching. But
they are, on the whole, well out of sight. If there
are dogmas at points beneath the surface one is also
not saying, and this is something else, that there
aro not specifically Barthian touches at points in
these sermons. But again they are rather unobtrus¬
ive, and, with a few exceptions, not central to the
basic import of his message.
Let us look at the import of these points.
V/as not the whole stimulus, or perhaps more accurately
t..e most central aim of the Church Dogmatics to serve
"Church Proclamation"j and further is not preaching,
for Barth, the central and most crucial expression
of "Church Proclamation"? Volume I of Berth's Church
2
Dogmatics clearly affirms these points.
viie have then cone to our central question: is
the whole Barthian Dogmatic enterprise necessary to
such preaching? We will have to say 'no', for the
following reasons: If it is necessary that some sort
1, Cf. "The hermeneutics of Count Nicholaus Ludvig
von Binaendorf", Arthur James Preeman, Unpublished
Doctoral Thesis, Princeton Theological Ceminary,
1962, pp. 217-256, Cf. also 'The art in Luther
Christmas Book, Translated and arranged by ioland
A. Sainton, Ffuhlenberg, Philadelphia, 1968, p.9-15.
and the sermons which follow.
22. O.D.I/1. pp.Iff, pp.51ff» and pp,98ff.
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of theologizing lie behind such preaching (1) ne--d it
be or awe been of a specifically Barthian character,
as we have tried to out-line and explicate in our
thesis, i.e. in its relation to tradition, and its
relation to the experience of "the Word of God"; and
(2) need it even be a theologizing which tries to
bring into the present the whole extent of the beliefs
of the Early Church Creeds and dogmas? Since (1)
dogmas as such play such a limited role in Earth's
preaching, and even if some exist beneath the surface
at points; and (2) since the general character of his
preaching is sore that of disciplined improvisation
on passages of Ccripture, we will have to say "no"
to both of the above questions. i'he human words in
w lien the evaugel/ion is expressed can have t r d. or
loose relationship to "established doctrine", i.e.
the dogmas and creeds of the Early Church. It is
Earth who has shown perhaps the best example of how
t ;is can be so, in his sermons.
,/e would thus conclude that Earth's specific
type of theological programme, both in its method and
in its content, was not necessary for this preaching.
Thus we cannot see that Earth's Dogmatics has any
necessary relevance to its most central stated aim:
to serve Church proclamation, i.e. preaching.
Rather than be of help to such preaching as Earth
•
.
_ «.< . •'!
practices, his Dogmatics may in fact be a threat to
such preaching. for as we have pointed out in our
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seventh, point, Earth's theology confronts man, and.
that includes the nan who mounts the pulpit, with a
dilemma: submit, or repudiate I Submit without quest¬
ion to the whole of "orthodoxy" or the beliefs of the
Early Church creeds, or repudiate the whole of the
same* This is the dilemma Earth's theology poses
for the one who would preach as well as for people
in general#
It is a false dilemma, as Earth's preaching
of "the babe" has shown us# for in this preaching
we see no necessary submission to the whole of credal
Tradition; we do not see that the dogmatic assertion
of the totality of credal Tradition is at all necess¬
ary for such preaching. A selective and critical
assimilation of Tradition, and a selective and crit¬
ical assimilation of what is alleged to be "the >vord
of God" would apparently serve just as well as a
basis for such preaching. The dilemma, therefore,
which Earth's Dogmatics poses for the preacher is a
false dilemma#
Yet it is a dilemma which carries with it a
threat, that is, a threat to the very heart of the
Christian message# for the number of preachers who.
can and would willingly submit, without question, to
the whole of credal Tradition is limited. Thus the
significant number of preachers who cannot and will not
submit to Tradition in this manner would be forced,
by Earth's theological programme to reject the central
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Christian beliefs, lock stock and. barrel. The "babe"
(in both its metaphorical and its literal sense)
would then be thrown out with the bathwater. The
central Christian message would be lost.
In contradiction to Barth, we are holding that
nan rauot have real freedom in relation to his, man's,
past. hot a freedom which he must set aside, and
repudiates before entering upon a dogmatic programme
such as Berth's. And additionally, that such freedom
is not of necessity a threat to "the babe", as we
have described. In contrast the denial of such free¬
dom in relation to the past may, in fact, pose a much
greater threat to this "babe", to tne central core
of the Christian message. This then is our eighth
and final reason for holding that Berth's theological
programme should not be taken seriously as a real
option for theology.
Here in Berth's theology faith, in our view,
has sought and found certainty. let It has done so
at the cost of honesty. It has not honestly faced
the question of truth regarding those assertions upon
which this theology is founded. In contrast It has
submitted unquestioningly to these assertions, and has
sought to make these assertions binding upon man
regardless of questions of truth. For the eight
reasons we have delineated, we have therefore argued
that this theological programme should not be taken




In the Bibliography which follows our purpose
lias been)firstly to give full notation of works cited
in our thesis, and indicate the sources, primary and
secondary^we have drawn upon, and secondly^ to point
the reader to the chief primary and secondary sources,
relevant for our subject matter# Any attempt to be
comprehensive both with reference to primary and sec-
ondary sources has proved simply impractical by reason
of the weight of numbers. lor example, the
Kirsehbaum-Busch bibliography of Berth*o published
works contains 553 entries. While one notes that
the number of separately published "open letters,"
sermons, and magazine articles form the bulk of this
material, simply to make a similar listing would only
be to present the reader with another problem, that
of selection. Urns we shall present our own bibli¬
ography as we have described above, yet in doing so
refer the reader to the Kirschbaum—Busch work.
'fhe Bibliography has been divided into the
following sections: I. Bibliographies. II. Works by
Barth. III. Works concerning Barth. IV. Ansela and
his Medieval Betting. V. fhe Political-Bcononic-
Social and Gultural-Ideational Context of Berth's Dev¬
elopment.
1. Gee Section I of the Bibliography.
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I»3I13LIOCR/J. -IBS.
"Bxblio; ;raphia Barthiana#" compiled by Charlotte von
Kirschbauo," in Antwort, Festschrift zuin 70.
Geburtstag von Karl Earth# editors E. Wot?,
d'. von IlrncITbaua ancl R. Prey. Svangellecher
Verlag, Zurich, 1956, pp. 945-960. This is a
comprehensive listing of Earth * s published works
up to the end of 1955*
"Bibliographic," compiled by Mberhard Busch, in
Parraeia# Karl Barth sum aehtzigsten Geburtstag am
To Mai, 1966, Evangelischer Verlag, Zurich, 1966*
pp. 709-719* This is a continuation of MBibliographia
Barthiana", listing works published between 1955 and
1965*
II. WORKS BY BARTil.
Barth, Karl, Aaseln: Fides Ouaerens Intellectual,
translated froni the second German edition by
I. . Robertson, Meridian Books, World publishing
Go. 1962; British Edition uses sane pagination
and includes an index, S.C.M., London, I960,
Translation of: Fides quaerens inteliectura:
Angelas Beweis der Siistence"Gotten in
Zusasbienhang seines'" theoTogischen Programs*
Kaiser> Bunchen, 1951# Second edition
(essentially a reprint of the original text
with references to more recent editions of
Medieval sources): Evangelischer Verlag,
Zurich, 1958.
Barth, Karl, and others. The Beginnings of Dialectic'
Theology, 2 Vols. , od'. J.M.1''Itdbirison, 'Ifrs."
K.R. 6rim and C. De Grasia, John Knox Press,
Richmond (Virginia), 1968#
Barth, Karl. Fie Christllohe Dogaatik im Fntwurf;
1, Die iTeh.rc7~vo;.i wbrte ""GotteTr'- Prolego.nona
zur c:5TstrIxcKen Dogmaiik# Glir. Kaiser,***—« a nwmnwi.iiH—.i 1 mill * *
Munchen, 1927#
Church. Dor-aatics, 15 part volumes, translated
By~various scholars, under the general editor¬
ship (excluding vol,I/l) of G.W. Bromily and
T.F. Torrance, T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh,
1956-1969# A Translation of: Die Kirchliche
Dograatik* Vols, 1/1 - IV/4, Evangelishor
Verlag, Zurich, 1955-1959*
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We shall list separately here those part-volumes
of specific relevance to our thesis, that is,
the dogmatics of the period 1930-1944, We shall
list them in order to indicate (1) their titles
and (2) their first date of publication#
I/l* Die Lchre voni Wort Gottes, 1932,
The Doctrine of the Word of God,
1/2, Die Lehre vom Wort Gottes, 1939,
The doctrine of the Word of God,
IX/l.Die Lehre von. Gotft 1940.^he Doctrine of Croa: The nov;ledp;e
oTUod; The Reality of God.
11/2 Die hehre von Gott> 1942,
Tne '3o'ctrinc bx Goa: TheLlection
of God; 'The Ooiamand of God,
Earth, Karl, and Harnack, Adolf von.
The Correspondence of 1923* see Bumscheidt,
II, Martin, Revelati n and Theolog/ (listed
under secondary sources).
Earth, Karl, Credo: A Prose-itat ion of the Chief
x-roblens of Doc,;..,atics with Reference to' the
Apostles"Creed, tr. J.8, Mckab, 'dodder and
Stoughton, London, 1936i 'Translation of:
Credo. Kaiser, nunchen, 1955*
— Dogaatics in Outline, tr, G.T. Thompson,
j farper, 'Lev; ivork, 1959, Translation of:
Dopgiatik ia Grnndriss Kaiser, . unchen, 194/•
The Epistle to the Romans, Translation of the
sixth edition,~by "B.C. Hoskgns, Oxford,
London, 1957; Translation of: Per doncrbrief,
iivangelischer VerlaK. Zurich, 1940, first
edition published 1919 J second edition, a
complex revision, published 1922{ later
editions include only minor revisions of the
second edition ,
Evangelical Theology: An Introduction, tr,
,"Voley''-.I'inehart and Winston, 'hew 'fork,
1965.
—— "Forward", Reformed Dogmatics: Set Out and
Illustrated from tne Cpurees, i>y"' 'ifelnricli
lleppe• ' Revised"and'edited by B. Biser, Alien
and Unwin, London, 1950, pp,v-vii.
Ti'om Rousseau to Ritac-Iil, see: Protestant
Thought...
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Barth, Karl. How I Channel fly Mind. Introduction
and Epilogue by John I). Godsey, John Knox
Press, lichnon; (Virginia) 1966, containing
three autobiographical sketches by Barth,
covering the years 1928-1958, 1958-1948 and
1948-1958 respectively, published originally
in 1959, 1949 and I960.
The Humanity of God, tr. T, Weiser and
J»H. Thomas, Knox, Richmond (Virginia), I960;
Translation of separate monographs in the
series, Tbeolonische Studien, Evangeliscner
Verlag, Zurich.
Karl Earth's Table Talk. Recorded and Edited
with Introduction '"by" John D. Godsey, Oliver
and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1965.
llxe Knowledge of God and the Service of God
according to the Teachings of "the" "leToruation.
lecalling the Scottish Confession of I960,
Tne OiffoFd Lectures 1937-1936, tr. t>y .
liaire and I. Henderson, Hodder and Stoughton,
London, 1958.
Barth, Karl, and Bail Brunner, natural Theology.
comprising "Nature and Grace", by iail iirunner,
and a reply, "Hoi", by Karl Barth, tr* from
the German by P. Fraehkel, Centenary Press,
London, 1946,
Barth, Karl. Parergon: Bee How I Changed my ;ind.
1 11'■ P roeestant Thought: Proa Rousseau to Ritschl,
tr. B. dozens, with an introduction by
Jaroslav Pelikaa, Harper and Row, Hew York,
1959; The foregoing is a translation of eleven
chapters of: Lie Protestantische Theolo,;io im
19 Jafarhunderf;, ffvangdl'ischer Verlag. nurlch.
1952. Pirst edition, 194? • See also the
•Complete English Edition'I Protestant Thought
in the nineteenth Century, S.C7""'.; LO'ho.on,197^«
Bai'th, Karl, and Thurneysen, Eduard, Revolut:ionary
Theology in the Halcing. Barth-Thurneysen
Correspondence, 1914-1925, Trans. J.P. Smart,
Knox, Richmond (Virginia), 1964.
Barth, Karl. Theology and Church: Shorter Gratings.
1920-19*28. translated from the 'German by
L.P. Sfciith, Harper and Row, New York, 1962.
— The Word of God and the Word of Kan, tr. by
1). 'ox-ton, harpor, new 'fork, 1957; Translation
of: Has wort Gottes und die Theologie. Kaiser,
Lunchon, 1924,
ill, „ , ; :: k 3 hi;.
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iiatv/orfc. Earl Bartk aum siebalKSten -•obnrtsta ; am
1Q bai 1936, bollikon. -nrlch, 1956.
Hot©j 2his Festschrift contains the biblio¬
graphy of Charlotte von Kirschbaun listing
nearly all of Berth's publications, up to the
end of 1955, PP«9^5-960,
Bail1 ie, John, "he heiiso of the : resenee of God,
Gi.fi'orh aeciures, 1981-196^, 6x£orG, liondon,
1962,
Baltliasar, ilr.no Urs, llao Tlieoloriy of barl Carta,
tr. iron the- German by Joan ilsrury, Holt
ieinhart and Winston, lew-York, 1971;
translation of: harl Garths_ jiagotellunr,^and
Joutuiy; seiner Tligologie, 1965 ' (Pirat," 'a£Mons
olteH, Ilegjaer, 19J5T7, This includes a good
lioting selected les er known works of Garth.
Bartseh, Hans Werner, ed,? Kerygma ami Myth:
,, nwolQ, ic I debatet"*muTr"tr:InsJLatcd iron
the Gorman by . Waller, h,i , , Lpndon, 1955
Berkouwer, a, . ? T'ko fk-iunpli of Grace in the i'heolojqr
of ^ard BsrEirr*tr. froa tae dutch by 55, .. ""Boer
'i'aternocter, London, 1956• Translation of:
ae trloaf lor gonad© in do ideologic van
bar1 BcirtTTTllo'ife itaiiipen»"jfopd-«
Setbye, Gerhard, Dietrich Bonhoeffer: Theologian,
vhiristisii. Oonteaporary, tr, from the German
by £•• : osbachcr, P. doss, B, loss, F. Clark
and ». clon-Doepel, ed, h, Robertson, Collins,
London, 1970,
Bonlioeffer, Dietrich, Letters and 'gapers fro., irison
"The enlarged .hdition" of 1971 ed. G, Lotkge
.0. », London, 1971 •
Bouillard, denri, derl.Barth, Aubier, Paris, 1957*
Vol«I, donese'et "evolution de la C.-.colo. iu
dlaleotloucl 761.11, 111, .rarolo "cle i)ieu ot "
existence Kumaine. botes Peatineat sections
of this work hav. been compiled in Bouillard*b
The hnowlo&ae of God, Cf, op.cit.
Bouillard, enri, The hnoylodge of God, tr. L. j.
Poaiano, Herder and Herder, 'liew York, 1968;
tr. of Gonnuiosonce do Dieu, .uabior, 1 oris,
""67.
Bawden, John, harl harth, . C. ,., London, 1971.
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Brunner, Jimil, "The Hew Barth : Observations on Karl
Berth's doctrine of i„an"« Scottish Journal of
Theology, Vol.B, Io,B (1931), pp. 123-135*
Buber, Martin, "The History of the Dialogical
Principle" in Martin Buber , Between Man and
Han, tr.'R.G# Smith, Hacmillan, Hew York,135$, pp.209—226. ?
Clark, Gordon II, Karl Par tlx* s Theological Method,
The Presbyterian ana deformed Publishing Company,
ihiladelphia, 1963 .
Gogarten, Friedrich, "Karl Earth's Dogmatik",
Ikealogische Rundschav, H.P.l, (1929), pp.60-80.
Hanier, Jerome, Karl Barth.. tr. P.M. Maruca, 5.J.,
Sands, London, 1962; Translation of: Karl
Bv.rth; 1' occasionaliame thoologique de "Karl
Barth, Brower, Paris, 194-9.
Hartwell, Herbert, The Thoolory of Karl Larth: -to
Introduction, Duckworth, London* 1964-.
Kung. Huns* Justification: The Doctrine of Karl Barth
a^ aTToIic lofloctionT London, 193*. .
Translation of: KochtSerti^nny;: tie Lehre Karl
Earths und sine katholische Besinnung
BinsiodeIn, 1957.
Heynell, Hugo A, Grace Versus Hature« ctudies in
Karl Bar th' s Church .jopiGticc.ftarhooks,
London, 196?.
Monsma,Peter H, Karl Earth's Idea of Revelation,
Somerset, Bdmervi'lle (New 'Jersey) 1937*
Parker, f.n.L,, Karl Barth. Berdmans, Grand Rapids
(I iichigan), 19*70 •
Prenter, Regin, "Dietrich Borihoeffer and Karl Berth's
Positivism of revelation," in world Come of -tge.
Ronald Gregor 3mith, ed., Oollins, London, 1962•
PP.93-130,
Robinson, James M, "Hermeneutic Since Barth" in
The Now Kcrruoneutic, James M, Robinson and
"ooari Cobb, eds•, llaroer and Row, Hew York,
1969, pp.1-77.
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Rumscheidt, H. Martin, Revelation ana Ihcolory, An
Analysis of the farth-Harnack' Corrcs -ondenco '
of lfcs. 5rdbrl<tef., tondon. 1^2. (fMo
work includes the correspondence)•
Runia, Klaas, Rarl Berth's Doctrine of Holy Rcrioture,
Eerdmans, Grand Rapid's C^icnigaa1), 1962,
Sir,art, James D., The Divided Mind of Modern Tiicolo y:
Karl Barth and iu&olf Bultmann, l^ub~19>J»
Westminster, Philadelphia, 1957#
Tillieh, Paul, On The- Boundary; An Autobio,pea-,Meal
Okotch. Joliiao, London, 1*567• first published
as Part I of The Interpretation of .history,
Gcribners, 193£>.
Torrance, 2.f., Rarl Uarth: An Introduction to his
Early Theoio;?/,' 19iO~l9'31, London,"
1962.
Torrance, 2.T., "The Problem of Natural Theology
in the Thought of Marl Berth" Religious Ctudios.
Vol.6, ho»2, 1970, pp.121-135.
Van Til, Cornelius, Theyev; Modernism: An Appraisal
o" too Theolorcf of Bartit and Drunner,"
Lcmcion, 19;M6.
Von Balthasar; Bee Balthasar, Iians, Urs von,
Willis, Robert E«, The Ethics of pari Barth, Brill,
Leiden, 1971.
Wingren, Gustav, Theology in Conflicti : ygren, Barth-,
Bultaann, Translated from the' ' German by
Erich H, Wahistro®, Minburgh, 1956.
Zahrnt, Heins, Tho Cn stion of God: Protestant
iheolosy in the Twentieth Century, tr. A,A.
Jiison', iollinn, Loudon, 1%5.
IV, AN33L:: AMD HIS .JlSV,-L SETTING.
pjialecta Ansolmiana, land I (1969), Band II (1970),
Band III (1972), ed. P.S, Schmitt, Minerva,
Frankfurt am Main,
Ansela, At, .Rtseln's Proslorion with .i re-dy on ohalf
of tho Pool by jcunilo and The Aut}'ior»s Reply"""""
to Gonnllo, translated with an introduction
and philosophical commentary by i-I.J, Jl&rlesworth,
Oxford, London, 1968.
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Barnes, Jonathan, She Gntological Argument, I acaillan,
London, 1972':
Brookes, Christopher, She Twelth Century renaissance,
Retheun, London, 19$9.
Carnina Suraria, eds. A. Hi Ike and 0, Schumann,
Heidelberg, Vol.1 (1930), Vol.11 (1941). An
edited collection oi' Redieval Latin poetry,
including poetry of the Galiards.
Charlesworth, K.J., Gee: Anael:n,St., Proslo; ;ion.
Grout, Donald Jay, A History ox . estorn Rusic,
Norton, Hew York, I960.
ileer, Ariedrich, She i edieval World; Burope from
1100 to 1.R30. tr. iron the German by Planet
Soundhe icier, Cardinal, London, 1974.
ilerlihy, David, Hodieval Culture and , ociety.
Walker, Lew York, 1968.
Hick, John, and HcGill, Arthur, eds,, ihe ; any Laced
Argument. :ccc t studies on the untological
-irgunent for t.. ..xistenee of God. Oacmill'on,
Hew i'ork, 19^7. i;art"une contains {reticles
important for the interpretation of the text
of the roslogion by a.J. IIcGill, A. Beckaert,
R. Berth , A. Hayen and A. Gtolz.
Hoyt, Robert S.. burope in the Riddle Ages,
Lew !ork, 1957:
Mclntyre, John, "Premises and Conclusions in the
Systems of St. Ansela's Theology," in
Gaicilegiua Beccense, J. Vrin, Paris, 1959,
pp.95-101.
Rclntyre John, ot. Anselm and his Critics: a
Heintemretaiion of the Cur Deus Homo,
Oliver and Boyd, ' dinbur tH, 1959-.
Potter, Vincent G., "Karl Barth and the Ontological
Argument," Journal of Religion, Vol.45, 1965,
pp.309ff.
Gcholz, H. "Der anselaische Gottesbeweis", in
Hathesis Universalis, ed. H. Hermes,
P. Kanbart and J. Hitter, Gchwabe, Basel-Stuttgart,
1961.
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Southern, R.W*, ,t, .mseln and his Bio ;raoher;
/i Study of Monastic Life and whou lit,1059-c• 1130,
Cambridge, London,
solcile^iua Becconse, J. Vrin, maris, 1959.
Vossler, Karl, ..ediaeval Culture: ;m Introduction
to Dante and . is finesT Vols,, tr. 1'rora the
German by W.C,Lav/ton, Ungar, Jew York, 1966,
V. - .. * u.ilC— IoCIAL
.>..u .;uLhuK_-ij.,,.V±G ..,191 G ^
di^.hO. ■ -,11.
Bocheneki, I.$, Co... temporary .Caropean ihilonordxY
Jr. from the German by J. Jicholl and
K, mschenbrenner, California, Berlcely, 1956,
Gay, Peter, eimar Culture, seeker and .arburp;,
London, 1956.
llolborn, Hajo, A history of ; .odorn Germany 1G4-Q--19J5*
Jyre and J ottisv/oode, London, 1959,
Laqueur, .alter, ..einnr: a Cultural history 1918-35,
Weidenfeld and ..ichoison, London, 1974-•
Kiciiolls, A.J,, oinar and the .Use of hitler,
i .acnillan, London, 19t>3.
Parker, ii.A.C., Burone 1919-45, Veidenfield and
Hicholson, London", I9€>9,
Aosonber;;, ^rthur, -j. History of the German Aepublic,
frs , I«m, h . t orrow and L. .. Si vekin;, Kethuen,
Londoii, 1936.
Simon, , Germany! Grief History, Batsi"ord,
London, 196?.
Wiskenann. Glizabeth, .warone of t.io dictators,
1919-19^-5♦ Collins, London, 196?.
